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I. INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was formed in order to establish a
set of international rules and norms for conducting trade among nations. The
objective of the organization is not only to strive towards a more harmonious
and equitable playing field within the global market, but to "rais[e] standards of
living, ensur[e] full employment, and expand the production of and trade in
goods and services. . . ." Despite the organization's recognition "that there is
need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, especially
the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development,, 2 many
WTO agreements have created discord between developed and developing
nations with respect to implementing these goals.
One particular WTO agreement, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), has created a great deal of debate about
the usefulness of international intellectual property rights. Will they result in
increased trade and fairer global competition or will they simply strengthen the
West's hold on the international economy as they increase western multination-
als' profits and weed out competitors from developing nations? Although the
process for developing and ratifying TRIPS was preceded with extensive debate
among WTO members,3 there remain a number of disagreements among nations
in regard to the interpretation and enforcement of TRIPS. The main divide
exists between developed nations and developing nations due to their diverging
national interests, which stem from their different levels of economic develop-
ment.4 The developing nation members, with their limited research, develop-
ment, and manufacturing capacities, took a leap of faith when they committed
to adopting and enforcing strong, non-discriminatory minimum standards of
intellectual property rights.5 Although it will take years to confirm whether this
commitment will result in the foreign investment and domestic economic
growth they aspire to obtain, these nations are under potent domestic pressure
to produce tangible results in a short timeframe. However, these expectations
cannot be met simply by strengthening intellectual property laws, but require
numerous other changes to interrelated legal regimes.
i. Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 155, 33
I.LM., Preamble.
2. Id.
3. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN 0. SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 962-64 (4th ed. 2002) (describing the
various disputes between developing and developed nations).
4. Id.
5, Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct
Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 109 (1998).
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This Note focuses on TRIPS' impact on the pharmaceutical industry as
well as health care in developing nations. By using Egypt as a case study, this
Note aims to emphasize that the benefits of TRIPS for developing nations
depends on the linkage between intellectual property rights (IPR) and other
legal regimes, particularly drug regulation, technology transfer, and foreign
direct investment (FDI) policies. The failure to adopt a holistic approach to the
creation of effective and beneficial intellectual property rights regimes will
merely increase the western pharmaceuticals' market share and increase drug
prices in developing nations.6 By asking whether Egypt, versus foreign multi-
national companies, is likely to benefit from its new IPR law (that is for the
most part TRIPS compliant) 7 one has to analyze the entire context in which the
law exists. This in turn will expose the importance of various factors relevant
to fulfilling the expected benefits of stronger IPRs in developing nations in
general.
Consequently, Section I provides a brief description of the ongoing debate
between the developed and developing nations in regard to the costs and bene-
fits of international pharmaceutical patents. Section II outlines and describes
the controversial provisions in TRIPS and how they are addressed, adequately
or inadequately, in Egypt's new IPR law. Section m then analyzes the context
in which the new IPR law is being introduced including the structure of Egypt's
pharmaceutical industry and national health care system. Section IV addresses
other legal regimes and policies, such as research and development, technology
transfer, and competition policy, which are inextricably linked to the efficacy
of intellectual property rights. Finally, Section V offers recommendations on
how Egypt can fully benefit from its commitment to TRIPS and its new IPR
law, which can then be extrapolated to other developing nations in similar
circumstances.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING
NATIONS ON PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS
A. Developed Nations' Perspectives
The global pharmaceutical industry is a technology intensive and science-
based industry, which can be divided into three categories: chemicals (or bulk
6. See id. at 112-13 (admitting that developing countries' interests in promoting foreign direct
investment, trade, and technological expertise is linked to numerous broader programs including stronger IPR
regimes).
7. Hadia Mostafa, Standing Up For Your Rights, BUSINESs TODAY EGYPT, Aug. 2002, available
at www.businesstodayegypt.com/issues/0208n'BEB/02087BEB.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2003); see infra
subpart II of this note for ways in which it may not be TRIPS compliant.
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drugs), intermediates, and formulations (or medicine ready for consumption).,
Only a few developed countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA) in the world have the
sufficiently sophisticated pharmaceutical industry and significant research base
necessary to conduct complex research and development activities.9 The
remaining nations can either reverse engineer already discovered drugs, produce
therapeutic ingredients and finished goods, or do nothing with regard to pro-
ducing even the most basic pharmaceutical products."
These factors have created a small group of pharmaceutical multinational
enterprises (MNE) worldwide" that possess significant influence in the forma-
tion of their home nation's domestic policy, particularly in the United States. 2
Hence it is predominantly their business concerns that determine developed
nations' approaches to implementing IPRs on an international scale. As the
focus of competition is increasingly on innovation and invention, the cost of
creative activities is increasing, as is the ease of copying these activities. 3 For
example, the large up-front investments of $200 to $500 million, which amount
to approximately 18% of product sales, necessary to develop a new chemical
entity 14 can only be returned through higher profits captured during the patent
period. Patents create more certainty of potential profits at the end of the
research cycle and decrease the risk of investment."' Therefore, the most
effective way of protecting profit margins from being eroded by cheap generic
drugs is through internationally enforceable patent rights. 6  These business
8. Assad Omer, Access to Medicines: Transfer of Technology and Capacity Building, 20 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 551 (2002).
9. Id.; see THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN EGYPT, THE EGYPTIAN PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY 1 (2001), available at http://www.amcham.org (last visited Oct. 13, 2003) (stating that the United
States controls 40% of the total world sales in pharmaceuticals) [hereinafter Amcham].
10. Omer, supra note 8, at 551.
11. See KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 52-54
(Institute for International Economics 2000) (describing the international pharmaceutical industry as being
hierarchical and very competitive. There are a small number of large MNEs based in the USA, Switzerland,
Germany, United Kingdom, and Japan that conduct most of the private sector R&D. The remaining majority
of pharmaceuticals are based worldwide and predominantly produce generic drugs.).
12. Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize
Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World
Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069, 1075-78 (1996).
13. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 2.
14. Id. at 52-54; Jayashree Watal, Pharmaceutical Patents, Prices, and Welfare Losses: Policy
Options For India Under The WTO TRIPS Agreement, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 733, 739
(2000).
15. Jean 0. Lanjouw, Intellectual Property And The Availability of Pharmaceuticals in Poor
Countries 12 (CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, Working Paper No. 5, 2002).
16. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 2; see also JACKSON ET. AL., supra note 3, at 926 (citing a 1988 study
by the United States International Trade Commission that concludes that $24 billion is lost annually due to
inadequate intellectual property protection abroad).
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considerations have translated into significant pressure by developed nations
onto developing nations to strictly conform to TRIPS via domestic laws in
return for other concessions.'
7
However, much of the developed nations' discoursejustifying international
IPRs does not revolve around their MNEs' economic interests, for obvious
political reasons, but rather emphasizes the global benefits of intellectual pro-
perty rights in general.' 8 By providing private firms with a monopoly over the
sale and distribution of their patented goods for a fixed period of time, 9 IPRs
are supposed to create incentives for research and development (R&D) activi-
ties" in every nation's private sectors. Developing nations' ensuing concerns
with high pharmaceutical prices and inaccessibility to important medicines are
countered with the theory that too much access caused by weak IPRs will create
more inaccessibility in the long run, resulting in the stagnancy of new drug dis-
coveries." Ultimately, the economic incentives derived from monopoly power
of individual pharmaceuticals will benefit overall global welfare through the
discovery of new drugs and therapies that cure debilitating, if not fatal,
diseases.22
Developed nations emphasize their belief that these benefits will not be
limited to their MNEs, but will also assist local firms in developing nations to
establish their own R&D activities, which will be better suited to local needs. 23
Many scholars note that one particular disadvantage of the current laxity in IPR
17. Michelle M. Nerozzi, The Battle Over Life-Saving Pharmaceuticals: Are Developing Countries
Being 'TRIPped' By Developed Countries?, 47 VILL. L. REv. 605, 616-17 (2002); MASKUS, supra note 11,
at 4. See Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPs, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries and Doha "Solution," 3 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 47, 59 (2002) (citing concessions in textiles and agriculture as one incentive for developing nations to sign
onto TRIPS).
18. See Sykes, supra note 17, at 55-59 (providing a general discussion of the pros and cons of
intellectual property rights from an economic perspective).
19. JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 291 (Kluwer Law International 2001); MASKUS, supra note 11, at 40-41. For patents, 20 years
is the international standard protection period. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Article
33 Legal Instruments, Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31 (1994), 33 LL.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
20. See Jean 0. Lanjouw, The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: "Heartless
Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering?" (NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Working Paper 6366,
1998) (admitting that the stimulation of R&D is a possible welfare benefit, but not a guarantee), available at
www.nber.org/papers/w6366 (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
21. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 30.
22. Id. ("The main goal of an intellectual property system should be to create economic incentives
that maximize the discounted present value of the difference between the social benefits and the social costs
of information creation, including the costs of administering the system."); A survey of 12 manufacturing
industries (including the chemical industry) concluded that 30% of inventions would not have been developed
without patent protection because research and development is high and imitation is easy. Id. at 43.
23. Id. at 33-34.
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laws in developing nations is the lack of focus by pharmaceutical MNEs on
diseases prevalent in developing nation illnesses.24 For example, currently 99%
of the global disease burden is concentrated in the low and middle-income
countries, but only 4.3% of global health-related R&D expenditures address
those diseases. 2' Therefore, IPRs will support innovative behavior that adapts
existing technologies to local needs of which the cumulative effect can ignite
growth in knowledge and economic activity. 26 The local firms will also have
an equal opportunity to sell their products abroad in order to reap the higher
profits currently enjoyed by western MNEs that own the majority of existing
pharmaceutical patents.27
Additional expected benefits from this process include the dissemination
of knowledge through required patent disclosures, which can be used as inputs
for more innovation,2" the transfer of technology through foreign direct invest-
ment from wealthy to poor nations with stable IPR regimes,29 and the facilitation
of contracting between firms which will increase the production of drugs and
the efficiency of the R&D process for new drugs.3" IPR laws may also prove to
be of more assistance to local firms than international firms in protecting their
intellectual property because the former do not have the large resources
necessary to prevent infringement nor the option to withdraw from the market
as a means of protecting their profit base.'
Finally, the creation of global IPRs is supposed to provide developing
nations with more access to up-to-date technologies through technology
transfer.32 Weak IPR regimes cause developing nations to have retarded tech-
nological development limited to outdated technologies and become isolated
from new technologies with the only solution being to build their own
technological knowledge from scratch, a nearly impossible mission given their
24. Lanjouw, supra note 20, at 2-5, 7 (acknowledging that stronger IPRs in developing nations will
lead to R&D on "neglected diseases" as well as the development of products more tailored to the specific
needs of poor countries).
25. Lanjouw, supra note 20, at 8-9 (also noting that only 0.2% of global R&D is spent on
pneumonia, dierrheal diseases, and tuberculosis which are all prevalent in developing countries and account
for 18% of the total global disease burden).
26. Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries: An Economic
Perspective, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 457, 460 (2001).
27. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 40-41.
28. Id.; Lanjouw, supra note 20, at 5.
29. See Lanjouw, supra note 20, at 1, 5 (concluding that MNEs will be more willing to license
patented innovations to local manufacturing firms for production); see also MASKUS, supra note 11, at 181
(qualifying the technology transfer benefits to developing nations with strong imitative and manufacturing
capabilities, hence the least developed countries are unlikely to experience much technology transfer).
30. Lanjouw, supra note 20, at 5.
31. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 190.
32. Omer, supra note 10, at 558; see also TRIPS supra note 19, at art. 66.2.
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economic constraints.33 On the other hand, with strong IPRs, foreign MNEs
should be more willing to commit to foreign direct investment, 34 joint ventures,
and licensing agreements in developing countries.3" Developed nations empha-
size that the possibility of an increase in foreign direct investment (developing
nations' most preferred form of technology transfer) "in complex but easily
copied technologies [such as pharmaceuticals] is likely to increase as IPRs are
strengthened. 36 Through the shipment of advanced inputs to subsidiaries,
MNEs will indirectly share blueprints, product designs, and skilled producer
services with the local market. 37 Technology transfer can also occur through
trade in technologically advanced inputs that will raise importers' productivity
and reduce their production costs. 38 Without strong IPR laws, not only will FDI
hesitate to move east and south, but many foreign producers may refuse to
export their high-tech goods in order to protect their global profit margins.
Therefore, the onus is on the developing world to create a business environment
friendly to the needs of wealthy, western multinationals.
B. Developing Nations' Perspectives
Although the aforementioned arguments facially appear to be sound and
reasonable, developing countries often emphasize the disparity between what
is theoretically supposed to occur after the implementation of IPRs and what
actually materializes. 39 They complain that IPRs have a negligible impact on
R&D incentives in their economies as they simply raise prices on patented
drugs,4° transfer rents to foreign pharmaceutical patent holders, and create dead-
weight losses as the consumers willing to pay the marginal cost of medicines are
33. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 55.
34. See Maskus, supra note 5, at 111 (defining foreign direct investment as "the establishment or
acquisition of production subsidiaries abroad by multinational enterprises"); see also Nerozzi, supra note 17,
at 621 (citing a 1994 World Bank study that 86%-100% of developed country pharmaceutical companies
based their decisions on whether or not to invest in a country on the amount of patent protection offered to
them by the host country).
35. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 138.
36. Maskus, supra note 5, at 133.
37. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 137.
38. Id. at 150.
39. UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, The TRIPS Agreement and The
Built-In Agenda: Background Paper, 4 (Jan. 1, 2002) ("several developing countries wish to re-open the
TRIPS Agreement which they consider has proven to be unable to reach its main objectives and has put a
disproportionate burden on developing countries without providing them with commensurate benefits"),
available at www.unctad.org/sections/comdip/docs/en//webcdpbkgd3-en.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2003); see
also JACKSON ET. AL, supra note 3, at 926 ("[d]eveloping countries tend to have lower levels of human capital
... thus [have] perhaps less capacity in relation to their size to generate commercially valuable innovations.").
40. See Maskus, supra note 26, at 469 (citing the increase in pharmaceutical prices in India, of up
to 50%, after the implementation of patents).
2003] Aziz
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priced out of the market." Moreover, the claim that more global R&D will be
directed towards developing nations' diseases may prove to be illusive due to
the low per capita incomes of their consumers. One expert on India predicted
that if you assume there are 20 MNEs in a market as large India, each MNE
would earn $2-3 million per product, which is significantly less than the re-
quired $200 to $500 million R&D expenditures. Therefore, "R&D for pharma-
ceuticals [that are] relevant only to a few developing countries [will] less likely
take place, even with full TRIPS implementation. 42 Another scholar notes that
the losses experienced from the transfer of monopoly rents from developing
nations to developed nations greatly exceed any benefits to developing nations
of the new drugs entering the market due to patent protection.43 For example,
"to compensate for the loss of domestic surplus ... as a result of higher drug
prices for existing patented products, a threefold increase in the number of
equivalent new products reaching [developing countries] would be required."'
The issue at the forefront of this debate is the accessibility to essential
medicines.45 Before TRIPS was ratified, developing nations' ability to imitate
foreign products and technologies without paying royalty fees was their primary
means of making medicine affordable for their large, poor populations as well
as a means of limiting the costs of health care.' The lack of national health care
insurance magnifies the importance of cheap medicine since most consumers
pay for drugs directly from their low GDP per capita incomes.47 These GDP per
capita incomes48 are much lower than developed nations per capita incomes
41. Sykes, supra note 17, at 3; Lanjouw, supra note 20, at 16; Robert J. Gutowski, The Marriage
of Intellectual Property And International Trade in The TRIPS Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match
Made in Heaven?, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 713, 755 (1999).
42. WATAL, supra note 19, at 739.
43. FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 362-66 (John
Greenman ed., Harper Collins College Publishers 1996).
44. F. M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry and World Intellectual Property Standards, 53
VAND. L. REV. 2245, 2259 (2000).
45. UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, The TRIPs Agreement and the
Built-In Agenda: Background Paper, 3 (Jan. 1,2002), available at www.unctad.org/sections/comdip/docs/en//
webcdpbkgd3_en.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter UNCTAD]. See generally Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001) (stating the concerns of
developing countries with regard to the drawbacks of stronger intellectual property regimes), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min0l_e/mindecltrips.e.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2003)
[hereinafter Doha Declaration].
46. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 33-34, 53-54; see Watal, supra note 14, at 747 (describing a
simulation of the Indian pharmaceutical market concluding that prices are likely to increase and welfare is
likely to decrease after the enforcement of patent rights).
47. Lanjouw, supra note 20, at 10; see MASKUS, supra note 11, at 33-34 (noting that higher
pharmaceutical prices will raise costs to health care providers and consumers).
48. See THE WORLD BANK, 2002 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 18-20 tbl. 1.1 (listing various
gross national income per capita for developed as well as developing countries).
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when they decided to fully implement IPRs in their economies. 49 Therefore,
developing nations feel unduly coerced into prematurely implementing a legal
regime that has not been preceded with the same degree of economic develop-
ment and industrialization that existed in developed nations preceding their
enforcement of IPRs.50
In addition to specific public health concerns, developing nations have
broader macroeconomic issues such as the erosion of the terms of trade, com-
petitive abuses by foreign MNEs, and employment losses within the generic
drug-producing firms.5' As technology importers, developing nations are con-
cerned that stronger IPRs will expand the market power of foreign providers of
information and new products, giving them more leverage to increase prices on
their goods. As MNEs repatriate these higher profits abroad, the nation experi-
ences a larger trade deficit and outflow of foreign currency, causing a decrease
in the nation's terms of trade.52 However, this phenomenon is highly dependent
on the market structure, demand elasticity, and competition policies within the
economy,53 which reemphasizes the importance of linking IPR regimes with
other policies in order to avoid simplistic conclusions by either side about their
interactions.
The increased market power may also lead to competitive abuses such as
the "cartelization" of horizontal competitors through licensing agreements that
fix prices, limit output, or divide markets,54 patent pooling,55 and cross-licensing
agreements between competing licensors.56 Individual and patent-pooled licen-
sors can also hinder the entrance of new competing technologies through
exclusive grant-back provisions,57 purchase exclusive rights to competing
technologies and products as a means of increasing market power and creating
49. Lanjouw, supra note 15, at 39 tbl. 1.
50. See Maskus, supra note 26, at 460 (describing how Japan's post-war patent system promoted
Japanese technical progress by encouraging incremental and adaptive innovation in order to promote diffusion
of knowledge throughout the manufacturing sector).
51. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 33-34.
52. Id. at 159; Lanjouw, supra note 20, at 1.
53. See MASKUS, supra note 11, at 159 (defining the market structure to include the number of total
firms competing with rights holders, the type of competition, the ease of market entry and exit, quality
differentiation among products, openness to trades, and wholesale and retail distribution mechanisms).
54. Id. at 206-07.
55. Dorothy G. Raymond, Benefits and Risks of Patent Pooling For Standard Setting Organizations,
16 SUM ANTITRUST 41 (2002) ("A patent pool is an agreement by multiple owners of IPR to interchange
licenses or to grant licenses to third parties.... Patent pools can enable the spread of technology, lower
consumer prices, and foster competition, but they can also limit innovation, restrict output, and raise prices.").
56. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 206-07.
57. Patricia A. Martone & Richard M. Feustel, Jr., The Patent Misuse Defense - Does It Still have
Vitality?, 708 PLI/PAT 213, 242 (2002) (defining grant back provisions as "require[ingl the licensee to grant
back to the licensor rights that the licensee may acquire or develop").
2003] Aziz
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horizontal mergers, and initiate bad-faith litigation and opposition proceedings
as a means of harassing and discouraging competitors from entering the
market.58 Although the degree of impact from such practices depends on the
market structure and regulatory framework of a nation, they are particularly
detrimental to developing nations with weak institutions. Hence the reduction
in competition ultimately harms consumers by increasing the prices of goods,
which is particularly devastating with respect to access to basic medicines.
Finally, the link between strong IPRs and technology transfer is not as
direct as some proclaim. There are immediate opportunity costs to implement-
ing stronger IPRs. The elimination of imitative activities does stop some level
of learning, albeit a much lower level than if true FDI existed, by the locals that
is produced via reverse engineering.59 The jobs created by imitative and copy-
ing activities will also be eliminated in countries with pre-existing high un-
employment rates.6°
Although stronger IPRs may indeed encourage more participation of
foreign firms with superior technological capabilities, the manner of participa-
tion is what matters. A patent must be worked locally to induce technology
transfer.6 Foreign direct investment that results in "the successful learning of
information and the know-how to use it by one party from another party"62 is
what developing nations hope to receive in return for strengthening their IPRs.
The spillover effects of on-the-job training, expanded management expertise,
the learning of new technologies, and the training of suppliers are additional
incentives for seeking FDI.63 Therefore licensing agreements, which some
economists believe are more likely to result from stronger IPRs and subsequent
increased certainty in contracting, insufficiently transfer information, know-
how, and technology to the market.64
As the aforementioned discussion highlights, the issues relating to TRIPS
and global IPRs are complex and can be articulated in significantly different
ways depending on a nation's economic and social constraints. One must fully
understand the details of a nation's disposition in order to appreciate the burdens
it faces in meeting its international commitments while maintaining its national
58. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 206-07.
59. Id. at 136.
60. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 48, at 60-62 (listing unemployment rates for numerous
developing nations).
61. Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the WTO TRIPS
Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT'L L 365, 374 (2002).
62. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 136.
63. Id. at 152.
64. See id. at 123 (recognizing that as IPRs increase, MNEs no longer have to worry about local
imitation of their products, therefore they are more willing to license out production to local firms since it is
often cheaper then setting up a subsidiary due to non-IPR related costs).
[Vol. 10:1
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integrity and economic survival. The following sections will shift to a more
focused analysis of what one particular developing country, Egypt, is experienc-
ing with respect to TRIPS. A brief comparison of Egypt's new IPR law with
TRIPS will be followed by an assessment of the legal and social context in
which this new law was passed.
Ill. A COMPARISON OF TRIPS WITH EGYPT'S NEW INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW
A. A Brief Description of TRIPS Standards
The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights was adopted
on April 15, 1994 at the Uruguay Rounds in Marrakesh, Morocco. The agree-
ment set out to establish minimum international standards, versus complete
harmonization, for intellectual property rights with the requirement that
individual member nations enact local laws to enforce the agreed upon rights.
65
Although it incorporates previous agreements such as the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property of 1967, Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1970, and the Washington Treaty,'
TRIPS aims to improve perceived weaknesses in these agreements. 6 Under its
purview of protection are copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications,
industrial designs, patents, integrated circuits, and undisclosed information or
"trade secrets." 6 Member nations must provide the procedures, remedies, and
dispute resolution processes associated with the enforcement of intellectual
property rights. For example, each member nation must allow for civil injunc-
tive remedies to prevent infringement of rights, provide a means by which rights
holders can gain the cooperation of customs authorities to stop infringing goods
from entering the nation, and establish contact points in relevant agencies in
order to distribute information about counterfeit or pirated goods.69 All laws,
measures, and decisions affecting the enforcement of intellectual property rights
65. Nerozzi, supra note 17, at 611.
66. See TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 1(3), 2; see Gutowski, supra note 41, at 718-25 (describing
the history of the Paris and Berne Conventions and how they lead up to the adoption of TRIPS); see also
Benedicte Callan, Pirates on the High Seas: The United States and Global Intellectual Property Right,
COLUMBIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ONLINE, at www.ciaonet.org/book/callan/index.html (last visited Oct.
7, 2003).
67. Nerozzi, supra note 17, at 611; see Gutowski, supra note 41, at 724 (listing "lack of
harmonization, disparate national treatment, and deficient enforcement and dispute resolutions" as
shortcomings in the Paris and Berne Conventions).
68. See generally TRIPS, supra note 19, at Part IH §§ 1-8 ("Standards Concerning the Availability,
Scope, and Use of Intellectual Property Rights").
69. Callan, supra note 66.
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must be published and available to the public. Because TRIPS aims for mini-
mum standardization rather than complete harmonization, the national IPR legal
and regulatory regimes of individual member nations can vary to accommodate
local constraints as long as the general provisions of TRIPS are adhered to.70
However, it is this inherent flexibility that has caused the ongoing debates, as
discussed in the previous section, 7' among nations with respect to textual
interpretation.
Under TRIPS, patents can be obtained for any invention, whether it is a
product or a process, that is new, involves an inventive step, is non-obvious, and
is useful or capable of industrial application.72 The rights of the patent holder,
which must last at least 20 years from the date of filing of the patent application,
include the right to prevent unauthorized persons from making, using, selling,
or importing any product covered by the patent. If the patent is for a process,
then the patent holder can stop unauthorized use, sale, or importation of pro-
73ducts directly obtained through that process. However, products or processes
that endanger the public order or morality; diagnostic, therapeutic drugs, or sur-
gical methods; plants and animals; and biological processes are not necessarily
eligible for patent protection.7"
Furthermore, the agreement does take into consideration the problems of
developing nations as exemplified in the extended transition periods granted for
implementation of TRIPS provisions, 75 exclusion of certain items from patent-
ability,76 compulsory licensing under certain conditions, 77 parallel importing,78
and technical and financial cooperation in favor of developing member
nations.79 These provisions have caused the most heated debates among
member nations, and thus will be discussed in detail in the following section.
70. NATHAN ASSOCIATES INC., EGYPT: OBLIGATIONS AND COMMITMENTS UNDER THE GATT/WTO
AGREEMENTS 50-51 (Aug. 1999) (document on file with author).
71. See supra subparts I(A-B) for a detailed discussion on controversies between developed and
developing nations.
72. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 28.
73. NATHAN ASSOCIATES INC., supra note 70, at 50.
74. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 27; Callan, supra note 66.
75. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 66 (allowing least developed countries to enjoy a transitional
period of 10 years from the date of application).
76. See UNCTAD, supra note 45, at 2 ("plants and animals may be excluded from patentability,
however, micro organisms cannot"). Consequently, developing countries want to clarify the definition of
microorganism in order to ensure greater legal certainty, avoid biopiracy, and assure fair access to genetic
resources. Id.
77. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 31.
78. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 6 (excluding the issue of parallel imports from the dispute
settlement system).
79. Nerozzi, supra note 17, at 612.
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B. An Overview of Egypt's Intellectual Property Law 82 of 2002
Law No. 82 of 2002 Promulgating Intellectual Property Law was passed
on June 2, 2002 after a seven-year drafting process and two years of formal
debate. 80 The new law constituted a comprehensive and historic improvement
in the legal rights of inventors, artists, and entrepreneurs.8 The section on
patents replaced the outdated Law 132 of 1949,82 which only protected the
manufacturing process rather than the finished pharmaceutical or agricultural
chemical product.83 Additional shortcomings of Law 132 include an overly
broad compulsory licensing provision, a forfeiture requirement if the patent is
not worked two years after the issuance of the first compulsory license, a
fifteen-year term of protection, and a definition of infringement that did not
include the use, sale, or importation of products made using the processes
patented in Egypt.' Although the new law resolves some of these issues, there
remains pressure from abroad to change some provisions, particularly
compulsory licensing, parallel imports, and enforcement provisions, which will
be discussed in more detail below.
Each ministry is currently developing its own executive regulations85 to
implement and enforce the provisions of the law.86 Because these executive
80. Egypt Considers New Patent Law, 8 No. 11 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 19 (1996); Emad Mekay,
Egypt: Poverty, Police, and the Ballad of Intellectual Property, INTER PRESS SERVICE, 2002 WL 4912920,
Feb. 19, 2002; see ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, No Protection, No Investment, BUSINESS MIDDLE EAST,
Aug. 1, 1998, at 2, http://stote.eiu.com.cart.asp?action=browse&layout=car-article_list&product-id=
23574802 (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) (stating that United States' experts have been working with the Egyptian
government since 1993 in drafting a new patent law).
81. Law 82 of 2002 is divided into four books that are individually assigned to a specific ministry's
profile for enforcement purposes. Book one addresses patents, utility models, semiconductor topography, and
undisclosed information and falls under the Ministry of State for Scientific Research and the Ministry of
Health. Book two deals with trademarks, appellations of origin, and industrial designs, which fall under
Ministry of Internal Trade and Supply. Book three covers copyrights and neighboring rights and is under the
purview of the Ministry of Culture and Communications as well as the Ministry of Information Technology.
Finally, book four focuses on plant varieties and is applied by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land
Reclamation. UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE EGYPT'S IPR LAw, PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL
ISSUE, No. 22 BIS- Dated 2nd of June 2002 (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Law No. 82 of 2002].
82. Egyptian Patent Law No. 82 of 1949, http://www.reldekki.com/lib02.html (last visited Oct. 7,
2003).
83. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Still Under Scrutiny, BUSINESS MIDDLE EAST, June 1, 2000,
at 3.
84. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, No Protection, No Investment, BUSINESS MIDDLE EAST, Aug.
1, 1998, at 2.
85. An executive regulation in the Egyptian legal context is equivalent to an administrative
regulation formulated by an administrative agency.
86. Niveen Wahish, IPR: The Mother of Invention?, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE, June 21-27,
2001, at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
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regulations were still being negotiated at the time of the writing of this Note,87
the issues discussed here are based on the various ways that the text of the law
may be interpreted and the consequences of such interpretations. It is worth
mentioning that Egypt has decided to take advantage of the ten-year transition
period offered to developing countries under TRIPS, which postpones full
implementation of a TRIPS compliant law until January 1, 2005 but requires
compliance with the mailbox, exclusive marketing rights, and undisclosed
information provisions as of January 2000.88
1. Compulsory Licensing
TRIPS Article 31 allows member countries to grant compulsory licenses
in limited circumstances. A compulsory license is an annulment of patent rights
by a judicial or governmental authority, causing a temporary deprivation of a
patentee's monopoly over the original subject matter. Therefore, recipients of
compulsory licenses may make, use, and sell the otherwise patented subject
matter before the expiration period of the compulsory license.89 Because the
language of Article 31 does not specify or place clear restrictions on the
purposes for granting compulsory licenses 9° and a compulsory license may
reduce the market price of a medicine by 75 percent,9' the issue has become
very controversial.92 In general, developed nations, including the United States,
want to limit this remedy to violations of competition laws or national
emergencies whereas developing nations want to include public health and
economic crisis as legitimate justifications for granting compulsory licenses.93
Developed nations also prefer to apply closely textual interpretations to Article
87. Mostafa, supra note 7.
88. The decision to take advantage of the additional five-year grace period was hotly debated in the
Egyptian Parliament beginning in 1999. Nermien At-Ali, The Egyptian Pharmaceutical Industry After TRIPS
-A Practitioner's View, 26 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 274, 295-96 (2003); Emily Downes, New Industries Demand
Improved Protection, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Issue 97, at 39 (Mar. 2000).
89. Nerozzi, supra note 17, at 612.
90. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 31 ("in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances
of extreme urgency"); Champ & Attaran, supra note 61, at 366.
91. Naomi B. Bass, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement For Developing Countries:
Pharmaceutical Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
191, 200 (2002).
92. Id. at 198-201.
93. See Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Under The TRIPS Agreement: Balancing Pills and
Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 941, 950-54 (2000) (describing South Africa's experience with the AIDS
crisis and its subsequent issuance of compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS drug therapies); see also David P.
Fidler, Neither Science Nor Shamans: Globalization of Markets and Health in The Developing World, 7 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191, 209-11 (1999) (describing the ensuing political conflict after South Africa and
Thailand permitted compulsory licensing for patented HIV/AIDS drugs).
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31 (b) regarding.the working of a patent with respect to compulsory licensing.94
They support the view that as long as the patent is worked in any one of the
WTO member nations there is no grounds for invoking Article 31 (b) as a basis
for compulsory licensing, placing this approach in direct opposition to
developing nations' local production requirements.95
Article 23 of Egypt's Law 82 of 2002 exercises a broad interpretation of
TRIPS Article 31. The basis for granting compulsory licenses without the need
for prior negotiation with the patentee include non-commercial public uses
necessary to preserve "national security, health, food, and environmental safety"
and "confronting cases of emergencies and extreme urgent circumstances,"
which is more or less TRIPS compliant. However, the provision permitting
compulsory licensing "to support the national effort in a significant sector for
economic, social and technological development, without unreasonable pre-
judice to the patentee rights"96 expands TRIPS' "national emergency and other
circumstances of extreme urgency"97 to include economic, social (i.e. public
health), and technological issues. Such language may be setting the stage for
broad public health exceptions to patent-holders' rights similar to those invoked
by Brazil or South Africa with respect to AIDS/HIV medicines. 98
Egypt's working standards for a patent are narrowly construed. "If the
patentee did not exploit the patent in Egypt directly or under his/her authoriza-
tion the exploitation was not sufficient following four years from the date of
filing the patent application or three years from the grant date whichever is
longer[,]" 99 then a compulsory license will be issued. If the patentee ceases to
exploit the patent without an acceptable reason for over a year, a compulsory
license will be issued. Egypt's law defines exploitation as "the manufacturing
of the product subject matter of production in Egypt, or using the manufacturing
process subject matter of the protected patent invention"" and excludes
94. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 31(b) ("if... the proposed user has made efforts to obtain
authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have
not been successful within a reasonable period of time").
95. WATAL, supra note 19, at 316-17 (citing art. 68(I) of Brazilian Patent Law, art. 43 of Argentine
Law). Note also that New Zealand issues compulsory licenses if there is a failure to supply the market on
reasonable terms and Germany issues them if there is no other substitute for the treatment of a disease. Id.
96. Law No. 82 of 2002, supra note 81, at art. 23, sec. 1(3).
97. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 31.
98. See generally Bass, supra note 91, at 206-23 (describing in detail the controversy over
compulsory licensing for HIV/AIDS in Brazil and South Africa); see also Jose Marcos Nogueira Viana,
Intellectual Property Rights, The World Trade Organization And Public Health: The Brazilian Perspective,
17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 311 (2002) (justifying Brazil's use of compulsory licensing toward HIV/AIDS drugs for
security and public health interests).
99. Law No. 82 of 2002, supra note 81, at art. 23, sec. IV.
100. Id. at art. 23, sec. IV.
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importation."' This language is likely to invite protest from MNEs who do not
want to perform foreign direct investment in a nation, but do want to preserve
their patents and import their goods.
A final justification for issuing compulsory licensing under Law 82 is "the
lack of supply of patented drugs to satisfy the country's needs, or because the
decline in its quality, or irregular incline of its price, or in the event that the
invention drug is related to critical cases or chronic or endemic or epidemic
diseases .... ."'02 Although the patent holder has the right to immediate notifica-
tion in this instance,"0 3 the government will possess a significant degree of
leeway that will impede her freedom to make market-based decisions in pricing
or sales. Egypt may have decided to use the aforementioned language in order
to avoid falling victim to global reference pricing. Many governments in
developed nations, including the United States, base their price controls on
pharmaceuticals on a global reference price that averages in the price of a drug
in the various countries it is sold. Therefore, if a price in a particular country
(or countries) is so low that it will decrease the global reference price, then the
pharmaceutical company may either raise the price to the levels found in
developed countries or withdraw from the market altogether in order to preserve
its primary profit base in developed countries. " Either option may prove to be
catastrophic to the developing nation's public health.
2. Compensation for Compulsory Licensing
An intimately related issue to compulsory licenses is the determination of
compensation owed to the patent holder in return for monetary losses incurred.
TRIPS Article 31(h) states that, "the right holder shall be paid adequate
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the econo-
mic value of the authorization" (emphasis added). Egypt's law states, "[t]he
patentee is entitled to a fair compensation against the exploitation of the inven-
tion. The economic value of the invention must be considered while determin-
ing said compensation" (emphasis added). 5 The difference in text has sparked
the debate of how to determine the compensation.
Pharmaceutical companies from developed countries want to be placed in
the same position monetarily as they would have been had the compulsory
license not been issued. This translates into the full market value of the license,
101. THE WORLDTRADEORGANIZATION, COUNCIL FORTRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OFINTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, Review of Legislation, Nov. 14, 2001, EP/C/278/Add.2 (responding to a question posed
by Switzerland to the Permanent Mission of Egypt).
102. Law No. 82 of 2002, supra note 81, at art. 23, sec. H.
103. Id.
104. Lanjouw, supra note 20, at Ii.
105. Law 82 of 2002, supra note 8 1, at art. 24(8).
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incorporating the costs of development and lost profits." 6 Factors they believe
should be considered include: the risks and costs associated with the invention
claimed in the patent and the commercial development of products that use the
invention, the efficacy and innovative nature and importance to the public health
of the invention or products using the invention, the degree to which the inven-
tion benefited from publicly funded research, the need for adequate incentives
for the creation and commercialization of new inventions, the interests of the
public as patients and payers of health care services, and the public health
benefits of expanded access to the invention. °7
The Egyptian government, on the other hand, may decide to limit the
remuneration to the profits earned from the temporary use by the compulsory
license recipient."' Or it may refuse any compensation to a pharmaceutical
company with no plans to invest in the domestic market, claming it has suffered
no loss and hence is not entitled to compensation. "9 These diverging interpreta-
tions have unsurprisingly initiated significant controversy within the ongoing
executive regulation negotiation process.
3. Parallel Imports (Gray Markets)
TRIPS Article 6 purposely punts the issue of exhaustion by stating,
"nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion
of intellectual property rights."' o Exhaustion limits the rights of a patent holder
in controlling the importing, exporting, and distribution of the patented item."'
A national exhaustion scheme gives the patent holder control over importing,
exporting, and distribution of the patented item so long as the patent holder has
not released the patented item into the market. But as soon as the patent holder
releases the item into that nation's market, then it is considered fully exhausted
and the patent holder no longer has that type of control, allowing anyone to
import or export the item." 2 On the other hand, if a country chooses interna-
tional exhaustion the patent holder loses control of distribution once he or she
puts the item into the market anywhere in the world." 3
106. Susan v. Vaughan, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical TRIPS: What Standard of
Compensation?, 25 HASTINGS INT'L&COMP. L REV. 87, 105 (2001).
107. H.R. 1708 Sec 2(a)(d), 107th Congress (2003), available at www.thomas.loc.gov (last visited
Oct. 11, 2003).
108. Vaughan, supra note 106, at 105.
109. Id. at 108-09.
110. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 6.
111. Shubha Ghosh, Pills, Patents, and Power: State Creation of Gray Markets As a Limit On Patent
Rights, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 217, 251 (2002) (also known in US law as the first sale doctrine).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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In Egypt's case, Article 10 states that the patentee's right in excluding
others from importing, exporting, using, selling, or distributing the product
"shall be exhausted if the patentee marketed or licensed said product to third
party/others." It does not specify the applicable jurisdiction for marketing and
licensing activities, nationally or internationally. However, the Permanent
Mission of Egypt in the WTO replied to a question pertaining to exhaustion
posed by the United States with, "[t]he patent rights are 'exhausted' if the patent
owner has marketed the invention (i.e. actually put the protected product on the
market for circulation in the normal channels of commerce) anywhere in the
world"' 4 (emphasis added). Therefore, once a party legally obtains the patented
item from the patentee, anywhere in the world, it may argue that it is free to
export or import it to whomever it chooses. From the patentee's perspective this
is problematic because she may sell it to an authorized purchaser who then sells
it to a third party who then engages in parallel exporting to another country with
similar or weaker laws.
This process of re-exporting to another country creates gray markets. Gray
markets are the unauthorized distribution of a good or service. They are created
when a business imports a good for a low price (due to its nation's lower GDP
per capita) from the patent holder and subsequently exports it to another country
to be sold for a price higher than the business purchased it for but lower than the
price offered by the patent holder. Consequently, the gray market goods com-
pete with the patent holder's goods and compromise her profit margins in the
higher priced market. 5 This specific situation is unlikely to occur in the United
States because US patent law protects patent holders from parallel imports,
allowing them to sue the US importer." 6 However, if the exchange takes place
between Egypt, applying an international exhaustion approach, and another
country with weak IPR laws, then the US company would have no power to
prevent this exchange." 7
As a consequence, the pharmaceutical may raise the price of the drug in
Egypt, in order to thwart any profitability from parallel trading. Hence,
Egyptian consumers will bear the burden for the lower prices obtained in the
importing nation. The patent holder will no longer engage in price discrimina-
tion among poor and rich nations, which will price out poor consumers." 8
114. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, COUNCIL FOR TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OFINTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, Review of Legislation, Nov. 14, 2001, IP/C/278/Add.2 (referring specifically to an
interpretation of art. II of Law No. 82 of 2002).
115. Ghosh, supra note 111, at 218; WATAL, supra note 19, at 297. For example, an Egyptian
company legally imports or locally purchases a drug from a United States company for $6 in order to export
it back to the United States for $10 when that same drug is sold by the United States company at $15.
116. Lanjouw, supra note 15, at 20.
117. Ghosh, supra note 111, at 253.
118. Sykes, supra note 17, at 63-64.
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Egypt may then react to the price increase by issuing a compulsory license
based on Law 82 of 2002 Article 23 Section Two's "irregular incline in its
price" justification. And if the patent holder responds by refusing to sell or pro-
duce the drug in Egypt, then Article 23 Section Four's provision for failing to
exploit the patent domestically may also initiate a compulsory license. The
patent holder is thus placed in a quandary when it comes to protecting her
profits with respect to gray markets.119
4. Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights
TRIPS addresses wealthy nations' specific concerns with IPR enforcement
deficiencies in developing nations' domestic laws. For example, TRIPS com-
pliant laws should address the inability to obtain evidence to prove infringe-
ment, indeterminable delays in bringing a case to trial and getting a final judg-
ment, the inability to get preliminary injunctions, inadequate damage awards
and criminal sanctions, and the lack of enforcement at the borders to prevent
importation of infringing goods. E° Consequently, TRIPS Article 41 requires
that enforcement include "expeditious remedies to prevent infringement and
remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringement [and] ... proce-
dures.., shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreason-
able time limits or unwarranted delay." Articles 42, 43, 44, and 45 address fair
and equitable procedures, evidence, injunctions, and damages respectively.
With respect to damages, Article 181 of Law 82 of 2002 may fail to meet
the TRIPS requirements. Article 32 of Law 82 of 2002 imposes a fine of 20,000
to 100,000 Egyptian pounds (approximately $3700 to $18,000)121 for first time
offenders. Recidivism is penalized with imprisonment of no less than three
months and a fine of 40,000 to 200,000 Egyptian pounds.12 2 Western commen-
tators believe this is an insufficient deterrence considering the high profits
gained from patent drug infringement.
However, the new law does include new provisions that provide for tem-
porary injunctions against the violator until the case goes to court. 23 Equitable
procedures are also available to patentees since they may ask the judge to "order
conservative procedures concerning the products and goods subject matter of
119. It is worth mentioning that gray markets create quality control issues. The US company may
be legally selling a lower quality version of the drug to Egypt in order to compensate for the lower prices. But
if this product is then re-exported to a higher priced market that is receiving a higher quality version of that
good, then consumer deception and potential litigation may ensue. Ghosh, supra note 11l, at 220; WATAL,
supra note 19, at 297.
120. WATAL, supra note 19, at 333.
121. See THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Report on Business: Money and Markets Foreign Exchange, Feb.
24, 2003, at BlO (citing the currency exchange rate on February 23, 2003 of 5.5 Egyptian pounds per US$1).
122. Law No. 82 of 2002, supra note 81, at art. 32.
123. Id.; Mostafa, supra note 7.
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the claim [in order to] . . . preserve the condition of such goods and pro-
ducts ... ,,24 and to "order appropriate conservative procedures to fulfill ren-
dered fines or compensation in addition to ordering the destruction of confis-
cated subject matter. .,,12 Finally, non-disclosure agreements are now subject
to Egyptian law and enforceable in Egyptian courts, which saves foreign com-
panies the time and resources of going abroad to enforce their rights.
126
Despite the legal improvements in the law, there remain institutional and
financial obstacles to efficient enforcement. For example, the Patent Office is
not automated, there is a shortage of trained patent examiners (those available
are poorly trained), and there are not enough judges to handle all of the cases
and appeals. 27 Overcoming these limitations is an expensive feat. In 1996, an
Egyptian spokesman to the United Nations estimated a cost of $98,000 to
increase patent personnel and purchase necessary equipment, $192,000 to pre-
pare the judiciary for patent enforcement, and $1,000,000 to train and develop
customs authorities.128 For a developing country with a pre-existing budgetary
crisis, 129 these expenses serve as formidable impediments to effective enforce-
ment of the new IPR law.
The Patent Office also lacks the necessary communication link with the
Ministry of Health to ensure that health regulatory authorities do not provide
marketing authorization for unauthorized copies of products subject to patent
protection. 3' Foreign pharmaceuticals are particularly concerned with the
Ministry of Health's interference with the patenting process.' 3' Under the old
law, the Ministry of Health participated in patent application processing in
collaboration with the Patent Office. 32 The new law's text grants the Patent
Office sole jurisdiction over patent applications,"' with some exceptions. If the
invention "possess[es] health value"' 34 then the Ministry of Health may oppose
124. Law No. 82 of 2002, supra note 81, at art. 33.
125. Id. at art. 35.
126. Id. at arts. 42, 63; Mostafa, supra note 7.
127. Downes, supra note 88, at 4; see also INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE,
2003 SPECIAL 301 REPORT EGYPT 94 (2003) (citing the lack of transparency, the snail's pace adjudication
process, and the lack of training as major obstacles to intellectual property rights enforcement), at
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2003/2003SPEC30lEGYPT.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
128. Al-Ali, supra note 88, at 283.
129. In The Shadow ofIraq, MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST, Aug. 9, 2002, available at 2002 WL
7406212 (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
130. PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, PhRMA Special 301 Submission
Priority Watch List Countries: Middle East, Africa, South Asia 64, www.phrna.org/intemational/resources/
2002-02-22.45.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2003) [hereinafter PhRMA].
131. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Failing Grades, BUSINESS MIDDLE EAST, Jan. 1, 2001, at 1.
132. Wahish, supra note 86.
133. Law No. 82 of 2002, supra note 81, at art. 16.
134. Id. at art. 17.
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the granting of a patent. This will inevitably involve the Ministry in reviewing
patents albeit for a limited purpose. The Ministry of Health also decides on a
case-by-case basis if the patent should be subject to a compulsory license.135
But most importantly, the Ministry of Health controls the drug registration
process and price-control system (discussed in detail in Subsection II (C)),
which impacts a drug manufacturer's profits as much as her patent rights. This
important separation of authority necessary to avoid inconsistent treatment
among patent holders is likely being addressed in the executive regulations
currently under negotiation.
IV. THE EGYPTIAN CONTEXT IN WHICH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS EXIST
A. The Political Debate on Intellectual Property Rights
Unsurprisingly, passage of the new IPR law in Egypt did not occur in the
absence of public controversy and opposition. The Egyptian government faced
significant political pressure from public sector generic pharmaceutical manu-
facturers. They launched a major lobbying campaign against the new law in
order protect their generic drug production.'36 This powerful opposition group
obtained public support by claiming that intellectual property rights would raise
the price of medicine, cause unemployment, and force the local factories to shut
down. 137 Pharmacists also believed that new therapies would take years to
become available to most Egyptians due to the increase in prices.'38 Such
allegations are particularly sensitive in a country where 23% to 35% of house-
holds live below the official poverty line. 39 Even a former Minister of Health
was staunchly against patent protection, claiming it was an unnecessary evil and
would result in foreign dominance of a key national sector and higher prices for
the poor. 4 '
Despite such strong opposition, the law managed to pass due to a variety
of factors. First, the number of patent applications by local parties doubled
from 1995 to 2000 due to improvements in the economy. This surge in applica-
tions indicated an increase in innovation of intellectual property as well as a
135. Id. at art. 23.
136. Susan Postlewaite, Egypt Changes the Way It Does Drugs, IP WORLDWIDE, Aug. 2002, at 16.
137. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, No Protection, No Investment, BUSINESS MIDDLE EAST, Aug.
1, 1998, at 2.
138. Hadia Mostafa, A Tough Pill to Swallow, BUSINESS TODAY EGYPT, Aug. 2002, available at
http://www.businesstodayegypt.comlissuesl0208/4D57/02084D57.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) (discuss
predictions of price increases).
139. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 137.
140. Id.; Downes, supra note 88; Mostafa, supra note 7.
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subsequent desire for protection. 4' Second, foreign investors, in particular the
members of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA), informed Egypt that its weak IPR regime deterred them from invest-
ing $300 million in Egypt's pharmaceutical sector. 4 A number of reform-
minded legislators in the Parliament took such missed opportunities seriously
and managed to get the law through. 4 3 Third, a new Minister of Health, who
is a respected academic, was recently appointed. His appreciation for the need
to attract foreign investment by strengthening pharmaceutical patent protection
played a key role in convincing the public of the benefits of the new law.'
Finally, Egypt feared that Jordan's recent passage of a new IPR law would
divert potential investment and deny Egypt the opportunity of becoming a
regional pharmaceutical manufacturing center. 45
In order to fully appreciate the impact of this new law on Egypt's econo-
mic growth prospects, as well as the reason why the new law is so controversial,
one must understand the highly concentrated market structure of Egypt's
pharmaceutical industry and its deficient health care system.
B. The Local Pharmaceutical Industry and Health Care Insurance
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the oldest strategic industries in
Egypt and the largest producer of pharmaceuticals in the Middle East and North
Africa region. Established in 1939, the sector underwent significant growth in
the 1980s as new pharmaceutical factories began locally manufacturing pharma-
ceutical products for local consumption as well as export to the Arab and
African markets.'46 The sector is composed of eight public production com-
panies, three public support services companies (importing, distributing, and
packaging), and twenty-two private production companies. It is highly concen-
trated with the top nine (foreign) companies controlling 45% of the market and
the top five of those controlling 32% of the market.1 47 Egypt exports 6% of its
production of which 74.9% is exported to the Middle East and North Africa
region.148
141. Downes, supra note 88.
142. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Egypt: Patent Pending, BUSINESS MIDDLE EAST, Jan. 16,
2001, at 1. Note that with stronger IPR laws, PhRMA members would also reclaim their annual losses of $100
million from patent infringements in Egypt and increase their market share from 18% to 25%. ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 131, at 2.
143. Mostafa, supra note 7.
144. Mostafa, supra note 138.
145. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 142.
146. AmCham, supra note 9, at 3.
147. Id. at 24-27.
148. Id. at 15.
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Public sector companies control 17.6% of local production and export 63%
of the nation's total pharmaceutical exports.149 Public sector firms have been
losing market share to the private sector, primarily foreign firms, due to ineffi-
cient distribution channels, high operating costs, heavy governmental control
and restrictions on expenditures, highly restricted R&D expenditures of 1%-2%,
weak marketing and sales efforts, overstaffing, and sale of drugs below cost for
socio-economic reasons.' The consequent loss of revenues has placed more
pressure on them to export. Moreover, since at least 200 drugs are currently
produced by Egyptian drug companies (private and public) without the payment
of royalties to the multinational pharmaceutical companies that discovered the
drugs through their own research and development,'' public sector firms have
reason to fear further erosion of market share upon implementation of the new
IPR law.
Although the public firms' concern with elimination from the market is
legitimate, it may be misdirected. The real threat to their success may not be as
simple as the presence of stronger IPRs, but their sub-standard managerial,
packaging, advertising, and quality control standards. To some extent, they will
lose their sources of revenue from on-patent generic drugs. But fully relying on
patent infringements for revenue is not sustainable in the long run. As the costs
of operations increase, due to their inefficient business structure, any potential
profits gained from producing a lower-cost, generic drug will be undermined.
If the government absorbs the losses in order to keep the prices of drugs low, the
public will ultimately suffer in other ways as the country's overall budget deficit
increases. Hence, a false sense of security regarding the affordability of medi-
cine is created among the population. Yes, the price of drugs is currently
affordable but perhaps at the expense of a higher quality health care system or
an adequate physical infrastructure.
But price does matter. Only 59% of Egyptians are covered by health
insurance of which 4% are covered by private health insurance and 55% by sub-
standard public health insurance.'52 The public health insurance scheme entitles
the recipient to a doctor and a hospital bed, but the quality of the services is so
low that most resort to private services paid at their own expense. 153 That brings
the number of people that pay for medicines straight from their pockets to 98%,
which resulted in a low per capita consumption of LE57.81 (approximately
149. Id. at 5.
150. Id.
151. Mohamed RaoufHamed, To Make the Medicine Go Down, AL-AHRAm WEEKLY ON-LINE, May
24-30, 2001; Ahmed Fekry, Drug Manufacturers Warn of Bankruptcies, MIDDLE EAST TIMES, Feb. 24,2002,
http://www.metimes.com/2k3Assue2003-39/methaus.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
152. Id. at 21.
153. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Life at the Bottom, MIDDLE EAST BUSINESS, Vol. 350, Issue
8111, at 10.
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$16.76) in 1998.154 These low consumption levels exist notwithstanding that the
price of drugs are as low as $1-$2 per package, which are among the lowest
prices in the world.155 Given Egypt's low GDP per capita of $1,490 156 and that
49.6% of the 70 million Egyptians live below the upper poverty line,'5 7 any
increase in price may decrease consumption levels to unacceptable lows
particularly with respect to diabetes, renal and heart diseases, and cancer. Add
to that the recent elimination of food subsidies and the increasing cost of
living. 5 8 These factors combined impose a heavy burden on consumers as they
struggle to meet their most basic needs. Due to the country's inadequate
political transparency and notorious record of government corruption, con-
sumers may nonetheless choose to have the lower priced drugs because they do
not believe that the savings gained from addressing the macroeconomic ineffi-
ciencies will be passed onto them in other forms.
Nevertheless, the Egyptian government decided in 1995 that privatization
and reform of public sector pharmaceutical companies was an integral part of
reforming the overall economy. 15  Therefore, even in the absence of IPRs,
public sector pharmaceutical companies will have to reform their internal
management systems, obtain the marketing and sales skills to prepare them to
compete in the global market, and invest more money into R&D." ° They will
have to improve their quality assurance tests to meet international quality
standards if they want to continue exporting their products abroad.' 6'
If these weaknesses are properly addressed, then the addition of strong
IPRs may indeed prove beneficial to local firms. For example, public sector
companies import most of their active ingredients, machinery, spare parts, and
equipment. The cost of these inputs will decrease in the presence of strong
IPRs. Foreign pharmaceutical patent holders will no longer be forced to
increase the price of inputs as a means of recouping lost profits from finished
drugs. 162 The public sector also focuses on export markets, which is unlikely to
exist in MNEs with strict orders from headquarters to limit service to the
domestic market. 163 If public pharmaceuticals do invest in R&D and patent new
products, these exports may become a significant source of profits and a vital
154. Amcham, supra note 9, at 24 (comparing this to $34.10 in Kuwait and $35.40 in Qatar the same
year).
155. Postlewaite, supra note 136.
156. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 48, at 18 tbl. 1.1.
157. Al-Ali, supra note 88, at 307.
158. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 153.
159. Amcham, supra note 9, at 8.
160. Id. at 23.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 6.
163. Id. at 8.
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source of foreign currency for Egypt - assuming the profits are reinvested into
the Egyptian economy.
Ten of the twenty-two private sector pharmaceutical producers are
domestic firms. These firms control 8.9% of total private sector sales. They too
import a large percentage of their primary elements, 80%-85%, in order to pro-
duce end-use products for final consumption.' 64 They export these drugs free
of margin ceiling limitations that are imposed on locally sold products.
165
Because most of their production is over the counter and generic drug (of on-
patent drugs), the new law will appreciably impact their operations. They will
be forced to innovate their own formulas and patent them, sign licensing
agreements with foreign pharmaceuticals to produce their patented drugs
domestically, or simply go out of business.
If the first scenario is too occur, these firms will need the research and
development training and financing necessary to engage in drug innovation.
How and whether this will occur will likely depend on the government's will-
ingness to directly fund their R&D endeavors, form public-private R&D
partnerships, and reform the price control system. 166 If the predominant effect
is the proliferation of licensing agreements, then actual technology transfer will
need to take place in order to produce the desired increase in productive
capacity within the local pharmaceutical industry. 167 And if the least desired
result of bankruptcy occurs, then the Egyptian government will most certainly
face a major political crisis.
C. Regulatory Obstacles to Efficiency
With respect to drug regulation, TRIPS' guidelines are limited to the prin-
ciples of non-discrimination and most favored nation treatment. 168 Each indivi-
dual nation, "in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, [is free to]
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development... ,,169 Therefore, price controls, drug registration
and approval, and import-export regulations are left to the discretion of the
individual WTO members, "provided that such measures are consistent with the
provisions [of TRIPS]."' 70
164. Amcham, supra note 9, at 6-8.
165. Id. at 6.
166. Aziza Saimi, A Bleak Prognosis, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE, May 31-June 6, 2001, at
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/536/ecl.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2003); see infra subpart HIl(C) for detailed
discussion of Egypt's price controls.
167. See generally infra subpart IV(B) (providing a detailed discussion of technology transfer).
168. TRIPS, supra note 19, at arts. 3, 4.
169. Id. at art. 8.
170. Id.
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The Egyptian pharmaceutical industry exists within a complicated regula-
tory environment. The government exercises strict control over the types of
drugs that can be imported into the country, which often results in the banning
of some finished drugs. 7 ' Importers must obtain an import license to bring in
a specified quantity of a drug at a specified price. Imported raw materials are
subject to a 5% customs duty and a 1% sales tax unless they are to be used for
the production of an essential drug thereby subjecting them to a 1% customs tax
and no sales tax.'72
New finished drugs must be registered. Under the old law, registration
took up to three years after submitting all the relevant research documentation
to the Ministry of Health.'73 However, foreign firms were more susceptible to
persevering through this process because local firns simply submitted a docu-
ment showing a slight variation in the manufacturing process of an existing
drug, gave the drug a new name, and received approval much quicker.'74
Whether this phenomena is a form of discriminatory treatment between foreign
and domestic firms is debatable since there is a substantive difference between
registering an entirely new drug and registering a slight variation of an existing
registered drug. Nonetheless, this issue should be resolvable under the new IPR
law's non-discrimination provision.' The more pressing issue lies in the
registration process itself. If Egypt is serious about attracting foreign direct
investment and assisting its own private sector's profitability, the registration
process must be reformed to decrease the amount of time taken to bring a new
finished product to the market, whether by a foreign or local party.
Egypt also sets price controls on pharmaceuticals, which is a legitimate
practice under TRIPS.'76 The Pharmaceutical Pricing Committee at the Drug
Planning and Policy Center sets prices with the aim to keep medicine affordable
to the majority of the population. Because the process revolves more around
social concems, the pharmaceutical's profitability objectives are overlooked.
The prices do not adequately reflect the fair market value with respect to R&D
costs, promotion spending, inflation, currency devaluation, 177 and the changes
in costs of raw materials. In 1996, the Govemment of Egypt (GOE) made some
reforms to the price-setting system by adopting a cost-plus formula that allowed
171. PhRMA, supra note 130, at 64; ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 84.
172. AmCham, supra note 9, at 10.
173. Postlewaite, supra note 136.
174. Id.
175. See Law No. 82 of 2002, supra note 81, at art. 4 ("Every natural or legal person whether or
Egyptian or foreign nationals... are entitled to the rights of applying for patent at the Egyptian Patent Office
and enjoy all rights granted by this law.").
176. Lanjouw, supra note 15, at 22.
177. See PhRMA, supra note 130, at 65 (citing major reductions in profitability in the sector due to
the recent 60% devaluation of the Egyptian pound).
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for a fixed profit margin above the cost of ingredients, but it continued to
exclude the other variables that contribute to production costs.
7 8
The adverse effect of this price-setting scheme is a reduction in R&D by
foreign and domestic firms because they cannot recoup those costs through
sales. 179 The limited potential profits deter prospective manufacturers of patent-
able pharmaceuticals from setting up shop in the country and stifle the
importing of new products.' 8 Additionally, monitoring and enforcement of
these price controls is costly as it adds more bureaucracy to an already strained
business environment. 181 Because allowing the market to completely control
prices may result in inaccessibility to medicine by a significant portion of the
population, one scholar suggests a selective use of price control for the products
with few affordable therapeutic alternatives. Therefore, the price-controlled
segment will be too small to jeopardize the introduction and availability of
newer, more effective pharmaceuticals into the market.8 2 Ultimately, if the
GOE wishes to fully exploit the benefit of the new IPR law, it will have to
address this important issue through dialogue and cooperation with the private
sector.
V. STRONGER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS Is NOT ENOUGH
A. Strengthening Research and Development Capabilities
Although the aforementioned description of Egypt's IPR reforms appears
to represent a significant step towards "reduc[ing] distortions and impediments
to international trade[,]' 18 3 it is insufficient to bring about the expected benefits
to both the Egyptian private sector and the Egyptian consumer. The IPR regime
must be complemented and linked with other legal regimes dealing with
research and development, technology transfer and competition policy. One
cannot disregard that the developed nations' reasoning in support of IPRs' is
based on the pivotal assumption that domestic pharmaceuticals in developing
nations, public or private, have the technical as well as financial resources to
conduct adequate research and development activities. However, this is rarely
the case, and Egypt is no exception. The domestic sector's technical capability
is limited to the production of therapeutic ingredients and finished goods and
178. AmCham, supra note 9, at 9.
179. Id.
180. WATAL, supra note 19, at 742.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. TRIPS, supra note 19, at Preamble.
184. See infra subpart I(A) (providing detailed discussion of developing countries' concerns
regarding strengthening intellectual property regimes).
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lacks a sophisticated research and development base.1 85  Pharmaceuticals
operating in Egypt allocate less than 2% of their revenues to research and
development activities, due in part to the defective price setting structure.
186
Local pharmaceuticals depend on imports for 85% of their raw materials,
making their costs heavily based on external economic factors.'87 Moreover,
Egyptian higher education, the main component in creating the necessary
human resources, is in urgent need of reform and upgrading. 8 8 In 1987, there
were only 3,782 Egyptian research scientists per million inhabitants compared
to 466,211 in the United States or 29,509 in India.
1 89
These debilitating factors will not miraculously be resolved by mere IPR
regime reforms. Although stronger IPR legal regimes will create financial
incentives and legal certainty for current and new entrants into the market, that
is not enough to produce the objectives of economic growth and improved
public welfare sought by developing nations. A robust system of national and
international linkages among practitioners needs to be established. Egypt
should also tap into the ongoing transformation of industrial firms in wealthy
nations. As these firms transition from vertically integrated firms to outsourcing
and subcontracting to individuals and businesses in the developing world,
Egyptian businesses can utilize the new IPR law to earn the trust of MNEs
concerned with their trade secrets and patented products.' 90
Technology policies that link Egyptian scientists and practitioners with
each other as well as with their foreign counterparts should be adopted. 9' For
example, the GOE should focus on creating incentives for cooperation between
research and development institutions, universities, and industry. Favorable tax
treatment and economic rewards, an obvious one being the monopoly power
created by patent, should be granted to local entrepreneurs.' 92 The policies'
incentive structures should also attract financing for research and development
activities. Egypt can learn from the United States' experience by providing
public funding for R&D activities through direct sponsorship. 93
185. Omer, supra note 8, at 551 n. 4.
186. AmCham, supra note 9, at 20.
187. Id. at 21.
188. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 65 (2002),
www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/chapter5.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Arab Human Development
Report].
189. Id. at 67.
190. See id. (noting that Asia and Latin American subcontractors greatly benefited from this process).
191. See id. at 66 (noting the establishment of linkages and policies in Brazil, China, and the Republic
of Korea as a means of strengthening their national knowledge base).
192. Id. at 70.
193. Id. at 71 ("more than 45% of all R&D efforts in the United States over the last 20 years have
been funded directly by government agencies").
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To the GOE's credit, new polices have recently been passed to support
information technology. National plans include promoting infrastructure,
encouraging foreign and local investment, providing Internet services to
schools, and establishing a free zone for information and communication tech-
nology (known as Smart Village).' 4 Similar approaches and attitudes are
required with respect to the needs of the technology intensive and science based
pharmaceutical industry.
B. Encouraging Effective Technology Transfer and Preventing Anti-Compet-
itive Practices
As subparts I (A) and (B) of this Note mention, a primary incentive for
developing countries to reform their IPR regimes is to encourage technology
transfer.' 95 More specifically, nations want an effective transfer of skills and
intangible know-how that will lead to an increase in production capabilities by
local market participants. 96 TRIPS Article 7 states "protection and enforcement
of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technologi-
cal innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology... in a
manner conducive to social and economic welfare" and Article 8 states that
"[aippropriate measures [consistent with other provisions] ... may be needed
to prevent the... adverse affect [to] the international transfer of technology."
In addition, a WTO Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology (of
which Egypt is a member) was created to "examine and recommend measures
that might be taken to increase flow of technology to developing
countries . '. ."'9' Therefore, signatories are encouraged to adopt policies that
will encourage the transfer of technology along with the strengthening of IPRs.
In Egypt's case, technology transfer in the form of foreign direct invest-
ment continues to lag behind expectations. The decrease in foreign direct
investment inflows illustrates that the nation is still in the unavoidably lengthy
process of transforming these legal incentives into tangible results. 98
Consequently, Egypt passed a new Commercial Code Law No. 17 of 1999,
194. Id. at 71, 77; Cam McGrath, Communication - Egypt: Silicon Oasis Rises in the Desert, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Jul. 16, 2002.
195. WATAL, supra note 19, at 386.
196. Omer, supra note 8, at 56 1.
197. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WORKING GROUP ON TRADE AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY, WT/WGTI r/W/2, (Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter WTO WORKING GROUP ON TRADE AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY].
198. See Maskus, supra note 5, at 153 (showing Egypt's decreasing FDI inflows at $948 million in
1987, $734 million in 1990, and $598 million in 1995); British Direct Investments in Egypt at $26 Mln Q1
FY2002, EGYPTIAN NEWS DIGEST, Feb. 7, 2002, at 2003 WL 3950525 (stating that Egypt attracted $428.2
million in foreign direct investment in 2001-2002 down from $509.4 million in 2000-2001).
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which included provisions specifically addressing technology transfer.'99 The
provisions permitted the invalidation of any restriction on "the freedom of the
importer of technology... in its use, development, acquaintance of the product
or its advertisement ''2°° placed in a technology transfer contract. Examples of
invalid contract restrictions include:
1) Prohibiting the improvement or modification to the imported
technology to suit local conditions;
2) The prohibition of acquiring similar technology or competing
technology;
3) Limitations on production volume, price, method of distribu-
tion, and export;
4) Required interference of the supplier in the importers business
operations;
5) Exclusive supply arrangements for raw materials, equipment,
machines, or spare parts from the supplier alone; and
6) Restrictions on the sale of the production.2"'
The supplier also has to supply the importer with information, data, and
technical documents needed to assimilate the technology into the local market
and provide the importer with technical services for the operation of the tech-
nology. Finally, the supplier has the obligation of providing the importer with
spare parts for machines and equipment supplied, if she produces them, or
advise the importer on other sources.2 2 This is particularly relevant to Egypt
because the majority of capital equipment and machinery used in production is
imported.
20 3
These complementary laws, however, may simply gather dust given the
competitive realities in the global market. Foreign firms are loathe to reveal any
trade secrets or technical information that may easily be imitated and compete
with their products. Therefore, the legal certainty brought about by IPRs, which
encourage information dissemination by guaranteeing patentees legal remedies
for infringement, will give technology transfer polices vitality. 2°4 Because
199. Tarek F. Riad, Egypt: Technology Transfer Provisions in Law No. 17 of 1999, ARAB LAW
QUARTERLY, 418-22 (2000) (publishing Commercial Code Law No. 17 of 1999, Articles 72-87 in their
entirety).
200. Tarek F. Riad, The Legal Environment For Investment In Egypt In The New Millennium, ARAB
LAW QUARTERLY 117, 120 (2000).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 121.
203. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 48, at 212 tbl. 4.3, 223 tbl. 4.6 (citing Egypt's manufacturing
of machinery and transport equipment as 15% of total manufacturing in 1999 and Egypt's manufactured
imports, which include capital equipment, as 77% of total imports in 2000).
204. Omer, supra note 8, at 558.
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pharmaceutical production does not entail complex technologies or highly
differentiated goods, foreign pharmaceuticals will find it more attractive to
import their products via licensing agreements rather then set up shop in a
developing country with complicated bureaucratic red tape, a costly and time
consuming drug registration system, and an unfamiliar legal regime."°5
On the other hand, the presence of stronger IPRs may increase the costs of
acquiring and diffusing technology if suppliers can negotiate higher license fees
and royalties due to their monopoly power.20 6 "Cartel-like restraints, exclu-
sionary conduct and monopoly leveraging by dominant firms, practices, or
mergers may chill technological innovation""2 7 as well as technology transfer.
Taking into consideration these competition risks, Egypt's technology transfer
law appears to also serve as a competition policy." 8 The second and fifth
invalid contract restrictions previously mentioned address the risks associated
with vertical licensing agreements. Although vertical-licensing agreements may
ensure downstream product quality, they may also erode competition, as they
become tie-in sales of unrelated products of technology that extend the scope
of patent protection.0 9 The third invalid contract restriction addresses the risks
of fixed pricing, limiting output, and division of market issues created via the
cartelization of horizontal licensing agreements.210
The technology transfer provisions, although useful, cannot substitute for
a well-developed competition policy addressing numerous other competition
related problems created by strong IPRs. 21 As the GOE transitions from a cen-
tralized, state-run economy to a free market, an appropriate competition policy
is necessary to address the pre-existing, as well as potential, allegations of anti-
competitive practices in the Egyptian market. Mergers and acquisitions are
often undertaken without adequate investigation regarding their impact on
market conditions and fair competition.1 2 A draft competition law, which
addresses these issues and sets up an impartial and independent Competition
Commission, has been proposed to Parliament. In order to maximize the
205. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 127; AmCham, supra note 9, at 20.
206. Omer, supra note 8, at 558.
207. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, Competition Policy and The
Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights, TD/B/COM.2/CLP22, 3 (July 2, 2001), available at
www.unctad.org/en/docs//c2clp22.en.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter UNCTAD2].
208. Egypt has not passed a formal competition law. Bahaa Ali El Dean and Mahmoud Moheildin,
On the Formulation and Enforcement of Competition Law in Emerging Economies: The Case of Egypt, (THE
EGYPTIAN CENTER FOR ECONOMIC STUDIES, Working Paper No. 60, 2 2001).
209. Keith E. Maskus & Mohamed Lahouel, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in
Developing Countries, 23 THE WORLD ECONOMY 595, 604 (Apr. 2000).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 603-05.
212. El Dean & Moheildin, supra note 208, at 3, 23 tbl. 1 (listing recent acquisitions in Egypt by
number and value).
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benefits of stronger IPRs in Egypt, the draft competition needs to be passed and
enforced in concurrence with the full implementation of Law 82 of 2002.213
To the GOE's credit, passage of Law No. 17 of 1999 successfully resulted
in a public-private development agreement between the GOE and Siemens.
Siemens plans to invest EE 1 billion to design, construct, and commission a
new pharmaceutical plant during 2003 to 2005. Included in the deal is also
technology transfer training for Egyptian employees and proactive efforts to
214export. Moreover, passage of another commercial law, Law No. 8 of 1997 on
Investment Guarantees and Incentives provides numerous incentives for
Egyptians and foreigners to invest in specific sectors as well as eliminates some
obstacles to foreign direct investment. 2 5 This law will likely prove very helpful
once Law No. 82 of 2002 is fully and properly implemented. Pfizer, the largest
pharmaceutical and health care product manufacturer in the world, declined to
build a new, state-of-the-art production facility in Egypt because of its distrust
of Egypt's willingness to enforce its new IPR law.216 The fact that foreign firns
are seriously considering foreign direct investment, but for the enforcement of
IPRs, is a positive sign that Law No. 82 of 2002, in conjunction with other
commercial laws, may produce the anticipated results.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Passage of Egyptian Law No. 82 of 2002 sent out a clear message to the
international business community that Egypt is serious about its WTO commit-
ments with respect to intellectual property rights. Despite this important
development, intellectual property rights do not exist in a vacuum. They are
closely linked and affected by competition policies, foreign direct investment
laws, and regulatory schemes. Therefore, passing the law is only the first step.
Egypt needs to "provide incentives to enterprises and institutions ... for the
purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer ... in order to create
a sound and viable technology base. 21 7 In order for this to come about, numer-
ous related issues must be directly addressed and actions must be taken in order
to maximize the benefits from the new law.
First, there needs to be internal improvements in the regulatory schema.
The patent process should be linked with the drug registration process in order
213. Id. at 27-30 (describing the draft competition law currently in parliament).
214. Al- Ali, supra note 88, at 313.
215. Riad, supra note 199, at 117-20; see generally Samiha Fawzy, The Business Environment in
Egypt, (THE EGYPTIAN CENTER FOR ECONOMIC STUDIES, Working Paper no. 34 1998) (discussing the various
obstacles faced by the Egyptian private sector in its attempts to compete in the global market).
216. Mostafa, supra note 138.
217. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 66(2).
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to speed up the latter process as well as assure consistent case handling." 8 The
patent process should be solely controlled by the Patent Office, rather than the
Ministry of Health, so as to avoid inconsistent treatment and delayed results.2t 9
Patent examiners and judges need to be properly trained to handle sophisticated
patent applications and disputes. 220  A national intellectual property council
should be created to oversee the granting of compulsory licenses rather than
placing the decision at the sole discretion of one ministry.22' The price control
system needs to be reformed to incorporate promotion spending, inflation,
exchange rate changes, and costs of raw materials.222
Second, economic incentives and public policies need to be adopted in
order to support the local pharmaceutical industry through the initial transition
phase. The government should take an active role in developing R&D in the
nation through more public-private partnerships, a national network of govern-
ment and university officials, tax incentives, and direct funding of R&D
activities. 22' An emphasis can be placed on incremental product development
rather than new products that require economies of scale.224 Exports should be
encouraged through tax incentives and technical support programs that can
prepare local firms competing in the global market for the first time. The local
firms should be encouraged to specialize in the phyto-pharmaceuticals sub-
industry by developing plant extracts and herbal drugs from Egypt's abundant
plants. 225
Third, other legal regimes need to be reformed. Adoption of an adequate
competition law is necessary in order to protect the market from anti-competi-
tive practices by patent holders.226 Commercial laws impacting foreign direct
investment decisions are required to fully exploit technology transfer opportuni-
ties that arise from a stronger IPR regime. Insurance and health care policies
need to accommodate the fundamental changes in the market that will inevitably
take place. Adequate health insurance coverage needs to be expanded to cover
218. AmCham, supra note 9, at 20.
219. Wahish, supra note 86.
220. AmCham, supra note 9, at 27; Lanjouw, supra note 20, at 19 (noting that patent examiners need
advanced degrees and work experience in the relevant sciences in order to properly perform their job duties).
221. Wahish, supra note 86.
222. AmCham, supra note 9, at 27.
223. Id. See WTO WORKING GROUP ON TRADE AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 197,
'j 14, 16 (supporting "capacity building through specific projects and programs and by establishing a
scientific and technological infrastructure on a cooperative basis for both the public and private research
facilities" and "joint research and technology upgrading efforts by enterprises and Governments").
224. AmCham, supra note 9, at 26.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 27; See generally UNCTAD2, supra note 207, at 20-23 (describing the various ways in
which competition policies with respect to IPRs need to be developed in order to promote innovation).
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a larger percentage of the disproportionately poor population and shield them
from price fluctuations.227
It is essential that these issues are identified and the linkages are made so
that poor, developing nations do not idealistically expect that merely changing
their IPR regime will automatically produce the proclaimed benefits espoused
by the wealthy, western nations. To its credit, some of these issues have been
and are currently being addressed by the GOE. For example, laws pertaining
to export promotion, money laundering, special economic zones, and chambers
of commerce have recently been passed by parliament. Meanwhile, the Unified
Corporate Tax Law, the Anti-Trust and Competition Law, the Unified Labor
Law, the Anti-Dumping Law, and the Information Technology Agreement are
currently undergoing parliamentary debate.228 Passing such laws is an important
first step. However, due to Egypt's limited human and financial resources, the
nation will inevitably face numerous obstacles as it attempts to properly address
such a variety of inter-linked issues.
Ideally, the developed nations will protect its own economic interests in
meeting the TRIPS objective to "reduce distortions and impediments to inter-
national trade... and ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellec-
tual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade[,] 229
by actively supporting, financially and technologically, nations like Egypt in
their challenging endeavor to fully and equally benefit from the strengthening
of intellectual property rights. Otherwise, developing nations' fears of becom-
ing mere consumer targets for wealthy pharmaceutical MNEs, (rather than
producers and beneficiaries of intellectual property rights) may materialize. If
so, governments of developing nations will understandably protect their own
interests and exploit compulsory licensing authority to the detriment of MNEs,
fail to address gray market issues, and allow weak enforcement mechanisms to
prevail, undermining the long-term sustainability of international intellectual
property rights.
227. Wahish, supra note 86; Niveen Wahish, Health Care Trip-Up, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE,
March 7-13, 2002, at http://weekly.ahram.org..eg2003/576/ec4.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
228. THE AMERICANCHAMBEROFCOMMERCE INEGYPT, Legislative Update, at http://www.amcham-
egypt.org/BSAC/WatchBulletin/BacklssuesfWBJul 102.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
229. TRIPS, supra note 19, at Preamble.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of the human rights movement to formulate a jurisprudence of
rights valid for all of humanity is considered laudable by some,' offensive to
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1. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 366 (2d ed.
2000) ("[T]he partisans of universality claim that international human rights ... are and must be the same
everywhere.").
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others.2  The universality/cultural relativist debate on human rights has
developed around the question of just how realistic it is to form universal rights
in the presence of vastly differing local cultures. 3 The compatibility (or non-
compatibility) of Islam with human rights provides a particularly rich, and
controversial, window into this debate. In Part I, I will briefly summarize the
main areas in which human rights commentators have portrayed a tension
between Islamic Law (hereinafter either "Islamic Law" or "Shari'a") and
human rights norms. In Part III, I will explore the three most common theories
which have been propagated on the question of the universality of human
rights-universalism, strict cultural relativism, and moderate cultural relativism
-- concluding that none of these offers a satisfactory analysis of the issue. In
Part IV, the main part of this note, I begin by noting that, just as the American
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement in the 1970s criticized the tacit
acceptance of the oppressor view as neutral, the same critique could be made of
the existing theories on the universality of human rights. I propose a new
theory, reverse moderate relativism, which offers a superior way to conceptua-
lize the universality question by focusing on local (in this case, Islamic) norms
instead of maintaining an international bias. I will test this theory in four areas
of Islamic law: the use of Zakat (almsgiving), the relationship between 'umma
(the Islamic community) and the individual, the coexistence of duties and rights
in Islam, and the concept of Islamic gradualism. In these four areas, inter-
national human rights norms and local norms are converging, but contrary to the
premise of moderate cultural relativists like Abdullahi Al An-Na'im, they are
not (and should not be) converging towards international norms in all cases.
Rather, in these four areas, international human rights norms and Islamic norms
are converging towards a more Islamic standard. In Part V, I conclude that
while strict cultural relativism/universality are both unrealistic, and moderate
cultural relativism is neo-colonialist, reverse moderate relativism offers a
refreshing now focus which continues to search for common ground between
international and local norms, but with a necessary attention to underlying
power dynamics.
2. Id. at 367 ("To the relativist, these [human rights] instruments and their pretension to
universality may suggest primarily the arrogance or 'cultural imperialism' of the West, given the West's
traditional urge... to view its own forms and beliefs as universal, and to attempt to universalize them.").
3. In this note, I will use the terms "local cultures" and "local norms" to refer to any culture/norm
which is not an international one. But, I employ these terms broadly, to mean anything from a truly "local"
culture/norm (such as the culture/norm of a specific and localized indigenous group), to domestic
cultures/norms (such as the culture/norms of a specific country), to a regional or even international religious
culture/norm (such as Islam/Islamic law). Thus, I refer to Islamic law as a "local norm" solely to distinguish
it from international norms, since the term "domestic norms" would not be appropriate in light of the wide
popularity of Islam throughout the world.
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II. THE UNIVERSALITY/CULTURAL RELATIVIST QUESTION IN ISLAM
Unquestionably, there are many areas of potential tension between Shari'a
and international human rights norms. In this section, I outline the areas that
.(Western) human rights commentators most commonly raise when the
compatibility of Shari'a and human rights is at issue. The largest and most-
often discussed point of contention involves the status of women,4 who
generally cannot hold a political or judicial office,5 sometimes lack capacity to
initiate a marriage contract or obtain a unilateral divorce,6 and may inherit half
as much as an equally situated male.7 A woman's testimony in court is valued
at half that of a man's,8 and monetary compensation for violent crimes (diya) is
less for female victims than for male. 9 According to some interpretations of
Shari'a (some of which are state-sanctioned), her husband may chastise her,
including "light beating,"'" demand intercourse at any time, and restrict her
freedom of movement." The presence of polygamy is also considered a
4. See, e.g., Donna E. Arzt, The Application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic States,
12 HUM. RTS. Q. 202, 208 (1990) (describing the issue of sexual equality as "[pirobably the most celebrated
inequality under traditional Islamic law"); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Human Rights in the Muslim World:
Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, A Preliminary Inquiry, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 36-
46 (1990) (noting that "[tihe most important general principle of Shari'a influencing the status and rights of
women is the notion of qawama (citing Holy Qur'an 4:34 ("Men have qawama [guardianship and authority]
over women because of the advantage they [men] have over them [women]."))); Rebecca J. Cook,
Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA.
J. INT'L L. 643 (1990); Leila P. Sayeh & Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Islam and the Treatment of Women: An
Incomplete Understanding of Gradualism, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 311 (1995); Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman,
Islamic States and the United Nations Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against
Women: Are the Shari'a and the Convention Compatible? 44 AM. U. L REV. 1949 (1995); ANN ELIZABETH
MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLMCS 97-130 (3d ed. 1999).
5. An-Na'im, supra note 4, at 37 ("[The] notion of general and specific qawama has had far
reaching consequences for the status and rights of women in both the private and public domains. For
example, Shari'a provides that women are disqualified from holding general public office, which involves the
exercise of authority over men, because, in keeping with the verse 4:34 of the Qur'an, men are entitled to
exercise authority over women and not the reverse").
6. Arzt, supra note 4, at 223 (noting that "Iran, Pakistan, and Tunisia allow wives to seek divorce
in a greater number of instances than Shari'a traditionally allowed ... Divorce reforms have also been
instituted in Algeria, Somalia, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.").
7. Id. at 208; but see id at 223 ("Tunisia has... altered inheritance law to allow daughters a greater
share.").
8. Holy Qur'an 2:282; Arzt, supra note 4, at 208; An-Na'im, supra note 4, at 39.
9. An-Na'im, supra note 4, at 39.
10. Arzt, supra note 4, at 208.
11. See, e.g. Third Periodic Reports ofStates Parties Due In 1998: Yemen. 18/10/2001. U.N. Human
Rights Committee, 141, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/YEM/2001/3 (2001) (citing The Yemen Personal Status Act
No. 20 of 1992, as amended, article 40, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/ CCPR.
C.YEM.2001.3.EnOpendocument (last visited Oct. 3, 2003).
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problem by Western human rights commentators. 2 A close second in terms of
shear amount of commentary after the status of women is the frequently-debated
tension between human rights and Shari'a in the area of religious freedom, 3
including religious discrimination 4 and Shari'a law of apostasy. 5 A third and
less-discussed area of tension is criminal defense rights, particularly the use of
criminal penalties as retaliation (qisas).6 Fourth, a potential tension exists
A husband has a right to his wife's obedience in matters affecting the family's
interests, particularly with regard to the following: She must ... permit him to live
with her and enjoy access to her... permit him to have licit intercourse with her...
obey his orders without obstinacy and perform her work in the conjugal home.., not
leave the conjugal home without his permission
Id.
12. An-Na'im, supra note 4, at 38-39; Arzt, supra note 4, at 222-23 (noting that Tunisia has
abolished polygamy, and that Syria, Morocco, and Pakistan have restricted it).
13. See, e.g., Arzt, supra note 4, at 208-09; MAYER, supra note 4, at 131-74.
14. Compare Holy Qur'an 9:5 ("Slay them [those who do not believe in revealed scriptures]
wherever you may find them."), and id. at 3:85 ("if anyone desires a religion other than Islam, never will it
be accepted of him; and in the hereafter he will be among the losers."), with Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, art. XVIII, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), http://www.unhchr
.ch/udhrlang/eng.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2003) [hereinafter UDHR] ("Everyone has the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion .... ); id. at art. II, at 2, ("Everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as... religion .... ); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. XVIII, para. 1,999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178 (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] ("Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion."); id. at art. lI, para. 1, at 173 ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as... religion ...."). See also Arzt, supra note 4,
at 223 (reporting that "the principles of religious freedom and nondiscrimination against religious minorities
are now constitutionally protected in the majority of Islamic states," but noting that "some such provisions
are in conflict with other constitutional sections that establish Islam as the official state religion or Shari'a as
a principle source of legislation").
15. Compare An-Na'im, supra note 4, at 23 ("According to Shari'a, a Muslim who repudiates his
faith in Islam, whether directly or indirectly, is guilty of a capital offense punishable by death."), with UDHR,
supra note 14, at art. XVII, at 5 ("Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief') (emphasis added), and ICCPR supra note 14, at art.
XVIII, paras. 1-2, at 178 ("Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and ... [nJo one shall be
subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.");
but see Holy Qur'an 2:256 ("There should be no compulsion in religion .... ); see An-Na'im, supra note 4,
at48 nn. 150-51.
16. Compare Arzt, supra note 4, at 208 ("Islamic law provides for penalties not to promote
rehabilitation of the criminal but as a retaliation (qisas), either by financial extraction or bodily mutilation."),
with UDHR, supra note 14, art. V, at 2 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."), and ICCPR, supra note 14, at art. VII, at 175 ("No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.").
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between Shari'a and a number of Civil and Political rights, such as the right to
be free from slavery, 7 freedom of expression, 8 and non-discrimination.
9
Faced with all of these possible tensions, one is likely to conclude that
Islamic law and human rights are primafacie incompatible. But, a fertile debate
continues to rage over the extent to which this is true. In the next section, I will
summarize the three main theories dominating this debate- universalism, strict
cultural relativism, and moderate cultural relativism-and conclude that none
of these theories is adequate.
Ill. THREE THEORIES EXAMINED
In her comprehensive article on cultural relativism, Islam, and human
rights,2" Kimberly Younce Schooley provided a useful framework with which to
describe and analyze the universality debate, by identifying five distinct camps
in the discourse: strict cultural relativism,2' moderate cultural relativism,
22
17. Compare An-Na'im, supra note 4, at 22 ("Although slavery was formally abolished in all
Muslim countries through secular law, the institution itself remains lawful under Shari'a to the present day"),
with UDHR, supra note 14, at art. IV, at 2 ("No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave
trade shall be prohibited in all their forms."), and ICCPR, supra note, at art. VIII, paras. 1-2, at 175 ("No one
shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms shall be prohibited ... No one shall be
held in servitude").
18. Compare An-Na'im, supra note 4, at 23 ("The Shari'a law of apostasy can be used to restrict
other human rights such as freedom of expression."), with UDHR, supra note 14, at art. XIX, at 5 ("Everyone
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression...."); ICCPR, supra note 14, at art. XIX, para. 2, at 178
("Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression...").
19. See An-Na'im, supra note 4, at 24-25 (describing a three-tiered rights entitlement based on
religious adherence under Shari'a, including Muslims; Ahl al-Kitab, believers in a divinely revealed scripture
such as Christians and Jews; and non-believers. Muslims are full citizens enjoying all Shari'a rights and
freedoms. Ahl al-Kitab hold the status of dhimma, a compact with the Muslim state guaranteeing them
inferior rights and freedoms to Muslims, including lack of equality with Muslims, a lower diya (financial com-
pensation for murder or bodily harm) than Muslims, non-application of the Muslim hadd of qadhf ("criminal
penalty for the unproven accusation of fornication"), inability of a dhimmi man to marry a Muslim woman,
and subjection to a jizya poll tax. The rights of unbelievers are limited even further, with recognition as
dhimmis as a best-case scenario); but cf. UDHR, supra note 14, at art. II, at 2 ("Everyone is entitled to all the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as ... religion .... "),
and ICCPR, supra note 14, at art. I, para. 1, at 173 ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized
in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as... religion .... ").
20. Kimberly Younce Schooley, Cultural Sovereignty, Islam, and Human Rights-Toward a
Communitarian Revision, 25 CUMB. L REV. 651, 678-79 (1994).
21. Strict cultural relativists believe that any contemplation of international human rights is a priori
offensive to local cultures. See Schooley, supra note 20, at 679-82.
22. Moderate cultural relativists believe that attention to local cultures precludes the universality
of certain human rights, but that a certain set of "core" rights do transcend national and cultural boundaries;
the moderate cultural relativist thus concentrates on separating the minimal core rights from the culturally
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universalism, 2 3 feminism,24 and communitarianism.25 Particularly useful is her
distinction between strict cultural relativism, in which any contemplation of
international human rights is a priori offensive to local cultures,26 and moderate
cultural relativism, in which attention to local cultures precludes the universality
of certain human rights, but that a certain set of "core" rights do transcend
national and cultural boundaries.27 In this section, I will explore the three
dominant categories Schooley identifies: Universalism, strict cultural
relativism, and moderate cultural relativism.2" I will conclude that, for various
reasons, each of these theories on the interplay between international and local
norms is unsatisfactory.
A. Universalism
There are many human rights commentators that want human rights to be
universal, and thus the literature on universalism is rich enough to be divided
into two areas: philosophical universalism and positivist universalism. This
section will treat, and reject, each in turn.
questionable rights, creating a workable, culturally sensitive list of universal rights. Schooley, supra note 20,
at 682-90.
23. Universalists argue that (Western) notions of human rights are universally applicable. Schooley,
supra note 20, at 691-98.
24. Feminists concentrate on deconstructing the male bias that exists, often both in the local cultures
and in the international human rights laws themselves. Schooley, supra note 20, at 698-704.
25. In the beginning of Schooley's article, she claims that Communitarianism "offers an alternative
framework that focuses on group privileges." Schooley, supra note 20, at 679. Yet, it is unclear why
Schooley feels that "[w]hen seeking to facilitate discussion across cultural lines without failing prey to the
alienation of universalism, the communitarian model, which views people in terms of their relationship to the
group, is the more effective model for international dialogue." Id. at 705. Similarly, she claims that "[c]om-
munitarianism 'engages' with cultures excluded by liberal rights language" and that "[u]nlike cultural
relativism, it does not discard universal standards." Id. at 711. But, Schooley does not explain why a pre-
ference for group privileges provides an alternative to cultural relativism or universalism, except perhaps that
it would be part of a general goal of revising "international norms to remove the presuppositions that all com-
munities are western liberal." Id. at 714; see id. at 704-14. In this note, I will attempt to expand where
Schooley left off. Developing the concept of reverse moderate relativism, which searches for shared values
beginning with a preference for local instead of international ones, I will provide four examples of areas in
which international norms are moving closer to local norms. See this author, Part IV, infra at 14. Schooley
is correct that communitarianism is one of these ways, but where she remained vague I will attempt to explain
why this is so. See this author, Part IV(B)(2), infra at 14.
26. Schooley, supra note 20, at 679-82.
27. Id. at 682-90.
28. I do not examine feminism because, contrary to Schooley, I do not view it as a distinct theory
of relativism per se. Rather, feminism (the deconstruction of male bias) is present in all of the theories. I do
not examine communitarianism because it is unclear exactly how Schooley is using this term. See this
author's comments, supra note 25, at 7.
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1. Philosophical Universalism
Philosophical universalism is the belief that international human rights law
can and should "transcend social and cultural idiosyncrasies by grounding moral
judgments in universal principles."29 Thus, rather than being a solution to the
tension between universal human rights norms and local customs, universalism
is a rejection that the tension exists at all. The tensions I identified in part H are
simply two numerous for this theory to be tenable. It is not possible to ignore
these tensions, and it is neo-colonialist to discredit them. Perhaps some day-
when cultures have mixed for many more millennia and human rights norms
have been continuously refined-universalism will be viable, but that day is
nowhere in sight.
2. Positivist Universalism
Positivists constitute another branch of the universalist school: by adopting
strict legal positivist interpretations of a state's human rights obligations based
on nothing more than the combination of its treaty ratifications and
reservations, 30 positivists confidently champion universality. They argue that
as long as a state has made reservation to any provisions that it cannot meet,
there is no threat to universalism. In fact, they contend, reservations to human
rights treaties support universalist ambitions by maximizing membership in such
treaties.3' Cook notes that "[rleservations offer a middle path by which a
convention's universality can be served by selective amendments that permit a
state party to adjust its relations with other states parties while preserving ... [a
human rights treaty's] integrity. ... Reservations may be ... seen as a limited
concession that may be yielded in order to build an integrated world order.
32
Indeed, reservations to human rights treaties, both by Islamic and Western
states, are common.33
29. Schooley, supra note 20, at 692.
30. See Cook, supra note 4, at 684 ("Reservations may be viewed in different ways. For example,
reservations may be seen as meeting the claim of sovereign states to bargain for treaty membership on their
own terms, or as a limited concession that may be yielded in order to build an integrated world order.");
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (2001) (describing state reservations and concluding that such
a "legal regime has the great merit of allowing as many States as possible to take part in treaties that include
provisions unacceptable to some of them").
31. Cook, supra note 4, at 711; see also id. at 680-81 ("It is proposed . . . that the universal
aspiration of the Convention [The International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination
Against Women] compels recognition that states parties are located at different points on the road to
achievement of the Convention's obligation of result and that they may progress at different rates.").
32. Id at 683-84.
33. See generally id.; Venkatraman, supra note 4. The most commonly reserved-to human rights
treaty, by Islamic and non-Islamic states alike, is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
2003]
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The strongest critique of positivist universalism is that its acceptance
undermines the whole system of human rights: If any given state (Islamic,
Western, or otherwise) can easily ratify all human rights treaties merely by
crafting reservations to relevant articles where state- and treaty-norms are in
tension, human rights treaties could quickly reach universal ratification without
ever effecting change at the domestic level. Afalse universalism is created and
espoused in those treaties, ratified widely but followed nowhere.34
B. Strict Cultural Relativism
Strict cultural relativism is the belief that "local cultural traditions ...
properly determine the existence and scope of ... [human] rights enjoyed by
individuals in a given society ... [and] that no trans-boundary legal or moral
standards exist against which human rights practices may be judged acceptable
or unacceptable. 35  Strict cultural relativists "oppose any discussion of
international human rights consensus as an affront to culture., 36
Strict cultural relativism has been criticized as self-contradictory: the
notion that all values are culturally relative, the belief in "the equal dignity and
worth of all cultures," or "the equal right of all peoples to participate in the
formation of international law" are themselves culturally shaped value
judgments, which would be void under the cultural relativist's own theory.
There is no reason for cultural relativists to accept these starting points as
universal in order to support a doctrine which denies the legitimacy of
Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 4, 1969) [herein-
after CEDAW]. See Cook, supra note 4, at 644; Venkatraman, supra note 4, at 1955 ("In terms of sheer
number of reservations, the Women's Convention has faced an extraordinary amount of opposition. Many
of the reservations are substantive. Further, the Convention has been subject to considerable political debate
over its alleged cultural and religious hegemonistic [sic] character.") (citations omitted). Despite the volumin-
ous commentary on Islamic reservations to this treaty, it bears mentioning that many reservations to CEDAW
are also entered by Western nations. For example, at the time of Cook's article, there were five reservations
to Article 16 from Islamic nations (Egypt, Iraq, Bangladesh, Tunisia, and Turkey) and eight from non-Muslim
states (Thailand, United Kingdom, Brazil, France, Republic of Korea, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Mauritius).
Cook, supra note 4, at 716. Although of varying breadth, there were thus more reservations to CEDA W
article 16 entered by non-Islamic states than there were by Islamic states, despite all the talk about the
incompatibility of Islam and human rights by commentators based on this article of the Convention. The fact
that CEDAW is heavily reserved from by all nations supports the moderate cultural relativist argument. See,
author's comments, infra note 40, at 10; see also Cook, supra note 4, at 663-73.
34. The positivist view that a State is subject only to its ratified treaty obligations less reservations
has been considerably weakened since both the European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights
Committee have taken the view that reservations contrary to a treaty's object and purpose are void. CASSESE,
supra note 30, at 130-31.
35. Fernando R. Tes6n, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, 25 VA.J. INT'L L. 869,
870-71 (1985).
36. Schooley, supra note 20, at 678.
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universals.37 From a normative human rights perspective, strict cultural
relativism is also questionable because it has little to no support in human rights
conventions. The only treatment of strict cultural relativism in a human rights
convention is article 63(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights,
which says that "[tihe provisions of this Convention shall be applied in [colonial
territories] with due regard, however, to local requirements. 38 A strict cultural
relativist reading of this provision has been rejected by the European Court of
Human Rights in Tyrer v. United Kingdom, where the local custom of corporal
punishment was at issue.39
Thus, because of the logical self-contradiction inherent in strict cultural
relativism, and because of the virtual complete lack of support for strict cultural
relativism in the human rights discourse, strict cultural relativism fails as a
paradigm to conceptualize the universality discourse.
C. Moderate Cultural Relativism
Moderate cultural relativism is the belief that human rights are culturally
relevant to a degree, but that there exists some minimum core of rights that can
be considered universal.' Thus, moderate cultural relativists concentrate on the
37. Guyora Binder, Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law, 5 BUFF.
HUM. RTS. L REv. 211,214-15 (1999).
38. Tes6n, supra note 35, at 877 (citing Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. LXIII, para. 3, Europ. T.S. No. 5, http://www.pfc.org.uk/legal/
echrtext.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
39. The court interpreted the word "requirement" narrowly, and found that corporal punishment was
not "required" to maintain law and order, and thus did not fit in to the exception. Tes6n, supra note 35, at 877
(citing Tyrer v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 5856/72 (ser. A) (1978)). As an additional defect, Schooley
notes "a logical flaw in the cultural relativist argument. When stating that all cultures differ, the relativist
makes a descriptive statement; however, when the relativist draws the conclusion that persons should not
make cross-cultural judgments the relativist makes a normative statement. Thus, the relativist contradicts his
own premise." Schooley, supra note 20, at 682. For perhaps the most scathing critique of strict cultural
relativism (without actually bolstering universalism), see generally Tes6n, supra note 35. Tes6n divides
cultural relativism into three branches: descriptive relativism, under which "different societies have different
perceptions of rights and wrong," metaethical relativism, which holds that "it is impossible to discover moral
truth," and normative relativism, which "asserts that persons, depending on their cultural attachments, ought
to ... have different rights." Id. at 886-87. The first two of Tes6n's theories are direct applications of
philosophical relativism, and the third, although invoking norms, is based on a philosophical relativist
rationale. According to Tes6n, "tn]ot only does positive international law fail to provide any basis for the
relativist doctrine, but the underlying philosophical structure of relativism also reveals profound flaws." Id.
at 894. He believes that "cultural relativism exhibits strong discriminatory overtones and is to a large extent
mistaken in its factual assumptions." Id. at 898.
40. Schooley, supra note 20, at 678-79 ("While maintaining a relativist perspective on the world,
moderate cultural relativists accept a need for some form of minimal standard of protection that must be
evaluated and legitimized through culture"). It bears mentioning that Tes6n's cultural relativism is only a
critique of strict cultural relativism, and would not apply to moderate cultural relativism. See Tes6n, supra
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two tasks of defining the minimum core rights and investigating possibilities for
the enlargement of this group of core norms, through reinterpretation of both
local and international norms. This camp has been made famous in the Islamic
context through the influential Islamic scholar Abdullahi Al An-Na'im, and his
mentor Mahmoud Mohamed Taha.4 According to An-Na'im and Taha,
"Shari'a reflects a historically-conditioned interpretation of Islamic scriptures
in the sense that the founding jurists had to understand those sources in
accordance with their own social, economic, and political circumstances. 42 An-
Na'im therefore advocates a constructive interpretation of primary sources
based on modern conditions, 3 all the way to the point of expanding the scope
of ijtihad (Islamic legal reasoning) "to enable modern Muslim jurists ... to
substitute previously enacted texts with other, more general, texts of Qur'an and
Sunna [the two principle textual sources of Islamic Law] despite the categorical
nature of the prior texts."" Defending this technique on the grounds that "the
proposed new rule would also be based on the Qur'an or Sunna, albeit on a new
note 35, at 870. Tes6n's main thesis is that "[i]f there is an international human rights standard - the exact
scope of which is admittedly difficult to ascertain - then its meaning remains uniform across borders...
[and] if there is a possibility of meaningful moral discourse about rights, then it is universal in nature and
applies to all human beings despite cultural differences." Id. at 873. In fact, this thesis is practically the
dictionary definition of moderate cultural relativism, admitting of some universal rights but remaining
cautious of the scope of universality. And, just as the line between strict cultural relativism and moderate
cultural relativism is often blurred, so is the line between positivist universalism and moderate cultural relati-
vism. I have argued above that positivist universaiists are mistaken to champion universalism based on treaty
reservations. See this author, Part I(A)(2), at 8. In some cases, however, treaty reservations may support
the theory of moderate cultural relativism. For example, the fact that CEDAW is heavily reserved-to by all
nations supports moderate cultural relativist argument. To the moderate cultural relativist, the high proportion
of reservations to CEDAW by both Islamic and non-Islamic states shows that some core minimal set of shared
universal rights does exist, but that CEDAW exceeds it. See Cook, supra note 4, at 663-73. The two main
ways in which CEDAW offends both Islamic and Western states' sense of acceptable international regulation
is its regulatory reach into the private sphere and its breadth to include "all forms" of discrimination against
women.
The Women's Convention is a brand apart from other treaties because it seeks to
regulate not only state, but also private, nongovernmental action. More specifically,
the Women's Convention seeks to influence cultural values that may prescribe the
traditional roles of men and women in marriage, family relations, and other situations
that are fertile ground for sexual stereotypes. It is precisely this state duty to counter
discrimination in private life that renders the Women's Convention a dynamic, as well
as controversial, instrument of human rights.
Venkatraman, supra note 4, at 1950-51.
41. Schooley, supra note 20, at 682-83.
42. An-Na'im, supra note 4, at 46.
43. Id. at 47 ("Working with the same primary sources, modern Muslim jurists might shift emphasis
from one class of texts to the other, and interpret the previously enacted texts in ways consistent with a new
understanding of what is believed to be the intent and purpose of the sources.").
44. Id. at 49.
2003] Morgan-Foster
interpretation of the text,"45 An-Na'im has employed this approach to justify
various human rights through Islamic Law, such as non-discrimination,"
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion,47 abolition of apostasy,4" and
equality of the sexes.49
Of the three theories explained in this section, An-Na'im's moderate
cultural relativism is certainly the best. Contrary to universalism, it admits that
notions of rights do differ between cultures, a reality I made readily clear in Part
11. Contrary to strict cultural relativism, however, it does not discount the
amount to which certain notions of rights are shared. It occupies a solid middle
ground between these two extreme theories. Furthermore, at least on its face,
moderate cultural relativism's goal of re-interpreting texts in light of modem
conditions is consistent with the Islamic legal methods of 'Urf (considerations
of custom), 50 Maslahah Mursalah (considerations of public interest),5, Istihsan
(considerations of equity),52 and changed circumstances, 3 "whose apparent aim
is to reverse the negative or unanticipated effects of a strict formalist reading...
and justify changes in doctrine."'
45. Id.
46. According to An-Na'im, "in numerous verses the Qur'an speaks of honor and dignity for
'humankind' and 'children of Adam,' without distinction as to race, color, gender, or religion." Id. at 47. An-
Na'im accomplishes this by interpreting "baniy'" in the Holy Qur'an 17:70 as both male and female children,
creating a verse in which God honors all "children of Adam." An-Na'im, supra note 4, at 47-48 n.149. He
finds further support for equality in the Holy Qur'an 49:13, which he translates/interprets as follows: "0,
humankind, We [God] have created you into male and female, and made you into peoples and tribes so that
you may be acquainted [and cooperate] with each other." Id.
47. Id. at 48 nn. 150-51 (noting several Qur'anic verses supporting freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion, which "have been either de-emphasized as having been 'overruled' by other verses which were
understood to legitimize coercion, or 'interpreted' in ways which permitted such coercion") (citing, inter alia,
Holy Qur'an 2:256 ("Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from error... ") de-
emphasized to Holy Qur'an 9:29 ("Fight those who believe not in God and the Last day, nor hold that
forbidden which hath been forbidden by God and His Apostle, nor acknowledge the Religion of Truth, [even
if they are] of Ah al-kitab, until they pay Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued")).
48. Id. at 48 (citing A. RAHMAN, PUNISHMENT OF APOSTASY IN ISLAM (1972)).
49. An-Na'im, supra note 4, at 48 (arguing that qawama, or guardianship and authority of men over
women, based on Holy Qur'an 4:34, is untenable when interpreted in light of modern conditions, since
"neither of the conditions-advantages of physical might or earning power-set by verse 4:34 as the
justification for the qawama of men over women is tenable today").
50. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OFISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 282-95 (rev. ed. 1991);
see also Sayeh & Morse, supra note 4, at 317.
51. KAMALl, supra note 50, at 267-8 1; see also Sayeh & Morse, supra note 4, at 317.
52. KAMALI, supra note 50, at 245-64.
53. See Sayeh & Morse, supra note 4, at 317.
54. Sherman A. Jackson, Fiction and Formalism: Towards a Functional Analysis of Us,l al-Fiqh,
in STUDIES IN ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORY 177, 195 (Bernard G. Weiss ed., 2002).
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But, although An-Na'im's approach is prima facie valid from the
perspective of these Islamic legal techniques, it should be analyzed from the
perspective of Professor Sherman A. Jackson's theory of a New Legal
Formalism in Islamic Jurisprudence. Jackson analyzes the Shafi'i jurist Imam
al-Haramayn al-Juwayni's argument that non-Muslims should not serve as
'executive viziers," noting that "Al-Juwayni began with a set of presuppositions,
among them the belief that it is not good for Jews and Christians to serve as
executive viziers. From here, he would go on to validate this view by tapping
into the rhetorical force supplied by usul al-fiqh [the science of source
methodology in Islamic jurisprudence] and the legal master-narrative."" Just
as Al-Juwayni began, and sought to validate, a set of assumptions in Jackson's
analysis, so too does An-Na'im. For An-Na'im, this set of presumptions is the
superiority of international human rights. For example, Schooley notes that
"although An-Na'im advocates a cross-cultural dialogue to define 'rights,' he
actually adopts as 'rights' those already considered the norm in international law
and advocates that the Shari'a be reformed to meet these standards. This
approach seems conceptually inconsistent with An-Na'im's cultural legitimacy
theme. 56 Thus, despite its relative strength in comparison to the other camps,
the An-Na'im school suffers a major flaw in its inherent international bias.
Although it is possible under An-Na'im's approach to reach common ground
with international norms on some issues by a plausible reading of local texts,
such a theory based on international norms is likely to offend local culture
frequently,57 and is dangerously neo-colonialist. It is this ignorance of
perspective that is the cornerstone of my theory of reverse moderate relativism,
developed in the rest of this note.
IV. REVERSE MODERATE RELATIVISM: A DFFERENT PERSPECTIVE
ON THE DEBATE
A. Introduction: False Universalism and the Flaw of Perspective
Although there is some merit to any of the above views, and the moderate
cultural relativist theory of Abdullahi Al An-Na'im has gained considerable
55. Id. at 196-98.
56. Schooley, supra note 20, at 690; see also Sayeh & Morse, supra note 4, at 331 (noting that the
United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women approaches human rights
protection "from a Western perspective... [which] ignores an important truth: There exist in non-Western
countries conceptions of human dignity which are as valid as those engendered in the West.").
57. Even An-Na'im himself admits this, prefacing his work with the caveat: "These [constructivist]
views, however, are appreciated by only a tiny minority of contemporary Muslims. To the overwhelming
majority of Muslims today, Shari'a is the sole valid interpretation of Islam, and as such ought to prevail over
any human law or policy." An-Na'im, supra note 4, at 21.
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attention, all of these theories contain a fundamental flaw: perspective. In
other words, each proceeds on the assumption that any conflict between Islamic
law and human rights norms is best resolved by a modification or reinterpreta-
tion of the Islamic norms, while the international ones remain the static. In
setting up the international norms as neutral, this assumption validates
international norms as a standard to be achieved by other norms, such as Islamic
Law. This is as neo-colonialist as it is patronizing, and is particularly open to
scrutiny in light of the fact that Islamic and other non-Western states did not
have equal bargaining power in the creation of the international norms.58 In
attempting to spawn universal consensus on rights based on a gravitation
towards a Western-centered conception of human rights, moderate cultural
relativism (and certainly universalism) do nothing more than re-enforce the
(Western) oppressor view.
The concept of equality, which is all-too-often viewed through the lens of
the oppressor, provides a fertile ground to explore this reality. For example,
commentators have forcefully criticized procedural equality as over-simplistic
when operating in a world where one group already holds the position of the
accepted neutral. In his book White, Richard Dyer argues that "[t]here is no
more powerful a position than that of being 'just' human. The claim to power
is the claim to speak for the commonality of humanity. Raced people can't do
that-they can only speak for their race."59 Professor Sherman Jackson notes
that "[w]hiteness, in other words, reigns supreme precisely because it is
invisible; and because it is invisible, whites enjoy the status of being 'just
people' in the most generic sense."' This is exactly what occurs in the
prevalent universality paradigms: by establishing human rights as the "neutral"
58. Schooley, supra note 20, at 680-81.
It should not be forgotten that the San Francisco Conference which established the
United Nations in 1945 was dominated by the West, and that the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights was adopted at a time when most Third World countries were still
under colonial rule. Thus to argue that human rights has a standing which is universal
in character is to contradict historical reality
Id.; but see Tes6n, supra note 35, at 897.
[E]ven if the law of human rights was originally conceived as an ideological tool [of
the West] against communism, today human rights have achieved a universal scope
and inspire the struggle against all types of oppression. In other words, the
circumstances surrounding the origins of human rights principles are irrelevant to
their intrinsic value and cannot detract from their beneficial features. (emphasis
added).
Id. (emphasis added).
59. Sherman A. Jackson, Islam and Affirmative Action, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 405, 411 (1999) (citing
RICHARD DYER, WHrrE 2 (1997)).
60. Id. at 411.
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norms to be achieved, all other local norms are subjugated before the process
of reconciling norms even begins.
Similarly, the Western notion of absolute equality of the sexes could be
criticized because, although the equality standard to be strived for is absolute,
the benchmark is masculine. In other words, the Western conception of equality
among the sexes means letting women live in a masculine world like men. Just
as the tacitly accepted neutral standard for race is white, the unspoken neutral
standard for sex is male. Against this notion, several Islamic states have
"emphasize[d] the concept of complementarity of the spouses ....... marshaling
a 'separate but equal' argument, portraying the Islamic concept of women's
equality in terms of complementary rights, [and] 'according women rights
equivalent to the rights of their spouses so as to ensure a just balance between
them."
61
These two substantive examples show that the Western notion of absolute
equality is undermined by its ignorance of the neutral benchmark to which that
absolute equality is expected to gravitate. As long as the neutral benchmark is
the oppressor (white, male), absolute equality will be insufficient. The same can
be said for human rights in general: as long as the neutral standard for
gravitation is (western) human rights, any universalizing theory of human rights
will have the effect of subjugating local norms to international norms in an
effort to standardize them. Thus, a new theory about the universality of human
rights is in order, which I will call reverse moderate relativism and elaborate in
the following section.
B. Support for Reverse Moderate Relativism in Islamic Law
On a general level, the tacit acceptance of the oppressor view as "neutral"
was critiqued by the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement born at Harvard
in the 1970s.62 Like the legal realists of the thirties, CLS questioned the
mechanics of formalism, asserting that interpreters of texts necessarily include
their own beliefs in any supposedly rigid and formalistic interpretation
61. Venkatraman, supra note 4, at 1961 (citing Cook, supra note 4, at 704). The two most
outspoken States in this regard by way of reservations to CEDAW Art. 16 have been Egypt and Morocco.
Egypt's reservation to article 16 (elimination of discrimination against women in all matters, public and
private, involving marriage and the family) states Egypt's adherence to that article
must be without prejudice to the Islamic Shari'a provisions whereby women are
accorded rights equivalent to those of their spouses so as to ensure a just balance
between them. This is... in view of the fact that one of the most important bases of
. . . [marital] relations is an equivalency of rights and duties so as to ensure
complementarity (sic] which guarantees true equality between the spouses and not a
quasi-equality that renders the marriage a burden on the wife.
Cook, supra note 4, at 704 (first brackets added).
62. Jackson, supra note 54, at 182.
[Vol. 10:35
Morgan-Foster
process. 63 But, the CLS movement launched the greater critique that, by the
addition of such personal beliefs and biases, ostensibly neutral interpreters
create a "consciously preserved system of defending the interests of the
powerful."'  Professor Sherman A. Jackson has since applied the CLS critique
to usul al-fiqh.65 Just as the CLS movement has criticized American law for
tacitly accepting and furthering the oppressor view, and just as Jackson has
applied this same theory to Islamic law, so must the theories on the universality
of human rights be understood and examined in light of the CLS critique. To
accomplish this end, I propose a new theory on the universality of human rights
is in order, which I will call reverse moderate relativism.
Like moderate cultural relativism, reverse moderate relativism proceeds on
the premise that universality of human rights is impossible, but that some core
set of rights or standards may exist which are universally applicable. But,
reverse moderate relativism searches for these core shared values in reverse
fashion from moderate cultural relativism: instead of starting with the
international value as the neutral benchmark and reinterpreting local law to draw
it closer to the international norm, reverse moderate relativism takes a given
local law as the neutral standard, and exposes ways in which international law
has drawn closer to that standard. Thus, in the remainder of this note, I will
attempt to refocus the debate in the reverse moderate relativist model,
considering four possible areas where Islamic law and human rights law are
becoming more similar by way of a Western doctrinal gravitation towards an
Islamic standard. While this approach does not aim to be exhaustive nor
causative,66 such examples provide a much-needed respite from the excess of
literature on the universality of human rights written in the Western-
international-neutral paradigm.
1. Islam's Zakat and the International Right to Social Security
In the Islamic faith, the duties to God are encompassed in the "five pillars
of Islam."67 These include the profession of faith (shahada), prayer (salat)
63. Id. at 181-82.
64. Id. at 182.
65. Id. at 196-98.
66. By "causative," I completely accept that the gravitations described are not the result of some
reversal of tacit power from international to local norms which caused these new gravitations towards certain
Islamic standards. Rather, the gravitations represent areas where, quite independently, the international
standard has begun to shift towards a long-standing Shari'a standard. Despite this lack of causation, such
changes are worth pointing out when they happen. Perhaps if they are pointed out enough, such a power shift
of neutral benchmarks may even become realistic.
67. Schooley, supra note 20, at 668 n.94 (citing JOHN L. EsPosITo, ISLAM THE STRAIGHT PATH 90-
93 (1988)).
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facing Mecca five times a day and a prayer in a community on Friday at noon,
almsgiving (zakat), fasting during the month of Ramadan, and making a hajj
pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime if physically and financially
able.68 This section will examine the zakat from a reverse moderate relativist
standpoint.
The payment of Zakat by Muslims helps to "support the poor, orphans, and
widows, [and] to free slaves and debtors., 69 The actual administration of zakat
has varied throughout time and from region to region,70 and the extent that zakat
actually serves as a wealth-redistributing device is open for debate. 7' But, an
68. Id.; see also Hamid M. Khan, Nothing is Written: Fundamentalism, Revivalism, Reformism, and
the fate of Islamic Law, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2003).
69. Schooley, supra note 20, at 668 n.94 (citing ESPOSITO, supra note 67, at 92); see also Arzt,
supra note 4, at 207.
Islam emphasizes the obligation of the state to provide sufficient levels of food,
clothing, and housing. The poor must not be required to beg. Thus, the public treasury
must contain a fixed portion for the needy, the aged, and orphans. Every Muslim has
the duty of zakat, to help the poor.
Id.
70. Zakat has a long and complex history. It is generally considered a wealth tax, but could be
considered an income tax. Timur Kuran, Islamic Redistribution Through Zakat: Historical Record and
Modem Realities, in POVERTY AND CHARITY IN MIDDLE EASTERN CONTEXTS (Michael Bonner, et al., eds.)
(forthcoming) ("Zakat was initially a wealth tax, and to this day it is generally defined as such.... But the
decision to limit collections to a share of 'apparent wealth' turned the obligatory levy into what we would now
call an income tax."). According to Professor Kuran, at the time of the Prophet Mohammed, "all taxes were
called zakat," including customs duties, but the precise scope of zakat has since narrowed considerably. Id.
at 8. Furthermore, at any one time, Zakat often differs substantially from one region to another. Kuran notes
that "[iun every country with a government-sponsored or -operated zakat system (including Malaysia,
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia), rates, exemptions, collection methods, and disbursement patterns have varied
over time; and variations across countries are... sharp." Id. at 1.
71. See id. at 2.
[P]overty alleviation is but one of the objectives that zakat was initially meant to serve.
Indeed... zakat was not designed solely, or even primarily, to redistribute wealth in
the manner of a progressive tax scheme, or as an antidote to poverty in the manner of
a welfare program. Although the Qur'an and the Sunna ... contain prescriptions
consistent with using zakat to transfer wealth to the poor, the system's past applications
are compatible with any number of other objectives, even redistribution in favor of the
rich.
Id. at 2. Kuran's point, that zakat does not always benefit the poor and may benefit the rich, repeated many
times over in his paper, is founded on the fact that the rich could potentially be among the eight possible
beneficiaries of zakat (the poor, the needy, zakat administrators, potential converts and Muslims who might
yet renounce Islam, manumitted slaves, debtors, people fighting for God, and wayfarers). Id. at 6 (citing Holy
Qur'an 2:177, 2:217, 4:8, 9:60, 24:22). For example, according to Kuran, any rich Muslim who is fighting
for Islam could "demand assistance," and "even the wealthiest traveler could make a case for having the state
treasury cover his expenses." Kuran, supra note 70, at 6. This is a weak critique. Although Kuran repeatedly
emphasizes that redistribution back to the rich is possible, he advances very little evidence to show it is
common, or likely. Assuming zakat often functions as an effective wealth re-distribution system, it should
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analysis of Islamic Law is concerned about norms, not facts or history.
Normatively, Kamali notes that "[t]he Qur'an often indicates the rationale of its
laws either explicitly or by reference to its objectives .... [T]he rationale of
zakah is to prevent the concentration of wealth in a few hands, which is clearly
stated in the Qur'an (al-Hashr, 59:7)."72 Similarly, Qur'an 51:19 states "And
those who seek help and are needy have due share in their wealth."7 3 In fact, "at
least a dozen Qur'anic passages have been interpreted as instructing believers
to establish foundations serving religious or charitable purposes. 74 Thus,
through zakat and other social equalization measures,75 Islam has since the time
of the Prophet placed a heavy concern on wealth redistribution and the
elimination of poverty by creating individual duty incumbent on each Muslim
to surrender a percentage of his or her income to the needs of others.
The importance of social equalization and wealth redistribution is also
recognized in human rights, particularly in the human rights discourse on
economic, social, and cultural rights (hereinafter "ESC rights").7 6 For example,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (hereinaf-
ter "ICESCR") claims a right to social security,77 the right to an "adequate
not be overly criticized simply because it sometimes redistributes wealth back to the rich. Few, if any, wealth
re-distributing systems outside of Sherwood Forest take all wealth from rich hands and put it in poor hands.
In a typical Western model of taxation for social services, for example, the poor stand to benefit more from
some social programs (welfare, unemployment) but everyone, even the rich, benefit from others (police, fire
protection). The same could be said about Kuran's concern that zakat could take wealth from the poor, such
as small farmers. Id. at 19. While this is possible (although un-substantiated), under a properly-functioning
zakat system that same small farmer would also be the recipient of zakat if she is truly in need. Thus, much
like income tax rebates for United States citizens on welfare, the zakat system could self-correct for Kuran's
concern.
72. KAMALJ, supra note 50, at 217. Kuran, however, has left normative analysis of the law on zakar,
for a factual analysis based on hypotheticals instead of facts. See Kuran, supra note 70, at 10 ("We have no
way of knowing [how much zakat benefited the poor]. The available sources have not been studied for
quantitative indicators, and in any case relevant documentation is very limited.").
73. Arzt, supra note 4, at 208 (citing Qur'an 51:19).
74. Timur Kuran, The Provision of Public Goods under Islamic Law: Origins, Impact, and
Limitations of the Waqf System, 35 LAW & SOC'y REV. 841, 844-45 (2001).
75. Kuran notes that "the Islamic inheritance system, which divided estates among extended
relatives, was certainly a more potent equalizing instrument than practices undertaken to meet the zakat
requirement." Kuran, supra note 70, at 11.
76. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
77. Id. at art. IX, at 7 ("The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone
to social security, including social insurance.").
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standard of living,""8 and the rights to be free from hunger.79 But, whereas zakat
is a concrete duty upon Muslims which falls under criticism only because it can
lead to perverse results or is not always followed,80 ESC rights have not even
reached the preliminary level of creating concrete duties." In fact, even the
extent to which ESC rights are individual rights at all is highly debatable, as can
be evidenced by the lack of an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR along the lines
of the Optional Protocol individual complaints mechanism that exists for the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 2 No such Optional
Protocol exists because ESC rights are considered by many human rights
commentators to be un-justiciable" The two largest human rights non-
governmental organizations have also until recently refused to consider them.'
Thus, from a strictly normative standpoint, zakat norms create quantifiable
78. Id. at art. XI, para. 1, at 7 ("The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.").
79. Id. at art. XI, para. 2, at 6.
80. See Kuran, supra note 70, at 1-8, 19; this author's comments, supra notes 70-71, at 17-18.
81. Kitty Arambulo, Essay, Drafting an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Can an Ideal Become Reality? 2 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 11,
116 (1996) (noting the "vagueness of the formulation of economic, social and cultural rights, and the opaque
normative contents of those rights"). Furthermore, it is interesting to note that social equalization under ESC
rights concentrates only on deprivation, whereas some have argued that Islam is also concerned with over-
affluence. Arzt comments that "Ujust as extreme poverty leads to non-belief, riches are to be shunned,
because they offer enticement to sin." Arzt, supra note 4, at 208. Although certain schools of thought which
influenced the drafting of human rights conventions (socialism, communism) are equally antithetical to
individual wealth, from a normative standpoint the text of the ICESCR never takes any stand against wealth.
Rather, it takes a stand against poverty and deprivation, while staying neutral on wealth. Thus, whereas zakat
is, according to Arzt, concerned about equalization at both the privileged and deprived ends of the spectrum,
ESC rights are solely concentrated on the deprivation end.
82. Arambulo, supra note 81, at 128.
83. Id. at 125.
84. Moreover, Amnesty International, the world's largest human rights non-governmental organiza-
tion (hereinafter NGO), had excluded ESC rights from its mandate until a recent change in 2001. Change in
the Air for Al: The 2001 International Council Meeting Sets a New Course for the Future of AL, THE WIRE,
Oct. 2001, http://web.amnesty.org/80256A3BOO688CC9/0f77AACFCBED 7901C880256AD200370C62?
Open&Highlight=2,mandate (last visited Oct. 3, 2003); This change came against bold criticism that Amnesty
International's mandate should stay fixed. See Katherine E. Cox, Should Amnesty International Expand Its
Mandate to Cover Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? 16 ARIZ. J. INTL & CoMP. L 261 (1999);
Similarly, Human Rights Watch, the world's second largest human rights NGO, has only recently begun
addressing violations of ESC rights, and even this most often occurs when the ESC violations "result from
violations of civil and political rights or must be remedied as part of a plan for ending violations of civil and
political rights." Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, (Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), at
http://www.hrw.org/esc/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2003). To its credit, Human Rights Watch, in the early 1990s,
took a strong stance that ESC rights are fundamental to effective civil and political rights. See generally
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, INDIVISIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS: THE RELATIONSHIP OF POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS
TO SURVIVAL, SUBSISTENCE AND POVERTY (1992).
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obligations on the part of each individual Muslim, while ESC rights create only
ambiguous, general rights, with no individual duties.85
In recent years, however, interest in ESC rights has increased. A growing
number of commentators are now arguing for the justiciability of ESC rights,86
and serious efforts are underway to create an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR
which would render the debate over ESC rights much more individualized87 and
specific.88  The debate is finally moving "from the legal character and validity
of economic, social and cultural rights, to the problem of their application
before quasi-judicial bodies."8 9
In the area of wealth equalization, the rules of zakat, although not always
effective, have been more rigid, quantifiable, and individualized than anything
possibly conceived in the domain of ESC rights. With the growing interest
among ESC rights commentators to further specify and individualize ESC
rights, reverse moderate relativism demands nothing more than that those
commentators recognize that such movement would be towards a standard that
is more Islamic. Reverse moderate relativism does not imply that Islam
influenced or caused this change,' but rather attempts to refocus the universal-
ity debate in a more objective light, acknowledging that no ideology has all of
the right answers or should ever be considered a neutral, benchmark standard.
85. Certainly, if one were to leave normative judgment, it would perhaps be even easier to make the
case that ESC rights, and human rights in general, have not led to tangible change any more than zakat. For
the most convincing analysis yet, see Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, I I 
YALE L.J. 1935 (2002) (arguing based on extensive empiracal analysis that human rights compliance of states
decreases after ratifying human rights treaties). However, in this note I confine the analysis to the law itself,
both of human rights and of Islam.
86. Arambulo, supra note 81, at 129-31.
87. Id. at 133 (noting the "quasi-judicial character of the proposed Optional Protocol to the
ICESCR").
88. According to the ICESCR, the adoption of [an Optional Protocol to the ICESCRI ... would
greatly enhance the understanding of economic, social and cultural rights in general for the following reasons:
(1) a more detailed complaints procedure would be able to bring relief in concrete cases; (2) the focus on a
particular case would provide a framework for inquiry which is otherwise absent in a report on the general
situation; (3) the mere possibility that complaints might be brought in an international forum would encourage
governments to ensure more effective local remedies with respect to economic and social rights; (4) the
possibility of an adverse finding by an international committee would give economic and social rights political
salience; (5) the existence of a potential remedy at the international level would provide an incentive to
individuals and groups to formulate some of their economic and social claims more precisely; and (6) a
complaints procedure would produce a tangible result, which is far more likely to generate interest in and
understanding of the Covenant as a whole and of specific issues.
Id. at 127-28.
89. Id. at 134.
90. Indeed, to the extent that moderate cultural relativists argue that international norms influenced
or should influence changing interpretations of local standards, dangerous neo-colonial implications arise,
particularly in light of differing levels of participation in the international system.
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2. The Synergistic Relationship between the 'Umma and the
individual in Islam
This section compares the complex relationship between the individual and
the 'umma (Islamic community) in Islam to the historically simple preference
for the individual in the Western liberal human rights tradition. After outlining
the complex interplay between individual and 'umma in Islam, it argues that the
addition of "third generation" rights to the human rights discourse creates, from
a reverse moderate relativist perspective, a similar level of complexity between
individual and group importance that has long existed in Islam. Although still
a legal analysis, this section takes a post-formative approach, relying more
heavily on present day legal authorities and less on textual reference.9
The status of the individual in Islam is complex, and has at times been
over-simplified. For example, Schooley notes that "non-western countries, such
as those that are Islamic, define personal identity in connection with one's group
membership." 92 Although this may be true, it cannot be said that the group
carries absolute importance over the individual in Islam. Muhammad 'Amara,
an Egyptian religious scholar and author, describes the Islamic balance between
individual and group:
Islam doesn't think either that the human being is the supreme being
in creation, or that he is indistinguishable from the rest of creation.
Man is the representative (khalifa) of God, and human beings have
liberties that reflect their nature as God's representatives. These
liberties are not absolute, they are bounded. So the individual as civil
and social being is free, but all this is limited by the need for the
freedom of the society. There has to be a balance between what is
good for the individual and good for the group--they are not mutually
exclusive. This... is very different from the Western view where,
in the democratic state, the ruling class's interests take precedence;
or where, in the authoritarian state, the state's interests take prece-
dence. In Islam, the 'umma's interests take precedence, not those of
the ruling class, not those of the state, and not those of the individual.
91. See Sherman A. Jackson, Kramer Versus Kramer in a 10th/16th Century Egyptian Court: Post-
Formative Jurisprudence between Exigency and Law, 8 ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY 27, 32 (200 1) (defining
post-formative jurisprudence in these terms and noting that "[b]ecause of disparity in narration on the
authority of the early authorities and differences in the way in which subsequent scholars extrapolated from
these views, there came to exist a multiplicity of views within a school").
92. Schooley, supra note 20, at 679-80. See also T6son, supra note 35, at 883 ("[T]he concept [that]
human dignity implies that high priority should be given to individual choices in ways of life, beliefs and the
conduct of public affairs. This concept, however, simple as it is, clearly contradicts many existing ideologies
and political arrangements.") (citation omitted).
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So, in this sense, Islam has a moderate view of the indiviual: the
individual is free in so far as it is of benefit to the community.
93
Similarly, according to Salah ed-Din Jorshi, a leading Tunisian religious
intellectual, it is incorrect to emphasize the concept of tawhid (unity of belief)
and umma to "reinforce the domination of the community over the individual
and to encourage conformity."'94 Jorshi notes that:
in Islam the individual exists: on the Day of Judgement, God does
not speak with the 'umma, He speaks with each individual. ... So, at
one and the same time there is the 'umma and there is the individual.
And in order to have an Islamic view of freedom, of the individual,
of human rights, you have to have a vision of the whole society and
also of the rights of the individual.9"
Thus, rather than a simple superiority of the umma over the individual, as
many commentators have attempted to construct, Islam is a subtle balance of
interests between them. In his authoritative treatise on Islamic law, Mohammad
Hashim Kamali specifically notes that, in some areas "rights of the community
and those of the individuals are combined. 96 At times, this combination is
weighted toward individual rights, such as:
[r]etaliation (qisas), and blood-money (diyah) of any kind, whether
for life or for grievous injury .... The community is entitled to
punish such violations, but the right of the heirs in retaliation and in
diyah for erroneous killing, and the right of the victim in respect of
diyah for injuries, is preponderant in view of the grievance and loss
that they suffer as a result. The guardian (wali) of the deceased, in
the case of qisas, is entitled to pardon the offender or to accept a
compensation from him. But the state, which represents the commu-
93. KEVIN DWYER, ARAB VOICES: THE HUMAN RIGHTS DEBATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 78 (1991)
(emphasis added); see also id. at 91:
One of the problems in reconstructing civil society is that in Tunisia, today, everyone
is talking of rights and freedoms. But if everyone thinks only of their own rights and
freedoms, society will destroy itself, because we are a society that doesn't have every-
thing, that is permeated by scarcity.... And that's why, at the same time that we talk
of rights and freedoms, we have to also talk of duties and obligations, which are
essential for us in this historical moment. A society that talks only of rights becomes
not a society, but an archipelago.
(quoting personal interview with Salah ed-Din Jorshi, one of Tunisia's leading religious intellectuals).
94. Id. at 90.
95. Id.
96. KAMALI, supra note 50, at 349.
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nity, is still entitled to punish the offender through a ta'zir punish-
ment even if he is pardoned by the relatives of the deceased.97
In other situations, there is debate among the Islamic schools about where
the emphasis should fall:
The right to punish a slanderer (qadhij) belongs, according to the
Hanafis, to [the] class, by reason of the attack made on the honour of
one of its members. Since the Right of God is dominant in qadhf, the
victim of this offence (i.e. the maqdhuj) cannot exonerate the offender
from punishment. The Shafi'is have, however held the contrary view
by saying that qadhfis an exclusive Right of Man and that the person
so defamed is entitled to exonerate the defamer.9"
Regardless of whether one sides with the Hanafis or the Shafi'is on this
particular question, it is clear that there is a place in Islamic law for both
individual and community interests. It may be true that Islam, and other non-
Western legal and moral traditions, place a heavier emphasis on the community
('umma)99 than Western liberal traditions. But, to say that Islamic law affords
no place at all for the individual would be misguided, ignoring the subtle
coexistence between individual rights and duties that Jorshi describes, the very
real presence of haqq Al-'abd (Islamic private rights)"°° and active debate
among the schools on this very question. Rather, in Islamic law, rights of the
individual and duties to the 'umma can be said to coexist in a synergistic
relationship.
97. Id. at 350.
98. Id. at 349-50.
99. Karnali's exploration of the numerous haqq Allah is illustrative. See KAMALI, supra note 50,
at 348-50; this author's comments, infra notes 115-120. Kamali specifically notes that haqq Allah "is called
so not because it is of any benefit to God, but because it is beneficial to the community at large and not merely
to a particular individual." KAMALI, supra note 50, at 348-49. In the framework of this note, it should be
noted, however, that notwithstanding Kamali's description, most of the principles he categorizes under haqq
Allah are more appropriately categorized as duties of the individual to the group than rights of the group itself.
See Part IV(B)(2)(3) of this article. Therefore, the norms Kamali mentions are specifically enumerated in the
next section on duties. See KAMALI, supra note 50, at 348-50; this author's comments, infra notes 115-120.
Perhaps Kamali would argue that there is no difference between duties of the individual and rights of the
group--that the two categories are reciprocal-but at least for this author, it is easier to conceptualize norms
such as hajj, jihad, zakat and hudud as individual duties, not group rights. There are some exceptions, which
are more easily conceptualized as group rights, including the uqubah qasirah (minor punishments) such as
excluding the murderer from the inheritance of his victim, the kaffarat penances, and "community right to
mineral wealth or to the spoils of war (ghana'im)." KAMALI, supra note 50, at 349.
100. See KAMALI, supra note 50, at 348-50; this author's comments, infra notes 115-20.
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Human rights law, on the other hand, has historically placed a strong
emphasis solely on the individual. For example, Professors Henry Steiner and
Philip Alston state in their authoritative text on human rights that "[o]bservers
from different regions and cultures can agree that the human rights movement
... stems principally from the liberal tradition of Western thought.... [and
that] [n]o characteristic of the liberal tradition is more striking than its emphasis
on the individual.'' Amidst a historical tradition recognizing "first generation"
civil and political rights of individuals,'0 2 and "second generation" economic,
social, and cultural rights of individuals, 1 3 it is only recently that the human
rights discourse has been enriched, becoming more like the Islamic discourse,
to recognize the importance of the group simultaneously with the importance of
the individual. Commentary on the importance of groups within society has
spawned the most-recent and least developed category of human rights, the so-
called "third-generation" human rights (group rights). 1°4 This innovative
category of "third generation" rights includes such group rights as the right of
self-determination,0 5 the right to development,1°6 and the right to peace. 10 7 A
current and highly debated third generation right is affirmative action.'° Just
as, "in the 1950's, the concept of and need for economic, social, and cultural
rights were heatedly debated," now "the opponents of the[se] new rights
contend in a similar manner that the third-generation rights are not really legal
101. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 1, at 361-62.
102. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 95-96 (2001) (listing "first
generation" civil and political rights, such as "freedom from slavery, torture, the right to recognition and
equality before the law, freedom from arbitrary arrest and the guarantee of fair criminal procedures, and
respect for rights of worship and expression").
103. Id. at 96 (listing "second generation" economic, social, and cultural rights, such as "the right to
work, to rest and leisure, to education, and to participation in cultural life").
104. See, e.g., Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L REV. 1, 48-62 (1982).
105. Id. at 48-52.
106. Id. at 52-56.
107. Id. at 56-59.
108. See Jason Morgan-Foster, From Hutchins Hall to Hyderabad and Beyond: A Comparative Look
at Affirmative Action in Three Jurisdictions, 9 WASH. & LEE R.E.A.L. J. (forthcoming 2003) (arguing that "as
a human right, affirmative action [is] ... a positive duty on a government and it protects group rights"); Louise
Mulder, How Positive can Equality Measures Be?, in NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 65 (Titia Loenen & Peter R. Rodrigues eds., 1999) (arguing that, by its very nature, affirmative
action represents some willingness to acknowledge group rights no matter what the jurisdiction); see also
Stephanie Browning, et al., Dueling Fates: Should The International Legal Regime Accept a Collective or
Individual Paradigm to Protect Women's Rights?, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 347 (2002) (a recent symposium
attracting far less publicity than the affirmative action cases, but also at the University of Michigan and
strongly signaling an increased interest in group rights).
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rights but are either political or social principles, or, at best, 'moral' rights."' 9
Although third generation group rights remain controversial, they have become
a regular part of the human rights discourse. From a reverse moderate relativist
perspective, human rights has moved more towards an Islamic standard: it has
moved away from a juridical structure which focused solely on the individual
towards a discourse in which the individual and group are both primary topics
of concern.
3. The Co-existence of Duties and Rights in Islam
This section begins by analyzing the co-existence of duties and rights in
Islam. It then argues that recent movements to emphasize individual duties and
responsibilities are another area that, from a reverse moderate relativist
perspective, the human rights discourse is approaching an already existing
Islamic dialogue.
Some commentators describe Shari'a as if duties held absolute priority
over rights. For example, A. Said explains that in Islam:
[H]uman rights .. .exist only in relation to human obligations.
Individuals possess certain obligations toward God, fellow humans,
and nature, all of which are defined in the Shariah. When individuals
meet these obligations they acquire certain rights and freedoms which
are again prescribed by the Shariah. Those who do not accept these
obligations have no rights, and any claims of freedom that they make
upon society lack justification." 0
Similarly, Donna A. Arzt states that:
The Quran has numerous references to duties (farud), but the few
references to rights (huquq) are better translated as "claims" and have
particular and specialized application to penal law. The only rights
that are "inalienable" in the Western, natural rights sense, are those
belonging to Allah and to the state, Allah's servant."'
A preference for the language of duties over rights is also evident in at least
two Constitutions of states with a large Islamic population. Article 12 of the
Constitution of Saudi Arabia states "The consolidation of national unity is a
duty, and the state will prevent anything that may lead to disunity, sedition and
109. Sohn, supra note 104, at 61.
110. Arzt, supra note 4, at 205-06 (citing A. Said, Human Rights in Islamic Perspective, in HUMAN
RIGHTs: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 92 (A. Pollis & P. Schwab eds., 1980)).
111. Id. at 206.
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separation."112 Similarly, The Iraqi Constitution prefers the language of duties
over rights in its Article 32(b): "Work is an honor and a sacred duty for every
able citizen."
'
"
13
But, the mere fact that Islamic law places importance in duty does not
necessarily eliminate any place in Islamic law for individual rights. Quite the
contrary, Professor Sherman Jackson states that "the relative dominance and
sanctity in Islamic law of individual rights gives rise to a formidable high
burden of proof for alienating private rights in pursuit of broader social
interests."1 4 The importance of Islamic duties has been over-stated, ignoring
the very real presence of private rights in Islamic law. In his authoritative
treatise on Islamic law, Mohammad Hashim Kamali describes this relationship
as one between haqq Allah (rights of God) and haqq al-'abd (rights of man).'15
Haqq Allah, which generally embody individual duties, 1 6 include iman (pro-
fessing the faith), salah (prayers), zakah (almsgiving), the hajj (pilgramage),
jihad (holy war), the 'id al-fitr (charity given at the end of Ramadan), the tithe
levied on agricultural crops, the kharaj (tax on land in the conquered territories),
and the hudud (penalties for theft and adultery)." 7 Haqq al-'abd, "which
exclusively consist of the rights of men,"' 18 include:
The right to enforce a contract, or the right to compensation for loss,
the purchaser's right to own the object he has purchased, the vendor's
right to own the price paid to him, the right of pre-emption (shuf),
and so on. To enforce such rights is entirely at the option of the
individual concerned; he may demand them or waive them, even
without any consideration.'
This divide between haqq al-'abd and haqq Allah, not always well
delineated, 20 is clear evidence of the simultaneous presence of both individual
112. SAUDI ARABIA CONST. art. XII (emphasis added).
113. IRAQ CONST. art. XXXII, para. b.
114. Jackson, supra note 54, at 410 (emphasis added).
115. KAMALI, supra note 50, at 348-50.
116. Kamali appears to consider haqq Allah as group rights rather than individual duties to the group.
Based on the norms he lists, I disagree with this categorization. See KAmAu, supra note 50, at 348-50; this
author's comments, supra note 99.
117. KAMALI, supra note 50, at 349.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id.
According to the Maliki jurist al-Qarafi, all rights in Islam partake in the Right of God
in the exclusive sense that there is no right whatsoever without the haqq Allah
constituting a part thereof. Thus when a person buys a house, he exercises his private
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rights and individual duties in Islamic law. Thus, similar to the synergy
between individual and 'umma in Islam, a co-existence also exists between an
individual's duties and rights. This combination of rights and duties is
exemplified in Article 10 of the Constitution of Iraq: "[S]ocial solidarity is the
first foundation for the Society. Its essence is that every citizen accomplishes
his duty in full, and that the Society guarantees the citizen's rights and liberties
in full.' 2' As is clear from this provision, it is the combination of individual
rights and duties which leads to social solidarity, rather than a complete
preference for either rights or duties.
Against this coexistence of rights and duties in the Islamic discourse,
human rights law has, on the other hand, a historical normative grounding in
rights, with hardly any focus on duties. 22 Until very recently, the only "duties"
right insofar as it benefits him, but the transaction partakes in the Right of God insofar
as the buyer is liable to pay the purchase price.
Id.
121. IRAQCONST. art. X.
122. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 1, at 323 (noting that a "fundamental characteristic of the UDHR
and ICCPR [is] their foundation in the rhetoric and concept of rights"). See also CEDAW, supra note 33
(fifty references to rights and no references to duties); Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter CERD] (forty-
five references to rights and no references to duties); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 [hereinafter Convention Against
Torture] (entered into force June 26, 1987) (fifteen references to rights and only one reference to duties (art.
10)); Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC] (entered into
force Sept. 2, 1990) (seventy-six references to rights and three references to duties (arts. 3, 5, 14)); but see Ben
Saul, In the Shadow of Human Rights: Human Duties, Obligations, and Responsibilities, 32 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L REV. 565, 581 (2001) (arguing that "contrary to the assertions of the human responsibilities movement,
there is rich and detailed critical literature addressing ideas of human duty, obligation, and responsibility in
Western rights discourse and theories of morality"). Saul's strongest argument, that "[d]uty is central to
contract, tort, equity, and criminal law," is weakened by the fact that, although potentially representative of
many Western domestic systems, it says little about international human rights' notion of duty. Id. at 583.
The closest domestic relative of international human rights law, after all, is constitutional law, which is not
included on Saul's list. Similarly, Saul's argument that "Rousseau's social contract presupposed reciprocal
rights and responsibilities," says little about international human rights law, which is a creature apart from
Rousseau. Id. at 584. Saul's main example is "correlative duties, referring to those duties that complement
specific rights." Id. at 585. But, reliance on correlative duties to make the case for the existence of duties in
the Western conception of human rights is weak, since correlative duties are not duties in their own right, but
mere reformulations of existing rights. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 1, at 342, 361-62, 585; author's
comments, infra note 125 Saul's discussion of duties language in regional human rights mechanisms seems
to directly contradict his point that duties language is present in the Western rights discourse, since Saul
himself claims that such regional treaties provide a mechanism for regional preferences to be acknowledged
despite differing Western-dominated international preferences. Saul, supra note 122, at 591-96. When Saul
does discuss international human rights, he rests his argument generally on articles of the UDHR. Id. at 588-
91. The UDHR is not a treaty constituting binding human rights law, and the extent to which the UDHR
represents customary international law is much more complicated than Saul admits. See, e.g., Hurst Hannum,
The Status and Future of the Customary International Law of Human Rights: The Status of the Universal
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language to emerge with regularity from the human rights movement was that
of correlative duties, which exist only because of the presence of rights (such as
the right to free speech implying a duty not to interfere in others' speech, 2 3 or
the right to be free from torture implicating a duty upon the state not to
torture 24), and are thus analytically distinct from the discourse on duties to a
larger social group discussed supra in the Islamic context. 25  Aside from the
rare preambular reference to duties in two human rights instruments, 26 human
rights law has been completely grounded in the normative language of rights.
27
As the name "human rights" itself suggests, "rights" and not "duties" have his-
torically been its focus.
Against this historical focus in individual rights, there has been in the past
few years a growing emphasis being placed on individual duties to groups.
Beginning with the United Nations Commission on Global Governance's 1995
report on individual responsibilities, entitled Our Global Neighbourhood,
28
many declarations have been produced by various international bodies, includ-
ing the Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities, produced by the Inter-
Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L&COMP. L. 287 (1996). Saul
does make the point, however, that both the ICCPR and ICESCR contain a reference to individual duties in
their preambular paragraphs. Saul, supra note 122, at 589. Rather than establish a definitive place for duties
in international human rights law, the presence of duties language merely in the preambular paragraphs of
these 1960s documents, followed by the revolution of declarations based completely on duties in the 1990s,
supports the point I will make in this section, that duties language in the human rights discourse is increasing,
and gradually taking on a complementary place next to rights as it already maintains in Islamic law. See this
author's comments, infra notes 128-142.
123. Saul, supra note 122, at 585.
124. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note I, at 342.
125. Id. (emphasizing that the kinds of duties found in non-Western contexts "are not the same as
duties within a scheme of rights that are correlative to the described rights") (emphasis in original).
126. Saul, supra note 122 at 589. The UDHR art. 29 also contains a reference to duties, stating
"Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is
possible." UDHR, supra note 14, at art. XXIX para. 1, at 8. When the UDHR was codified in two binding
Covenants, this reference to duties is now found only in the preambles.
127. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 1, at 323; CEDAW, supra note 33; CERD, supra note 122;
Convention Against Torture, supra note 4; CRC, supra note 122; Saul, supra note 122, at 581; STEINER &
ALSTON, supra note I at 342, 361-62, 585; Hannum, supra note 122.
128. Saul, supra note 122, at 573 (referring to Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the
Commission on Global Governance, http:llwww.sovereignty.net/p/gov/gganalysis.htm (last visited Oct. 10,
2003)). Saul also mentions several documents from international religious organizations as being central to
the beginning of the international responsibilities movement, including the Parliament of the World's
Religions' Declaration Toward a Global Ethic, Council for the Parliament of the World's Religions, About
CPWR, 1993, http://www.cpwr.org (last visited May 15, 2001); and the report of the Inter-Action Council,
In Search of Global Ethical Standards, Inter-Action Council (1996), http://www.interactioncouncil.org/
meetings/report/m96 I.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
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Action Council in 1997; 129 a Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities,
produced by UNESCO in 1997; 130 a Declaration of Human Duties and Respon-
sibilities, produced by the City of Valencia and UNESCO in 1998;'' a Declara-
tion of Human Duties: A Code of Ethics of Shared Responsibilities, produced
by the International Council of Human Duties in 1997;32 and a Declaration of
Human Responsibilities, produced by the United People's Assembly in 1998;133
and a Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities, produced by the Hart
Center in 1998.' 4
Perhaps most notably of all, the debate over individual duties entered the
UN human rights machinery with the Resolution on Human Rights and Human
Responsibilities, by the United Nations Human Rights Commission.'35 This has
been followed by the appointment of a Special Rapporteur to study the question
of human responsibilities and duties, 136 who released a preliminary report on the
subject in 2002,' and will release his full report at the 59th Session of the
Human Rights Commission later this year. 3 '
In addition to this express advocacy and study of human duties, a number
of other examples can be cited which implicitly do the very same thing. First,
the growing movement in corporate social responsibility is easily characterized
129. Saul, supra note 122, at 574 (citing A Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities, Inter-
Action Council (1997), http://www.interactioncouncil.org/meetings/report/m972.doc (last visited Oct. 10,
2003)).
130. Id. (citing Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities, UNESCO (1997),
http://astro.temple.edu/-dialogue/Antho/unesco.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2003)).
131. Id. (citing Declaration of Responsibilities and Human Duties, City of Valencia (Valencia Third
Millennium Foundation) & UNESCO (1998), http://globalization.icaap.org/content/v2.2/declare.html (last
visited Oct. 2, 2003)).
132. Id. (citing The Carta of Human Duties: A Code of Ethics of Shared Responsibilities,
International Council of Human Duties (1997), http://www.units.it/-ichd/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2003)).
133. Id. (citing A Declaration of Human Responsibilities, United People's Assembly (1998),
http://acgc.org/Documents%20Page.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2003)).
134. Saul, supra note 122, at 574 (citing Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities, The Hart
Center (UK) (1998)).
135. Human Rights and Human Responsibilities, U.N. Commission on Human Rights., 56th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/63 (2000).
136. Decision 2001/285, U.N. Economic and Social Council, at 139, U.N. Doc. E/2001/INF/2/Add.
2(2001).
137. Human Rights and Human Responsibilities, Report of Mr. Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Special
Rapportuer Appointed by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights to
undertake the Study Requested by the Commission in its Rresolution 2000/63, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/107
(2002), http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90faO238025668700518ca4/
e413d84b25dd7ac7c1256b9e003765c9/$FIE/G0211472.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2003) [hereinafter
Preliminary Report of the Special Rapporteur].
138. Id. para. 119.
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as a movement advocating increased individual duty, since corporations are
legal individuals. 39  Second, the building emphasis on the duty to protect the
environment provides another salient example. Whereas many international
treaties present a clean environment as a right, a growing number of such
treaties are now emphasizing the duty to protect the environment over the right
to enjoy it. 4° Third, Saul notes that "human rights law occasionally recognizes
the collective responsibility of present communities for past action by
communal ancestors.''
From a reverse moderate relativist perspective, this move from a wholly
rights-centered discourse to one which combines rights with duties is another
example of the international model moving closer to the Islamic one. The report
of the UN Special Rapporteur studying responsibilities and duties emphasizes
this point, noting that "the relationship between the individual's rights and
duties" had already been "made clear in several provisions of the Cairo
Declaration" on Human Rights in Islam. 42  The emerging standard among
human rights commentators recognizing the co-existence of rights and duties
should be seen for what it is: a standard in which the Islamic conception was
the benchmark for the human rights dialogue to approach.
4. Islamic Gradualism and Dynamic Human Rights Norms
Leila P. Sayeh and Adriaen M. Morse, Jr. use the term gradualism to
describe the way Islamic law "proceeds by degrees, over time, advancing slowly
but regularly" to suit evolving standards in the Islamic community itself.'43 As
a conceptual framework,'" gradualism can be observed in the measured and
139. Saul, supra note 122, at 597.
140. Id. at 599 ("The right to a quality environment carries with it a 'solemn' individual
'responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations."' (citing Stockholm
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
http://www.mint.gov.my/policy/treaty-multidim/unche72_stockholm.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2003). Saul
mentions another treaty that he says, like the Stockholm Declaration, emphasizes duty. He explains that the
Declaration of the Hague imposes "a narrower duty only on 'the community of nations' to preserve the
environment for 'present and future generations."' Id. (citing The Hague Declaration, 1989,
http://www.earthaction.org/en/archive/97-05-envinst/haguedecl.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2003)).
141. Saul, supra note 122, at 599-600 (noting "compensation to Holocaust and World War II victims,
victims of medical experimentation, for slavery and colonization, and for the dispossession of indigenous
peoples, including genocidal child removal policies") (citations omitted).
142. Preliminary Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 137, 82 (citing the Cairo Declaration
on Human Rights in Islam, Nineteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, UN Doc: ST/HR/I/Rev.5
(Vol. I) (Aug. 5, 1990) (hereinafter "Cairo Declaration")).
143. Sayeh & Morse, supra note 4, at 318.
144. In addition to describing gradualism as a conceptual framework, Sayeh & Morse also describe
gradualism as a method of interpretation. This conception of gradualism, championed by the exiled Sudanese
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time-sensitive way in which certain points of Islamic law were revealed to the
Prophet. For example, beginning in a time when "Arabs had been accustomed
to drink alcohol and gamble," God gradually revealed Qur'anic verses on the
interdiction of drinking and gambling to the Prophet Mohammed, first revealing
a mere recommendation on their disuse, then a moratorium on drinking during
the hour of prayer, and finally an "outright and absolute interdiction of all
intoxicants and gambling in all circumstances."' 45 Sayeh and Morse argue that
gradualism produced more effective, lasting social change in "[c]ertain cultural
practices and habits common in Arab society [which] ... were less amenable to
instant change" by preparing them "little by little" for the "full Word of God."'14
6
scholar Abdullahi Al-An-Na'im, is open to critique. See this author, supra part III(C), at 10. An example of
this gradualism in interpretation is found in the Qur'anic verses on polygamy. Potentially because of then-
existing situations (the battle of Uhud, killing ten percent of Muslim men and leaving many women and
children without means of support), the Qur'anic verse 4:3 was revealed, allowing a Muslim man to marry
up to 4 wives. Sayeh & Morse, supra note 4, at 328 (citing Holy Qur'an IV:3). But, verse 4:129 later
qualifies verse 4:3 by stating that "Ye are never able To be fair and just As between women, Even if it is Your
ardent desire." Sayeh & Morse, supra note 4, at 328 (citing Holy Qur'an 4:129). Under gradualism of
interpretation, the two verses must be read together, the latter being accepted as a qualification of the former
based on changing times. This approach has indeed been adopted by the Tunisian personal Statute Code,
exemplifying the "application of principles of religious interpretation to allow Islam to best serve the needs
of a modem society." Sayeh & Morse, supra note 4, at 330. For a thorough treatment of the interplay of these
two Qur'anic verses on polygamy, see QUAMARUDDIN KAHN, STATUS OF WOMEN IN ISLAM 21-22 (1988);
JOHN L. ESPOSTO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH 97 (1991); Sayeh & Morse, supra note 4, at 329, n. 122 (citing
Azizah F. al-Hibri, A study of Islamic Herstory: Or How Did We Ever Get into This Mess? 5 WOMEN'S STUD.
INT'L F. 207, 216 (1982)). For an exhaustive account of human rights in Tunisia, which has taken gradualism
to the extreme and takes international human rights norms far more seriously than some Western countries,
most notably the United States. See Republique Tunisienne, Les Droits De L'Homme en Tunisie: Rapport
National 1991-1993 (1993). The report describes several national mechanisms to protect international human
rights, including Le Conseiller Sp6cial aupr6s du President de la Rdpublique, chargd des droits de Ihomme,
and Le Comitd Supdrieur des droits de l'Homme et des Libertds Fondamentales; several area-specific councils;
relations with all relevant UN and regional mechanisms; and voluminous documentation of relations with no
less than 23 non-governmental organizations. Furthermore, contrary to the United States, which prefers to
speak of human rights in United States Constitutional terms, the report contains 271 pages describing rights
in Tunisiaframed in and using language from international human rights mechanisms. Id. at 229-500. With
Tunisia as a case-study, one would be hard pressed to argue that human rights offend Islam (at least Tunisia's
Islam). For a specific and exhaustive treatment of women's human rights in Tunisia, see EMMA CHrITOUI
AoUtL, LA TUNISIE ET LES DROrrs DE L'HOMME (1992).
145. Sayeh & Morse, supra note 4, at 320 (citing Holy Qur'an 2:219 ("They ask thee, concerning
wine and gambling. Say: 'In them is great sin, And some profit, for men; But the sin is greater Than the
profit."'); Holy Qur'an 4:43 ("0 ye who believe! Approach not prayers With a mind befogged, Until ye can
understand All that ye say, Nor in a state Of ceremonial impurity"); id. at 5:90-92 ("0 ye who believe!
Intoxicants and gambling, (Dedication of) stones, And (divination by) arrows, are an abomination, Of Satan's
handiwork; Eschew such (abomination), That ye may prosper").
146. Sayeh & Morse, supra note 4, at 320.
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Through a process of slow but regular change, gradualism's various legal
mechanisms adapt Islamic law to the changing needs and values in Islamic
society. Sayeh and Morse note that:
Gradualism is ideally suited to Islam because, while the Qur'an does
enumerate certain legal standards, it consists primarily of very broad
and general moral directives. The idea of gradualism complements
the notion that Islam is a further step along the path to a greater
understanding of God. Just as Muslims see Judaism and Christianity
as precursors of the advent of Islam, so are the limitations and
changes made upon society by the Qur'an signs of how God wishes
His community to continue to evolve and grow in the future. 47
Just like Islamic law under the Qur' an, human rights law is often framed
in broad, generalist terms. Moreover, human rights law has never been stagnant
or uncontroversial and has had to adapt to changing social standards.
48
Moreover, more controversial human rights, such as ESC rights, are the most
accepting of gradual change. For example, rather than adopting a rigid
standard, the ICESCR requires that States parties "take steps, ... with a view
to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the
present Covenant."'49 Thus, just as under gradualism the Prophet Mohammed
gradually prepares Muslims for the "full Word of God" in areas they are "less
amenable to instant change,"' 0 the ICESCR's progressive realization standard
is an open acknowledgment that ESC rights will also require gradual change to
meet the full obligations of that Covenant in areas where they are less amenable
to change due to economic or social barriers. From a reverse moderate relativist
147. Id. at 318.
148. The controversial, and adaptable, nature of human rights has been evident since the birth of the
modern human rights movement fifty years ago, when disagreement among States made it impossible to create
a binding human rights instrument containing both Civil and Political rights and Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, leading to the adoption of two separate human rights instruments. See Comment on Historical
Origins of Economic and Social Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,
MORALS 242, 244-45 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 2000); BEDERMAN, supra note 102, at 96-97
(explaining that "although the original conception was to have a single instrument on human rights, this
proved politically impossible" because of ideological differences between socialist and capitalist nations).
Similarly, the body of human rights law has gradually, and controversially, expanded with changing social
realities, from "first generation" to "second generation" and now "third generation" rights. See id. at 95-96;
Sohn, supra note 104, at 48-62; author's comments, supra notes 102-07.
149. ICESCR, supra note 76, at art. U, pars. 1, at 5 (emphasis added). Compare the rigid standard
in the equivalent provision of the ICCPR: "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant." ICCPR, supra note 14, at art. II, para. 1., at 173.
150. Sayeh & Morse, supra note 4, at 320.
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perspective, the ICESCR's progressive realization standard is employing a
technique as old as the Qur'an itself.'51
C. The Superiority of Reverse Moderate Relativism
Reverse moderate relativism shares some characteristics with both strict
cultural relativism and moderate cultural relativism, in that both theories place
emphasis on the determination of rights by local cultures."52 But, whereas strict
cultural relativism takes this criteria and creates an impasse for the advancement
of universality by assuming Western norms to be inflexible, and moderate
cultural relativism attempts to universalize norms only by changing the local
norms, reverse moderate relativism calls for a reorganization of the examination
of universal rights away from Western-oppressor starting points and towards
local starting points. Schooley notes that "[c]ultural relativism's strength is its
strong consideration of context. Yet, ... its weakness is 'its assumption that the
importance of context proves it is not possible for one context to be superior to
another in some transcendent sense.""5 3 Reverse moderate relativism takes
cultural relativism's strength (thoughtful consideration of context), and then
doubly transcends its weakness by proposing not only that one context can be
superior to another, but that the superior context could and may often be the
non-Western context.
V. CONCLUSION
As I explored in Part II, commentators on Islamic Law and human rights
alike all agree that a tension between the two doctrines exists in a number of
areas; but, what to do with this tension is still an open question. The three most
popular theories-universalism, strict cultural relativism, and moderate cultural
relativism-are each conceptually flawed. Universalism is untenable, because
it eliminates the tensions simply by ignoring them. Strict cultural relativism is
unsatisfactory, because discredits the whole field of human rights, which may
not be necessary. An-Na'im's moderate cultural relativism, which first appears
the most attractive, is perhaps the most dangerous of all: In attempting to create
and expand a list of core shared rights, moderate cultural relativism treats the
international norm as the neutral benchmark to be achieved, with dangerous
neo-colonialist implications. In Part IV, I proposed a new theory, reverse
moderate relativism, which accepts the virtues of moderate cultural relativism
151. Id. at 318 (noting that western Common Law also adopts a gradualist approach, although
mistakenly framing that argument from a moderate cultural relativist perspective that gradualism "parallels
the common law study in analogy and reason").
152. See Tes6n, supra note 35, at 678.
153. Schooley, supra note 20, at 682.
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while avoiding the western-centric detrimental focus on international norms as
neutral benchmark standards to be achieved which is the hallmark of moderate
cultural relativism. By refocusing attention to areas where international norms
are approaching Islamic ones, reverse moderate relativism offers a superior
outlook on relativism which avoids the neo-colonial and western-centric
undertones of moderate cultural relativism.
It must be emphasized that reverse moderate relativism does not claim any
causative link between (often) longstanding Islamic traditions and developing
human rights norms. Perhaps the theory is open to criticism as nothing more
than a catalogue of coincidences. But, such a critique ignores the profound
importance of restructuring the universality debate from Western neutrals to
local neutrals. Although reverse moderate relativism cannot claim to be
causative (Indeed, why would it want to? Causation only lurks behind moderate
cultural relativism as a neo-colonial phantom.), and this preliminary inquiry
certainly cannot claim to be exhaustive, it provides a necessary change in
momentum, a change of focus and perspective. The universality story has been
told and rejected. An-Na'im's moderate cultural relativist theory, although a
step in the right direction, lives in the shadow of a neo-colonialist cloud.
Perhaps, with the refreshing new focus on rights universalization by Western
gravitation towards certain local cultures, the stalled universality debate can be
given some true meaning.
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I. ABSTRACT
The application of punitive damages in the United States is widely
misunderstood by European jurists. The case of the "pet in the microwave"
appears to be entirely fictional, yet it is often cited as an example of United
States jurisprudence. Likewise, the McDonald's "coffee spill case" is often
cited, even though it was reduced significantly upon appeal and later settled in
a private out-of-court agreement between the parties. Neither case is satisfac-
tory as an example of United States punitive damages in application, and
neither has legal relevance or precedence in United States jurisprudence. This
article discusses several sources of misunderstanding with respect to these
"cases." As an alternative, the author proposes that his European colleagues
review the legal standards set forth in the United States Supreme Court case
BMW v. Gore.' This is a real case, with binding legal precedence. Gore sets
forth standards for the application of punitive damages and shows that punitive
damages are in fact rational and understandable within the context of estab-
lished legal standards and guidelines.
Most recently, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the application
of punitive damages in the April 7, 2003 decision State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Company v. Campbell. In Campbell, the Supreme Court
overturned a punitive damages verdict of $145 million because of an insurer's
bad-faith failure to settle. The Supreme Court said that punitive damages were
applicable to the case, but, after applying the Gore test, it found that the ratio
of punitive damages to compensatory damages was excessive. Campbell pro-
vided further clarification on the application of punitive damages in the United
States.
HI. INTRODUCTION
American lawyers who live in Europe often find themselves in the line of
fire of their continental2 colleagues who expect them to explain and justify the
1. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 116 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
2. Here, "continental" refers to the European continent, i.e., Europe without England. The effect
is to distinguish civil law from common law, since England is the only European country with a common law
system.
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sometimes bizarre twists of law and politics in the United States. Some favorite
topics that arise from these discussions include the use of juries in the judicial
process, death penalties, lawyers' contingency fees, and punitive damages.
This article deals with one of those matters-punitive damages.
Admittedly, United States laws that allow for punitive damages are far
from perfect. Still, the system, if properly understood, is not without merit.
Unfortunately, the system is widely misunderstood. It is the author's proposi-
tion that much of the misunderstanding in Europe can be traced to instances in
which the continental press takes highly publicized trial-level decisions, extra-
polates from them, and incorrectly interprets them as a full function of United
States law. This phenomenon is not unlike the many "urban legends" which
have recently given rise to many popular books and Web sites on urban
legends.3
III. THE UNFORTUNATE TENDENCY TO BELIEVE URBAN LEGENDS
It is tempting to focus on fictional "urban legends"-and even legitimate
cases-in which the outcome seems bizarre and silly. Doing so is easy and
entertaining. But without a deeper analysis into outcomes and an understanding
as to the law and policy behind the underlying premises, such discussions have
little value. In the context of anecdotes and stories, one commentator has
suggested that the legal education system needs reform.4 The author applauds
this proposition and believes this is particularly applicable in the context of
United States law as it is taught in Europe.
One must look no further than the often discussed "case" in which a
woman was allegedly awarded damages for an unsuccessful attempt to dry her
pet in her new microwave (hereinafter referred to as the pet in microwave
"case").5 If a plaintiff victory in the pet in the microwave "case" ever existed-
which is highly doubtful-it would almost certainly be reversed at the appellate
3. See, e.g., RoLF WILHELM BREDNICK, DiE SPINNE IN DER YUCCA-PALME, (C.H. Beck, 1999).
Additional references to books and websites are provided in footnotes below. Note that many of the
comments and references are to German speaking sources, since the author has previously worked and studied
in Germany and therefore has selected mostly German speaking sources for examples and citation.
4. Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1327 (2002) (Professor Rhode also
notes at p. 1348 that the coffee spill case and the pet in the microwave case as not useful anecdotes although
they "sell better than statistics").
5. See also http://www.snopes.com/horrors/techno/micropet.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2002),
which states that the pet in the microwave case is a hoax and notes other perverse variants of the hoax and
other "cooked to death" legends. There are countless other sites in the UNITED STATES similar to
www.snopes.com which directly state that the pet in the microwave case is a fabrication. See
http://www.stellaawards.com/bogus.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2002). A German website for "urban legends"
also exists: http://www.kuwest.de/joke/ul.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2002), although as of this date, the
German website does not mention the pet case.
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level. In a more likely scenario, the plaintiff would be prosecuted for a crime.6
Unfortunate as it may be, the author and many of his European colleagues have
heard even well-respected European professors discuss the non-existent pet in
the microwave "case" as an example of how far United States courts are willing
to go. This "case" and others have taken on a life of their own, and as a result,
the image of punitive damages has, perhaps, been perhaps irreparably harmed.
The United States has a full legal system with courts of various instances;
including, obviously, courts of appeal. As will be illustrated, one must review
the full process of the court system (i.e., beyond the first instance) to under-
stand the functioning of punitive damages. Through a discussion of two cases,
first, the legendary McDonald's coffee spill case (hereinafter called the "coffee
spill case") and secondly, the more relevant United States Supreme Court
decision in Gore,7 the article hopes to achieve two objectives. The first is to
explain, from an American perspective, how the United States system of
punitive damages works and to assist the author's European colleagues in
understanding the policy behind it. This article is not intended to provide
unconditional support for the punitive damages system in the United States, but
rather to point out some of its strengths, outline the review procedure and
guidelines, and identify areas in which punitive damages may have been mis-
understood. The second objective of this article is to show that, for numerous
reasons, the coffee spill case is a poor example to be used for academic
purposes. While the coffee spill case is perhaps a good example for litigation
strategy, it should not be used as an example of United States tort law.8
IV. THE PET IN THE MICROWAVE
The author hopes to quickly and effectively discredit the pet in microwave
"case" so as to convince the reader that it not useful for serious discussion. It
is of course impossible to prove the non-existence of something. There is even
some evidence that the story has European, not American origins.9 In any
event, the lack of positive evidence of the case's existence should be sufficient
6. The only similar case that the author could find was State v. Tweedie, 444 A.2d 855 (R.I. 1982),
a criminal case in which the defendant was criminally convicted under Rhode Island statute for "cruelly
killing" a cat that defendant placed in the microwave.
7. Supra note 1, at 568.
8. See Friedman Kiethe, American Law Introductory Courses 2001, 3 GERMAN L.J. 5 (May 1,
2002), www.germanlawjoumal.com (noting that an extension from the University of Michigan teaches the
coffee spill case during a summer course in Germany) (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
9. The earliest citation of the pet in the microwave legend that the author could find was in Paul
Smith's, THE BOOK OFNASTY LEGENDS, (T.J. Press Ltd.) (1983). The book dispels the pet in the microwave
case as false (at p. 65). The author also noted that the "pet" has been described variously a cat and a dog, and
even as a baby. Paul Smith has also traced origins of the story back to pre-microwave technology where the
owner tried to dry her pet in a regular oven or wood stove.
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for the sophisticated reader. Notwithstanding, it may be understandably
difficult for many Europeans to "unlearn" the non-existentpet in the microwave
"case." It seems to appear in many different forms, both at the University as
well as in the press.
The pet in the microwave "case" has found its way into a (otherwise
excellent) German Doctoral Dissertation as a footnote reference.'" This is not
the only example in academia: an Austrian university lecturer appears to use
the fictional "case" as a teaching example for his courses-or at least, he has
used it in a newspaper article that makes a failed attempt to explain the United
States punitive damages system." Note that here the lecturer's victim is a dog.
In a similar article many years earlier in France, Le Monde discussed the
fictional victory of the fictional plaintiff in the pet in microwave case as a real,
non-fiction example of United States absurdity. 2 But for Le Monde, the victim
was a cat. Again, Le Monde provided no basis, citation, or reference of any
kind to the underlying court proceeding. Even so, for Le Monde, the "case"
served as a prime example as to why the United States system should be
reformed. To cite the pet in the microwave case as an example of the need for
United States punitive damage reform, as Der Standard and Le Monde have
done, is in the author's view, just as absurd as it would be to cite an episode of
"The Simpson's" as legally binding precedent.
10. See, for example the case reported in the German press, whereby the user of a microwave oven
used the device to warm up his cold pet, and successfully obtained damages from the manufacturer, who
neglected to advise him that the microwave device was not appropriate for this use.
11. Christian Hausmaninger, Schadenersatzprozesse in den USA: das grosse Geldfir Pechvogel.
DER STANDARD, Sept. 9, 1997. With no citation of the underlying "case," Dr. Hausmaninger highlights the
pet in the microwave (he seems to think it is a dog) as an example of the failures in the United States system.
To wit:
It is often the case where the intentions of compassionate jurors grant exorbitant
damages, particularly for dubious damages claims in the order of millions against
deep-pocket companies. The case of a dog owner, who dried his dog in the microwave
and then sued the manufacturer because there was not a warning regarding the drying
of pets, is just one of many examples.
12. LE MONDE, La 'socit contentieuse'-Aux ttats-Unis, hommes d'affaires et mrdecins
dbnoncent la multiplication des proc~s en tout genre, Aug. 18, 1992. Quoting from article:
... [t]his litigoious explosion is directly responsible for the disappointments of the
American light aircraft industry, or manufacturers of ladders and scaffolding, and has
created a multiplication of lawsuits between people who have insurance and the
insurance companies that insure them. Totally frustrated with this, the latter point out
the case of a manufacturer who lost a lawsuit from a homemaker who inopportunely
attempted to dry her cat in a microwave...
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V. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: THE UNDERLYING POLICY
Punitive damages, also commonly called in English exemplary damages,3
are designed to punish, not to compensate. In general, punitive damages are
awarded for socially deplorable conduct, such as fraud or malicious, reckless,
or abusive action. Since the early 1900s, punitive damages have been available
only for tort but not for contract damages, 4 with some exceptions. 5 Punitive
damages are discretionary and are never given as a matter of right. Although
viewed as a United States law phenomenon, punitive damages can be traced
back to the Old Testament, 16 and their attraction has given rise to attempts by
some European tort victims to seek recovery in an American forum. This was
the case for the German train accident in Eschede.'7 This was also the case in
the wake of the Concorde aircraft 8 accident in Paris, in which damages were
statutorily limited. One German commentator has described the limitations on
damages as "a deficit in German tort law."' 9
A. The Punishing and Deterrent Functions of Punitive Damages
The "punishing" function of punitive damages is a source of great criticism
by civil law proponents. In Germany, for example, public policy equates all
punishing functions-including fines-with criminal law, an area in which the
state enjoys a constitutional monopoly.2° The argument in support of this view
is that punitive damages should be rejected due to their criminal or quasi-
criminal nature.2' After all, the purpose of a civil action, particularly in tort
law, is to restore the plaintiff to the position in which he would have been if the
13. BLACK'SLAW DICTIONARY 396 (7th ed. 1999). Other variants ofthe term, exemplary damages,
include: punitive damages, presumptive damages, added damages, aggravated damages, speculative
damages, imaginary damages, smart money, and punies.
14. See Trammel v. Vaughan, 59 S.W. 79 (Mo. 1900).
15. See, e.g., Given v. Field, 484 S.E.2d 647 (W. Va. 1997).
16. See Exodus 22:1 ("If a man shall steal an ox or sheep and kill it, he shall restore five oxen for
an ox, and four sheep for a sheep.").
17. Europaerzieht es verstarkt an amerikanische Gerichte, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINEZEITUNG,
Sept. 3, 2001, at Nr. 204, 14.
18. Dr. Ronald Schmid, Wenn die bosen Buben locken ... Oberlegungen zum Concorde-Unfall,
DER ANWALT, Heft 7/2001 (Beilage zu NJW 2001).
19. General comment: For readability, original quoted text will not be provided in the footnotes.
Should the reader wish to review quotations for accuracy, he/she is asked to review the text from the
underlying citation.
20. BGH, IX ZR 149/91, NJW 92, 3096 (1992): (Only the state, not a private person, can punish,
and in order to do so, the state must adhere to strict legal procedures designed to protect the defendant it is
prosecuting).
21. See Christian E. Schlegel, Is a Federal Cap on Punitive Damages in our Best Interest?: A
Consideration of H.R. 956 in Light of Tennessee's Experience, 69 TENN. L. REV. 677, 682-88 (2002).
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tort did not occur.2 2 Indeed, United States lawmakers23 do not entirely disagree
with this view. United States courts also believe that punitive damages are
similar to criminal punishment. However, while many continental European
courts (such as those in Germany) generally reject punitive damages outright,
United States courts will allow them where appropriate substantive and
procedural safeguards are used to minimize risk of unjust punishment.
There is little dispute that punitive damages are designed to punish, not to
compensate. By punishing, punitive damages are said to have a deterring effect
within society itself.24 According to that theory, the deterring effect depends,
in part, on a broadcasting effect, so that punitive damages serve as a lesson to
others in a similar situation. Few would argue with the proposition that
awarding punitive damages has a "broadcasting effect," although whether
punitive damages actually deter and whether they are fair is a separate matter.
Convincing arguments have been advanced by American commentators
that punitive damages have spun out of control and that they should be
stopped.25 This is particularly true as applied to juries, which are generally the
grantors of exaggerated awards. As stated by one commentator: "It is usually
much easier to arouse a jury's emotion or anger than it is to persuade a judge
to abandon her comparatively detached and balanced view of a pending case. "26
Others have said that punitive damages create legal uncertainty and discourage
new product innovation and introduction into the market.27 These arguments
all make sense. On the other hand, tort reform measures 28 and state action are
under way to correct an upward trend in awards.29
22. KEETON ET. AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, AND ACCIDENT LAW (West Publishing Co.
1983).
23. For the purposes of this article, "lawmakers" is defined as both the legislature and the law-
creation function of the common law system.
24. JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 695 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 1999).
25. For a good balancing of arguments, see Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive
Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REv. 103, 104-06 (2002).
26. Graham C. Lilly, The Decline of the American Jury, U. COLO. L. REv. 53, 56 (2001).
27. Richard Mahoney & Stephen E. Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial: Punitive Damages Versus New
Products, SCIENCE, Dec. 15, 1999, at 1395.
28. See Schiegel, supra note 21, at 677.
29. For an analysis of data that shows the increase in award trends, see Marc Galanter, Real World
Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REv. 1093, 1113-115 (1996).
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B. A Delicate Balance: Weighing "Enormity" of the Offense against the
Wealth of the Defendant
In a punitive damages award, it is generally the plaintiff, not the state, who
is the beneficiary of the award.3 ° The calculation is based on the degree of
misconduct or "moral retribution" of the defendant.3 As explained by Justice
Thomas in the United States Supreme Court decision Molzofv. United States,
ajury may award punitive damages against a defendant based on "the enormity
of his offense rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff."32 As
a check and balance to make sure that juries do not overly punish, the United
States Supreme Court requires that the "enormity" factor be carefully reviewed.
In application, some courts require a showing of wealth of the defendant in
order to determine whether the amount of damages exceeds the level necessary
to properly punish and deter.33 Other courts may not have a firm requirement
to show the wealth of the defendant, but they may encourage it.34 As Judge
Posner explains, "to a very rich person, the pain of having to pay a heavy award
of damages may be a mere pinprick and so not deter him (or people like him)
from continuing to engage in the same type of wrongdoing. '""
Appellate courts in the United States are constantly reviewing the policies
of balancing punishment against the wealth of the punishee, and of balancing
punishment by the gravity of the tort. As will be demonstrated below in
discussion of the BMW v. Gore decision, the Supreme Court has determined
that under certain conditions, punitive damages can be excessive and violate the
Due Process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment in the United States
Constitution. Review by higher courts is available to all parties and is a key
element to the full functioning of the legal system.
VI. THE MCDONALD'S CASE IN THE EUROPEAN PRESS
For the press to announce definitively that jury awards at the trial level are
the end-all of a full legal process would be to call the winner of a football match
after the first few minutes of play and to ignore the rest of the match. True,
there are many exaggerations that arise from United States juries, but there are
also many built-in checks and balances. Unfortunately, the checks and balances
30. The plaintiff does not necessarily always receive the punitive award. Damages may instead,
upon agreement of the parties, go to charitable organizations, or third parties. See Dardinger v. Anthem Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121 (Ohio 2002) (Ohio Supreme Court requiring that one-third of a
$30,000,000.00 punitive damages award go to a charity).
31. See Mgmt. Computer. Servs., Inc. v. Hawkins, 557 N.W.2d 67 (Wis. 1996).
32. 502 U.S. 301, 306 (1992), quoting Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851).
33. See Zazu Designs v. L'Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 1992).
34. See Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348 (Cal. 1991).
35. Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996).
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do not make headlines. This was the case in Die Zeit's discussion of the coffee
spill case:3
6
In a sensational case in the early nineties an elderly woman success-
fully sued McDonald's. She had ordered a coffee in the drive-
through and while driving out she put it in between her legs. When
she braked, the cup was crushed and the woman burned herself on
her thighs. The jurors awarded punitive damages of just under one
million dollars. They based this on a finding that McDonald's should
have warned its customers of the danger. Since this time McDon-
ald's prints the warning: "Warning, contents hot." Incidentally, the'
elderly woman did not receive much from her victory-her lawyers'
bills were so high that she only ended up with a bit more than one
thousand dollars.
Die Zeit misstated the facts of the case in almost every possible way. First,
the punitive damages that were initially awarded were $2.7 million,37 not $1
million, and the award was later reduced upon appeal by more than 75%, from
$2.7 million to $480,000.38 Also, the comment on what was left for plaintiff
Liebeck after attorney fees is curious; there is no public information available
on that topic since the case between Liebeck and McDonald's was confiden-
tially settled after the 75% reduction in the award.39 "The elderly woman"
(Mrs. Liebeck) was not driving, but was a passenger in the car.4° Furthermore,
as will be noted below, the issue in question was not the warning on the cup,
but the fact that McDonald's had received over 700 complaints in the past
resulting from similar accidents.
It is no wonder that the coffee spill case is misunderstood: other well-
known German newspapers have also been careless in their reporting on the
case. In 1996, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,4" incorrectly reported total
damages of $2.3 million, without reference to the reduction by the appellate
36. Michael Schweilen, Anwalt Grenzenlos, DIEZErr, week 35, 2001, available at
http://www.zeit.de/2001/35/Politik/200135_witti.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
37. See Liebeck v. McDonald's Rests., P.T.S., Inc., 1994 WL 360309, at *1 (N.M. Dist. Aug. 18,
1994).
38. McDonald's Coffee Award Reduced 75% by Judge, WALL STREET JOURNAL Sept. 15, 1994,
at A4. (Note that the total award, as reduced, was $640,000.00, consisting of $480,000.00 in punitive
damages and $160,000.00 in actual damages).
39. McDonald's Settles Lawsuit Over Burn From Coffee, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 2, 1994,
at B6.
40. For description of case facts, see Washington State Trial Lawyers Association,
www.consumerrights.net/mcdonalds.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
41. Carol Kaps, Die Schufte vor Gericht, FRANKFURTER ALL GEMEINE ZEITUNG, Sept. 6. 1996, at
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court and final outcome of the case. The appellate reduction and the subse-
quent settlement were of course well known for over two years prior to
publishing the article. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung also incorrectly
stated that punitive damages are allowed "in all 50 states. 42 They are not.43
Even Handlesblatt has recently (May 2003) cited the Coffee Spill case as an
example of the functioning of the law in the United States within the context of
recent tobacco judgments." It is hard to understand why a respectable paper
such as the Handlesblatt would cite this as a real case when in fact it was
reversed, privately settled, and has absolutely no legal or jurisprudential value
in the United States.
To be fair, the German press is not alone in careless reporting of punitive
damages. In 1997, long after the coffee spill case was reduced by the appellate
courts and then settled for an unknown sum, the Neue Zircher Zeitung
incorrectly reported that Mrs. Liebeck "earned herself millions of dollars."45
This was, as in the other examples, reported well after the case was reduced and
then settled for an undisclosed sum. However, for the Neue Zuircher Zeitung,
the case conveniently served as a key example in a series of reports brazenly
entitled "Lawsuits as a National Sport in the U.S.A."46
On the one hand, the United States system is perhaps one that encourages
frivolous lawsuits. Indeed, at the writing of this article, a class-action lawsuit
was filed against McDonald's claiming numerous damages, including punitive
damages. It alleges that McDonald's burgers and fries make kids fat, provoke
42. Id.
43. Five states do not permit punitive damages to be awarded: New Hampshire, by statute, and
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Washington, by common law. See Scirica, Gottschalk & Weiner,
Debate: Punitive Damages, N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 577,586 (1977); see also Michael Rustad, In Defense of
Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1,
9-10(1992).
44. Gerhard Maurerer, "Ein Teil der Angst Lost sich in Rauch auf'HANDLESBLATT, May 28, 2003,
at 29, Nr. 102m. ("One only needs to remember the McDonald's case where a purchaser of hot coffee burned
herself upon opening the cup and received punitive damages of $2.7 million.").
45. U. Schmid, Klagen als Volkssport in den USA, NEUE ZURCHER ZEITUNG, Apr. 11, 1997, at 7.
Although perhaps the NEUE ZORCHER ZEITUNG should be congratulated for publishing a letter to the editor
the following week by a reader who, in response to the article, brought the editor's attention to the incorrect
statement and noted that the coffee spill case was reduced on appeal and ultimately settled, NEUE ZORCHER
ZEITUNG, Apr. 25, 1997, at 77. Over the years, the NEUE ZURCHER ZEITUNG has been inconsistent in its
reporting of the coffee spill case. Three years earlier, the NEUE ZORCHER ZEITUNG had properly noted the
damages in the case in an article calling for reform in the United States. In the earlier article, however, the
newspaper provided no discussion at all regarding the relevant facts of the case for punitive damages. The
only facts provided were that Mrs. Liebeck poured coffee on herself and received third degree bums. If those
were truly the only facts to the case, Mrs. Liebeck would probably have received nothing!; See Reinhard
Meier, Der Fall O.J. Simpson und andere Beispiele Zweivel an Amerikas Geschworengerichten Inflationen
massloser Schadenersatz-Verdikte, NEUE ZORCHER ZEITUNG, Oct. 15, 1994, at 9.
46. U. Schmid, Klagen als Volkssport in den USA, NEUE ZORCHER ZETUNG, Apr. 11, 1997, at 7.
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diabetes, and cause high blood pressure.47 As a worldwide actor and a "deep
pocket" defendant, McDonald's has been the target of other lawsuits, including
one that led to a recent settlement due to its use of meat products in its allegedly
"vegetarian" french fries.4' The United States system-like any legal
system-is indeed prone to aberrations. Notwithstanding, the fundamental
distinction between lawsuits that are allowed and those that are not allowed
cannot be overstated,49 particularly in understanding the full functioning of
United States law. Although lawsuits alone may have strategic value, it is only
the final outcome of a case at the appellate or Supreme Court level that
becomes integrated into the United States common law system through the
doctrine of stare decisis.
With respect to the coffee spill case, sensationalism has unfortunately
twisted it in such a way that the true outcome is either ignored or not known.
It is, in fact, very close to impossible to fully set the record straight on the
coffee spill case. The case is not reported or published, which means that under
United States law it cannot be considered as valid precedent for any legal
purpose. Westlaw50 has a simple one-page "unpublished"51 version available
as part of its database service.52 LEXIS-NEXIS has no record of the case.
Regarding the appeal, there is nothing, either in published, unpublished, or any
other unofficial or official form. Consequently, in order to find out what truly
happened, one is required to review many different sources that discuss the
topic. Sources include consumer-biased Web sites, personal Web sites,
newspaper articles, and a few law review articles.53 This article uses all these
sources to ascertain the details on the case. The reader is advised that his or her
own research may yield different results, which again supports the proposition
that the coffee spill case is really not a "case" at all.
47. Wolfgang Koydl, Fette Aussichtenftir Dicke, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Nov. 23, 2002, at 12.
48. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, June 7, 2002, at 9, Nr. 129.
49. The "McDonald's makes kids fat" lawsuit has recently been dismissed. See Pelman v.
McDonald's Corp., 2003 WL 22052778, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003), available at
http://news.findlaw.comlcnnldocslmcdonalds/plmnmcdl2203opn.pdf. (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
50. Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis are the two largest subscriber-based database services in the U.S. for
legal research. See www.westlaw.com and www.lexis.com.
51. "Unpublished" opinions are provided by some databases as an additional customer service, but
they have no effect as legal precedence.
52. See Liebeck, 1994 WL 360309.
53. See generally supra note 43. See also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil
Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1996).
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A. McDonald's: The Facts
Plaintiff Liebeck was sitting in the passenger seat of her grandson's car
holding a coffee that she purchased from a drive-through window of a
McDonald's (in Europe this is often referred to as a "McDrive"). When
Liebeck opened the lid of her coffee to add cream and sugar, she spilled the
coffee on herself. The coffee cups were made of Styrofoam and were not
particularly sturdy.
The sweatpants that Liebeck was wearing absorbed the coffee and held it
next to her skin. A vascular surgeon determined that Liebeck suffered third-
degree bums over 6% of her body, including her inner thighs, groin, buttocks,
and genital areas. She was hospitalized for eight days, during which time she
underwent skin grafting.54 As a result of the bums and surgery, Liebeck had
permanent scarring on more than 16% of her body.5
Plaintiff Liebeck initially contacted McDonald's for reimbursement of the
medical charges, which at that time totaled $11,000. McDonald's countered
with an offer of $800.56 After her medical treatment was completed, Liebeck
had $20,000 of medical bills and decided to hire a lawyer. As part of the trial
process, the case went to a mediator for attempted resolution. The mediator
recommended the parties settle for $225,000. McDonald's refused and the case
continued to trial.5
B. McDonald's: The New Mexico Trial Court Ruling
Evidence submitted by Liebeck indicates that McDonald's kept its coffee
at 165-170 degrees Fahrenheit, which is apparently hotter than at other fast-
food chains.58 Although the cups are marked with the warning "Caution,
contents are hot," Liebeck advanced the proposition that McDonald's customers
should be in a position to reasonably expect that "hot" means "hot" relative to
other fast-food vendors. Liebeck did not contest the axiom that coffee was hot,
nor that coffee can cause bums; Liebeck argued, however, that the full
circumstances must be taken into account. In this context Liebeck argued that
54. See Consumer Attorneys of California, Know the Facts: The McDonald's Coffee Case, at
http://www.caoc.com/facts.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2002) (providing description of the case facts).
55. See Stella Award Subscriptions, Opportunists and Self-Described Victims, Plaintiffs v. Any
Available Deep Pockets and the United States Justice System, Defendants, at http://www.stellaawards
.com/stella.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2002) (stating that although there are discrepancies in the reporting of
how much of Mrs. liebeck's body was burned, sources seem to agree that burns covered between six percent
and sixteen percent of her body).
56. See supra note 40.
57. Gregory Nathan Hoole, In the Wake ofSeemingly Exorbitant Punitive Damage AwardsAmerica
Demands Caps on Punitive Damages-Are We Barking Up the Wrong Tree?, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 459,471
(1996).
58. LIABILiTY WEEK, Vol. 12, No. 38, Sept. 29, 1997.
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it is relevant to consider the following: (a) whether the coffee is hotter than
coffee served by similar restaurants, (b) whether the cups are fragile and
adequate for handling hot material, (c) if the cups and lids work well in a drive-
through setting, and (d) if the operator is aware that its product has caused
damage to other consumers.
The last criterion proved to be one of the most relevant facts in the award
of punitive damages. During the trial, the plaintiff demonstrated that McDon-
ald's had already ignored more than 700 similar claims of coffee burns.59 The
company even ignored a written request from the Shriners Burn Institute in
Cincinnati to reduce the temperature of its coffee.6' Harry J. Gaynor, president
of the National Burn Victim Foundation, had said the temperatures for
McDonald's coffee were "[miuch too hot for human consumption and extreme-
ly dangerous."'" Mr. Gaynor pointed out that coffee and other hot drinks are
not deemed "shippable" until they cool to 154 degrees.62 Indeed, Liebeck
advanced proof that the coffee was between 165 and 170 degrees when it
spilled, compared to home-brewed coffee, which is usually between 135 to 140
degrees.63
With respect to other claims, McDonald's representatives initially misled
the court and jury about the existence of other claims and complaints. Liebeck
produced evidence of nearly 700 prior complaints against McDonald's.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs showed that McDonald's had paid out-of-court
settlements to other victims for similar bums and injuries. Liebeck's evidence
demonstrated that McDonald's total payouts for hospital fees and actual
damages in similar injuries totaled more than $500,000. Yet McDonald's still
had not changed its coffee temperature or serving method. McDonald's own
testimony in court by one of its executives, Mr. Appleton, demonstrated that
McDonald's knew that consumers had suffered bums, but the company had no
interest in changing its policy.64 In a particularly callous statement, a McDon-
ald's representative testified to the court that the number of injuries were
"statistically insignificant" when compared to the billion cups of coffee
McDonald's sells annually.65
59. Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided that Coffee Spill is Worth 2.9 Million
-McDonald's Callousness Was Real Issue, Jurors Say, In Case ofBurned Woman,-How Hot Do You Like
It?, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Sept. 1, 1994, at Al.
60. See supra note 40.
61. Dan Shaw, Coffee, Tea, or Ouch?, N. Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1994, at Cl.
62. Id.
63. Gerlin, supra note 59.
64. Id.
65. Saunders & Schmeiler, P.C., Liability Exposure of Owners & Operators of Malls, Retail
Establishments & Commercial Enterprises, athttp://www.sslawfrm.compub.premises.htm (last visited Oct.
7, 2003).
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Based on evidence produced by Liebeck, it would be difficult to argue that
the decision of the New Mexico jury in favor of Liebeck was irrational. The
amount of the award, however, is another story.
C. Calculation of Damages
As has been discussed earlier, punitive damages are intended to create an
incentive for a company to change policy and behavior. To do this, punitive
damage calculations will often be based on the strength of the company as a
whole.66 The jury found that McDonald's had engaged in willful, reckless,
malicious, or wanton conduct, which is the standard used for the awarding of
punitive damages. Ms. Liebeck's attorney provided evidence that McDonald's
made $1.35 million per day from coffee sales alone. As a measure of punitive
damages, the attorney's recommendation was that the jury award one or two
days of revenue coffee sales as punitive damages. 67 The trial court award was
the equivalent of two days of worldwide coffee sales, totaling $2.7 million.
With respect to actual damages for medical bills, attorneys' fees, and
compensation for loss, Liebeck was awarded $200,000. However, the jury
determined that Liebeck was also at fault in the way she handled the coffee. On
this point, the jury determined that Liebeck was 20% at fault, which automati-
cally reduced the $200,000 award by 20% to $160,000.68
D. McDonald's: The New Mexico Appeals Court Ruling & Settlement
The punitive damages award became the main issue upon appeal. As
previously noted, an appeals judge later reduced the $2.7 million jury award in
punitive damages to $480,000, which, when added to the $160,000 compensa-
tory damage claim, totaled $640,000. Liebeck then threatened to take the case
to another level of appeal; however, the parties quickly settled the case for an
undisclosed amount, requiring that the deal be kept sealed.69 According to
some sources, the final total amount (compensatory and punitive) was less than
$600,000.70 Based on the emerging case law, such as the Supreme Court Case
of BMW v. Gore, it is unlikely that the plaintiff would have been able to do any
better upon appeal.
66. See Adams, 813 P.2d at 110 (noting that evidence of the defendant's wealth is necessary to
enable the court to determine "whether the amount of damages exceeds the level necessary to properly punish
and deter").
67. Gerlin, supra note 59.
68. Liebeck, 1994 WL 360309 at 5. This is known in United States law as the comparative
negligence doctrine, whereby a plaintiff's recovery is reduced proportionally to the plaintiff's degree of fault
in causing the damage.
69. WALL STREET JOURNAL, supra note 39, at B6.
70. See Liebeck, 1994 WL 360309 at 1.
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VII. BMM v. GORE: THE FACTS AND THE ALABAMA TRIAL COURT RULING
BMW v. Gore7 serves as an excellent example of reduction of punitive
damages in practice. Also, it is interesting for the context of this article as it is
"international" in the sense that it involves the repainting in the United States
of cars ordered from a German manufacturer.
The facts of the case are as follows.72 The plaintiff, Dr. Ira Gore Jr.,
bought a new 1990 BMW 535i automobile from an Alabama dealership for
approximately $40,000. At the time of the sale, Dr. Gore signed an "Acknowl-
edgement of Disclosure" in which he acknowledged that the automobile might
have sustained damage at some point prior to his purchase. The disclosure form
also stated that Dr. Gore had inspected the automobile and had agreed to accept
it. This disclosure form did not list the repair that is the subject of the case, and
Dr. Gore did not know that he ought to specifically check the quality of the
painting process.
Dr. Gore drove the car for approximately nine months before taking it to
"Slick Finish," an independent automobile detailing shop, to make the car look
"snazzier than it normally would appear." Prior to taking the car to "Slick
Finish," Mr. Gore was not unsatisfied with the car's appearance and had not
noticed any flaws in the finish on the car. Yet Dr. Gore's assumption had been
that since the car was new, it had never been damaged.
The detailer at "Slick Finish" informed Dr. Gore that the car had been
partially repainted. Dr. Gore later determined that the refinishing had been
done because of acid rain damage to the car's paint finish sustained during
transit between BMW AG's manufacturing plant in Germany and BMW NA's
vehicle preparation center in Brunswick, Georgia. BMW NA, the American
distributor of BMW automobiles, had adopted a policy that it would not
disclose any damage to dealers or customers if the cost of repairing the damage
was less than 3% of the manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP). The
cost of refinishing Dr. Gore's automobile was $601, less than 3 % of the MSRP.
Consequently, BMW NA did not disclose to Dr. Gore that the automobile had
been refinished prior to purchase. Thejury found that the damage devalued the
car by $4,000, or approximately 10% of the price paid by Dr. Gore. The
devaluation was based on the assertion that the United States paint job was not
as good as the "super heating" procedure used by the factory in Germany. The
jury found that the paint would fade earlier, reducing the value of the car.
Upon his discovery that the automobile had been refinished, Dr. Gore sued
German Auto, BMW AG, and BMW NA, alleging that the failure to disclose
71. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 116 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
72. Unless stated otherwise, the facts are taken from the United States Supreme Court Ruling, in
BMW, 116 U.S. at 565.
Ryan
84 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
the refinishing constituted fraud, suppression of a material fact, and breach of
contract. At trial, Dr. Gore presented evidence that BMW's Executive Board
had adopted a policy in 1983 to deliberately and fraudulently conceal from
customers and dealers that vehicles had been repainted, regardless of the extent
of the damage or cost of repairs. Further evidence showed that a minimum of
983 other cars, each with at least $300 in damage, had been sold to unsuspect-
ing American customers. Dr. Gore attempted to show that these figures, even
though impressive, underestimate BMW's program of nationwide fraud.
Dr. Gore's claim was that, by selling damaged cars for more than they
were worth, BMW reaped millions of dollars through nationwide consumer
fraud. The jury returned a verdict against all three defendants for $4,000 in
compensatory damages, and it assessed $4 million in punitive damages against
the BMW defendants jointly. The ruling was based on a determination that the
BMW defendants had been guilty of gross, malicious, intentional, and wanton
fraud. The noteworthy result is that the ratio of actual damages versus punitive
damages was 1000:1. The trial court entered a judgment on that verdict and
subsequently denied post-judgment motions filed by the BMW defendants. The
BMW defendants appealed.
A. BMW v. Gore: The Alabama Supreme Court Ruling
The Alabama Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that BMW's
misconduct had been reprehensible and merited punishment. However, the
state Supreme Court found that the jury should not have considered the
fraudulent acts occurring outside Alabama. The Alabama court then considered
the fraudulent cases in that state and reduced the punitive award by 50% to $2
million. Said another way, the damages ratio of actual to punitive was reduced
from 1000:1 to 500:1. BMW appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which accepted the case through a process in United States law known as
certiorari.73
B. BMW v. Gore: The United States Supreme Court Ruling
The United States Supreme Court vacated the reduced $2 million award
and remanded the case to the Alabama Supreme Court, finding the actual harm
slight and the misconduct to be minor. The Court noted that "none of the
73. "Certiorari" is a writ of a higher court to a lower court to send all the documents in a case to
it so the higher court can review the lower court's decision. Certiorari is most commonly used by the United
States Supreme Court, which is selective about which cases it will hear on appeal. To appeal to the Supreme
Court one applies to the Supreme Court for a so-called "writ of certiorari," which it grants at its discretion
and only when at least three Justices of the Supreme Court believe that the case involves a sufficiently
significant federal question in the public interest. By denying such a writ the Supreme Court says it will let
the lower court decision stand, particularly if it conforms to accepted precedents (previously decided cases).
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aggravating factors associated with particularly reprehensible conduct is
present" (emphasis added).
Justice Stevens, in writing for the Supreme Court,74 stated at the outset of
the case that protections from the United States Constitution apply. In
particular, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a
state from imposing a "grossly excessive" punishment on a tortfeasor.75 If an
award can be fairly categorized as "grossly excessive" in relation to legitimate
state interests, it enters the so-called "zone of arbitrariness" that violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.76
To assist lower courts in determining the constitutional boundaries of
punitive damages, for this case and future cases, the Court offered three "guide-
posts" to gauge whether a punitive damages verdict violates substantive due
process. The result is a three-factor test that analyzes the following elements:
(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the
relationship (or ratio) between the punitive award and the actual harm; (3) the
difference between the punitive damages remedy and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in similar cases. Each of these "guideposts" will be
briefly discussed below.
1. The First Guidepost: Degree of Reprehensibility
The Supreme Court explained that "[p]erhaps the most important indicium
of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. 7 7 In reviewing reprehensibility,
the Court noted that reprehensibility included economic torts (which were
present in the BMW v. Gore case), although it noted that conduct involving a
substantial risk of bodily injury will be deemed more serious and more
deserving of a sanction than pure economic torts. There was no risk of bodily
injury here since painting is purely a cosmetic function.
One of the unique characteristics of United States jurisprudence,
particularly in reading Supreme Court cases, is the presence of "majority,"
"concurring," and "dissenting" opinions. Often, the reader must refer to all
three in order to fully "frame" the jurisprudence. The "concurring" portion of
the opinion helps provide clarification for the first guidepost. In writing for
concurring Justices O'Connor and Souter, Justice Breyer emphasized that the
74. In a United States Supreme Court case, one Justice is appointed by the Chief Justice to write
the "majority" opinion. As will be explained later, the other justices may either join the majority opinion,
or they may write a separate "concurring" opinion or a "dissenting" opinion.
75. Gore, 116 U.S. at 562 (citing TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S.
443, 454 (1993)).
76. Id. at 568.
77. Id. at 575.
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harm to Dr. Gore was certainly not "especially or unusually reprehensible
enough to warrant $2 million in punitive damages, or a significant portion of
that award. To find to the contrary ... it is to make 'reprehensibility' a concept
without constraining force, i.e., to deprive the concept of its constraining power
to protect against serious and capricious deprivations" (emphasis in original).78
As noted above, it is perhaps more likely that risk of bodily harm or physical
injury would lead to punitive damages than would pure economic torts.
2. The Second Guidepost: Ratio Between Damages and Actual Harm
The Court emphasized that the primary goal in awarding punitive damages
is to punish present conduct, with the further objective of deterring future
egregious conduct. However in doing so, the Court emphasized that rationality
in awarding damages must prevail. The punitive damages must rationally relate
to the award of compensatory damages:
[W]e have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line
is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares
actual and potential damages to the punitive award. Indeed, low
awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio
than high compensatory awards if, for example, a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic
damages (emphasis in original).79
The Court noted that the 500:1 ratio in actual damages to punitive damages
awarded in BMW v. Gore was "breathtaking. 8 1 Still, with respect to future
cases, the Court refused to rule out the potential for granting high punitive
awards even when the damages are low. Legal commentators who have
analyzed case law after the BMW v. Gore decision have noted that courts have
had little difficulty finding large ratios to be excessive, although no hard-and-
fast "bright line" rule exists here.8 '
78. Id. at 590.
79. Id. at 582.
80. Id. at 583.
81. FISCHER, supra note 24, at 709. See also Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648, 661 (8th Cir.
1995) (finding a ratio in the order of 250,000:1 to be excessive); Ace v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1241,
1248 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that a 13:1 ratio was far beyond what had been previously approved by Alaskan
courts).
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3. The Third Guidepost: A Review of Sanctions for
Comparable Misconduct
The third guidepost in the Supreme Court's analysis in BMW v. Gore
requires the court to compare "the punitive damages award and the civil or
criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct. '12 In
reviewing excessiveness of punitive damages under this test, a court must
"accord 'substantial deference' to legislative judgments concerning appropriate
sanctions for the conduct at issue.18 3 In BMW v. Gore, the Court reviewed the
Alabama Supreme Court's $2 million economic sanction against other statutory
fines available for such misconduct in Alabama and elsewhere. The Court
noted that the maximum civil penalty authorized by the Alabama Legislature
for a violation of its Deceptive Trade Practices Act is $2,000.84 Ratios
(borrowed from the "second guidepost") may help here: note that the Alabama
Supreme Court's $2 million sanction is a factor of 1000:1. In applying its test
to the BMWv. Gore case, the Supreme Court found that the sanction imposed-
a ratio of 1000:1 versus the legislature's $2,000 violation for deceptive trade
practices-was overly drastic. The decision was reversed.
C. BMW v. Gore: Remand to the Alabama Supreme Court
When the United States Supreme Court reverses a lower court's ruling, it
will rarely change the award directly. Instead, it will remand the case for
reconsideration by the same lower court that issued the previous ruling. In the
present case, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Alabama Supreme
Court and required that it analyze the case with an application of the United
States Supreme Court's newly established tests. Upon remand, the Alabama
Supreme Court applied the United States Supreme Court's test and reduced the
punitive damages award to $50,000.85
VIII. STATE FARM
Most recently, the United States The Supreme Court reviewed the
application of punitive damages in the April 7, 2003 decision State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell, ("Campbell"). 6 In
Campbell, the Supreme Court overturned a punitive damages verdict of $145
million because of an insurer's bad-faith failure to settle out-of-court. The
82. 116 U.S. at 583.
83. Id. See also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301
(1989).
84. BMW, 116 U.S. at 584.
85. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 515 (Ala. 1997).
86. State Farm Mut. Auto. ns. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1517 (2003).
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Supreme Court said that punitive damages were applicable to the case, but the
ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages-here, 145:1-was
excessive. The Supreme Court reached this conclusion by applying the criteria
of BMW v. Gore. Perhaps the most important contribution of Campbell to
United States jurisprudence is its further clarification of the second BMW v.
Gore guidepost.
A. Background and Facts
The case took over two decades to resolve, beginning in 1981 and ending
in 2003. In 1981, Curtis Campbell ("Campbell") was driving with his wife on
a two-lane highway in Utah. Campbell decided to pass six vans traveling ahead
of them. Todd Ospital ("Ospital") was driving a small car approaching from
the opposite direction. To avoid a head-on collision with Campbell, Ospital
swerved off the highway, lost control of his car and collided with another car
driven by Robert Slusher ("Slusher"). Ospital was killed, Slusher was per-
manently disabled, and the Campbells escaped without injury.
Although Campbell initially insisted that he was not at fault, opposite
conclusions were reached by early investigations after the accident.87 The
Campbells were insured by the insurance company State Farm. Even State
Farm's own internal investigators concluded that Campbell was probably
responsible for the accident.88
The policy limit that the Campbells purchased from State Farm covered
their losses up to $50,000, or $25,000 per claimant. Prior to trial, Slusher and
Ospital offered to settle the matter out of court with Campbell for the policy
limit of $25,000 each.89 State Farm, however, refused the offer to settle and
insisted on challenging the matter in court, gambling to pay either nothing or
less than $50,000. It would be later determined that State Farm altered the
records from their own investigation to hide their determination that Campbell
was at fault.
When State Farm insisted on litigation, company representatives reassured
the Campbells that "their assets were safe, that they had no liability for the
accident, that [State Farm] would represent their interest, and that they did not
need to procure separate counsel."'  This reassurance equated to an
indemnification, since it was State Farm's choice alone to litigate rather than
settle at the $50,000 policy limit.
87. Id. at 1517.
88. Id. at 1518.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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State Farm proceeded with challenging the matter in court and lost at the
court of first instance.9 The court of first instance determined that Campbell
was 100% at fault and awarded damages to Slusher and Ospital of $185,849.
This judgment equated to a delta of $135,849 over the Campbells' $50,000
policy limit.
In spite of their earlier promise to indemnify the Campbells, State Farm
then refused to pay the $135,849 in excess liability. Representatives from State
Farm boldly told the Campbells that "you may want to put for sale signs on
your property."92 State Farm further refused to represent Campbell any further
through an appeals process and therefore Campbell hired his own lawyer to
appeal the judgment.
Eventually, after many months and a series of litigious activity, State Farm
decided to pay the $135,849 in excess liability. Still, the Campbells believed
that their refusal to settle and their advice (in capacity of their attorney and
insurer) to sell their home was bad faith, and further that they had committed
fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
B. A unique litigation strategy
After many months in the litigation process, Slusher, Ospital and the
Campbells-together-made a strategic agreement. They agreed that the
activities of State Farm were in bad faith and decided to join together against
State Farm on the bad faith, fraud and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims. Slusher and Ospital agreed not to seek payment of their
$135,849 claim against the Campbells. In exchange, the Campbells agreed to
pursue a "bad faith" lawsuit against State Farm which would hopefully render
punitive damages. This would result in a new lawsuit that would be represented
by Slusher's and Ospital's attorneys. The Campbells also agreed that Slusher
and Ospital would have a right to participate in all major decisions concerning
the bad faith lawsuit. For example, no settlement could be concluded without
Slusher's and Ospital's approval. Furthermore, Slusher and Ospital would
receive 90% of any verdict against State Farm. This new lawsuit would
continue under Campbell's name since the bad faith claims against State Farm
were vested in Campbell alone.
C. Claims against State Farm
When the new portion of the trial was underway, the Campbells introduced
evidence that State Farm's decision not to take the case to trial was the result
91. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 65 P.3d 1134,1141 (Utah 2001).
92. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1518.
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of a national scheme to fraudulently limit payouts company wide.93 In support
of this claim, the Campbells introduced extensive expert testimony regarding
fraudulent practices by State farm in its nation-wide operations. The Campbells
also showed how they altered documents related to their own investigation of
Campbell. The Campbells claimed that these nation-wide practices were
sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages.
The Campbells were very successful at the court of first instance in Utah.
The jury of the court of first instance awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in
compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages. However, the
judge of first instance partially corrected the verdict, citing the (then recently-
decided) BMW v. Gore decision. The judge reduced the jury verdict from $2.6
million and $145 million to $1 million and $25 million respectively. Both
parties appealed, and the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the jury's $145 million
punitive damages decision, but left the $1 million in compensatory damages
intact.94 State Farm then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
D. The United States Supreme Court applies its previous punitive damages
judgments to the facts
The majority opinion of the Court in Campbell was written by Justice
Kennedy, and was joined by Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Souter and
Breyer. Justices Scalia, Thomas and Ginsburg filed dissenting opinions.
Kennedy evaluated the facts of Campbell against the judgment of BMW v.
Gore, stating that, under the BMW v. Gore principles, the case was "neither
close nor difficult. ' 9
5
1. The Supreme Court provides further clarification on the
second "ratio" guidepost
The Supreme Court in Campbell stated, at the outset, that this was not
punitive damages per se, but, as in BMW v. Gore, the Court reviewed the
amount of punitive damages. In Campbell the punitive damages ratio was
145:1. The issues which gave rise to punitive damages, as stated above, was the
fact that State Farm had altered the company's records to make Campbell
appear less culpable. Then they promised the Campbells that they would
indemnify them and take the matter to court, when it was almost certain that
they would lose. When State Farm lost, they reversed their indemnification
promise. This harm was amplified by the fact that State Farm told the
Campbells that they should put a for-sale sign on their house.
93. Id.
94. Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1153.
95. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1521.
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In applying thefirst Gore guidepost (reprehensibility) the Supreme Court
in Campbell found that the reprehensibility claimed was related to State Farm's
bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Since the
claims were not related to damage or risk of bodily injury, the Supreme Court
found that the amount of punitive damages should be relatively low.
In applying the second Gore guidepost (the ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages), the Supreme Court provided further clarification on
what they believed would be reasonable in cases where reprehensibility is low.
As noted above, however, the Gore court decided not to apply a mathematical
formula. While the Supreme Court still officially maintains this position, in
State Farm it provided a useful additional guideline, stating that "[slingle-digit
multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving
the [s]tate's goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards in range of 500:1
[citing BMW v. Gore], or in this case, of 145:1" (emphasis in original).96
The third Gore guidepost (the ratio of punitive damages to statutory
criminal fines) received little discussion.
Finally, the Supreme Court emphasized that the application of punitive
damages must be limited to harm related to the plaintiff. In Campbell, the
lower court's punitive damages award was also based on nation-wide conduct.
This is not allowed, because it would require a calculation of hypothetical
damages to other parties' claims in other states. By allowing evidence of
nation-wide evidence it infringes on the ability of other states to punish and
regulate the same conduct. This, itself, would also infringe the United States
Constitution.
E. Dissenting Opinions
Dissenting opinions were filed by Justices Scalia, Thomas and Ginsburg.
In State Farm, the dissenting opinions of Scalia and Thomas were very short
and contained little new interpretive information. Justices Scalia and Thomas
regularly dissent whenever the Supreme Court overturns punitive damages.
According to Scalia and Thomas, the Constitution should not be used to reduce
the size of punitive damage awards. Scalia and Thomas would have upheld the
$145,000 judgment.
Justice Ginsburg's dissent was somewhat more detailed and speaks to the
tort reform movement in the United States. According to Ginsburg, the legisla-
tures, not the courts, should pass laws to limit punitive damages. Ginsburg also
extensively reviewed the data and found that the action by State Farm was
extremely reprehensible. Consequently, Ginsburg, like Scalia and Thomas,
would have let the $145,000 award stand.
96. Id.
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IX. CONCLUSIONS
The United States system of punitive damages makes European lawyers
nervous for a number of reasons. One of them is predictability and certainty.
Civil lawyers, although supported by hybrid systems of jurisprudence, are not
comfortable with uncertainties that arise from common law claims for punitive
damages. Another reason is the "strategy" factor present in the United States
law system, i.e., the fact that United States lawyers can sue and create massive
legal costs for their opponents without having to pay for them if they lose. 97
The recently filed "McDonald's makes kids fat" case is an excellent example
of this. Another previously noted example is the filing of claims by a German
victim of the Eschede train accident in United States courts.
Although the United States system may operate in a manner that is
confusing-some may say inefficient-it is not irrational. This is not to say
that the United States tort system does not need reform-it does. With respect
to who receives the payouts of punitive damage awards, i.e., generally the
victim, the author supports a commonly held reform view that punitive damages
should be paid to government.98 Although this view still needs to be reconciled
against the incentive argument, i.e., that plaintiffs should have an incentive to
bring to court cases in which defendant conduct is egregious and against public
policy. A trend in tort reform is already in place that requires portions of
punitive damages to be given up by the plaintiffs; so far, eight states have
enacted laws in this regard. 99 On the whole, however, solid empirical data exist
to show that the full review procedure will often assure rational results for tort
cases in the end.'0° BMWv. Gore is an example of this rationality as a case that
emerged from the full functioning of the United States system. The United
States Supreme Court's recent Campbell decision further secures the rationale
and policy, and provides further clarification (particularly the "single digit
multiplier" in cases of low reprehensibility).
97. This is known as the "English Rule," or the "loser-pays rule," which requires the losing litigant
pay the winner's costs and attorney's fees. In the United States the so-called "American Rule" prevails,
which requires that each litigant must pay its own attorney's fees, regardless of who prevails in the lawsuit.
The rule is subject to bad-faith and other statutory and contractual exceptions. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 12, at 82.
98. See Tort on Stilts, THE ECONOMIST, (Opinion section) Mar. 22, 2001, at 4.
99. See Anthony J. Sebok, Why the Future of Punitive Damages May Only Grow Brighter,
FindLaw.com, at http://www.writ.corporate.findlaw.com/sebok/20030107.html (last visited Oct. 11,2003);
see also Dardinger, supra note 30, at 105.
100. See Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 55
(1983) (noting that when adjusted for population, American court filings are in the same general range as
those in Ontario, Australia, England and Denmark).
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Although liabilities in the United States common law system may seem
"unknown," the system of checks and balances, if properly understood and
considered, sets relatively rational limits to damages. A recently published,
detailed analysis by three Cornell law professors has shown that the
relationships between actual damages and punitive damages is in fact coherent
and rational.l°' One may believe that the rational limits of the system are being
tested by the ongoing litigation with asbestos and in the tobacco industry. This
may be true. However, since many of these cases are still under way, it is
perhaps too early to tell. It should never be forgotten that the United States
system is a complete one that only begins with the trial process. Outrageous
damages can and will be reduced by appellate courts if they fall within certain
clearly defined criteria. While the United States Supreme Court has still
declined to set an absolute constitutional limit on punitive damage awards, its
holding in Campbell that "single-digit multipliers" are more likely to agree with
due process provides the clearest guidance to date concerning the permissible
size of punitive damages.
101. Theodore Eisenberg, ET. AL., Reconciling Experimental Incoherence with Real-World
Coherence in Punitive Damages, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1239, 1245 (2002).
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I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
A. Introduction
Zimbabwe held a crucial Presidential Election from the 9th to the March
11, 2002. The election was momentous because it was preceded by cataclysmic
events in the country's post-colonial scene. The election attracted such singular
international attention that the question of sovereignty that had never been
raised vis-a-vis the conduct of elections became a topical issue in Zimbabwe and
other countries. Furthermore, human rights fears that had characterized the
2000 parliamentary elections paled into insignificance by comparison.'
The importance of these elections provides more evidence when we
consider that more than a year later, the political crisis in the country was far
from over. This article is an attempt to critique the presidential election in the
light of international human rights standards guiding electoral practices. This
article also measures electoral practices against democratic norms prevailing in
the global environment. Consequently, it is envisaged that this will help
scholars and political scientists who are studying electoral institutions to con-
textualize the event and appraise it against the democratic ethic that Africa is
aspiring towards. The election, as a model, can either be accepted or rejected
in contributing to the improvement of domestic or regional systems.2 The
limitation of this paper is that during the election, the writer was only an
unaccredited observer. As such, it was not possible to gain access into polling
stations or to formally interview the main actors in the election. Thus, much
reliance was placed on information from the Zimbabwe Human Rights (N.G.O.)
Forum (Z.H.R.F. or the Forum), newspaper reports, the Internet and reports
from international groups, aside from the traditional forms of information
gathering.3
B. The importance of elections
Granted that the reasons that the international community was drawn to the
Zimbabwean election may not have been entirely selfless; this concern is based
1. Allegations from different comers were made regarding the state of human rights in the pre-and
post-2000 Parliamentary election period. See e.g., Zimbabwe: Terror Tactics in the Run-up to the Parlia-
mentary Elections, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, June 2000; Rule of Law, The LAw SOCIETY OF ZIMBABWE
MAGAZINE, 2000, at 5; Law Society of Zimbabwe; B. Raftopoulos, Politics in Zimbabwer-2001: Confronting
the Crisis, Address at the Crisis in Zimbabwe Conference, (Aug. 4, 2001) (transcript is on file with the author).
2. Individual aspects of the election may be dealt with likewise.
3. HUMAN RIGHTS AND ZIMBABWE'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, The Zimbabwe Human Rights
Forum (March 2002), at http://www.hrforumzim.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) [hereinafter THE FORUM].
The Forum is comprised of twelve non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in the field of human
rights.
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on the fact that democratic practices are not only important but must be
monitored.4 Thus, in this age of globalization, no country is an island. If
Country X does not measure up to democratic behavior, there may be a ripple
effect that impact not only the region, but on the whole world.
It is now axiomatic that one of the fundamental prerequisites for any
democratic transition is free and fair elections.5 Indeed, some scholars go as far
as to say that the notion of democracy, involving the two aspects of "free and
fair elections" and "good governance" has become a global norm.6 It is ad-
mitted that the notion of democracy and all its corollaries like the rule of law
and good governance has not yet found universal acceptance, let alone inter-
pretation.7 Nonetheless, it cannot be gainsaid that the notion of democracy,
involving the two aspects of "free and fair elections" and good governance has
become established in the course of the 1990's.8
Among other things, governance in the modern sense recognizes that the
will of the people should be central to how they must be ruled.9 Like elsewhere,
the outcome of the 2002 election in Zimbabwe was expected to reflect the will
of the majority of the people since the citizens have a right to determine their
own existence and to choose who should preside over their day-to-day life in
their pursuit of fulfillment and happiness. 10 This will of the people is reflected
in the doctrine of free and fair elections.
4. The ruling party and its friends argued that American and European interests, especially that of
the British, was actuated not because of any concern for democracy but because of a 'satanic conspiracy' to
return white supremacy and prevent the land redistribution exercise in which prime land belonging to white
commercial farmers was being acquired reportedly for redistribution to landless blacks. See generally, 28
PARL. DEB. (The Parliament of Zimbabwe) (2002) 4:4128-9; 28 PARL. DEB. (The Parliament of Zimbabwe)
(2002) 46:4136.
5. Larry Diamond, Globalisation of Democracy: Trends, Types, Causes and Prospects Centre for
Democratic Studies 17 (quoting R. DAHL, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POLITICAL DEMOCRACY: LINKAGES AND
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS).
6. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, 1996 REPORT OF
THE DEMOCRACY FORUM 2 (1996) [hereinafter I.D.E.A.].
7. J.A. WISEMAN, THENEW STRUGGLE FORDEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 7-8 (Ashgate, Aldershot 1996).
8. I.D.E.A., supra note 6.
9. Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections, G.A. Res. 137,
UN GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/46/137 (1991).
10. "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government." Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at art. XXI(3), U.N. Doc. A/Res/217(A)(m1)
(1948) [hereinafter U.D.H.R.].
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1. Free and fair elections
It is unlikely to be seriously contested that free and fair elections are a
human right." Indeed, the elements of freedom and fairness in elections per-
vade all international and regional legal instruments. 2 Elections should also be
free and fair so that the rights and interests of the governed are protected. 13
The right of individuals to determine their own fate will remain a sham if
they are not granted the necessary environment in which to exercise that right
freely and without unnecessary impediments. Thus, state parties, in this case
Zimbabwe, are bound to hold genuine and periodic elections "guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors."' 4 State parties are also bound to
ensure that representatives are "freely-chosen."15 Apart from protecting the
individual, these requirements are also designed to give legitimacy to the politi-
cal system and to enhance democracy. In this respect, they are a motivation to
contribute to the development process. 16
It should also be observed that the idea of freeness protects the voters not
only at the time of voting, but also stretches back to the pre-election period.'7
As a consequence, the principle of free elections is closely linked to the funda-
mental freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, expression, and association
as well as assembly; and freedom from discrimination. 8 These essential free-
doms are also protected in the African Charter. 9
Lastly in this respect, it is also observed that the idea of freedom in the
electoral process contemplates a political environment that is not manipulative.
It envisages a situation where there is greater freedom of the media to operate
11. G. TOTEMEYER & D. KADIMA, ELECTORAL INSTITUTE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, SADC OBSERVER
HANDBOOK 3 (2000).
12. See generally, United Nations Framework for Strengthening the Rule of Law, available at
www.arts.mcgill.ca/programmes/polisc/unsco-ruleoflaw.html (last visited July 15, 2002); see also, U.D.H.R,
supra note 10, at art. 21; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N.
G.A.O.R., 21st Sess., (1996) [hereinafter I.C.C.P.R.].
13. Context and objectives of UN electoral assistance, at www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ead/websites (last
visited Aug. 13, 2002).
14. I.C.C.P.R., supra note 12, at art. 25(b),
15. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People's Rights, July 20, 1979, art. 13, 21 I.L.M. 58
[hereinafter African Charter]; see also UDHR, supra note 10, at art. 21(1); I.C.C.P.R., supra note 12, at art.
25(a).
16. Part One of the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation
(the African Charter for Development).
17. See generally, G.S. GOODWIN GILL, FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1994).
18. M. NOWAK, CCPR COMMENTARY 449 (N.P. Engel Publishers 1993)
19. African Charter, supra note 15, at art. 2, 8-11.
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without undue influence or hindrance. G. Feltoe sets out some of the consider-
ations that could negate the freeness and fairness of an election as where:
a) Campaigning by a political party is prevented or seriously obstructed;
b) Voters are intimidated or bribed;
c) The electoral laws give an unfair advantage to one of the political
parties contesting the election;
20
d) There is rigging of the elections.2
It follows from the above therefore that the notion of freedom in elections
is a prerequisite for democracy. It basically denotes an environment wherein
voters have the freedom to participate in elections the way they want without
fear of adverse effects on their and/or their families' safety, welfare, or general
dignity and without coercion and restrictions.22
It may also be added that fairness means that the rules of the game are
clearly spelled out for all contesting parties to know what is at stake. The
elections must also be held in respect to the principles of universal and equal
suffrage, paying attention to the right to equality.23 These requirements are
widely captured in international and regional legal instruments.
2. The international and regional instruments governing elections
Many conventions, declarations and protocols provide for free, fair and
genuine elections. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(I.C.C.P.R.) makes provision for open elections, as does the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (C.E.R.D.).24 Zimbabwe is
20. Transparency establishing the legal ground rules in an inclusive and open manner is necessary.
THE ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, THE O.D.I.H.R. ELECTION OBSERVATION
HANDBOOK 7 (1999).
21. G. Feltoe, An unfair contest: The Presidential Elections in Zimbabwe, in 6 ZIMBABWE HUMAN
RIGHTS BULLETIN 81 (2002). (Electoral fraud vitiates or even perverts the will of the people.)
22. This is the requirement for the secrecy of the ballot.
23. Any restriction to the right to vote should be reasonable; not discriminatory. See G.A. Re. 137,
U.N. G.A.O.R., 46th Sess., U.N. Doc A/RES/46/137 (1991); I.C.C.P.R., supra note 12, at art. 25(b).
Restriction on the grounds of residency was upheld by the European Commission, see App. Mo. 7566176, 9
Eur. Comm'n H.P. Dec. & Rep. 121 (1976). See also M. Nowak, supra note 18, at 449.
24. G.A. Res. 2106, U.N. G.A.O.R., 20th Sess., arts. 5, 25 (1965); see also Convention on the
Political Rights of Women, Dec. 20, 1952, 193 U.N.T.S. 135.
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a party to these two conventions.25 It also ratified the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights.26
For the purposes of this inquiry, it suffices to say that all the instruments
cited above basically make provisions for the conduct of regular (or periodic),
genuine (or free and fair) elections, mostly by secret ballot. However, it is
interesting to note that unlike the European and American conventions, the
African Charter is silent on the issue of secrecy of the ballot. It is also
remarkable that of the regional instruments, it is only the American Convention
that makes a direct reference to the question of suffrage. 7 The Charter may also
be compared to the American Convention, which adds a right to be elected.2"
Evaluated against international and regional instruments the African
charter therefore "stands out as meager and without substantial legal content"
with regard to the right to vote. Moreover, the right is to be exercised "in accor-
dance with the provisions of national laws." It may be noted however that there
is no clear check or limitation on the import or operation of national legislation,
leaving wide discretion to the individual state. 29 This leads us to examine the
extent to which sovereignty, as contested by the government of Zimbabwe, can
preclude international interest in domestic elections.
3. Sovereignty and elections
The state party to the international instruments setting out the rules and
standards for the conduct of elections has some modicum of latitude to conduct
elections within the parameters of its own laws. 30 The United Nations recog-
nized sovereignty in its Resolution on "respect for the principles of national
sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states in their electoral
processes."'"
25. CHRISTOF HEYNS, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA I (Kluwer Law Intenrational 1996 Series,
1996). In the regional sphere, Article 13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Article 20
of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Article 23 of the American Convention on
Human Rights, and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Protocol I make provision for
open elections.
26. Id. at5.
27. American Convention on Human and Peoples' Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. XXIII(l)(b), 1144
U.N.T.S. 123.
28. Id.
29. LONE LINDHOLT, QUESTIONING THE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE AFRICAN CHARTER
ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS IN BOTSWANA, MALAWI AND MOZAMBIQUE 156 (DARTMOUTH PUBLISHING
Co.) (1997).
30. The principle of sovereignty has been codified in, among others, Article Two of the United
Nations Charter.
31. U.N.G.A. Res. 46/130 of 17 December 1991; see also U.N.G.A. Res. 47/130 of 18 December
1992 and U.N.G.A. Res. 48/124 of 20 December 1993.
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Although they are held within the limitations of domestic law and practice,
elections must be held in an environment that caters to the exercise of funda-
mental freedoms in accordance with international law. It seems incontrovertible
that on the global scene, the principle of sovereignty is and should indeed keep
on giving way to the principles of accountability, the observance of international
norms, and human rights.32 Sovereignty should never become a sanctuary for
dictatorship and human rights violations.
II. ZIMBABWE: A BRIEF POLITICAL BACKGROUND
The struggle for democracy and human dignity has its roots in the colonial
period of the country. The British formally colonized Zimbabwe in 1890. In
1893, the Anglo-Ndebele War erupted against the local Ndebele ethnic group
in the Matebeleland region. This war was actuated by the dispossession of
blacks of their land and cattle.
Shortly thereafter the Shona groups from Mashonaland joined the war and
by 1896, the conflagration had become so widespread that it was called The
First Chimurenga or "war of liberation." After the arrest and execution of the
Chimurenga leaders, further dispossession and oppression followed, the upshot
of which was that dissent spread commensurately.33
As a result, the trade union movement gave birth to several opposition
political parties. The Zimbabwe African National Union (Z.A.P.U.) was formed
in 1961 under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo and the Zimbabwe African
National Union (Z.A.N.U.) was formed in 1963 under the headship of
Ndabaningi Sithole34 as discontent with a political system that was premised on
the notion of white supremacy grew. Smith proclaimed a Unilateral Declaration
of Independence (U.D.I.) on November 11, 1965. 3' This move was designed to
perpetuate minority rule and is largely seen as the precipitator of the bitter
liberation struggle that was to follow: the Second Chimurenga.36 The guerrilla
war forced Smith to the negotiating table, culminating in the country's first
32. Admittedly, there is a lack of consensus about in which issues the international community has
the right to intervene. See generally, M. HEINBERG, SUBDUING SOVEREIGNTY: SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RIGHT
To INTERVENE 136 (Pinter Publishers 1994). In his book Keeping a Fractured Peace, J.J. Holst observes
"[s]overeignty may in fact be waning more rapidly than widely presumed...."
33. For information about Zimbabwe, visit the Zimbabwe government website at
http://www.gta.gov.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
34. Subsequently led by President Mugabe as the First Secretary of the party.
35. The system was segregationist and the franchise was only extended incrementally until equal
and universal suffrage was obtained at independence in 1980.
36. GABRIELSHUMBAETAL., Report on the Presidential Election in Zimbabwe 4 (2002). The paper
was researched under the guidance of the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, and is on file with
the Centre.
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majority vote in 1980. The elections were won by Z.A.N.U. (P.F.), uninterrupt-
edly the ruling party, and ushered in black majority rule.37
Although the country has never been a de jure one-party state, the ruling
party has completely dominated Zimbabwean politics since the Unity Accord
with Z.A.P.U. in 1987. However, it seems to have been shocked out of com-
placency when the Movement for Democratic Change under the leadership of
Morgan Tsvangirai almost won over half the contested seats in the June 2000
Parliamentary Elections. Compounded by the fact that the government had
suffered defeat when Zimbabweans rejected a government-sponsored draft
Constitution at a referendum earlier in the year, the tone of government official
speeches became ominous if not utterly menacing as the Presidential election
drew near.38
The legal regime for the elections
In evaluating the election, recourse should be had to the domestic legal
regime, in particular, the electoral law and the Constitution. The Constitution
provides for fundamental human rights.39 These include political rights like
freedom of conscience, expression, assembly and association, movement and
protection from discrimination.40 Other freedoms include the right to life, the
right to protection from inhumane treatment and the right to protection from
arbitrary search or entry.4'
The Constitution also provides for the election of the president in accor-
dance with the electoral law.42 To be elected to presidency, one must be a
citizen by birth or descent and should have attained forty years of age and be
ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe.43 The tenure of the office of the president is
limited to six years. It is however notable that the constitution is silent on the
duration of the term of office of the incumbent president in the event of his/her
being re-elected.
Section Sixty-one of the Constitution provides for the establishment of an
Electoral Supervisory Commission (E.S.C.). It may be observed that although
the Constitution provides for the registration of voters,44 it does not guarantee
37. Id. Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) won 116 out of the 120 contested seats.
38. See generally, The FORUM, supra note 3. (These speeches are extensively captured within.)
39. ZIMB. CONST., ch. M.
40. Id. §§ 19-23.
41. Id. §§ 12, 15, 17.
42. Id. at ch. V, § 2.
43. Id.
44. ZIMB. CONST., ch. VI, § 8.
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that those entitled to be registered will actually be registered as voters. It also
does not grant the right not to be prevented from casting the ballot.
The Electoral Act provides for regulations and procedures governing
parliamentary and presidential elections. 45 It makes provisions for the appoint-
ment of an Electoral Directorate (the E.D.), the functions of which include
"giving instructions and making recommendations" for "ensuring that elections
are conducted efficiently, properly, freely and fairly."4 6 It also regulates the
procedure and conditions of service of the E.S.C. and Registrar-General of
Elections (the R-G) as well as the registration of voters. The Act also provides
for the functions of the R-G who is subject to the direction of the E.D.47
1. The Election Directorate (E.D.)
The E.D. consists of a chairman appointed by the President, the Registrar-
General and no fewer than two, or more than ten other members. The Minister
of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs appoints the ten others. Any other
person assigned for the administration of the Act in terms of Section Three may
also assume the Minister's responsibility.48 It would seem that the composition
of the E.D. does not augur well for guaranteeing free and fair elections. Ulti-
mately, the President appoints members in one way or another. In practice, it
has often been shown that the E.D.'s partiality in handling contentious elections
is suspect.49
The E.D. was chaired, ex officio, by Mariyawanda Nzuwa (appointed by
President Robert Mugabe) and the Registrar-General (Tobaiwa Mudede). Who
exactly comprised the E.D.'s other members in March 2002 was not clear.
However, the Police Commissioner sat together with the E.D. Chair and the R-G
at the table from which the results were announced.5°
2. The Electoral Supervisory Commission (E.S.C.)
An Electoral Supervisory Commission (E.S.C.) is established by Section
Sixty-One of the Constitution. The President, in consultation with the Judicial
Service Commission, appoints a chairperson and two other members.5' Two
45. Electoral Act, Zimb., at http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/Zimbabwe/ElectoralAct.pdf. (last visited
Oct. 11, 2003).
46. Id. § 4.
47. Id. § 15(2)-(3).
48. Id. § 4.
49. See generally, THE FORUM, supra note 3, Angela P. Cheater (2001).
50. Id.
51. ZIMB. CONST., ch. LXI(1).
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additional members are "appointed by the President after consultation with the
Speaker."52
It should be noted that although the President must consult, he or she is not
required to adopt recommendations given to him/her. The President also
decides the tenure of office of the Commissioners. 3 Furthermore, members
hold office "on such conditions as the President may fix" and the President may
remove them from such office 4.5 Thus, the impartiality of the E.S.C.- appointed
by the President- remains suspect. Practice has also generated suspicions that
the E.S.C. panders to political considerations although the Constitution provides
for its independence.
Together with the R-G, the E.S.C. is responsible for conducting presiden-
tial and parliamentary elections. Still, it is interesting that neither the Electoral
Act nor the Constitution specifically grants the E.S.C. a mandate to conduct
elections for presidency.
The E.S.C. appeared to be inadequately geared to discharge its constitu-
tional mandate as only four of the five required E.S.C. members were appoint-
ed.56 The President appointed retired army colonel, ex-combatant, and lawyer
Sobusa Gula-Ndebele as the Chair.5 7 In turn, the Chair of the E.S.C. appointed
as Director of Elections brigadier Douglas Nyikayaramba. 58  Seventy-two
Zimbabwe National Army officers were reportedly seconded to the E.S.C. One
thousand eighty election supervisors and 22,000 election monitors were mostly
recruited from the ministries of defense, home affairs and education. 9
It would appear that the selection of electoral officers was not transparent
and inclusive. A balance could have been attained by also including people
from other sectors of the national spectrum to give the impression of independ-
ence. In Lesotho, for example, officers of the Independent Electoral Commis-
52. Id.
53. Electoral Act, supra note 45, at art. § 7.
54. Id. §§ 7, 10.
55. ZIMB. CONST., ch. LXI(6). In 2002, the United Parties resolved to boycott the election until
amendments were made to the Electoral Act and the Registrar-General was precluded from conducting voter
registration. See also Angela Cheater, A Baseline Report in Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, ZIMBABWE
HUMAN RIGHTS BULLETIN, Jan.-June 2000, at 66.
56. See generally THE FORUM, supra note 3.
57. He took over after Peter Hatendi resigned in protest over funding and other inadequacies.
58. See THE ZIMBABWE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 14, 2002, at http://www.standard.co.zw (last visited
Oct. 11, 2003).
59. See THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 2002, at http://www.mweb.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11,
2003).
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sion (I.E.C.) came from diverse backgrounds.6 Moreover, the law was amended
willy-nilly to favor the ruling party, as will be seen below.
3. Changes to the electoral law
The President used his wide powers three times6' under the Electoral Act
to promulgate laws that were detrimental to the opposition.62 One such law was
the General Laws Amendment Act (G.L.A.A.). 63 The G.L.A.A. made extensive
amendments to the Electoral Act. It was described by the opposition as
"undemocratic and contrary to the S.A.D.C. Parliamentary Forum Norms and
Standards for Elections in the S.A.D.C. Region."'  The Minister of Justice,
Legal and Parliamentary Affairs described the amendments as designed "to kick
out from our politics the influence of foreign money and foreign interests" and
to prevent private organizations from conducting voter education.65
Also contentious was a provision in the G.L.A.A., which empowered the
Registrar-General to change voters' registration particulars without informing
them.' It was feared that it facilitated rigging of the voter roll by moving voters
between constituencies without their knowledge or even throwing them off the
roll altogether. After the Supreme Court nullified the G.L.A.A., 67 an Electoral
Amendment bill was introduced carrying identical provisions.68
4. Evaluation
It may be observed that the electoral institutions for the election were not
independent, at least in principle. International standards for transparency,
freeness and fairness of the electoral process can normally be enforced when,
among other things, the selection of electoral officers and the setting up of
institutions is seen as unbiased. Charges to the electoral law that fly in the face
of court judgments may only have one purpose: to favor the ruling party at the
60. LESOTHO COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP REPORT, General Election May 25, 2002, at
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/dynamic/press-office/display.asp?id=480&type=press&cat=57 (last visited
Oct. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Lesotho Report]. Lesotho held its General election on the 25th of May 2002.
61. See Statutory Instruments, in, Zimbabwe Presidential Elections, REPORT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP, Mar. 9-11, 2002 [hereinafter COMMONWEALTH].
62. See Electoral Act, supra note 45, § 158. This section gives the President powers to make
statutory instruments that s/he "considers necessary or desirable to ensure that any election is properly and
efficiently conducted and to deal with any matter or situation .. "
63. General Laws Amendment Act § 2 (2002) [hereinafter G.L.A.A.].
64. 28 PARL. DEB. (The Parliament of Zimbabwe) (2002) 35:3135.
65. See generally, THE FORUM, supra note 3.
66. See ZIMB. CONST., ch. XXXIV(1).
67. See COMMONWEALTH, supra note 61, at 23.
68. G.L.A.A., supra note 63, at 4.
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detriment of the opposition.69 However, this on its own should not be taken in
isolation to arrive at any conclusion on the freeness or otherwise of the election.
There are other stages that are crucial to an electoral process, as those analyzed
hereunder.
Ill. THE PRE-ELECTION SCENARIO
A. Voter education
Unlike the position regarding the 2000 parliamentary election, the
government outlawed the provision of voter education by civil society and made
it a preserve of the E.S.C. The E.S.C., however, could delegate its responsibil-
ity and supply material to whomever it granted the permission to carry out voter
education.7 °
The G.L.A.A. also banned foreign contributions or donations for the
purposes of voter education to anyone except the Electoral Supervisory Com-
mission. 7' This restricted the participation of civil society in voter education
and deprived voters of their freedom of information. This provision was not as
illogical as it might seem considering that the E.SC. was short on resources.
Since education is power, it is arguable that the government had a reason
to want the electorate to remain ignorant in the face of mounting economic
problems and what promised to be a stiff election. It is notable, however, that
these provisions were largely ignored as the Zimbabwe Election Support Net-
work (Z.E.S.N.) and others continued to distribute pamphlets. 72 Thus, although
the G.L.A.A. had the potential to, and did prejudice voters, the effect was not
fatal in terms of voter education.73
B. Voter registration
On January 31, 2002, the nomination day for the presidential election, the
E.S.C. announced that 5,479,100 people were registered on the voters roll.74
The official government newspaper, The Herald, announced that, of those
69. In Lesotho, electoral laws were only changed to facilitate the smooth running of elections in
view of the compromises made by the contestants.
70. G.L.A.A., supra note 63, at 14D(4), (6).
71. Id. § 14D(5).
72. Lesotho Report, supra note 60.
73. It may also be noted that the Civic Alliance for Social and Economic (C.A.S.E.P.) and the Legal
Projects Centre (L.P.C.) continued to educate people on their rights in spite of the G.L.A.A.
74. The Forum reports that the M.D.C. claimed to have uncovered 524 duplications and 107
deceased voters still registered on the roll.
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registered, 3.2 million were urban voters and 2.2 million rural voters. 75 The
government later altered the figure to reflect the presence of 3.2 million rural
voters and 2.2 million urban voters. This is significant because the ruling party
believed its support base was the rural area.76
It is alleged that the office of the Registrar-General declined to publicize
the number of voters registered in each constituency on the grounds that the
information was confidential. 77 Furthermore, the R-G is also alleged to have
refused to release the final roll used in the election.78 This caused disquietude
within the opposition as it was argued that the roll could be used to manipulate
the outcome of the vote. Some commentators claimed that this anomaly
reflected the fact that the roll had not been updated, leaving "a vast reservoir of
fictional voters who can then be mobilized at will when the going gets tough.,
79
This secretiveness was hardly in the spirit of transparency and had the potential
to vitiate the fairness of the election, contrary to international expectations.
C. Complaints with regards to registration
The Human Rights Forum observes that the fundamental rights to vote and
equality were compromised. It also observed that the effects of the G.L.A.A.
and other subsequent laws was to disenfranchise Zimbabwean citizens of
foreign descent and those previously entitled to postal votes. Moreover, proce-
dural complexities also resulted in most people being deprived of their right to
register, and therefore, their right to vote.
Disenfranchisement occasioned by failure to secure national identification
was particularly rampant among women married under customary law and the
youth. Chiefs and headmen (under the pay of the ruling party) became a con-
duit for securing national identity cards (IDs) for the purposes of registration.
Tendai Shumba, of Magunje (Hurungwe district) failed to secure a national ID
reportedly because she did not take a letter of recommendation from Z.A.N.U.
(P.F.) officials. 80
It is also reported that numerous roadblocks were set up by Z.A.N.U. (P.F.)
supporters to dispossess people of their identity cards so that they could not
prove their membership to the ruling party. The Forum also reported that, by
the time of voting, about 1,300 national identity cards had been reportedly
stolen in the districts of Mutoko, Tsholotsho, Nkayi, Bulilimamangwe South,
75. See THE HERALD, Mar. 12, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw. (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
76. See THE HERALD, Mar. 11, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw. (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
77. See THE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 10, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
78. See THE HERALD, Mar. 7, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw. (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
79, See THE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 2, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
80. See THE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 7, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
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Kwekwe and Buhera North. Such extensive disenfranchisement impacted the
freeness and fairness of the election.
Other "stringent" provisions that may have contributed to the disenfran-
chisement of voters were the proof of residence requirements in the G.L.A.A.'
Many people in the urban areas (touted to be the opposition M.D.C. stronghold)
were either homeless or could not obtain proof of residence. Many expatriates
intending to come to Zimbabwe to vote were likewise disenfranchised.82
Approximately 22,000 prisoners in jail could not vote either, although there is
no legal impediment for those on remand or those serving six months or less.
In contrast, all prisoners were allowed to vote at independence in 1980.
Students were also among those to suffer disenfranchisement. Those who
had been registered at tertiary institutions found that they could not vote as the
Ministry of Higher Education gave instructions that the institutions remain
closed during the election. Students attempting to vote at polling stations near
their institutions were reportedly turned away.83
In addition, amendments that were introduced to the Citizenship Act' were
also used to disenfranchise a majority of the electorate who held dual citizen-
ship. It is reported that the R-G refused to re-instate those who had successfully
applied to the courts against these amendments.85 There were also allegations
of procedural irregularities like registration after the roll had been closed or by
the underage. 6
Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to verify all allegations, surely
some of these complaints must have a basis in fact. It would seem that most of
them were founded, as the government did little to counter them. Violations,
and willful manipulation of the law is difficult to dispute. Such a scenario
offends the standards for elections as contemplated in the international instru-
ments adverted to previously.8
81. G.L.A.A., supra note 63, § 3(e)-(f). It is generally felt that the G.LA.A. placed "unreasonable"
demands on the electorate.
82. See THE ZIMBABWE STANDARD, Mar. 10, 2002, at http://www.standard.co.zw (last visited Oct.
11,2003).
83. See THE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 2, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003)
(quoting the Zimbabwe National Students Union (Z.I.N.A.S.U.)).
84. See The Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act, § 4:01 (1990).
85. Lesotho Report, supra note 60.
86. See generally, The Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, at http://www.hrforumzim.conspecial-
inhrru/Election (last visited July 30, 2002).
87. See also Southern African Development Community (S.A.D.C.) Parliamentary Forum, Norms
and Standards for Elections in the SADC region. (Zimbabwe is a member of S.A.D.C.)
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IV. THE ELECTIONS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
A. The freedoms of expression and information
The right of freedom of expression is protected in the Constitution."8 As
was the case in Lesotho' s General Elections, the state-controlled media devoted
most of their coverage to the ruling party. In Zimbabwe, however, the situation
was more serious. To begin with, the media was clearly polarized between the
independent press and the state-controlled press.8 9 The former seemed to favor
the opposition, although most of them strove for balance. The government con-
trolled media was however glaringly partisan. For example not a single state-
controlled newspaper, radio or television ran any advertisement for the opposi-
tion when the private press would advertise the ruling party.9°
Even more repugnant, the state-controlled media often invented stories to
paint the opposition in a bad light.91 In fact, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cor-
poration (Z.B.C.) was subsequently accused of not adhering to basic standards
of journalism in their support for the ruling party.92 The Media Monitoring
Project issued a report of the news bulletins carried by the television from
December 1, 2002 to March 7, 2002. It observed that ninety-four percent
favored Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) while the remainder was negatively slanted against the
opposition.93
Unlike the case with Lesotho, incidents of violence against media house
and personnel were not uncommon during the Zimbabwean election. Offices
and printing houses of The Daily News were bombed several times by suspected
ruling party supporters. Independent publications were 'banned' from such
areas as Bindura, Karoi and Masvingo, all strongholds of the ruling party.94
Vendors of these publications were invariably assaulted or tortured.
The law was also used to make it difficult for the media to freely inform
the populace. Laws like the Public Order and Security Act (P.O.S.A.), 95 as well
88. ZIMB. CONST. § 20; see also U.D.H.R., supra note 10, at 19; I.C.C.P.R., supra note 12, at art.
19.
89. See generally, Media Monitoring Project (2001), in http://www.kabissa.org/lists/newsletter-
submissions-1/0876.html; R. Saunders, (1999) A History of the Media in Zimbabwe.
90. ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS FORUM, (2002) Human Rights and Zimbabwe's Presidential
Election: Mar. 2002, at 15.
91. G. Feltoe, supra note 21, at 83-84; See also SUNDAY MAIL, Feb. 24, 2002 and Mar. 3, 2002; see
also THE HERALD, Feb. 11, 2002.
92. COMMONWEALTH, supra note 61.
93. FORUM, supra note 3, at 18.
94. See THE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 25, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
95. Public Orders & Security Act, ch. 11:17.
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as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Bill (now an act), were
often used to arrest journalists for publishing "false statements, which are
peddled internationally.
96
In summary on this issue, it may be observed that ruling party supporters
deliberately violated the rights of media personnel as well as the electorate.
Opposition parties were denied coverage in the state-owned media. As if that
was not enough, laws were introduced to curtail the right of expression as well
as its attendant right to receive information. Where the playing field is not
level, elections cannot be said to be genuine, free and fair. Next, we look at the
level at which other basic rights were respected during the election.
B. Freedoms of association and assembly
The Constitution protects these two freedoms.97 The African Commission
in John D Ouko v Kenya also held freedom of association sacrosanct. 98 Like-
wise, the Commission affirmed freedom of assembly as a fundamental political
right in Sir Dawda K. Jawara v The Gambia.99 However, these freedoms seem
to have been trampled upon during the Zimbabwean election.
The introduction of the P.O.S.A. heralded the intensification of a series of
violations.'0 Summarized, P.O.S.A. made it illegal to hold political meetings
without advance notice and permission of the police. It also prohibited state-
ments likely to cause 'ridicule' to the President. A month after its promulga-
tion, forty-two people had been arrested under the Act. The Forum notes that
none of them were ruling party supporters.' 0'
While President Mugabe addressed fifty major rallies, Tsvangirai could
only address eight as the police mostly refused to grant permission on the
grounds that they feared for public security.'0 2 In White City Stadium in
Bulawayo, the police fired tear gas to disperse M.D.C. supporters after clashes
with Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) sympathizers who invaded the stadium.' 3 Subsequently,
96. P. Chinamasa, as recorded in 28 PARL. DEB. (Parliament of Zimbabwe) 39:3547.
97. ZIMB. CONST., ch. § XXI. See also U.D.H.R., supra note 10, at art. XX; I.C.C.P.R., supra note
12, at arts. XXI, XXI.
98. Communication 232/99, http://www.achpr.org/html/communications.html.
99. Communication 149/96, http:// www.achpr.org/html/communications.html.
100. Public Order & Security Act, supra note 95. Violations included freedom of association. See
generally, Report of the South African Parliamentary Observer Mission 9, Mar. 9-11, 2002, http://www.
gov.za/issues/zimreport.htm. [hereinafter S.A.P.O.M.]. Although the group held (amid disagreements) that
the election was "a credible expression of the will of the people," their observations seem to controvert the
conclusion.
101. THE FORUM, supra note 3, at 23.
102. Id.
103. See THE DAtLY NEWS, Feb. 1, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
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the M.D.C. had to obtain an injunction against the police.'O° There were also
reports that police asked for national IDs before allowing people to attend rallies
addressed by M.D.C. Those with no cards were allegedly turned away.
10 5
C. Freedom from violence and intimidation
Political violence impedes the elector's ability to participate freely in the
electoral process. The electors can either be deterred from voting or may be
unduly influenced in their choice.10 6 Violence was the most outstanding occur-
rence in the Zimbabwean election. In most instances, it appeared to have been
incited by the ruling party. The opposition M.D.C. was the principal target, but
civil society and churches were not spared. We must, however, mention that the
opposition itself was not above perpetrating violence.0 7 Nonetheless, the ruling
party employed the full weight of the 'war veterans' and state agents in order
to win the election.
Political violence on such a scale had never been experienced before the
2000 Constitutional referendum and Parliamentary election.1'0 Inflammatory
statements from the leadership of the ruling party worsened it. President
Mugabe was quoted boasting that his party had several "degrees in violence."
He also urged his supporters to wage "a real war" on the M.D.C."°9 "The war
is going to be physical," he said.°"0
Following a request by S.A.D.C., he eventually made an appeal for an end
to violence, arguing that it was drawing international attention."' After the
European Union (E.U.) and the Commonwealth mounted the pressure, the
President made further calls for an end to violence." 2  The governor for
104. See THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE, Jan. 27, 2002, at http://www.mweb.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11,
2003).
105. See THE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 4, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
106. COMMONWEALTH, supra note 61, at 7.
107. Id.
108. Evidence of the massive violence and intimidation came to light in the cases following the
disputed 2000 Parliamentary Elections. See generally Mutoko South Election Petition, HH 68/2001,
ZIMBABWE REPORT 14, June 20, 2002; Hurungwe East Election Petition and Silas Matamisa v. Phillip
Chiyangwa and Registrar General of elections HH48/2001. See also S. Moyo (2001) 'The rule of law in
Zimbabwe' Paper presented to the Canadian Bar Association Annual General Meeting which is on file with
the author.
109. See THE FINANCIAL GAzET E, Jan. 10, 2002, at http://www.mweb.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11,
2003).
110. See THE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 6, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
111. See THE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 19, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
112. See THE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 30, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
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Manicaland is also reported to have called for a peaceful campaign." 3 These
pleas did nothing to stop the tide as party youths trained under the national
youth service, known as the "green bombers" for their military-style uniforms,
continued to set up roadblocks and terrorize the people.
The "war veterans" and the "green bombers" also set up terror "bases"
where victims would be tortured or "re-educated"." 4 Several deaths and dis-
appearances were reported." 5  In the Midlands, an M.D.C. supporter was
allegedly beheaded with a spade. Another victim had the letters M.D.C. carved
with a knife on his back." 6 Gang rapes were not uncommon against suspected
opposition supporters." 7 In stark contrast, Tsvangirai appealed for reason and
resort to the law." 8
Tsvangirai's faith in the rule of law was however misplaced, as the
Zimbabwe Republic Police (Z.R.P.) was clearly partisan in enforcing the law."9
In fact, it has been said, "[slympathizing with the opposition became a sure way
of having normal life disrupted by the law enforcement agents."120 In Chivi
District, police fired live bullets and hurled teargas at Tsvangirai' s convoy after
he stopped to greet supporters lining the roadside.' 2 ' This was not the first or
last time the police harassed him or his supporters.'22 Today, the M.D.C.
president faces two counts of treason, whereas senior Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) officials
perpetrate violence and incite mayhem with impunity during elections.
113. See THE ZIMBABWE STANDARD, Jan. 27, 2002, at http://www.standard.co.zw (last visited Oct.
11, 2003).
114. See THE ZIMBABWE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 1, 2002, at http://www.mweb.co.zw (last visited Oct.
11, 2003).
115. The Forum catalogues a total of 56 reported politically motivated deaths. THE FORUM, supra
note 3, at 97-100.
116. COMMONWEALTH, supra note 61.
117. Id. This writer has assisted some of these victims and has also suffered torture at the hands of
state agents. Such mindless violence is still continuing at the time of writing.
118. See THE ZIMBABWE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 8, 2002, at http://www.mweb.co.zw (last visited Oct.
11, 2003); THE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 11, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
119. This has been going on since the Constitutional referendum in which the government's
sponsored Draft Constitution was rejected, see for example The Human Rights Observer 'Deterioration of the
rule of law in Zimbabwe'; Norwegian Election Observation Mission (2002 Presidential Elections in
Zimbabwe 2002, Preliminary Report Issued on 12 March 2002 p 3 and G. FELTOE, The Onslaught Against
the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe (2001) (Paper presented to the South African Institute of International Affairs,
Johannesburg).
120. ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION, ZIMBABWE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2002 REPORT
3 (2002) [hereinafter ZIMRIGHTS].
121. See THE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 23, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. !1, 2003).
122. See THE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 7-8, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
[Vol. 10:95
Shumba
V. POLLING AND POST-ELECTION SCENARIO
Although there were incidents of gross human rights abuses in the run-up
to the election, it is encouraging that the election days were generally peace-
ful. 123 However, police fired teargas in Kuwadzana, Harare to dispel voters who
had become impatient with the slow pace of the election process. A large
number of people could not vote in the M.D.C. strongholds of Harare and
Chitungwiza as a result of the reduction of polling stations in urban areas. The
reduction amounted to about thirty to forty percent. 24
Even though verification and counting was delayed, the process was con-
ducted smoothly and according to procedure, as was the case in Lesotho.
Notwithstanding that, prior irregularities had marred the whole process. For
example, it is reported that the uniformed forces' voting was done in the pre-
sence of senior officers and was therefore not secret and subject to influence.'
"Numerous M.D.C. agents were kidnapped, injured or arrested or had their cars
stoned or taken away," making it impossible to supervise the process.'26
Furthermore, in Kuwadzana, "war veterans" allegedly assaulted and dis-
persed voters while wielding guns. 27 It is not surprising, therefore, that the out-
come of the election has not been accepted by the main opposition party, which
has filed suit. More importantly, the European Union and the United States
have imposed targeted sanctions against senior members of the ruling party.
VI. WHAT WENT WRONG?
A. The electoral system
In analyzing the Zimbabwean anomaly, it is fitting to make a brief
comparison with other countries. 2 8 Lesotho 2002 elections and Ghana 2000
elections were remarkable for the peacefulness. In Lesotho, it has been mooted
that this was because of the new electoral system that was introduced.'2 9
Zimbabwe uses the First Past the Post (F.P.P.) or "winner takes all"
electoral arrangement. It cannot be said that the choice of a political model is
merely important. Apart from its impact on the "representativeness, legitimacy
123. This writer was an unofficial observer on behalf of the Centre for Human Rights, University of
Pretoria.
124. COMMONWEALTH, supra note 61, at 16.
125. ZIMRIGHTS, supra note 120, at 5.
126. Feltoe, supra note 21, at 92.
127. See THE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 11, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
128. This writer has observed several elections, including the Lesotho 2002 ones.
129. The Mixed Member Proportional Representation system.
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and stability of the government born of it,"'3° the choice of a model is also
important in that it shapes the limitations and expectations of the contestants and
steers their conduct with respect to human rights. For example in the F.F.P.
system the stakes are high in the sense that the loser loses everything. Knowing
this, parties and individuals are liable to use unethical and unlawful means to
win the election. Since elections have been held relatively peacefully (in Ghana
for instance) using the F.F.P. system, the choice of an electoral model should
not be overemphasized. Even in Lesotho, where a new model was introduced,
it must not be forgotten that it was used on a limited scale. There are other vital
considerations to be taken into account.
B. The lack of transparency in Zimbabwe
Perhaps the most serious cause of violence in Zimbabwe was the lack of
openness accompanying the electoral process. For instance, the registration pro-
cess reopened three times, amid claims by the opposition that there was
insufficient publicity of the event.13 The electoral laws that had been the hall-
mark of past elections were often changed haphazardly. The courts sometimes
struck down some of the laws but nevertheless, the same provisions would be
returned in the form of other laws.'32 In instances such as these, it is likely that
both the electorate and the contestants would be driven to unlawful means out
of sheer frustration or even to compliment an apparently anarchical process.
The refusal to grant accreditation to both domestic and foreign observers
that the Zimbabwean government perceived as unfriendly worsened the
situation. 3 3 It also seemed to give credence to the fact that the process was
flawed. 1
34
Also important is the fact that in Lesotho, the "rules of the game" were
clearly defined. The opposition had been included in the negotiations surround-
ing the post-1998 electoral preparations. This was in sharp contrast to the
"ostracization" of the opposition in Zimbabwe. Thus, more because of the
"inclusivity" of the development in Lesotho rather than the new electoral
system, the election went smoothly.
130. N.L. Mahao, Electoral System and Legitimacy of Representation, (2000) 10 LEsOTHO L.J. 245
(2002); see also S.N. Ndengwa, The Relevance of the Electoral System: A simulation of the 1992 Kenyan
Election, 2 AFR. L.J. POL. SCI. 14 (1997).
131. COMMONWEALTH, supra note 61.
132. For example the General Laws Amendment Act was stuck down by the courts to be returned
a barely two weeks later in the form of the Electoral Amendment Bill (number 4 of 2002).
133. The local Zimbabwe Election Support Network (Z.E.S.N.) applied to field 12,500 observers but
was only allowed 500. The twenty-three strong delegation of NGOs from South Africa was refused
accreditation. The E.U. pulled out after its head of delegation had also been denied observer status.
134. Comparing Lesotho 2002 and Ghana 2000 elections.
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C. The advent of a strong opposition in Zimbabwe
It could be contented that the Zimbabwean election was strikingly different
because of the recent emergence of a strong official opposition. Unlike in
Lesotho, where the major opposition parties had been testing their strengths
against one another for a considerable period of time, the ruling party in
Zimbabwe had a history of dominance and complacency that made it appear
invincible. Although Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) seems to have a history of violence
against political opponents,'35 in 2002 the fear of loss was palpably existent, as
evidenced in the overreaction by the ruling party.'36 This apprehension could
only lead to desperate measures that would be an indictment to the whole
electoral course.
It should be noted further that unlike Lesotho, Zimbabwe has a very big
middle class, a student movement and civil society so strong that consciousness
was complementally high. Because of unparalleled economic woes-largely
the result of corruption and Economic Structural Adjustment Policies-students,
urbanites, and the middle class were the most poignant victims of the economic
downturn. This could only increase strife, as demonstrations became a daily
phenomenon. Believing it was under a siege of coup like proportions, the ruling
party increased strong-arm tactics.
D. The Land Question
Although no African state could be said to be liberated from problems
regarding the land issue, in Zimbabwe the clamor took on a serious tone in the
run up to the elections for various reasons. The liberation struggle (one of the
most bitter in the struggle for the decolonisation of Africa) was principally
premised on the land question.
The Lancaster House Constitution, which was negotiated in 1979, made it
practically impossible for the new black government to expedite the process of
redistribution. 137 Thus after the government failed to win support to solve the
land issue through what many perceived to be an unrepresentative, unjust and
discriminatory Constitutional overhaul, it mounted what was dubbed a "racist
campaign" against white farmers. They were accused of having sponsored the
135. Africa Watch (1989) Zimbabwe: A Break With the Past? The Africa Watch Committee pp 55-
76; see generally, ARNOLD, MILLIARD W. ET AL., Zimbabwe: Report on the 1985 General Elections (Inter-
national Human Rights Law Group Zimbabwe 1986); RicHARD SAUNDERS, NEVER THE SAME AGAIN:
ZIMBABWE'S GROWTH TOWARDS DEMOCRACY, 1980-2000, pp. 20-24.
136. Most statements by senior personnel in the government were astonishingly un-statesmanlike.
137. Jeffrey Herbst, 'The dilemmas of land policy in Zimbabwe' in Simon Baynham (1990) State
Politics in Zimbabwe: University of Zimbabwe Publications p 131.
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rejection of the draft Constitution in cahoots with the M.D.C., who were also
called "puppets" of Western influence and "Rhodies.' ' 8
This gospel of hate found its mark and spawned ruling party militants in
the form of "war veterans" and most unemployed youths who were willing to
go to extremes to advance the "Third Chimurenga." Thus, although other coun-
tries have their own land crisis, the demagoguery surrounding the issue in
Zimbabwe contributed to violence.
139
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Following from the above, it is our submission that an honest critique will
reach the conclusion that the 2002 Presidential election was not genuine, legiti-
mate, free, or fair. While there is little controversy over the genuineness of the
elections in Lesotho, the Zimbabwean process violated all the norms and stand-
ards, international or regional, expected in an election. It is sad, therefore, that
some observers opted to see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil."4
In view of this, it is hoped that it is not a misplaced sense of brotherhood
or an "old-boy network of African strongmen," (as Philip Gourevitch calls it) 4 '
that makes African leaders stick together in the face of wanton human rights
violations. Now is the time to come up with clear, binding and enforceable
human rights protection protocols and mechanisms before the continent is
relegated to the dustbin of democratic competitiveness.
For the sake of progress and development, the continent should be courage-
ous enough to admit, condemn and rectify its shortfalls. Where praise is due,
as in the Lesotho election, it must be generously accorded. By the same token,
wherever intervention is necessary, as was arguably the case in Zimbabwe, the
international community should not hesitate to intervene. It is mainly because
nothing was done then that people continue to die today.
138. Zimbabwe was formerly Rhodesia under colonial rule.
139. South Africa, Kenya and Namibia are some of the countries where the land question has
manifested itself recently.
140. These include the Namibian, Kenyan and Tanzanian Government Observer Teams, the
C.O.M.E.S.A. Observer Team, the O.A.U. Observer Mission, the African Heads of (Diplomatic) Mission and
the S.A.D.C. Ministerial Task Force.
141. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR
FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 254 (Picador USA 1999).
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years, for lifetimes, until that first crime is punished. Or else we'd all be
animals."'
I. OVERVIEW
Is it possible that the perpetrators of an atrocity so heinous it was code-
named "Spare No Living Thing" could not be brought to justice? The Govern-
ment of Sierra Leone said no! On June 12, 2000, the President of Sierra Leone
sent a letter to the United Nations Secretary General requesting assistance in
establishing a special court to try those responsible for the heinous crimes
perpetrated against his people and the country. The Special Court for Sierra
Leone (the "Special Court") was established on January 16, 2002, when the
United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone agreed to -a hybrid
structure, or joint effort, for prosecuting those most responsible for the murders,
rapes, mutilations, looting and other crimes against humanity that have occurred
during the civil war in Sierra Leone.
The Special Court is currently scheduled to open on June 30, 2003.2 The
hybrid Special Court, the first of its kind, should be the model for pursuing war
criminals in countries where the local courts and or governments are unable to
do so. Part II of this paper will provide a brief background on the country of
Sierra Leone and provide limited examples of the atrocities that occurred during
war. Part I will address the numerous attempts at peace and the failure of
those attempts. Part IV will provide background information on the establish-
ment of the Special Court, its mandate, and the offenses it will cover. Benefits
and detriments of the statutory structure of the Special Court will be outlined.
Additionally, there will be some comparisons to the Yugoslavia and Rwanda
tribunals, as well as the International Criminal Court ("ICC"). Part V will
discuss the benefits of the hybrid system as an institution and why it is an
appropriate model for future tribunals. Part VI will address the pitfalls in the
hybrid model as an institution and ways to overcome them. The historical
background and attempts at peace outlined in Parts II and III created an
environment that compelled the government of Sierra Leone to seek assistance
from the international community. The Special Court, outlined in Part IV, is a
direct result of that request for assistance. While the Special Court is not
without its defects, they are clearly outweighed by the benefits of the hybrid
system. As such, hybrid courts, like the Special Court, should be a model for
future international criminal tribunals.
1. Joyce Carol Oates, Norman and the Killer, in JOYCE CAROL OATES, UPON THE SWEEPING FLOOD
AND OTHER STORIES, 144-45 (1966).
2. Sierra Leone: "Special Court is Threat to Peace" - Ex Combatants, AFRICA NEWS, Nov. 22,
II. BACKGROUND
A. History/Country Issues
In 1652, the first slaves in North America were brought from what would
become the Republic of Sierra Leone to the islands off the southern coast of the
United States.' Ironically, Sierra Leone was established as a settlement for freed
slaves by Granville Sharpe in 1772, but was later proclaimed a crown colony of
Great Britain in 1808.' On April 27, 1961, Sierra Leone became an independent
state, although it retained the Queen of England as the constitutional Head of
State until April 19, 1971.' On September 27, 1961, Sierra Leone became a
member of the United Nations.6
In 1967, an army coup ousted the previously elected government and the
country came under military rule until 1992.7 At this time, Valentine E.M.
Strasser was installed as head of state by the Revolutionary United Front
("RUF').' He held office until January of 1996 when he was "ousted by a
military coup led by his defense minister, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio." 9
General elections followed and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was elected President in
February 1996. ° However, civil war once again erupted in 1997. Kabbah was
forced to flee in May 1997, but he was returned to power in March 1998 after
intervention by ECOMOG, the Economic Community of Western African
States Monitoring Group."
On May 14, 2002, the people of Sierra Leone held peaceful elections, in
which incumbent President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, of the Sierra Leone People's
3. Background Note: Sierra Leone U.S. Department of State website (January 2002), at
http://www.state.gov/rpa/ei/bgn/5475.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
4. BANKOLE THOMPSON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW OF SIERRA LEONE (1961-1995)
1(1997).
5. Id. at 7-8.
6. List of Member States, United Nations, http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (last
visited Sept. 28, 2003).
7. DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE
UN CHARTER: LEGAL LIMITS AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 143 (2001).
8. Id.
9. Timeline: Sierra Leone, BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1065898.stm
(last updated Aug. 6, 2003).
10. Id.
11. Id.
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Party was elected for a second five year term.' 2 While numerous parties were
represented, the RUF's leader Foday Sankoh, who is currently being held to
face trial in front of the Special Court, was prevented from running for the post
due to a technicality; he had not registered to vote.' 3
Today, Sierra Leone has a population of approximately five million
people. 4 The life expectancy at birth is 36 years for men and 39 years for
women, with an infant mortality rate of 170 per 1,000 births. 5 In its 2002
Human Development Report, the United Nations Development Programme
ranked Sierra Leone 173rd (lowest) in human development.16 It is officially the
poorest country in the world.
B. The Insurrection
It is estimated that between 100,000 and 200,000 people (2-4% of the
population) lost their lives during the war. 17 An additional 100,000 or more
were mutilated.' 8 Moreover, countless persons were displaced by the war."
There is no single cause for the 10 year war in Sierra Leone, which began on
March 23, 1991. The conflict started as a rebel incursion at Sierra Leone's
border with Liberia.20 The RUF claimed responsibility for the uprising, declar-
ing it was fighting against the corrupt middle-class in the capital, Freetown.
Additional contributing causes include corruption, monopolization of power,
and unequal distribution of wealth. The prominent human rights group, Human
Rights Watch stated, the "[d]eep-rooted issues that gave rise to the war [include]
12. The Jury Is Still Out: A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper on Sierra Leone, July 11, 2002,
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/sl-bckO7l 1.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2003) [hereinafter The Jury Is
Still Out].
13. Declan Walsh, The Vote For Hope in a Country that Once had No Future, THE INDEPENDENT
(LONDON), May 15, 2002.
14. Sierra Leone, FINANCIAL TIMES INFORMATION, June 14, 2002.
15. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, WORLD STATISTICS
POCKETBOOK 170 (2000).
16. SAKIKO FUKUDA-PARR, ET AL, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: DEEPENING DEMOCRACY
IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD 41 (Stephanie Flanders & Bruce Ross-Larson eds., Oxford University Press, for
United Nations Development Programme 2002), available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en/pdf/
complete.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
17. Ex-S. Leone Rebels Demand Sankoh 's Unconditional Release, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept.
17, 2002 [hereinafter Ex-S. Leone Rebels].
18. Children on the Frontline, THE IRISH TIMES, Mar. 2, 2002 [hereinafter Children].
19. Human Rights Watch estimates hundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced during the
war. See The Jury is Still Out, supra note 12, at 1.
20. There have been reliable reports that the war, or parts thereof, was supported by Charles Taylor
of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, now President of Liberia. Liberia's involvement in the war is
outside the scope of this paper, but may help to understand how the RUF and other factions were able to
sustain the insurrection for prolonged periods.
21. Children, supra note 18.
a culture of impunity, endemic corruption, weak rule of law, crushing poverty,
and the inequitable distribution of the country's vast natural resources ....22
The leader of the RUF was an ex-Corporal in the Sierra Leone Army
("SLA"), Foday Sankoh The goal of the RUF was to overthrow the All
People's Congress Party Government, headed by Major-General Joseph Saidu
Momoh. While claiming they were liberating the people of Sierra Leone from
Government corruption, the RUF began a reign of terror over them. No area of
the country was spared.
The rebels became notorious for hacking off limbs, predominantly of
women and children. They conscripted children, often through coercion and
drugs, to aid in the performance of atrocities. For instance, Musa Daboh was
abducted when he was 13. The RUF made cuts in his leg and rubbed cocaine
in before sending him into the front line. "Daboh says they were on drugs when
they attacked the village [his home town Kabala], going on a fring spree, as
humans 'were like chickens.'
24
Rape and murder were widespread. "'They stripped me naked and raped
me in front of my husband... They told him to laugh in front of the children
or he would be shot.' [said Baindu] It didn't matter. They shot him anyway,
and their three children.9
25
There was mass destruction of property and forced labor. Sahr Gbamanja
saw the RUF bum his 13-year-old brother to death in their house. "The rebels,
he said, tied people together in gangs and forced them to work or carry food and
ammunition. Those who refused or were too weak to work had their hands cut
off or were butchered. 26
These are just a few examples. A United Nations supported forensic team
has uncovered more than 75 mass graves, which are expected to be exhumed
after the final mapping of the sites takes place.27 Additional information
regarding how the bodies were killed should be available after the bodies are
exhumed. The exhumation may uncover atrocities that to date are unknown.
22. The Jury is Still Out, supra note 12, at 1.
23. UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, BOUND TO COOPERATE: CONFLICT,
PEACE AND PEOPLE IN SIERRA LEONE 15 (Anatole Ayissi & Robin-Edward Poulton eds., 2000) [hereinafter
BOUND TO COOPERATE].
24. Children, supra note 18.
25. Declan Walsh, Picking up the Pieces, THE IRISH TIMES, Feb. 19, 2002.
26. Richard Dowden, Justice goes on Trial in Sierra Leone, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Oct. 3,
2002, http://www.guardian.co.uklinternationallstory/0,3604,803280,00.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2003).
27. UN Team Identifies 75 Mass Graves in Sierra Leone, PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY DAILY
NEWSWIRE, June 26, 2002.
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Ill. ATrEMPTS AT PEACE
A. Abidjan Peace Agreement
The Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra
Leone and the RUF, signed at Abidjan on 30 November 1996,28 was the first
attempt to end the internal conflict in Sierra Leone. This agreement, among
other things, called for the immediate cessation of the armed conflict between
the parties, the disarmament and demobilization of the insurgents, the restructur-
ing of the military to integrate members of the RUF into Sierra Leone's armed
forces, the release of prisoners of war, the transformation of the RUF into a
political party, and Article 14 of the agreement provided a blanket amnesty for
members of the RUF, stating:
To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconcili-
ation, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or
judicial action is taken against any member of the [RUF] in respect
of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of
that organization up to the time of the signing of this Agreement.2 9
Although signed by President Kabbah of Sierra Leone and RUF leader,
Corporal Foday Sankoh, with the Government of COte d'Ivoire, the United
Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the Commonwealth Organiza-
tion acting as moral guarantors, peace in Sierra Leone was not lasting. Despite
the accord, attacks on the civilian population continued. The Government
blamed the RUF for the attacks and the RUF blamed the Government civil
defense forces, also known as the Kamajors.3 °
As a result of the continued conflict, on May 25, 1997, a coup led by Major
Johnny Paul Koroma of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council ("AFRC")
ousted the Kabbah government. Rebels from the RUF joined forced with the
AFRC junta, which also consisted of members of the SLA. 3' Although the
AFRC claimed the merging of the antagonistic forces of the RUF and the SLA
meant peace for Sierra Leone, the AFRC did not have the support of the local
28. Letter Dated 11 December 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the
United Nations Adressed to the Secretary-General, SCOR, 51 st Sess., Annex: Peace Agreement Between the
Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Signed at
Abidjan on Nov. 30, 1996 U.N. Doc. No. S/1996/1034 (1996).
29. See id. at art. XIV, at 6.
30. See BOUND TO COOPERATE, supra note 23, at 39.
31. UN Food Agency Warns Shortages in Sierra Leone, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 17, 1997.
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or international communities. As such, the AFRC resorted to terror tactics in
order to impose its will.
32
B. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Peace Plan
The Communiqu6 issued at Conakry on 23 October 1997, at the conclusion
of the meeting between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of
Five on Sierra Leone of the Economic Community of West African States and
the delegation representing Koromah,33 laid out a six point peace plan, to be
implemented over a six month period. First, it called for the immediate cessa-
tion of hostilities throughout Sierra Leone. Second, it called for the disarma-
ment, demobilization and reintegration of combatants supervised by ECOMOG.
Third, it called for the monitoring of humanitarian assistance by ECOMOG and
the United Nations military observers. Fourth, it called for the return of
refugees and displaced persons, with the assistance of the United Nations High
Commissioner of Refugees. Fifth, it called for the Kabbah government to be
restored as of April 22, 1998, with a procedure for power sharing. Sixth, it
called for the reintegration of combatants through job training or educational
scholarships. In addition to these points, the Plan included that "unconditional
immunities and guarantees from prosecution be extended to all involved in the
events of 25 May 1997 with effect from 22 April 19 9 8 ."'
This agreement was not implemented due to lack of political will on both
sides.35 Although the ECOMOG forces were successful in reinstating President
Kabbah, the result was the AFRC retreated into the bush and broke up into
disorganized bands of RUF and SLA troops.36 In early January 1999, a
combined force of rebel soldiers invaded Freetown. A massive attack on the
city, which included the killing of more than two hundred police personnel and
their families took place.37 The first three weeks of this battle are considered the
most "intensified, systematic and widespread violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law against the civilian population.
' 38
32. See BOUND TO COOPERATE, supra note 23, at 164.
33. Letter Dated 28 October 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United
Nations Addressed to the Presidents of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., Annex 2: Economic
Community of West African States Six-month Peace Plan for Sierra Leone (Oct. 23, 1997-22 Apr. 1998), U.N.
Doc. No. S/1997/824 (1997), availableathttp://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierraleone_09231997.html (last
visited Oct. 8, 2003).
34. See id. para. 8.
35. See BOUND TO COOPERATE, supra note 23, at 41.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 75.
38. Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.
SCOR, 55th Sess., para. 26, U.N. Doc S /2000/915 (2000), available at http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord2000/
documentation/security/s-2000-915.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Report].
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The January 1999 mission was code-named "Spare No Living Thing", and
consisted of the murder, rape and mutilation of thousands of civilians. 39 Other
missions included "Operation Bum House" which was a series of arson attacks
and "Operation Pay Yourself' which was a looting mission.'
C. Lome Peace Agreement
On July 7, 1999, the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF entered into
another Peace Agreement, the Lome Peace Agreement.4' The Lome Peace
Agreement was much broader in scope than the previous agreements. It
addressed such issues as: an immediate cease-fire and monitoring thereof,4 2
incorporation of the RUF into the government and its transformation into a
political party, the establishment of various commissions to ensure peace and
humanitarian assistance,43 the establishment of a formula for post-conflict peace
and security, the transformation of ECOMOG and UNOMSIL' s" mandates, the
disarming, demobilization and reintegration of all combatants, the establishment
of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the request for international
involvement. As with the prior agreements, Article IX of the Lome Peace
Agreement contains a broad amnesty, stating:
1.... the Government of Sierra Leone shall take appropriate steps to
grant Corporal Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon.
2.... also grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all com-
batants and collaborators in respect of anything done by them in
pursuit of their objectives...
3. To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national recon-
ciliation ... shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken
against any member of the [RUF], ex-AFRC, ex-[Sierra Leone Army]
39. Danna Harman, Sierra Leone: The Path from Pariah to Peace, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Sept. 18, 2002.
40. Caroline Hawley, A Country Torn by Conflict, BBC NEWS, Jan. 12, 1999,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/special-report/l1999/01/99/sierra_leonet251377.stm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
41. Peace Agreement, July 7, 1999, Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone-Revolutionary
United Front of Sierra Leone (1999), http://www.usip.org/library/pa/slsierrajleone-07071999.html (last
visited Oct. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Lome Peace Agreement].
42. Id. A separate Cease-fire Agreement was signed by the parties on May 18, 1999.
43. This included a Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Recon-
struction and Development, which is to control the exploitation of natural resources, including diamonds. Id.
at art. VII, para. 1. Corporal Foday Sankoh was offered Chairmanship of the Board of this Commission. Id.
at art. V, para. 2. This is ironic since much of the fighting during the decade of war was perpetrated by
Corporal Sankoh ostensibly in part because of diamonds.
44. The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was later replaced by the
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).
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or [civil defense forces] in respect of anything done by them in
pursuit of their objectives.. . since March 1991 .... 45
Like before, peace was fleeting as general incursions continued to take
place, including an attack on ECOMOG troops, the abduction of UN forces, and
11 British soldiers being taken hostage.' Additionally, in May 2000, Corporal
Sankoh ordered his guards to open fire on protestors outside of his house:
Twenty people were killed.47
D. Ceasefire Agreement dated November 10, 2000
The most recent cease-fire agreement48 between the Government of Sierra
Leone and the RUF was signed on November 10, 2000.4 ' This agreement called
for the halting of hostilities on that date. It also reaffirmed the parties' commit-
ment to the Lome Peace Agreement as the framework for establishing peace in
the country.
The war was officially declared over on January 14, 2002, when approxi-
mately 45,000 rebels surrendered.5" Weapons from these fighters were symboli-
cally destroyed over the prior six-month period. Significantly, the Statute for
the Special Court was adopted two days later, on January 16, 2002. No reports
of rebel incursions have occurred since this time. With the support of the UN,
the Kabbah government could declare the war over with conviction knowing it
had the backing of the international community.
IV. SPECIAL COURT
In response to President Kabbah's request of June 12, 2000, Resolution
1315 (2000) was adopted by the Security Council on August 14, 2000."' The
resolution requested the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the
Government of Sierra Leone to create a special court (the "Special Court").
Pursuant to that resolution, the Secretary General submitted a report to the
Security Council (the "Report").52 The Report outlined the general premise for
45. Lome Peace Agreement, supra note 41, at art. IX, paras. 1-3 (emphasis added).
46. See Timeline: Sierra Leone, supra note 9.
47. Ex-S. Leone Rebels, supra note 17.
48. Ceasefire Agreement, Nov. 10, 2000, Government of Sierra Leone-Revolutionary United Front
of Sierra Leone (2000), http://www.sierra-leone.org/ceasefirel 100.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2003) [hereinafter
Ceasefire Agreement].
49. It should be noted that the AFRC is not a party to this ceasefire agreement. Id. The last peace
agreement signed by the AFRC was the ECOWAS Peace Plan.
50. Michael Chege, Sierra Leone: The State that Came Back from the Dead, 25 WAsH Q. 147
(Summer 2002).
51. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess. 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000).
52. See Report, supra note 38.
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the statute of the Special Court with commentary from the Secretary General
regarding the workings of the Special Court.
The agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra
Leone creating the Special Court was adopted on January 16, 2002. 53 The
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (the "Statute") establishes the
guidelines under which the Special Court will operate.
Significantly, the Special Court is a treaty-based court. It represents the
first time that a court has been established between the UN and a local govern-
ment. The previously established ad hoc tribunals, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ITCY") and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), were established under Chapter VII of the UN
Security Council. The International Criminal Court ("ICC") is also a treaty-
based court. 4
The following sections will discuss the Statute, and where significant note
the statute based differences between the Special Court and the ITCY, ITCR,
and the ICC.
A. Temporal Jurisdiction
The Special Court's temporal jurisdiction is limited to violations that were
committed in Sierra Leone after November 30, 1996. This date was determined
after careful consideration of three possible dates by the Secretary General:
November 30, 1996, May 25, 1997, and January 6, 1999. 55 The following
issues were taken into consideration: (a) not overburdening the Special Court
or the prosecutor; (b) arriving at a date that corresponds with a new phase in the
conflict, but is not politically motivated; and (c) ensuring the date encompasses
the most serious crimes.56 It was determined the March 23, 1991 date would
create a heavy burden on the Special Court, and was not considered by the
Secretary General.57 The May 25, 1997 date was thought to have political
connotations that may imply that the prosecutions were aimed at punishing the
coup d'etat. To ensure the prosecutions encompassed the many crimes that
53. Letter Dated 6 March 2002 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., Attachment: Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, at 29,
U.N. Doc. S/2002/246 (2002), available at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/Statute.html (last visited
Oct. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Statute].
54. The ICC entered into force on July 2, 2002 and is open to ratification by all States.
55. See Report, supra note 38, para. 26.
56. See id. para. 25.
57. As the Special Court only intends to try a limited number of cases and only try those "who bear
the greatest responsibility", this date appears to be the most appropriate. Id. 1 1. There is no reason why the
key perpetrators of violations should not be held accountable for crimes committed from the period of May
23, 1991 to November 30, 1996, particularly, given the Secretary General comments regarding amnesty,
which are outlined later in this paper. See id. para. 22-4.
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were committed in the rural areas and countryside, the January 9, 1999 date was
also not deemed appropriate.
The November 30, 1996 date represents a significant limitation, as it
effectively absolves the crimes that occurred from the beginning of the war,
March 23, 1991. Such limitation risks undermining the objective of the Special
Court"... to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious
violations of international humanitarian law . . .58 Admittedly, the worst
atrocities of the war took place in January 1999, however, there are reports of
extra-judicial executions, deliberate and arbitrary killing, torture, rape and
mutilation dating back to the beginning of the war.59 The prosecutor could use
his discretion to meet all of the concerns of the Secretary-General, without
denying justice to victims during the early part of the war.
B. Personal Jurisdiction
Pursuant to Article 7 of the Statute, the Special Court has personal jurisdic-
tion only over individuals 15 years or older at the time the alleged crime was
committed.
As with temporal jurisdiction, the Report outlines several options for
personal jurisdiction: (a) a minimum age of 18 for prosecution; (b) a minimum
age of 18 for prosecution, with children between the ages of 15 and 18
recounting their stories to a Truth and Reconciliation Commission or similar
mechanism; or (c) have those 15 to 18 go through the judicial process but
without punishment. The Government of Sierra Leone strongly urged judicial
accountability for child combatants responsible for crimes falling within the
Special Court's jurisdiction. 60 There were equal concerns, particularly from
non-governmental organizations, that judicial accountability might hinder the
rehabilitation of the child combatants. The Report reviewed internationally
recognized standards for juvenile justice, in particular the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, and gave weight to the moral-educational message that
would be given to both the present and future generations of the children of
Sierra Leone. It was determined that personal jurisdiction should include
persons between the ages of 15 and 18, but that they would not be subject to
incarceration.6'
The Special Court is authorized to order any of the following for children
under the age of 18 found guilty of crimes outlined in the Statute: "care
58. See Statute, supra note 53, at art. I, para. 1, at 29.
59. The Preeminent human rights organizations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
publish reports for Sierra Leone which are available online at www.amnesty.org and www.hrw.org,
respectively.
60. See Report, supra note 38, para. 35.
61. See id. para. 32-38.
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guidance and supervision orders, community service orders, counseling, foster
care, correctional, educational and vocational training programmes, approved
schools and, as appropriate, any programmes of disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration or programmes of child protection agencies."62 However, the
Prosecutor for the Special Court has stated that he will not prosecute children
over the age of fifteen because they do not bear the "greatest responsibility., 63
As with temporal jurisdiction, this is a significant limitation on the Special
Court's mandate, as there were a plethora of child combatants involved in the
conflict. However, given the circumstances and special needs of child comba-
tants, this limitation is legitimate especially since the Statute provides for
rehabilitation of the children involved in the war. "[C]hild combatants were
initially abducted, forcibly recruited, sexually abused, reduced to slavery of all
kinds and trained, often under the influence of drugs, to kill, maim and bum."'
Children, as young as 5, were combatants in the conflict. These children were
coerced to fight for fear they would be killed. A 12 year old child combatant
said, "[w]hen I was killing, I felt like it wasn't me doing these things. I had to
because the rebels threatened to kill me. '65 These child combatants represent
the future of Sierra Leone. Limiting personal jurisdiction in this situation, in
line with international standards, and providing rehabilitation, is appropriate.
A benefit of the hybrid court model is that these types of situations can be taken
into account because jurisdiction is not bound by a global mandate.
C. Primacy over National Courts
Article 8 of the Statute states, "[t]he Special Court and the national courts
of Sierra Leone shall have concurrent jurisdiction. 66 However, the Special
Court is given primacy over the national courts and therefore has the power to
request that a national court of Sierra Leone defer proceedings in a particular
case and transfer a defendant to the Special Court for prosecution. For
Example, on July 10, 2002, the prosecution requested the transfer of Foday
Sankoh, who was being held for violations of domestic laws.67
62. See Statute, supra note 53, at art. VII, para. 2, at 33.
63. Sierra Leone: Special Prosecutor Meets Local Chiefs, AFRICA NEWS, Nov. 22, 2002.
64. See Report, supra note 38, para. 32.
65. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SIERRA LEONE CHILDHOOD - A CASUALTY OF CoNFLicT 4 (2002),
http://web.amnesty.orglaidoc/aidoc.-pdf.nsf/Index/AFR5 10692000ENGLISH/$File/AFR5 106900.pdf (last
visited Sept. 20, 2003).
66. See Statute, supra note 53, at art. I, para. 1, at 29.
67. Ex-S. Leone Rebels, supra note 17.
Concurrent jurisdiction is also found in the statutes for the ICTY6 and
ICTR,69 which both have primacy over all national courts. However, because
they were established under the Chapter VII powers of the Security Council, the
ICTY and ICTR also have the power to assert primacy over the national courts
of third States and to order the surrender of an accused within their territory.
This power has not been extended to the Special Court. That factor should not
impede the Special Court. If a person located outside of Sierra Leone is indicted
by the Special Court, an international arrest warrant could be issued by the
Special Court. Given the stature of the Special Court, it is presumed that most
countries would comply. If a country did not comply, or if the person being
sought is the head of state, as may be the case with Charles Taylor from
Liberia,7" the Special Court could request the UN Security Council intervene on
its behalf. In fact, if a warrant cannot be executed locally, or a country refuses
to execute a warrant, the Special Court has the authority to go directly to the
Security Council for intervention.7"
In contrast, the ICC statute provides that national courts will have primacy
over the international tribunal, unless the State is unwilling or unable to pro-
secute the crimes.72 If the State were unable to adequately prosecute an accused,
the ICC can assert its primacy over the national courts. Like the Special Court,
the ICC is a treaty based body, and as such can only exercise jurisdiction in
accordance with its statute. 73 Presumably, if the accused fell outside the juris-
diction of the ICC, the same procedure outlined above for requesting the aid of
68. See Amended Statute of the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia, (as amended May 25, 1993),
art. IX, http:llwww.un.org/icty/basic/statutstat2OOO.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2003) [hereinafter ICTY
Statute].
69. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda Article VIII http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/
ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html#statute (last visited Sept. 20, 2003) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
70. Taylor reportedly admitted to his support for the RUF in a November 12, 2002 Washington Post
interview. See Liberia: The Liberian Government Finally Admits Support to RUF, AFRICA NEWS, Nov. 27,
2002.
71. Charles Cobb Jr., Sierra Leone's Special Court: Will It Hinder or Help?, AFRICA NEWS, Nov.
21, 2002.
72. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, GAOR, 43rd Sess., art. XVII, para. 1,
U.N. Doc. AICONF.183/9, 37 LL.M. 999, 1012 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
... the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) The case is being
investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless that State
is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) The
case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has
decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; ....
Id.
73. Article 12 of the ICC Statute provides for court to have jurisdiction if (a) the State where accused
committed the crime is a party to the statute; (b) the accused is a national of a State that is a party to the
statute, or (c) if the UN Security Council refers a matter. See id. at art. XII, para. 2, at 1010.
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the UN Security Council, would be used if a country was unable or unwilling
to comply with an arrest warrant.
D. Crimes
Articles 2 through 5 of the Statute outline the crimes that the Special Court
has the jurisdiction to prosecute. These include: (i) Crimes Against Human-
ity,74 (ii) Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol I
thereto of 8 June 1977,'7 (iii) Other serious violations of international humani-
tarian law,76 and (iv) Specific crimes under Sierra Leonean Law.77
74. Crimes against humanity are defined thusly:
[t]he Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed the
following crimes as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population:
a. Murder;
b. Extermination;
c. Enslavement;
d. Deportation;
e. Imprisonment;
f. Torture;
g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other
form of sexual violence;
h. Persecution on political, racial ethnic or religious grounds;
i. Other inhumane acts.
See Statute, supra note 53, at art. II, at 30.
75. Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977 provides that
[t]hese violations shall include:
a. Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particu-
lar murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal
punishment;
b. Collective punishments;
c. Taking of hostages;
d. Acts of terrorism;
e. Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treat-
ment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
f. Pillage;
g. The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples;
h. Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
See Statute, supra note 53, at 30-31.
76. Article IV provides that
[t]he Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed the
following serious violations of international humanitarian law:
a. Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities:
20031 Stafford
It was determined that the crime of genocide could not be included under
the jurisdiction of the Special Court, as it is in the other criminal tribunals.
There was no evidence that the "massive, large-scale killing in Sierra Leone was
perpetrated against an identified national, ethnic, racial or religious group with
an intent to annihilate the group.
78
Chief Investigator, Alan White, has placed a special emphasis on gender
related crimes stating:
And let me mention one of the things that makes this special tribunal
unique. Gender crimes will be emphasized as a war crime and will
be pursued from the onset. It will not be an afterthought. We are
making gender crimes a top priority of our investigation and prosecu-
tion because rape, and sexual assault used as a tool of war needs to be
prosecuted.79
Although rape falls under the mandates of the ICTY and ICTR and has
been included in prosecutions by these tribunals, this is the first time such a
forceful statement has been made regarding the intent to specifically address the
issue of gender crimes on a large scale basis.
b. Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or
vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection
given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict;
c. Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces
or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities.
See Statute, supra note 53, at art. IV, at 31.
77. Article V includes
the following crimes under Sierra Leonean law:
a. Offences relating to the abuse of girls under the prevention of Cruelty to
Children Act, 1926 (Cap.3 1):
i. Abusing a girl under 13 years of age, contrary to section 6;
ii. Abusing a girl between 13 and 14 years of age, contrary to section 7;
iii. Abduction of a girl for immoral purposes, contrary to section 12.
b. Offences relating to the wanton destruction of property under the Malicious
Damage Act, 1861:
i. Setting fire to dwelling - houses, any person being therein, contrary to
section 2;
ii. Setting fire to public buildings, contrary to sections 5 and 6;
iii. Setting fire to other buildings, contrary to section 6.
See Statute, supra note 53, at art. V. at 31-32.
78. See Report, supra note 38, para. 13.
79. Cobb, supra note 71.
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E. Amnesty
There appear to be conflicting opinions regarding the amnesty provision
in the Lome Peace Agreement. If the provision is effective, no crimes prior to
July 7, 1999 could be prosecuted. However, the UN Secretary-General has
stated:
While recognizing that amnesty is an accepted legal concept and a
gesture of peace and reconciliation at the end of a civil war or an
internal armed conflict, the United Nations has consistently main-
tained the position that amnesty cannot be granted in respect of
international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity or
other serious violations of international humanitarian law."°
Moreover, the UN representative was instructed to append a disclaimer to
his signature to the Lome Peace Agreement stating that, "the amnesty provision
contained in article IX of the Agreement... shall not apply to international
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious
violations of international humanitarian law.'
As the UN representative was not a party to the Lome Peace Agreement,
it is unclear what legal status, if any, his disclaimer would have. Additionally,
since the RUF breached the Lome Peace Agreement, one may consider the
amnesty clause no longer binding. The issue of whether customary international
law has supplanted the amnesty provision in certain areas, while of significant
concern, is beyond the scope of this paper. The fact is the Special Court will be
trying perpetrators, if their crimes occurred after November 30, 1996. Article
10 of the Statute states that any "amnesty granted to any person falling within
the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of crimes referred to in articles
2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution."82
V. BENEFITS OF THE HYBRID SYSTEM
A. Location of the Court where the Atrocities took Place
The Special Court will be located in Sierra Leone, the country where the
crimes took place; in contrast to the ICTY and ICTR which are located in The
Hague, Netherlands" and Arusha, Tanzania, respectively.
80. See Report, supra note 38, para. 22.
81. See id. para. 23.
82. See Statute, supra note 53, at art. X, at 34.
83. The ICC will also sit in The Hague.
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Holding the court in Sierra Leone will reap immeasurable benefits. First,
it will enable the Special Court greater and timelier access to witnesses and
evidence. Because the Special Court will be based in Freetown, the prosecutor
will have direct access to many of the victims and alleged perpetrators. It will
also be easier to visit sites where atrocities took place for hands-on fact-finding
and evidence gathering without the need for lengthy delays in the trials.
Victims may also feel more comfortable testifying in their own country under
familiar surroundings.
Second, it will help to strengthen the legal system in Sierra Leone. Based
on the British system, the legal system in Sierra Leone is comprised of a
Supreme Court, an Appeals Court and a High Court.84 Pierre Bourin, Justice of
the Court, stated, "[t]he main objective of the court is to reestablish the rule of
law in this country and then show to the people of Sierra Leone that justice can
be done in this country."85 The judicial system has been decimated by 10 years
of war."6 As the Government will have significant involvement in the
establishment and administration of the Special Court, the experience will set
concrete examples of how the courts in Sierra Leone should be run in the future.
It will also help to cement the rule of law, including that of international law,
into the judiciary. Robin Vincent, Registrar of the Special Court noted:
... it will become not only a Special Court for the period that it is
here, but beyond that we see it as being part of a legacy that hopefully
the international community will leave behind in Freetown. It is
important that we make sure that the structure is built properly...
and that it would stand the test of time. 7
While Mr. Vincent was primarily speaking about the physical structure of the
Special Court, his words are equally applicable to the imprint the Special Court
should leave on the judicial structure of Sierra Leone, by laying the foundation
for an effective system of criminal justice.
Third, the local population will have greater access to the proceedings of
the Special Court if they are local. Local journalist will be able to provide
84. Sierra Leone: Country Profile, Africa Review World of Information, Quest Economic Database,
Sept. 26, 2002, http://us.politinfo.com/Inforation/Country-Profiles/country-profile-177.html (last visited
Sept. 20, 2003).
85. The National: Recovery (CBC television broadcast, Dec. 26, 2002).
86. Although certainly other firms may exist, Martindale Hubble reported one law firm, Basma &
Macaulay, in Sierra Leone, with four lawyers. The author met one of the lawyers who was residing in the
United States, leaving three lawyers at that firm. For more information, see http://www.martindale.com (last
visited Sept. 20, 2003, at which time the site listed two firms). Moreover, Human Rights Watch reported that
only 10 judges remain in the country. See http://www.hrw.org (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
87. Press Briefing, Patrick Coker, Acting UNAMSIL Spokesperson, (Near Verbatim) (Oct. 11,
2002), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/DB/DBI 1002.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
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updates in native languages,8 in periodicals read by the local population. This
is not only important for the successes of the Special Court, but also for the
failures. The entire population of Sierra Leone is a victim of the war. If the
Special Court is not assisting in the healing of the nation, the people of Sierra
Leone are present to "judge" the proceedings and ensure the Special Court does
not deviate from its mandate or get bogged down in political issues or
mismanagement. This can be done most effectively when the victims are in the
proximity of the court. The UN Secretary-General stated:
If the role of the Special Court in dealing with impunity and develop-
ing respect for the rule of law in Sierra Leone is to be fully under-
stood and its educative message conveyed to Sierra Leoneans of all
ages, a broad public information and education campaign will have
to be undertaken as an integral part of the Court's activities.89
Unfortunately, at this time there is no clear plan for keeping the people
outside of Freetown informed. Robin Vincent, Registrar of the Special Court,
has suggested using a network of NGOs, district coordinators, Paramount chiefs
and leaflet/fact sheets to tell people about the Special Court. 90 Broadcasting the
trials over the radio has also been suggested. UNAMSIL was successful using
traditional ways of communication to inform the local people about its mission,
including: "town criers, comedians, theatre groups, women mobilisers, sports,
and drama."9' These methods certainly could be used for communicating the
trials to the local people. Regardless of the method used, having the Special
Court in Sierra Leone will keep the community in touch with its progress, as
well as any failures, and will allow the victims personal access to justice.
Lastly, since the Special Court will only be able to prosecute a small
number of the perpetrators, those "who bear the greatest responsibility for
serious violations", 92 having the Special Court in Sierra Leone should encourage
the local population to seek redress from the national courts for crimes not
addressed by the Special Court.93 Watching justice occur at the Special Court
88. While English is the official language of Sierra Leone, Bassa, Born, Bullom So, Fuuta Jalon,
Gola, Kisi (alternatively, Kissi), Klao, Kono, Krim, Krio, Kuranko, Limba, Loko, Mandingo, Mende, Sherbro,
Susu, Themne, Vai and Yalunka are also spoken. See, Languages of Sierra Leone, Ethnologue.com,
www.ethnologue.com/show country.asp?name=Sierra+Leone (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
89. See Report, supra note 38, para. 7.
90. See generally id. para. 48.
91. Sierra Leone: I Consider My New Appointment as a Challenge, (interview with Patrick Coker,
acting UNAMSIL spokesperson), CONCORD TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002.
92. See Statute, supra note 53, at art. 1, para. 1, at 29.
93. As previously noted, it is unclear what effect the amnesty provision in the Lome Peace
Agreement will have on the ability to prosecute those accused of crimes prior to July 7, 1999. However,
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will serve as an impetus for the people, the government and the judiciary to
continue the "healing" of the country after the Special Courts mandate expires.
The people of Sierra Leone need justice for the 10 years of atrocities that
devastated their country. The most effective way for the people to reconcile
with the past and start building a future is to see justice being done. Having the
Special Court located in a third country deprives the local communities - the
victims---of being a part of the judicial process.
Yugoslavia's tribunal is in the Hague. There is not a real sense of
justice or feeling of justice by the victims because they don't see it,
unless you have the opportunity to go from the Yugoslavia area to the
Hague. Same thing with Rwanda; the trials are in Arusha, Tanzania.
It is not easy to get there. People don't see it.94
B. Use of Domestic Criminal Law in Conjunction with International Law
The Statute includes sexual crimes and certain crimes against property,95
both of which were widespread during the conflict. Every war is fought
differently. Therefore "cookie cutter" justice is not always the best answer. The
common crimes in the ICC, ICTY and ICTR (crimes against humanity,
genocide, and grave breaches of article 3 of the Geneva Convention) are
sufficient as a starting point, but will not always be adequate to address all
atrocities that occurred.
While most of the crimes committed in the Sierra Leonean conflict during
the relevant period are governed by international law provisions set out in
articles 2 to 4 of the Statute, recourse to Sierra Leonean law has been had in
cases where a specific situation or an aspect of it was considered to be either
unregulated or inadequately regulated under international law.96
As previously noted, genocide was not considered as a crime under the
Statute due to the nature of the war. However, because mass abuses occurred
to both children and property, it was deemed appropriate to expand from the
"traditional" tribunal crimes to include these domestic crimes. Just because
future atrocities do not fit neatly within the traditional mold of what constitutes
a war crime, does not mean that the crimes should not be punished by tribunals.
Access to domestic laws permits the Special Court to seek justice for all of the
victims, regardless of the crime. Future hybrid courts would be able to use the
prosecution for crimes committed since that date, which are not heard by the Special Court, can be brought
in the domestic courts.
94. Cobb, supra note 71 (quoting Alan White).
95. See Statute, supra note 53, at art. V., at 31-32.
96. See Report, supra note 38, para. 19.
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relevant aspects of their domestic laws to ensure the prosecutions cover all
atrocities that were committed during their particular conflict.
C. Regional Example
Sierra Leone is located in a hot bed of civil unrest. Liberia, Guinea,
Burkina Faso and other countries in Western Africa have had tumultuous pasts.
Obtaining sustained peace and the return to the rule of law in Sierra Leone
would set an exceptional example for both the people and the governments of
other West African nations. Equally important is the fact that the prosecution
of key war criminals would send a clear message to rebels in neighboring areas
that the international community will no longer permit impunity. While this is
true for the ICTY and ICTR also, the message is not as visible when the trials
take place hundreds or thousands of miles away. Moreover, there have been
clear indications that rebel units have served in different regional militias. If
these rebels see their commanders and comrades being prosecuted locally, they
may hesitate before engaging in hostilities in a neighboring state.
D. Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Although not part of the Statute, the Lome Peace Agreement mandated the
establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC"). The TRC
working in conjunction with the Special Court will be instrumental in providing
a forum for victims and perpetrators to heal the wounds of Sierra Leone. The
Special Court will help end the culture of impunity and provide accountability
for past abuses, while the TRC will create a historical record, to ensure that the
mistakes of the past are not repeated. The Prosecutor for the Special Court,
David Crane, has said that he would not use evidence adduced at the TRC for
the indictment of alleged perpetrators of crimes. This will encourage all
parties to go before the TRC and tell their story without fear of reprisal, and
preserve the cleansing and restorative aspects of the TRC. Although there is no
amnesty if you come before the TRC, the pledge not to use evidence from the
TRC appears to be analogous to "use immunity" under US law, where a
witness' compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used for criminal
prosecution of the witness. If however, the witness can be indicted through
information not related to the testimony that they were compelled to give, the
prosecution can continue. This system will allow the mandates of both bodies
to be met, while continuing to encourage the people to tell their stories.
Although the hybrid court system is effective without the TRC, the TRC
is an important tangential body for the Special Court. Together these two
97. David Crane, Sierra Leone; Special Court will not use TRC's Evidence, CONCORD TIMES, Sept.
30, 2002.
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institutions can address most of the judicial and rehabilitative needs of Sierra
Leone, particularly given the number of child combatants previously discussed.
E. Hybrid Courts Working in Conjunction with the ICC
The ICC became a reality when the Rome Statute entered into force on July
1, 2002. Currently, 84 countries9 8 have ratified the Rome Statute, including
Sierra Leone.99 This represents less than half of all nations and does not include
three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council or some
countries in which significant human rights abuses and crimes against humanity
have occurred in the past. While some countries are objecting to trials by an
independent international tribunal, they may be more amenable to a joint
initiative between the international and national courts, such as the Special
Court. This will allow all war criminals to be held accountable for their crimes.
Article 3 of the ICC Statute provides for the court to be established in The
Hague, but permits the court "to sit elsewhere, whenever it considers it
desirable."'' ° Since a hybrid court has already been established in Sierra Leone,
the ICC may want to use this as a seat for prosecutions that take place in
Western Africa. This would aid in maintaining peace and stability in Freetown
and continue to reinforce the importance of the judiciary and in upholding the
rule of law. It would also bring international prestige to Sierra Leone, which
could boost its economy. Future hybrid courts could serve this same function
in other regions.
As previously discussed, there are certain benefits to establishing a
criminal tribunal in the nation where the atrocities occurred. Even if a country
has ratified the ICC, there may be issues related to the particular conflict that
took place that would warrant a separate in-country tribunal. This could either
be a full tribunal within the country, or a smaller version where some crimes are
98. Ratifying countries include: Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia,
Canada, Central African Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany,
Ghana, Greece, Honduras, Hungary Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lesotho, Uechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mongolia, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania,
Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Yugoslavia, and Zambia. See ICC Statute, supra note 72, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbiblelpartl/chapterXVI]/treatylO.asp (last visited Sept.
23, 2003).
99. Id. at art. Iml, para. 3, at 1003.
100. See id. at art. III; see ICC Statute, supra note 72.
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prosecuted within the country and some at the ICC. There appears to be no
reason why the ICC could not establish a hybrid type tribunal in a country under
Article 3. Allieu Ibrahim Kanu, the representative from Sierra Leone to the ICC
Legal Committee stated, "[tihe crimes covered by the [ICC] would augment and
solidify the work of the tribunals and similar institutions, such as the special
court established in [Sierra Leone] ... contributing to the establishment of a just
international legal order... [and] the rule of international law."'' Hybrid
tribunals can effectively work side by side with the ICC providing the best of
both worlds: personal justice within the victimized country and the backing of
a UN organ.
VI. DETRIMENTS OF THE HYBRID SYSTEM
A. Relies on Funding Commitments from States
In the Secretary General's Report on the Special Court, he noted the only
realistic financing mechanism would be through assessed contributions,
realizing that this would for all practical purposes transform the Special Court
from a treaty-based court to a UN organ.'02 Voluntary contribution was not
deemed desirable because of the risk of insufficient or continued availability of
funds. However, the final agreement was for individual countries to contribute.
The Secretary General's recommendation was well founded as the original
budget of $114 million has already been slashed, due to lack of contributions,
to $60 million for the three years and will be financed by only 15 to 20
countries. '03
Even if the Special Court is eventually fully funded, there may be donor
fatigue for future hybrid courts, particularly with the ICC coming into force.
This would send a negative signal to other countries that may be considering
establishing UN assisted tribunals. There are some things the UN could
consider to address this issue. First, United Nations members that are not a
party to the ICC could be required to make set payments annually into a fund
for future country specific tribunals outside the ambit of the ICC. Second,
private benefactors, who wish to support the spread of justice and furthering
victim's rights could be permitted to donate to future tribunals. If this money
was placed in a trust or a similar mechanism for disbursement by the UN, as it
101. International Criminal Court Has Safeguards Against Misuse, Legal Committee Is told: Con-
cerns of Doubters Can Be Addressed; Most Delegates Express Support; United States, Dissenting, Cites
Problems of Jurisdiction, Due Process, Lack of Security Council Oversight - Part 2 of2, M2 Presswire, Oct.
15, 2002.
102. See Report, supra note 38, para. 71.
103. Christopher Wren, Sierra Leone War Crimes Court to Begin Deliberations in Fall, NEW YORK
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002.
deemed necessary, any concerns regarding outside pressure from a particular
source to target or harass a specific individual would be allayed. Third,
countries could be solicited for services in-kind, instead of strictly monetary
contributions to help defray the cost of additional tribunals. This could take the
form of lawyers and judges remaining on a country's payroll but being loaned
to a tribunal, or a country could donate needed legal resources or other furnish-
ings that a court may need. Last, and probably least likely to occur, there could
be a resolution to expand the UN budget to address these tribunals as they come
up, or to fund them directly from the current budget. Given the difficulty in
financing the Special Court, this appears to be the least desirable alternative.
However, if the Special Court is successful, particularly when combined with
the healing process of the TRC, it may be possible to pass such a resolution in
the future. To some degree funding for future tribunals will depend on how
efficient the current tribunals are in the future and how successful the ICC will
be in bringing war criminals to justice.
Donor fatigue is a factor with the ICTY and ICTR also. Although
countries are not individually donating, they are being assessed through the UN.
After experiencing long delays and limited prosecution by the ICTY and ICTR,
the international community should welcome a tribunal with a limited mandate
that will be able to hand-off any outstanding indictments or evidence for indict-
ments when its term has expired. Tribunals modeled after the Special Court
should help to limit donor fatigue and produce greater results from the funds
committed.
B. Retaliation
There is a certain amount of concern that if the rebel commanders are tried
for their crimes, their supporters may be angered and retaliate sending the
country back into war. This is of particular concern once the UNAMSIL peace-
keeping force is withdrawn. For some time now foreign forces have been
training the police and the armed service in proper conduct and integrating
former combatants into formal military service. The local police and military
should be sufficiently trained to deal with any uprisings that occur once the
international forces leave. It will be incumbent upon the United Nation to
ensure UNAMSIL forces are not prematurely withdrawn from the region.
Moreover, the international community is keeping a close eye on Sierra Leone
particularly since this is the first time post World War II, that a war crimes
tribunal is being held in the country where the crimes were committed. An
immediate response should come from the international community if any
retaliatory measures are taken.
If the Special Court is successful in prosecuting the most powerful
combatant commanders, it will deter future incursions, not serve as an impetus
Stafford20031
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for them. The perpetrators of future war crimes will meet the same fate as those
who were responsible for the atrocities of the past. Contrary to the claims of
possible retaliation, prosecuting the key perpetrators will reduce the potential
for any future incursions.
Moreover, this is an issue related to prosecution and not the structure of the
hybrid court system. Presumably retaliation, if it were to occur, would be
planned regardless of where the perpetrators were prosecuted.
C. Impartial Judiciary
The eight judges for the Special Court were sworn in on December 2,
2002. Five, from varying countries outside Sierra Leone, were appointed by the
UN Secretary General and three by the Sierra Leone government. Some claim
that the inclusion of judges from Sierra Leone renders the proceedings unfair.
Issa Sesay, interim Chairperson of the RUF stated, "[i]f the Court is to be
neutral then no Sierra Leonean judge should be included because they may have
their prejudices."' 4
The mix of national and international legal experts is germane to the
continuing development of the judiciary in Sierra Leone. International judges
from Britain, Canada, Austria, Nigeria, Gambia and Cameroon will be impartial
and provide the necessary impediment to any prejudices the local judges may
have. At the same time, the international judges will be reaffirming the rule of
law and helping the local judges to reestablish a working judicial system in the
country.
Article 13 of the Statute requires impartial and independent judges.'°5 The
Trial Chamber will consist of one local judge and two international judges and
the Appellate Chamber will consist of two local judges and three international
judges.'6 Article 18 of the Statute requires judgments be delivered in public
and be rendered by a majority of the judges. International judges represent the
majority in both chambers and therefore will be able to safeguard against any
issues of impartiality. Significantly, public judgments subject to external
scrutiny, will serve as an additional check on impartiality.
104. Lansana Fofana, War Tribunal to Start Operation Soon, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 19, 2002.
105. See Statute, supra note 53, at art. XIII, para. 1, at 36.
The judges shall be persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who
possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the
highest judicial offices. They shall be independent in the performance of their
functions, and shall not accept or seek instructions from any Government or any other
source.
106. See Statute, supra note 53, at art. XII, para. 1, at 35.
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D. Issues of Corruption
It is generally agreed that one major contributing factor to the war in Sierra
Leone was corruption within the government. It is not, nor should it be, within
the mandate of the Special Court to deal with this issue. However, if issues of
corruption are not address, the chance for lasting peace diminishes. If the
domestic courts are able to apply the lessons of accountability and rule of law
garnered from the Special Court, those engaging in corrupt activities can be
brought to justice, giving Sierra Leone a greater survival rate. This can only be
effective because the Special Court is being held in Sierra Leone and providing
hands-on experience to the future purveyors of justice.
The Government has also established an Anti-Corruption Commission and
states that it will maintain a zero tolerance for corruption.10 7
VII. CONCLUSION
The combined initiative of the United Nations and the government of
Sierra Leone is ground breaking. Not only will it end the cycle of impunity in
Sierra Leone, after 10 years of ravaging internal conflict, it will set an example
for the people, the nation, and the region. Accountability and reconciliation are
the cornerstone to peace and stability in Sierra Leone. The hybrid court will
provide the accountability and the TRC will provide the reconciliation. There
is no reason that future tribunals based on the hybrid model should not be
established, either free standing or in conjunction with the International
Criminal Court. On the contrary, such tribunals should be encouraged by the
international community.
The numerous attempts at peace, followed by the break down thereof,
indicate sever weaknesses in the past governments of Sierra Leone. The hybrid
court provides an international component to the political structure that affords
the government the backing to support lasting peace. With the court seated in
Sierra Leone, the eye of the international community remains focused on the
country, providing additional political support.
The victims of the war in Sierra Leone saw devastating tragedy. One can
only imagine what operations "Spare No Living Thing," "Burn House" and
"Pay Yourself' included. Impunity has been allowed to continue for too long.
Justice will be done by the Special Court. The victims will see justice being
done and will be able to rebuild their lives and their country. A primary reason
for this is the fact that the court will be located in Sierra Leone but will have the
backing of the international community. The perpetrators of these heinous
crimes can and will be called to account for their actions.
107. AAGM: Presidential Address, STANDARD TIMES (SIERRA LEONE), July 20, 2002.
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There are many countries that face the same problems as Sierra Leone.
They too could reap the significant benefits of an institution like the Special
Court: seeing justice, a key pillar of any democracy, done first hand; reestab-
lishing the rule of law and creating a solid criminal justice system; and applying
domestic, as well as international, laws to ensure that no crime escapes punish-
ment. These are key attributes that set the Special Court above the prior models
for ad-hoc tribunals. Moreover, the benefits of the hybrid court as an example
to the West African region could be substantial. While there are some potential
detriments, these are not insurmountable with the support of the international
community. The hybrid model of the Special Court should be the standard for
future war crimes tribunals.
"Healing is a matter of time, but it is sometimes also a matter of opportunity."
- Hippocrates
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I. INTRODUCTION
In July 2003, the United States Supreme Court ruled in a six to three
decision' that a state statute proscribing "deviate sexual intercourse with another
individual of the same sex' 2 violated the United States Constitution. The Court
in this landmark decision held that the "State cannot demean [the petitioners']
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime. ' 3
The Due Process Clause of the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."4 According to the Court, the petitioners' "right to
liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their
* J.D. student at Shepard Broad Law Center at Nova Southeastern University. After receiving a
bachelors degree in English from Florida State University, Mr. Atkinson served four years in the United States
Army. He is a fellow at Alliance Defense Fund's Blackstone Fellowship. He would like to thank God and
his wife, Christine.
I. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
2. Id. at 2476 (quoting Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (2003)).
3. Id. at 2484.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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conduct without intervention by the government."5 The Court concluded that
"[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual. 6
Lawrence v. Texas has garnered a considerable amount of media coverage
and legal criticism because of the majority's use of foreign law in its opinion.
While the Court asserted that "[t]he right the petitioners seek in this case has
been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries,"7
it provided very little insight into the legal reasoning of the judiciaries of those
countries as to why homosexual sex is considered an integral part of human
freedom.'
After a litany of references to foreign decisions protecting homosexual
conduct, the Court admonished that "[t]here has been no showing that in this
country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow
more legitimate or urgent."9 This direct comparison between the United States
and other countries invites an analysis of the law upon which foreign cases were
decided and the reasoning of their courts. Without such an analysis we cannot
be satisfied that Texas' governmental interest is less "legitimate or urgent"'0
than that of those foreign governments whose similar statutes were invalidated.
The purpose of this article is to provide that analysis as it pertains to the
European Court of Human Rights case Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.
To stress the importance of analyzing any case that is cited as precedent is
not to concede the majority's implication that a State needs to show that its
governmental interest in circumscribing any behavior is as legitimate or urgent
than that of a foreign country. If an American court relies on the decision of
another American court, it is expected that the decision being relied upon is
analogous in reasoning to the case for which it is being cited as authority. That
Dudgeon is not an American case should not exempt it from the same scrutiny.
II. DUDGEON, THE CONVENTION, AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
The majority in Lawrence v. Texas made explicit reference to Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom. " In Dudgeon, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that
certain laws of Northern Ireland "which have the effect of making certain
5. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 2483.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.
11. Id. at 2481.
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homosexual acts between consenting adult males criminal offences"' 2 violated
Article Eight of the European Convention of Human Rights.1 3 Article Eight
provides that "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence." 
1 4
The Vice-President of the European Commission of Human Rights said,
"the European Court of Human Rights has for all practical purposes become
Western Europe's constitutional court. Its case law and practice resembles that
of the U.S. Supreme Court,"'5 comparing the influence of the European Court
of Human Rights (E.C.H.R.) to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation
of the United States Constitution's Bill of Rights. 6 The E.C.H.R. was
established in 1959 by the Council of Europe for the purpose of enforcing the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the
Convention). 7 The Convention, "drawn up within the Council of Europe in
1950," was "opened for signature" by Contracting States in 1953.8 According
to Article One of the Convention, the signatory nations ("High Contracting
Parties") are obliged to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights
and freedoms defined in Section One," which includes Article Eight. 9
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, used almost the
same words used in Article Eight of the Convention when he asserted that the
"petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives."20 The similarities of
Lawrence and Dudgeon do not end there. Both Lawrence and Dudgeon
chronicle the debate over the issue of anti-sodomy statutes in the United States
and Europe respectively, describing a trend toward abolishing same-sex sodomy
prohibitions. Both Lawrence and Dudgeon make note of a reluctance to enforce
existing anti-sodomy laws in their respective jurisdictions. Both Courts come
to the same conclusion: that the most powerful judicial body in their jurisdic-
tion must make the ultimate decision concerning the propriety of laws proscrib-
ing homosexual behavior. The legal framework upon which this conclusion was
12. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1981).
13. Id. at 23.
14. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Convention].
15. Gerda Kleijkamp, Comparing the Application and Interpretation of the United States
Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 307,
310 (2002) (citing J.A. Frowein, Recent Developments Concerning the ECHR, in LAws, RIGHTS, AND THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS I I (. Sundberg ed. 1986)).
16. Kleijkamp, supra note 15, at 310.
17. Information document issued by the Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Edocs/HistoricalBackground.htm#Convention (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
18. Id.
19. Convention, supra note 14, at art. 1.
20. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
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based, and the reasoning employed to arrive at it, says much about the
perception that each Court has of its own role in the democratic process.
I. THE CONVENTION'S ARTICLE EIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION'S
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The European Court of Human Rights and the United States Supreme
Court share a similar power: the power to declare government action within
their respective jurisdictions to be in violation of a governing document.2' In
the case of the E.C.H.R., that document is the Convention. 22 For the Supreme
Court, that document is the Constitution.23 Because the E.C.H.R. and the
Supreme Court have come to the same conclusion from different bodies of law,
a comparison of those legal documents is in order.
Article Eight of the Convention gives the E.C.H.R. the power to decide
what constitutes a legitimate state interest. With express language, it empowers
the E.C.H.R. judges to do that job. Article Eight, Section Two gives the Court
the task of making a final determination of what laws are "necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others. 24
This language effectively affords the Court a power normally reserved to
a legislature; it requires them to balance personal privacy against the good of
society and a state's interest in protecting that good. The entity in a democratic
society that makes the final decisions concerning what is necessary in that
democratic society is usually a body of elected lawmakers, if not the people
themselves. To the extent that these decision-makers are not elected, the
"democratic" society is not very democratic. Nonetheless, when the Convention
gives this decision-making power to a group of judges, the fact that they are not
elected makes them no less lawmakers.
Judges, in the traditional sense, apply pre-determined norms, previously
enacted laws, and transcendent principles-preformed decisions about what is
necessary in a democracy-to the cases that come before them. One need not
agree with the foregoing characterization of a judge's role to acknowledge that
if what is necessary in a democracy has not been finally decided by the time a
judge is hearing a case, then the judge must decide then and there what is
necessary. The Convention authorizes the E.C.H.R. to do just such last-minute
21. Kleijkamp, supra note 15, at 311.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Convention, supra note 14, at art. 8, § 2.
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decision-making. The E.C.H.R. judges do not write the laws of the member
nations, but they do act as the final arbiters of what government actions are
necessary for national security, public safety, economic well-being, prevention
of disorder or crime, and protection of health or morals."
Whether the power that the Convention confers on the E.C.H.R. can
accurately be characterized as legislative is a semantic debate for another place.
What is pertinent is that the text of the United States Constitution does not
confer that power upon the United States Supreme Court. Consider the clause
upon which the majority in Lawrence relied in overturning Texas' statute. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, although it does not include
the word "privacy," does have something to say about liberty. Yet the text of
the Due Process Clause gives the Supreme Court the power to determine, not
whether a state can deprive an individual of liberty, but whether due process has
been afforded the person whose liberty has been deprived: "Nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law., 26
The Due Process Clause presupposes that states can deprive a citizen of
freedom. Justice Scalia, conceding that the Texas statute "undoubtedly imposes
constraints on liberty," as do laws "prohibiting prostitution, [and] recreational
use of heroin," pointed out in his dissent that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment
expressly allows States to deprive their citizens of 'liberty,' so long as 'due
process of law' is provided. ,27
The Supreme Court has relied on this logic before. In Gregg v. Georgia,
the Court upheld a Georgia statute that imposed the death penalty against a
challenge that capital punishment violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution. 28 The Court argued that rather than prohibiting the
death penalty, the Constitution presupposes its existence in American law.29
"[TIhe Fourteenth Amendment ... similarly contemplates the existence of the
capital sanction in providing that no State shall deprive any person of 'life,
liberty, or property' without due process of law.,' 30 The Due Process clause
does not give persons the right not to be put to death; neither does it give
persons the right not to be deprived of liberty. The State retains the right to take
both life and liberty from its citizens.
25. See id.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2491 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
28. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
29. Id. at 177. ("It is apparent from the text of the Constitution itself that the existence of capital
punishment was accepted by the Framers.")
30. Id.
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The dissent in Lawrence asserts that, "there is no right to 'liberty' under the
Due Process Clause, though today's opinion repeatedly makes that claim."'3' It
is with this claim that the majority opens its opinion:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions
into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is
not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives
and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a
dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case
involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcen-
dent dimensions.32
Justice Kennedy's idea of liberty may presume what he says it does, but the
Fourteenth Amendment does not presume any freedom of "certain intimate
conduct."33 The Constitution's text' does include protections for "thought,
belief, [and] expression, 35 but the majority's addition of "certain intimate
conduct,"36 is just that-an addition. While the Dudgeon court may have relied
on an express right to privacy in the Convention, the Constitution does not
provide any express right upon which the Lawrence court can base its asserted
entitlement to respect for "private lives" or the "realm of personal liberty which
the government may not enter.
37
This illuminates an inherent difference between the structure of Article
Eight and that of the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, although at first
blush they may appear similar. Article Eight prohibits government "interfer-
ence" with the right to private and family life and lists various exceptions to that
prohibition.3" The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause prohibits
government "deprivation of life, liberty, and property" and lists an exception to
that prohibition-the provision of due process. This ostensible similarity in
structure belies very important and effectual textual differences.
31. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2491 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 2475.
33. Id.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.")
35. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2484.
38. Convention, supra note 14, at art. 8.
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The Convention grants individuals express rights. The rights granted to
individuals by the Constitution are most often characterized by prohibitions on
governmental power. The difference has been explained as the distinction
between negative and positive rights.39  A recent comparative law article
explains that the Convention proclaims "positive rights," "phrased in affirmative
terms,' '4 0 e.g., "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence.' ' The article points out that, in contrast, the
Constitution guarantees "negative rights" by limiting the power of government:
"[s]imilar protection is granted by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion which provides, in part, that '[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." 42
The right to privacy that the Supreme Court has recognized in past
decisions is "a judicial extrapolation from the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. '43 Moreover, while the word "liberty" is actually found in
the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to liberty relied upon by the court in
Lawrence is similarly extrapolated from text that guarantees only the right to
due process of law.44 Having found unenumerated rights in the text of the
Constitution, the Court has had to find unenumerated balancing tests in order
to take into consideration the government's inevitable need to encroach upon
those rights from time to time.45
As the article explains, the Convention prescribes a balancing test, ready-
made for the E.C.H.R.: "[T]he Convention does provide in Articles 8 through
11 specific requirements for standards of review, which the European Court,
after concluding that a Member State interfered with an applicant's substantive
right or freedom, must apply to determine whether the interference is
39. Kleijkamp, supra note 15, at 314.
40. Id.
41. Convention, supra note 14, at art. 8, § 1.
42. Kleijkamp, supra note 15, at 314 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
43. Robert A. Ermanski, Comment, A Right to Privacy for Gay People Under International Human
Rights Law, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 141, 159 (1992).
44. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) ("It is true that despite the language of the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which appears to focus on the process by which
life, liberty, or property is taken, the cases are legion in which those Clauses have been interpreted to have
substantive content, subsuming rights that to a great extent are immune from federal or state regulation or
proscription. Among such cases are those recognizing rights that have little or no textual support in the
constitutional language.")
45. Kleijkamp, supra note 15, at 315. ("[T]he Supreme Court...was forced to 'create some judicial
exceptions' to the absolute language of, for example, the First Amendment's Freedom of Speech Clause or
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.") (quoting Gregory P. Propes, Wherefore Art Thou
Deference? The European Court of Human Rights, Military Discipline, and Freedom of Expression, 19 Hous.
J. INT'L., 281, 286 (1996)).
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justified., 46 If a government interferes with a person's right to privacy, that
interference must be "in accordance with the rule of law" and must be "neces-
sary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others. 47
"In contrast to the E.C.H.R., the Supreme Court's balancing remains
mostly implicit, once the regulation has passed its initial legitimacy hurdle."48
Gerda Kleijkamp notes that the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny test, which
demands that any government infringement on "fundamental liberty interests"
be "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, '49 closely resembles
the E.C.H.R.'s "review of a Member State's interference with an applicant's
fundamental right or freedom."5 Kleijkamp explains that the government must
not only prove that its interference is "'in accordance with the law,' 'pursues a
legitimate aim' and 'is necessary in a democratic society,"' but must also prove
that it is "motivated by a 'pressing social need"' and "no greater than necessary
and should utilize the least intrusive means possible."'"
According to the United States Supreme Court's due process clause
rational basis test, if the Court does not find that a right is fundamental, a state
must prove only that its interference with that right is rationally related to a
legitimate government interest.52
IV. THE DIFFERING ROLES OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE SUPREME COURT
"To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization,
it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected
elsewhere." 53 Justice Kennedy's use of the Dudgeon case in Lawrence, without
any explanation as to Dudgeon' s reasoning or bases, obscures the fact that what
the Lawrence Court did is not what the E.C.H.R. did in Dudgeon. The
E.C.H.R., applying Article Eight's explicit right to privacy, was acting in
46. Kleijkamp, supra note 15, at 321.
47. Convention, supra note 14, at art. 8, § 2.
48. Markus Dirk Dubber, Note, Homosexual Privacy Rights Before the United States Supreme Court
and the European Court of Human Rights: A Comparison of Methodologies, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 189, 206
(1990).
49. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2491 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
50. Kleijkamp, supra note 15, at 321.
51. Id. (citations omitted).
52. See id. at 322.
53. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.
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accordance with its Conventional role as the arbiter of what government action
is "necessary in a democratic society.".4
The Fourteenth Amendment does not give the Supreme Court the role of
arbiter of what government action is "necessary in a democracy. 5 5 It requires
only that due process is afforded to people whose liberty is deprived.56 Despite
having divergent roles-the Supreme Court's role being decidedly more limited
than that of the E.C.H.R.-both courts embark on a very similar analysis of
public policy considerations.
In Dudgeon, "the E.C.H.R. focused its attention on recent developments
in the member states in public perceptions of the limits of acceptable govern-
ment interference as reflected in legislative developments in the member
states."57 Article Eight of the Convention allows this type of analysis; in fact,
it actually provides for it. It is relevant to look to the member states in deter-
mining what is "necessary in a democratic society. ' 'S What is working? What
is not working? If a significant number of countries have repealed anti-sodomy
laws without detriment to their security, safety, economy, order, health or
morals,59 then the conclusion could be drawn that such laws are not "necessary
in a democratic society."
The E.C.H.R. also considered how the anti-sodomy laws were enforced,
noting that the majority of the very infrequent instances of prosecution involved
"persons under eighteen."'  This too is a fitting analysis for a court charged
with applying Article Eight. If the court is to determine what laws are neces-
sary, it would do well to look to the member nations. If those nations are not
prosecuting existing anti-sodomy laws, the conclusion that such laws are not
"necessary in a democratic society"61 may be warranted.
It being accepted that some form of legislation is 'necessary' to
protect particular sections of society as well as the moral ethos of
society as a whole, the question in the present case is whether the
54. Convention, supra note 14, at art. 8, § 1.
55. Id. at art. 8, § 2.
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
57. Dubber, supra note 48, at 210-11.
58. Id. at 205. ("The ECHR initially assesses whether the particular law challenged responds to a
pressing social need. In this inquiry, the court may take into account evidence of a popular consensus on the
issue, whether the regulation has fallen into disuse, and the state's ability to further the law's aims in the
absence of the challenged regulation.")
59. Convention, supra note 14, at art. 8, § 2.
60. Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11 ("During the period from January 1972 to October 1980
there were 62 prosecutions for homosexual offences in Northern Ireland. The large majority of these cases
involved minors, that is persons under eighteen." )
61. Convention, supra note 14, at art. 8, § 2.
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contested provisions of the law of Northern Ireland and their
enforcement remain within the bounds of what, in a democratic
society, may be regarded as necessary in order to accomplish those
aims.
62
The E.C.H.R., in answering this question, is assuming its rightful role not only
as interpreter of what the Convention says, but as arbiter of what is necessary
in a democratic society. The Member Nations of the Council of Europe under-
stood when they became members that the E.C.H.R. is, as far as Article Eight
is concerned, the final arbiter of what is "necessary in a democratic society"
with respect to "interference by a public authority with the exercise" of the
"right to respect for his private and family life. 63
The states that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
made no such concession to the Supreme Court. The Constitution does not give
its Supreme Court the power to decide what is necessary in a democracy. After
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the States retained the power to
deprive their citizens of life, liberty or property as long as they ensured that
those citizens enjoyed "due process of law." Each citizen, regardless of race,
would henceforth be guaranteed due process of law, without regard to how
compelling a government's interest may be in depriving them of that process.
Legislators remained the arbiters of what is necessary in the democratic society
of each State.
For the Supreme Court, which has not been granted the power to decide
what is necessary in a democracy, a survey of the criminalization and decrimi-
nalization of same-sex sodomy is a gratuitous exercise. What difference does
it make how many states have repealed laws that punish homosexual conduct,
when what is really at issue is whether the Constitution gives states the power
to pass anti-sodomy laws in the first place?
The Court intended to overrule Bowers v. Hardwick, which anthologized
the history of anti-sodomy laws in America in order to discredit the argument
that sodomy is a fundamental right "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition." 64 Yet the majority in Lawrence did not find that Texas had deprived
the plaintiff of a fundamental right; it did not apply strict scrutiny. "[W]hile
overruling the outcome of Bowers, the Court leaves strangely untouched its
central legal conclusion: 'Respondent would have us announce ... a fundamen-
tal right to engage in homosexual sodomy. This we are quite unwilling to
do."'
65
62. Dudgeon, supra note 60, at 11.
63. Convention, supra note 14, at art. 8.
64. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
65. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191) (emphasis
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Nonetheless, the majority attempted to establish that "early American
sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals as such but instead sought to
prohibit non-procreative sexual activity more generally."66 It posited that "laws
targeting same-sex couples did not develop until the last third of the 20th
century."67 Yet the Court's reasoning does not lead it to the conclusion that
there is a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.
If bestowing fundamental right status on sodomy was not its aim, the
Court's analysis of American sodomy laws must have served another purpose
altogether--describing a great national debate, and positioning itself as the
institution to bring it to resolution. "States with same-sex prohibitions have
moved toward abolishing them," the Court asserted.68 The Court described how
the American Law Institute omitted laws against consensual sex in its Model
Penal Code in 1955,69 after which states began to "change [their] laws to
conform to the Model Penal Code."7 ° This all tends to "show an emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.' If some states,
like Texas, are yet unaware of, or refuse to conform to, this emerging aware-
ness, the Court presumably sees itself as ideally positioned to bring the trend to
the attention of such intransigent lawmakers.
The majority discussed the states' divergent treatment of same-sex sodomy
as though it were a circuit-split-a situation in which the same issue is decided
differently by lower federal courts, and the highest court in the land must
resolve the matter. Likewise, if states cannot agree on whether to criminalize
sodomy, the Court must assume the role of its European cousin and become the
arbiter of what laws are "necessary in a democracy." That the Court is assum-
ing this new role is further evidenced by its discussion of a "pattern of non-
enforcement" of sodomy laws "with respect to consenting adults acting in
private. 72 The Court infers from the supposed reluctance of law enforcement
officials, district attorneys, and attorneys general across America what the
people of Texas have never expressed by democratic means: that they want their
statute repealed.
However, differences in state law concerning homosexual sodomy do not
amount to the legislative equivalent of a split in opinions among the circuit
in original).
66. id. at 2479.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2480.
69. Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2, Comment 2, at 372 (1980)).
70. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481.
71. Id. at 2480.
72. Id. at 2481.
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courts. Rather, this statutory variation is a reflection of the divergent views of
the citizens of various American states, represented by laws, enacted by their
elected officials. The dissent concedes that, "Texas is one of the few remaining
States that criminalize private, consensual homosexual acts. ' 73 However, it
rejects the notion that the Supreme Court should compel Texas to follow the
trend of its sister states: "What Texas has chosen to do is well within the range
of traditional democratic action, and its hand should not be stayed ... by a Court
that is impatient of democratic change."74
V. THE CULMINATION OF EXPANDING SUPREME COURT POWER
In his dissent, Justice Scalia laments that "the Court has taken sides in the
culture war, departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the
democratic rules of engagement are observed."" Yet the Court has gone a step
farther. It has taken measures to change the rules of engagement. It has thrown
off the encumbering former role, and taken for itself that of the European Court
of Human Rights: arbiter of what is necessary in a democratic society. To be
accurate, it must be pointed out that this change began decades ago when the
Court assumed the duty of rating governmental interests by its own special
formulas. That the Court decided that the Texas statute "furthers no legitimate
state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of
the individual '7 6 presupposes what has now long been accepted: Texas has an
obligation to justify its intrusion into private life with something more than due
process of law.
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia is correct in his implication that Lawrence
reveals an even deeper shift in the Court's role. In fact, Lawrence is arguably
a much more momentous decision than Dudgeon was. After Dudgeon, the
balancing test between the right to privacy and the interest of the government
remained codified in Article Eight of the Convention. The protection of morals,
to the extent that it is necessary in a democratic society, remained a governmen-
tal interest that could justify interference with the right to respect for a person's
private life.7 7 The Dudgeon opinion only reaffirmed that fact: "As the Govern-
ment correctly submitted, it follows that the moral climate in Northern Ireland
in sexual matters ... is one of the matters which the national authorities may
legitimately take into account in exercising their discretion."78
73. Id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. id.
75. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2497.
76. Id. at 2484.
77. See Convention, supra note 14, at art. 8.
78. Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19.
Atkinson
However, as Justice Scalia lamented in his dissent, Lawrence's majority
opinion effectively forecloses the protection of morals as a legitimate justifica-
tion for a state's regulation of non-violent sexual behavior.79 "[T]he fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice. '  This is an epochal shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence.8  The
dissent connects the dots, asserting that if "the promotion of majoritarian sexual
morality is not even a legitimate state interest," then criminal laws against adult
incest and bestiality cannot "survive rational-basis review. 82 Those who have
sought to overturn anti-sodomy laws realize the importance of this development.
In a forward-looking law review article entitled, Lessons from the Past and
Strategies for the Future: Using Domestic, International and Comparative Law
to Overturn Sodomy Laws, James D. Wilets and Charlene Smith expounded
what has become a winning strategy:
The second strategy is to argue that morality alone cannot be used as
a justification to strike down or uphold a law. This strategy questions
the court's ability to apply objective criteria to determine whether the
morality upon which the legislation is based represents a legitimate
governmental purpose, or whether it simply represents the illegitimate
biases of society towards a particular disfavored group.8"
VI. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S NON-SEQUITURS
The Lawrence majority's reliance on foreign precedence reveals faults in
Justice Kennedy's reasoning, if not a disregard for the Constitutional structure
of the United States federal government.
If the Convention allows E.C.H.R. judges to determine what laws are
necessary in a democratic society, then the Constitution must allow the Supreme
Court to determine whether anti-sodomy laws are no longer necessary to the
American democracy. This does not follow. The Court's reasoning disregards
79. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (warning that the majority opinion "decrees
the end of all morals legislation").
80. Id. at 2483 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
81. Id. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recalling that "[c]ountless judicial decisions and legislative
enactments have relied on the ancient proposition that a governing majority's belief that certain sexual
behavior is 'immoral and unacceptable' constitutes a rational basis for regulation," and citing a list of cases
upholding, on the basis of public morality, laws proscribing such activity as the sale of sex toys and public
indecency).
82. Id. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. James Wilets & Charlene Smith, Lessons from the Past and Strategies for the Future: Using
Domestic, International and Comparative Law to Overturn Sodomy Laws, 24 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 49, 54
(2000).
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the decidedly different scopes of review afforded to the E.C.H.R. and the
Supreme Court by the language of Convention and the Constitution, respec-
tively.
The majority's reference to British statutory bans on sodomy likewise
bares its flawed reasoning. "A committee advising the British Parliament
recommended in 1957 repeal of laws punishing homosexual conduct ...
Parliament enacted the substance of those recommendations 10 years later."'
The implication is that if the British Parliament decriminalizes homosexual
conduct, the Supreme Court should decriminalize homosexual conduct. This
overlooks the fact that British Parliament is a legislative body and the Supreme
Court is not. The Texas legislature could have repealed its anti-sodomy law,
just as Parliament did. However, the Supreme Court is not a legislature.
The Dudgeon decision and British Parliament's repeal of sodomy statutes,
if taken as persuasive authority, militate against Supreme Court action. If they
provide any suggestion at all, it is this: the United States should codify its right
to privacy and legislatively eliminate anti-sodomy laws.
VII. LAWRENCE'S LIBERTARIAN IDEALS
Justice Kennedy and the Lawrence majority may have a point that appeals
to many Americans: perhaps states should not enjoy the presumption that their
deprivation of a person's liberty is valid. Perhaps our liberties would be more
secure if our Constitution presumed, as the Convention does, that deprivation
of liberty or invasion of privacy is invalid unless the court determines that it is
"necessary in a democratic society." Perhaps the Supreme Court should decide
which laws serve the interest of security, safety, prosperity, and health. Perhaps
state governments should legislate only public morality and leave private
morality to the individual.85
However, the text of the Constitution does afford states the presumption
that their deprivation of personal liberty is valid; the Constitution does not grant
the Supreme Court the power to decide which laws serve society's interests; and
nothing in the Constitution enjoins states from promoting private morality as
well as public morality.
84. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481.
85. The Institute for Justice, in its amicus curiae brief in support of the petitioners, drew a distinction
between public and private morality:
There is a crucial difference ... between promoting public morality and protecting the
sensibilities of reasonable members of the community while in the public sphere-
something that falls under the police power of state-and criminalizing private con-
sensual conduct that harms neither the individuals involved nor the general public
-something that is outside the bounds of police power.
Brief of Amici Curiae The Institute for Justice at 14, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-1-2).
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Two-thirds of Congress and three-fourths of the state legislatures could
change all that. Article Five of the Constitution provides a procedure to amend
the text of the Constitution. But Due Process jurisprudence has made the
Article.Five amendment process unnecessary, paving the way for the Supreme
Court to make those changes itself.
VIII. A LEGAL STRATEGY BEARS FRUrr
James D. Wilets, in an article published in 1994, outlined a legal strategy
of utilizing international law to bring about the invalidation of anti-sodomy laws
in the United States.86 He enumerated "three principal strategies," suggesting
that "legal practitioners ... [d]irectly apply the terms of international treaties that
have been ratified by the United States government ... [u]se international law
to guide the interpretations of U.S. domestic laws, [and] [d]irectly apply
'customary international law.' ' 87  Professor Wilets described a customary
international norm as "a principle or practice accepted as 'customary' by the
world's countries," that "binds all governments, including those that have not
specifically recognized it, so long as they have not expressly and persistently
objected to its development. 88 However, he was not optimistic that attempts
to apply these customary international laws or norms would be successful,
lamenting that "it is, however, unlikely that a U.S. court would find the
criminalization of same-gender private sexual behavior as violative of a binding
customary international human rights norm." 9
Professor Wilets' strategic prescience was mitigated only by the cautious-
ness of his optimism. The majority in Lawrence did find that the Texas statute
was "violative of a binding" customary international human rights norm."9'
The law proscribes what the Court describes as a "right ... accepted as an
integral part of human freedom in many other countries.,
92
What the Court did not do might say a lot about its strategy. The Court did
not employ Professor Wilets' first suggested strategy: application of interna-
86. James D. Wilets, Pressure from Abroad: U.N. Human Rights Ruling Strengthens Hopes for U.S.
Gays and Lesbians, 2! HuM. RTS. 22 (1994).
87. Id. at 23.
88. Id. at 43.
89. Id.
90. The Court did not find the norm binding in the sense that it was bound to follow it; however,
it considered the norm persuasive even thought it was not part of a binding treaty. Furthermore, foreign
precedent was not found persuasive because of the substance of foreign law or the reasoning of foreign courts.
(Neither was discussed, beyond that they have decriminalized same-sex sodomy.) For these reasons, the
Court's use of foreign precedent falls into Professor Wilets' third category: an international norm.
91. Wilets, supra note 86, at 43.
92. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.
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tional treaties that have been ratified by the United States.93 Forgoing this
strategy may serve to insulate the Lawrence decision from future threats. If it
had relied on international treaties, as it was urged to do by amicus curiae,9' and
if those treaties were subsequently dissolved, the Court's opinion would be
weakened.
Neither did the Court not use Professor Wilet's second strategy-use of
international law to guide the interpretation of United States law. While the
Court mentioned the conclusions of foreign courts, it did not describe the law
upon which the foreign opinions were based. Nor did it describe the foreign
courts' reasoning process. The majority's use of foreign jurisprudence was
based, not on the substance of foreign law or the superiority of international
legal reasoning, but on the simple supposition that if other nations accept a
purported right as "an integral part of human freedom," then American courts
should do so as well.
What the Court did do was precisely what Professor Wilets predicted
would be a long shot: directly apply a "customary international norm.95"
However, by relying on a totality of international law as persuasive "values we
share with a wider civilization,"96 the Court has preempted debate that Professor
Wilets' binding international norms 97 would have demanded: Can an interna-
tional norm ever be binding on all governments? 98 If so, what implications
would that have for the rule of law and representative democracy? 99 Do State
anti-sodomy laws and a Supreme Court decision upholding their constitutional-
ity' °° amount to express and persistent objection' °' to the development of
customary international norms? If so, would those objecting countries not be
93. Wilets, supra note 86, at 23.
94. Brief of Amici Curiae of Mary Robinson, et al. at 11-12, Lawrence v. Texas 123 S. Ct. 2472
(2003) (No. 02-102) (citations omitted) ("In Toonen v. Australia (1994), the United Nations Human Rights
Committee followed the Dudgeon Court's reasoning and rejected this Court's reasoning in Bowers. The
Committee construed Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which applies
to 149 states party with combined populations of at least three billion people. These countries include the
United States, which ratified the Covenant on June 8, 1992.")
95. Wilets, supra note 86, at 43.
96. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.
97. Wilets, supra note 86, at 43.
98. Id.
99. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2494 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Constitutional entitlements do not
spring into existence because some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behavior.
Much less do they spring into existence, as the Court seems to believe, becauseforeign nations decriminalize
conduct.") (emphasis in original).
100. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (upholding a Georgia state law banning sodomy).
101. Wilets, supra note 86, at 43.
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bound by the norm? These questions, although pertinent, are for another article.
Lawrence v. Texas has provided much to contemplate.
In Lawrence, the Court has made its innovations clear. It will now fill a
role comparable to that of the E.C.H.R.: ultimate public policy decision-maker.
In its new capacity, the Supreme Court will consider international norms and
"values we share with a wider community"' 2 as persuasive authority, as it does
the text of the Constitution.
IX. CONCLUSION
Lawrence v. Texas shows the extent to which the Court regards the Con-
stitution as mere persuasive authority, along with past Supreme Court decisions,
legislative statistics and public policy suggestions from abroad. While por-
traying this modem approach to Constitutional review, Lawrence left Due
Process jurisprudence largely unchanged. If a right is deemed fundamental,
infringement of that right must still be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest. If a right is not fundamental, infringement of that right must only
be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 03 The revolutionary
alteration of the Lawrence decision is the pronouncement that the preservation
of morals is no longer a legitimate government interest. 14
If the American people are to reassert their right to make laws that reflect
their morals (a right that, on paper, the Member Nations of the Council of
Europe still retain)'05 the Due Process framework must be changed. It must be
thrown out wholesale, and the presumption that a state may take life, liberty,
and property must be restored. Lawrence has not ushered in an era, as some
libertarians might hope, in which no one can impose his "moral disapproval ' 1 6
upon another. The Lawrence Court has not scrubbed the laws of America clean
of morality. It has only ensured that the moral convictions of a Supreme Court
majority can always trump a moral consensus of American voters.
The Institute for Justice, in its amici curiae brief on behalf of the
petitioners, warns of the dangers of elected officials: "Legislators are perfectly
capable of invading liberty, and that is why government is limited."'0 7 Duly
102. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.
103. See id. at 2483 ("The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual") (emphasis added); id. at 2483 ("... no showing
that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate
or urgent.") (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 2483-84.
105. See Convention, supra note 14, at art. 8, § 2.
106. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
107. Brief of Amici Curiae The Institute for Justice at 6, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003)
(No. 02-1-2).
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noting the Institute's caveat, it must be remembered that legislators are elected
by the people; Supreme Court justices are appointed for life. 0 8
108. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The courts must declare the sense of the
law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally
be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.")
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States, for over three-quarters of a century, has maintained a
foreign trade policy concerning American citizens working abroad that provides
for the foreign earned income exclusion.' Citizens of the United States engaged
in the promotion of American foreign trade and residing in foreign countries,
were subject to double taxation by the foreign country and the United States.2
In an effort to stimulate foreign trade and to place Americans who work abroad
on equal footing with competitors, Congress exempted the foreign earned
income of its citizens working overseas from taxation.3 Today, the policy
remains unscathed despite the limitations on the exclusion and the controversial
* J.D. candidate 2004, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University; C.P.A., State
of Florida; M.Acc., Nova Southeastern University; B.B.A., Florida International University. The author wishes
to extend a special thanks to his loving wife, Ussette Riera, for her unwavering support and understanding
and his beloved children and parents. The author also wishes to thank Dean Gail Richmond for her guidance
and wisdom as mentor, and Professor Elena Marty-Nelson for her role as advisor.
1. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 69-356, at 33 (1926), reprinted in 97 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1909-1950 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAws AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (1979).
2. Krichbaum v. U.S., 138 F. Supp. 515, 523 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
3. Id.
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attempt to repeal section 911 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) under the Jobs
and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003.'
In this endeavor, the legislative history of the exclusion reflects sharp con-
flicting views of members of Congress.' As early as 1926, Senator Smoot, past
chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, demonstrated strong opposition
opining the tax exemption provision was unnecessary.6 In May 2003 Senator
Grassley, present chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, restated past
opposition to the exemption by saying, "section 911 is a tax loophole that forces
you and me, as well as every other taxpayer out there throughout the United
States, to subsidize high-paid corporate employees and their companies." 7
However, the majority of the policy makers today continue to agree with the
original policy as evidenced by the elimination of the amendment repealing the
provision, thus allowing for the exclusion.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the policy for enacting and main-
taining the foreign earned income exclusion. Beginning with Part II, this article
assesses the legislative history and origins of section 911 of the IRC; including
restrictions and limitations. Part III analyzes court issues regarding agencies of
the United States as contemplated by section 911 of the IRC. Part IV examines
the political and industry opposition to the repeal of the IRC provision wherein
individuals were allowed to exclude foreign earned income from United States
taxation. Part V discusses the conclusion that the policy and purpose of the
provision excluding foreign earned income is beneficial to the economy of the
United States and its citizens working abroad.
I1. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 911
A. Origins of Section 911
In 1925, Congress projected that in the taxable year of 1926 they would
over collect taxes by approximately $200,000,000.' Congress enacted the
Revenue Act of 1926 as a measure to reduce and equalize federal taxation. 9
United States citizens and residents are generally subject to taxation on world-
4. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752
(2003).
5. Krichbaum, 138 F. Supp. at 519.
6. S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 21 (1926), reprinted in 97 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 1909-1950 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (1979).
7. 108 CONG. REC. S1054 (daily ed. May 14, 2003) (statement of Sen. Grassley), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited June 21, 2003).
8. H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 1 (1926), reprinted in 97 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 1909-1950 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (1979).
9. Id.
wide income.'0 However, Congress excluded United States citizens working
abroad from taxation on all foreign earned income under section 213(b)(14) of
the IRC." The foreign policy for the exclusion provision was to encourage
employment of Americans abroad and place them on equal footing with their
foreign competitors.12
Six years later, the Senate Finance Committee embarked on an attempt to
repeal the exclusion.' 3 The Committee expressed their concerns regarding cer-
tain United States citizens claiming the exclusion and consequently not paying
any taxes. 4 The Finance Committee believed the exclusion was unnecessary
because of the foreign tax credit provision.' 5 Congress, under the Revenue Act
of 1932, limited the exclusion "except as to amounts paid by the United States
or agency thereof," and codified the exclusion under section 116(a). 6
In 1942, the exclusion was again under siege by the House Ways and
Means Committee. 7 The Committee proposed a plan to repeal the exclusion to
increase tax revenues and eliminate a tax benefit skewed toward United States
citizens earning foreign income from nongovernmental employers and non-
governmental agencies.'" Instead of repealing, Congress amended the exclusion
and extended the residency requirement from six months to "the entire taxable
year."' 9 Thus, the taxpayer must establish a bona fide residence for the entire
taxable year to qualify for the exclusion.20 Congress' intended purpose in
10. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47,56(1924); see also I.R.C. § 61 (a) (West 2003) (stating "gross income
means all income from whatever source derived").
11. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 69-356, at 33 (1926), reprinted in 97 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OFTHE
UNITED STATES 1909-1950 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (1979); I.R.C.
§213(b)(14) (states: "There shall be excluded from gross income in the case of our citizens working abroad
in selling our merchandise amounts received as salary or commission for the sale for export of tangible per-
sonal property produced in the United States"); see also Foreman v. U.S., 60 F.3d 1559, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
12. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 69-356, at 33 (1926), reprinted in 97 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OFTHE
UNITED STATES 1909-1950 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (1979); See
also Comm'r v. Wolfe, 361 F.2d 62, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
13. S. REP. NO. 72-665, at 31 (1932), reprinted in 99 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 1909-1950 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (1979).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, § 116(a), 47 Stat. 169, 39 (1932), reprinted in 99
INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (1979).
17. H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333, at 50 (1942), reprinted in 108 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1909-1950 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (1979).
18. Id.
19. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L No. 77-753, § 148, 56 Stat. 798, 49 (1942), reprinted in 108
INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (1979).
20. S. REP. NO. 77-1631, at 116(1942), reprintedin 108 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OFTHEUNITED
STATES 1909-1950 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (1979).
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enacting the amendment of 1942 was to eradicate the misuse under the former
requirement of absence from the United States instead of presence in a foreign
country." Congress, under the Revenue Act of 1951, attempted to remedy the
strict application of the term "bona fide residence abroad. 22 Under the prior
provision adopted in 1942, individuals with technical knowledge were having
difficulty establishing residency, and could not qualify for the exclusion.23
Examples of these individuals included, "managers, technicians and skilled
[workers] induced to [work] abroad for periods of [eighteen] to [thirty-six]
months to complete certain projects."'24 Because Congress intended to encour-
age individuals with technical knowledge to work abroad, it eased the bona fide
residency requirement. 2' The residency requirement now permitted taxpayers
working abroad to exclude foreign income if physically present in a foreign
country for seventeen months during a period of eighteen months.26
Some American citizens with substantial earnings exploited the amended
version of section 116(a) by working abroad. 27 These citizens went to foreign
countries to perform tasks regularly performed within the United States, for the
primary purpose of claiming the foreign earned income exclusion and evading
28taxation. Individual citizens of the United States physically present in a
foreign country for seventeen months, out of a period of eighteen months were
able to exclude their entire foreign earned income from taxation.29 Congress
recognizing the need to limit the exclusion accordingly amended the provision
"sufficient to correct the evils. '30 As a result, those taxpayers who were resi-
dents abroad for an entire taxable year qualify to claim the exclusion subject to
a ceiling of $20,000 of the foreign earned income a.3 In 1954, Congress amend-
ed and reenacted former section 116, earned income of citizens of the United
States from sources without the United States, as section 911 of the IRC of
1954.32
21. Comm'r v. Matthew, 335 F.2d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 1964).
22. S. REP. NO. 82-781, at 112 (1951), reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 2024.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Krichbaum, 138 F. Supp. at 522.
27. S. REP. NO. 83-685, at 10 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2423, 2427.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 11.
31. Id.
32. S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 1043 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5063. "This
section is identical with section 911, relates to exclusion from gross income derived from sources without the
United States by citizens of the United States and is, in substance, identical with section 116(a) [of] the 1939
[Internal Revenue] Code...." See Foreman v. U.S., 60 F.3d 1559, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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B. Section 911 Revisions and Restrictions
During the Kennedy administration, President Kennedy proposed eliminat-
ing the exclusion except for citizens living abroad in undeveloped foreign
countries allowing an unlimited exclusion of foreign income. 33 The Legislature
disagreed and rejected the President's recommendation. 4 Instead, the Revenue
Act of 1962 placed a ceiling on the exclusion amount of earned income for
those citizens establishing a bona fide residence in a foreign country.35 The
amended provision permitted a taxpayer earning income abroad, who met the
bona fide residence requirement, to exclude $20,000 per year from taxation for
the first three taxable years. 6 The excludable amount accrues throughout the
taxable year, and is computed on a daily basis.37 Therefore, the amount
excluded is not to exceed $20,000 for a United States' citizen with foreign
income qualifying under either the bona fide residence or the physical presence
requirement.3 However, citizens working abroad, who qualify as a bona fide
resident in a foreign country for more than three consecutive years, may exclude
$35,000. 39 The Revenue Act of 1964 reduced the maximum excludable amount
to $20,000 for citizens that remain abroad for an uninterrupted period of more
than three years.'
The most radical changes to the foreign earned income exclusion can be
attributed to the Tax Reform Act of 1976." Congress imposed restrictions on
foreign earned income to counter growing sentiment that the exclusion provided
a tax advantage to citizens working abroad.42 Moreover, Americans working
abroad were not subject to double taxation because foreign countries did not tax
33. S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 166 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3297, 3377.
34. Id. at 167.
35. Id. at 171.
36. Id.
37. Id. The following example illustrates how to compute the excludable amount pursuant to section
911 (a):
A, a U.S. citizen, who files his return on a calendar year basis, is privately employed,
and is a bona fide resident of France for the period April 1, 1963, through June 30,
1968. The amounts excludable from gross income for the various calendar years,
under the provisions of section 911 (a) ... are computed by applying the special rules
contained in section 911(c), are not to exceed the following amounts: For the year
1963, $15,068.49 (275/365 X $20,000); for the year 1964, $20,000 (366/366 X
$20,000); for the year 1965, $20,000 (365/365 X $20,000); for the year 1966,
$31,301.37 (90/365 X $20,000 plus 275/365 X $35,000); for the year 1967, $35,000;
and for the year 1968, $17,404.37 (182/365 X $35,000)).
S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 527 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3297, 3535.
38. S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 171.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 200 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3095.
42. Id.
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the income of United States' citizens.43 For example, an employee's compensa-
tion excluded under section 911 was not subject to taxation by the foreign
country if the employer paid the compensation to a bank outside that foreign
country." The amendment disallowed the exclusion to taxpayers working
abroad, receiving income outside the country, if the foreign country did not tax
income received outside that country.45
The Committee recognized that citizens working abroad incurred higher
cost of living expenses, since they did not benefit from services provided in the
United States by state, local, or federal agencies.' Congress accordingly
reduced the excludable amount to $15,000 for individuals with foreign
income." In addition, the foreign income was subject to taxation based at the
higher tax bracket for the non-excludable earned income. For example, if a
taxpayer earns $20,000 of gross income and qualifies for the exclusion under
section 911, the individual would reduce their gross income by $15,000, thus
would have taxable income of $5,000. 49 That taxpayer would now pay taxes
based on the higher tax bracket of $20,000 not the tax bracket of $5,000.0
However, employees of charitable organizations working abroad maintained an
exclusion amount of $20,000 of their foreign earned income.5
The Foreign Earned Income Act of 19782 (FEI) liberalized the restrictions
of its predecessor. " The FEI "generally replaced the section 911 ... earned
income exclusion with a new deduction for the excess costs of working in a
foreign country. 5 4 Under the FEI, taxpayers had the option of using the new
provision, including deductions for the excess costs of working abroad, or the
provisions under the Tax Reform Act of 1976."5 The deductions for excess
costs of living overseas, defined under section 913 of the IRC, consisted of
separate factors for each of the following; general cost of living, housing,
43. S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 210 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3438, 3640.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 211.
47. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L No. 94-455, § 1011, 90 Stat. 1520, 1610 (1976).
48. S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 211 (1976). The manner of determining the applicable tax rate may be
illustrated by the following example: "if a taxpayer has $20,000 of gross income which is excluded under the
income exclusion and also has $5,000 of deductions not allowable ... the taxpayer is treated as having $15,000
of taxable income for purposes of computing the tax rates on the non-excluded income." Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Tax Reform Act of 1976, 90 Stat. at 16 10.
52. Foreign Earned Income Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-615, 92 Stat. 3098 (1978).
53. S. REP. NO. 97-144, at 34 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 141.
54. Id.
55. Id.
education, and, home leave costs. 6 The FEI defined the deductions for excess
costs abroad as follows:
The [general] cost of living [deduction] is generally the amount by
which the cost of living in the taxpayer's foreign tax home exceeds
the cost of living in the highest cost metropolitan area in the continen-
tal United States (other than Alaska). [The general] deduction [was]
based on the spendable income of a person paid the salary of a federal
employee at grade level GS-14, Step 1, regardless of the taxpayer's
actual income. The housing [deduction] is the excess of the tax-
payer's reasonable housing expenses over [their] base housing
amount (generally one-sixth of [the] net income). The education de-
duction is generally the reasonable schooling expenses for the educa-
tion of the taxpayer's dependents at the elementary and secondary
levels. The deduction for annual home leave consists of the reason-
able costs of coach airfare transportation for the taxpayer, spouse, and
dependents from the taxpayer's home outside the United States to
[their] most recent place of residence within the United States.57
To encourage United States citizens to accept positions in geographical hardship
areas, the Congress carved out a special deduction of $5,000 for taxpayer's
working abroad and living in areas designated by the State Department as
hardship areas.5" Employees who reside in hardship areas may elect to claim a
$20,000 earned income exclusion in place of the excess living costs and hard-
ship area deductions.5 In addition, taxpayers under certain circumstances may
qualify for a waiver of the time requirements for the excess living costs and
hardship area deductions.6° To qualify for the waiver the taxpayer must meet
the three following requirements:
First, the individual actually must have been present in, or a bona fide
resident of, a foreign country. Second, [the taxpayer] must leave the
foreign country after August 31, 1978, during a period with respect
to which the treasury department determines, after consultation with
the state department, that [required] individuals to leave the foreign
country because of war, civil unrest, or similar adverse conditions in
the foreign country which precluded the normal conduct of business
by those individuals. Third, the individual must establish to the satis-
56. Id.
57. Id. at 34-35.
58. S. REP. NO. 97-144, at 35 (1981). 'The term geographical hardship area means any foreign
place designated by the Secretary of State as a hardship post where extraordinarily difficult living conditions,
notably unhealthy conditions or excessive physical hardships exist." Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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faction of the treasury that [they] reasonably could have ... expected
to meet the time limitation requirements, but for the war, civil unrest,
or similar adverse conditions.6
Although the FEI liberalized the tax burden, American businesses faced an
intense competitive market abroad.62
Three years later, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198163 (ERTA) again
revised taxation for citizens working abroad to encourage American businesses
overseas and "promote the export of United States goods and services. ' 64 Con-
gress recognized that although the FEI had liberalized the tax burden, American
firms still experienced difficulty hiring American employees in foreign
countries.65 Most businesses, in an attempt to encourage employees to transfer
to positions overseas, assumed the tax burden and incorporated those costs as
part of the their compensation package.' Businesses such as the construction
industry, facing overwhelming competition abroad, were unable to secure
projects due to higher bids resulting from increased employee compensation
packages.6 7 Congress decided to modify the excess foreign living cost deduc-
tion and exclusion, and to provide qualifying United States citizens an appro-
priate incentive, by allowing them to elect a substantial exclusion from
taxation.68 However, Congress "placed a specific dollar limitation on the exclu-
sion" to prevent abuse. 69 The provision also shortened the period of physical
presence necessary to qualify for the exclusion.7 ° The amended provisions
allowed taxpayers to exclude foreign earned income and their housing expen-
ses. 7 1 Under the revised provision, an individual qualified as physically present
for the taxable year if present in a foreign country for 330 days in any period of
twelve consecutive months.72
The Tax Reform Act of 198673 restricted the exclusion amount under
section 911 to a maximum of $70,000 in a taxable year.74 However, Congress
revised the exclusion again under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,7' recogniz-
61. Id.
62. S. REP. NO. 97-144, at 35 (1981).
63. Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
64. S. REP. NO. 97-144, at 36 (1981).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. S. REP. NO. 97-144, at 35 (1981).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
74. Id. at 2564.
75. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788, 988 (1997).
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ing that working abroad imposed "additional financial burdens on the employ-
ees" of United -States businesses, and increased the allowable exclusion amount
of foreign earned income.76 These burdens transpired from taxpayers maintain-
ing two separate homes; one in the foreign country, and the other in the United
States.77 Additional burdens included the increased cost individuals incurred
from traveling to maintain family relationships in the United States, or the
increased cost of living in a foreign location.78 Congress decided that an
increase of the exclusion amount was appropriate because of the higher financial
burden coupled with the increase of worldwide inflation.79 The revised amend-
ment increased the exclusion amount to "$80,000 in increments of $2,000 each
year, beginning in 1998. "8 Although Congress has dealt with section 911 after
the 1997 Act, the provision has not suffered any further revisions or amend-
ments to the exclusion for foreign earned income.
II. AGENCY FOR PURPOSES OF EXCLUSION
A. Payment of Earned Income from Agencies
Section 911 of the IRC allows "citizens or residents of the United States"
living and working abroad to exclude foreign earned income from income taxa-
tion.8" Foreign earned income is an individual's earnings from sources "attribut-
able to services performed" within a foreign country, subject to the individual
either establishing a bona fide residence or being physically present in the
foreign country, as prescribed under section 911 of the IRC.82 Foreign earned
income does not include amounts "paid by the United States or an agency
thereof to an employee of the United States or an agency thereof."83 The Trea-
sury Regulations expands on the definition by exempting the amounts paid to
an employee working for "any [United States] government agency or instrumen-
tality."8' Moreover, employees working for a non-appropriated fund instrumen-
tality (NAFI) and meeting the employee status test are employees of agencies
of the United States and therefore are not entitled to the exclusion of foreign
earned income.85
76. H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 519 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 913.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 520.
81. I.R.C. § 91 l(a)(1) (West 2003).
82. I.R.C. § 91 l(b)(1)(A) (West 2003).
83. I.R.C. § 91 l(b)(l)(B)(ii) (West 2003) (emphasis added).
84. Treas. Reg. § 1.911-3(c)(3)(1985); In re Nadybol, 254 B.R. 352, 354 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000).
85. Matthews v. Comm'r, 907 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The court in Nadybol defined a
NAFI as: "an entity created to administer non-appropriated funds. Non-appropriated funds ... are funds that
have not been appropriated by Congress, but are generated instead by participation of [military] personnel and
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Courts have broadly construed the term agency under section 911 of the
IRC because a "narrow construction ... would be incompatible with a strict
application of the exclusion." 16 The term agency was defined by the Revenue
Act of 1942 as follows: "(1) Faculty or state of acting or of exerting power; ...
instrumentality; or (2) Office or function of an agent, or factor; relation between
a principal and his agent; business of one entrusted with the concerns of
another., 87 The term instrumentality was defined as: "Quality or state of being
instrumental; that which is instrumental; means; medium; agency."88  The
Treasury regulations interpreting the definition of the terms agency and
instrumentality stated: "[i]nstrumentality ... [equals] agency." 9 The following
are examples of recognized Government agencies; "United States Armed Forces
exchanges, commissioned and non-commissioned officers' messes, Armed
Forces motion picture services and other organizations similarly organized and
operated under Government regulations." 9
The United States Court of Claims established "essential characteristics"
to identify an agency of the United States under the meaning of section 911.91
The court, in determining "what constitutes an agency," applied the following
factors in considering the "degree of control" by the United States Government:
(1) power of the United States to initiate and terminate; (2) effectuation of
government purposes by the entity; (3) the exclusion of private profit; and, (4)
limitation of employment to government connected persons. 92
The United States Court of Appeals applied the "essential characteristics"
test in Kalinski v. Commissioner,93 and determined that a United States Air
Force (USAF) child-care center located in Germany was an agency of the
United States, within the meaning of section 911.94 The USAF established and
operated the center "to provide care for the disabled and handicapped children
of its personnel. 95 USAF exercised "pervasive control" of the centers' financial
decisions and monitored the functioning of the center.96 The center, a not for
others in [military], religious, morale, welfare, and recreation programs such as base exchanges, theatres, book
departments, and restaurants." 254 B.R. at 353.
86. Groves v. U.S., 533 F.2d 1376, 1383 (5th Cir. 1976).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Morse v. United States, 443 F.2d 1185, 1190 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (internal citations omitted).
91. Id. at 1188 (internal citations omitted).
92. Payne v. United States, 980 F.2d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Morse, 443 F.2d at 1188
(internal citations omitted).
93. 528 F.2d 969, 973 (1st Cir. 1976).
94. Id. at 973.
95. Id.
96. Id.
profit enterprise, limited its services to Air Force personnel. 97 The court con-
cluded that "the center was an agency" of the government and that employees
of the center were not qualified to claim the foreign earned income exclusion.98
The Second Circuit in Payne v. United States99 concluded that, "the
Panama Canal Commission (PCC) was an agency of the United States Govern-
ment."'0° The United States Congress under the auspices of the Panama Canal
Treaty enacted legislation and created the PCC.'0 ' The Treaty "required the
United States to create the PCC" and referred to the PCC as "a United States
Government agency."' 02 The United States initiated the PCC under its laws and
regulations. 0 3 Furthermore, the majority of the board members are United
States nationals and the President of the United States "appoints and terminates
the administrator and the deputy administrator."'" Thus, the United States
actually has the power to initiate and terminate the PCC by exerting control over
the Board membership and its policies. 105
The next factor used to determine whether the PCC is an agency, is
whether the PPC was established to effectuate the United States Government
purposes."° Article III of the Panama Canal Treaty states that "the United
States of America shall ... carry out its responsibilities [under the Treaty] by
means of a United States Government agency called the [PCC]." °7 The third
factor is whether the PCC generates private profits or government revenues.'0 8
The United States statute creating the PCC affirms that the PCC will expense
any profits it generates, solely for purposes of the PCC."°9 The final prong of
the test is whether the "membership of the PCC is limited to government-con-
nected persons.""0 The PCC employees were subject to substantially the same
responsibilities, duties, and laws applicable to federal employees."' Moreover,
some United States citizens, working for the PCC, qualify for federal employ-
ment benefits packages." 2 Therefore, the court deemed the PCC an agency for
purposes of section 911 because it was under the control of the United States
97. Id.
98. Kalinski, 528 F.2d at 974.
99. 980 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1992).
100. Id. at 149.
101. Id. at 150.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Payne, 980 F.2d at 151.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Payne, 980 F.2d at 151.
110. Id. at 151.
111. Id. at 151-52.
112. Id. at 152.
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government and denied the taxpayer their claim to the foreign earned income
exclusion." 3 Next, we will examine whether NAFI programs are agencies for
purposes of section 911 of the IRC." 4
B. Non-appropriated Fund Instrumentality
The purpose of establishing NAFI programs is to maintain the "morale,
welfare and recreation" for the benefit of the military." 5 The Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Maryland determined that the Army Recreation Machine Fund
(ARMF) a NAFI located in Germany, was an agency of the United States." 6
The United States Department of the Army established the ARMF for the
morale, welfare, and recreation of soldiers and their family members, as a
NAFI. 7 The debtor employed by the ARMF lived and maintained a residence
in Germany."8
The In re Nadybol' 9court, acknowledged that the United States Army
established the ARMF, and could terminate it at any time. 2° The effectuation
of government purposes by the entity was the second factor the court
analyzed.' 2 1 The debtor interpreted the second prong in the following way:
"only if the governmental purpose [achieved] by ARMF is essential or critical
[emphasis added] can there be a finding that it is a section 911 (a) agency."'' 22
The debtor objecting to the notion that the ARMF was critical for the United
States Army, referred to Army Regulation (AR) 215-1 maintaining the ARMF
was "considered less essential from the perspective of the military mission. ''123
The court not persuaded by the debtor's contentions, quoted from AR 215-1,
"the Army considers every NAFI ... integral and essential to the conduct of the
military mission."' 124 Moreover, the court rejected the debtor's line of reasoning
113. Id.
114. In re Nadybol, 254 B.R. 352, 354 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000); see I.R.C. § 91 1(a)(l).
115. Id. at 353.
116. Id. at 357. The ARMF mission statement and purpose is "to provide a highly controlled gaming
operation designed to provide recreation for soldiers and family members overseas while generating revenue
for the morale, welfare and recreation programs and projects." Id. at 353.
117. Id. at 353; see I.R.C. § 911(a)(1).
118. Id.
119. 254 B.R. at 352.
120. Id. at 355.
121. Id.
122. Id.; see also Morse, 443 F.2d at 1188. The court in stated that the second element of control that
identifies an agency is the effectuation of Government purposes is paramount over those of the organized
members. Furthermore, the court stated that for taxpayers to succeed they "would have to show that the
[entity taxpayers worked for] was established to provide essential morale and recreational facilities and
services for personnel of an installation." (internal citations omitted). Id.
123. Nadybol, 254 B.R. at 355.
124. Id.
that the ARMF must be essential to determine whether it was an agency of the
government. 125  The court, discussing the element of whether the ARMF
operated for private profit, determined that the revenues generated by the
ARMF were for the benefit of other morale, welfare and recreational programs
of the Army. 26 In addition, the ARMF funds were subject to the control of the
Army. 127 The court concluded that in order to satisfy the governmental connec-
tion prong of the test, a sufficient showing of governmental connection is
enough. 128 The debtor put forth a similar argument to that of the employee in
Payne, that since foreign nationals could use the slot machines of the ARMF the
purpose was not limited to "government connected persons."'129 The court used
a similar analogy to that of the court in Payne.30 First, the employees of the
ARMF were subject to the same standards of conduct and regulations as those
established by the Army.' 3 ' Moreover, the court quoted from the AR 215-1,
"[all] Army NAFI's operate under the authority of the United States Govern-
ment and are administered by military or civilian personnel acting in an official
capacity. '  Although foreign nationals, persons other than the military
personnel, had limited access to the ARMF, the court concluded that the
evidence of government connection was sufficient so the ARMF satisfied the
final prong of the government control test.
133
Although NAFI's generally are agencies of the United States, depending
on the particular facts, courts may hold that they are not agencies contemplated
by section 911 of the IRC.' 3' The Court of Claims in Brummitt, 135 concluded
that the United States Officers' Open Mess, Tapei (USOOMT) located in
Taiwan was not an agency of the United States. 136 The court reasoned that
while the club possessed some characteristics of a NAFI because it was subject
to the regulations of the military and received benefits from the military in the
form of loans, the totality of the circumstances militated against determining the
USOOMT an agency of the United States. 137 The court considered the
following factors: (1) the military did not exercise "fiscal control over the club;"
(2) the club was constructed on privately owned land, (3) the club negotiated
125. Id. at 356.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Nadybol, 254 B.R. at 357.
129. Id. at 356.
130. Id. at 357.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Nadybol, 254 B.R. at 357; see also Kalinski, 528 F.2d at 973-74 (1st Cir. 1976).
134. Brummitt v. U.S., 329 F.2d 966, 969 (Ct. CI. 1964).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. ld.
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and was financially responsible for its loan, and, (4) "government employees
and foreign nationals [alike] were entitled to membership" without limitation.' 3
Therefore, the employees of the USOOMT, which is not an agency of the
United States, are qualified to claim the exclusion.13 Next, we will examine the
political and industry opposition to repealing the IRC provision for foreign
earned income exclusion.
IV. POLITICAL AND INDUSTRY OPPOSITION TO REPEAL THE EXCLUSION
PROVISION
Amid the Senate Finance Committee debating the Jobs and Growth Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act,140 and limited to a budget of $350 billion in tax relief
to stimulate the economy and increase the number of jobs in the United States,
there emerged a controversial plan to repeal section 911 of the IRC.' 4 ' The
proposed plan emerged as a potential revenue raising provision worth thirty five
billion dollars over the next ten years to offset the tax reductions and remain
within budget limits.'42 The controversial plan by Senator Grassley, chairman
of the Senate Finance Committee, would have eliminated the tax exemption
available to over 358,000 American taxpayers working overseas. 43
Business leaders representing expatriates criticized the proposed repeal
claiming that Congress should expand the foreign income exclusion instead of
eliminating the provision.' The taxpayers affected are American citizens
overseas, working in remote areas of the world with modest salaries that create
jobs in the United States. 45  Many organizations with employees abroad
expressed support for retaining the exemption, because without it they would
have to replace those American employees with foreign nationals. 14 6 Nonprofit
organizations such as the Catholic Relief Services and the International Rescue
Commission, performing humanitarian work on behalf of the United States, also
138. Id.
139. Brummitt, 329 F.2d at 969.
140. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752
(2003).
141. 108 CONG. REC. S1054 (daily ed. May 14, 2003) (statement of Sen. Grassley), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited June 21, 2003).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Proposal to Add Taxes for U.S. Citizens Abroad Draws Fire, Agence France-Presse, May 15,
2003, available at 2003 WL 2802787.
145. 108 CONG. REC. S1054 (daily ed. May 14, 2003) (statement of Sen. Breaux), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited June 21, 2003).
146. Id. Among the organizations voicing opposition to repeal the foreign earned income exclusion
were "the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Foreign Trade
Council, the Financial Executives International, the U.S. Council for International Business, the Association
of General Contractors of America, and, the American Council of Engineering Companies." Id.
expressed their support for retaining the exemption.147 Senator Breaux led the
opposition and expressed his concerns to the Finance Committee regarding the
elimination of the provision
[W]hy do American workers get a credit for working overseas? ...
[T]hey are [neither] in this country... [nor] enjoy the benefits and the
security of living in this country, and, therefore, ... in order to
encourage American workers to have jobs overseas instead of hiring
foreign citizens, the [Internal Revenue Code provides] American
workers an $80,000 tax exemption on [the] wages ... they earn over-
seas. In many cases, they work in dangerous places. In most cases,
[American's working abroad do not] get the privileges and the
security of living in the United States.48
It is a bad tax policy to place American businesses in an uncompetitive
position with foreign companies, forcing them to replace American workers
with foreign nationals.149
However, Senator Grassley justified his position in favor of repealing the
foreign earned income exclusion, by stating on the Senate floor:
[t]he policy issue presented by repeal of section 911 is whether tax-
payer dollars should be used to underwrite an employer's cost of
sending employees overseas. Why do we subsidize moving employ-
ees overseas? I think sending employees overseas should be a busi-
ness decision. Repeal will not cause U.S. citizens to be double taxed.
A U.S. citizen who earns [foreign] income ... taxed by a foreign
country [may elect].., to reduce ... U.S. taxes [by an amount equal
to] ... any foreign income taxes paid.15
In a memorandum addressed to reporters and editors, Senator Grassley
further stated that, "[a] worker in Des Moines pays federal income taxes, but his
colleague working for the same company overseas probably pays nothing, that
[does not] make sense."15'
Ways and Means Committee members verbally assaulted the Senate
Finance Committee bill to offset tax reductions by repealing the exclusion
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 108 CONG. REC. S1054 (daily ed. May 14, 2003) (statement of Sen. Breaux), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited June 21, 2003).
150. 108 CONG. REC. S1054 (daily ed. May 14, 2003) (statement of Sen. Grassley), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited June 21, 2003).
151. Memorandum from Senator Charles Grassley, Section 911 repeal, U.S. Senate Commission on
Finance, to Reporters and Editors (May 14, 2003), available at http://finance.senate.gov (last visited June 2 1,
2003).
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provision.'52 Representative Foley, referring to the thirty-five billion dollar
repeal of the tax exclusion declares "[tihe Senate's idea of giving tax relief to
American families is to increase their taxes."'53 Senate Majority leader Tom
Daschle voiced his concerns over the impact the exclusion would have on the
American economy "[w]e need people to take ... jobs [abroad] to continue to
grow this economy as much as we can ... [not] a huge tax increase on working
families [overseas] at the time when we need ... them more than ever."'""
V. CONCLUSION
Repeal of the long standing provision that allows for foreign earned
income exclusion would result in a loss of jobs that is in direct conflict with the
Bush administration's "intentions to stimulate the economy."'55 Eliminating the
exclusion would result in United States businesses hiring foreign nationals in
place of American workers employed in foreign countries."' Moreover, if
businesses replace American workers with foreign nationals the unemployment
rate would rise and exports would suffer.'
Those in opposition to the exclusion provision claim that American
taxpayers working abroad have an advantageous tax position because they are
not subject to double taxation, thus the provision is not necessary.'58 Some
taxpayers qualified to elect section 911 may work abroad and earn income free
of personal income taxation by working in a foreign country that imposes no
taxes. 159 However, foreign countries that do not levy taxes on personal income
use other means to tax individuals. 60 For example, the Bahamas does not levy
taxes on the personal income of its citizens or any individual working in that
country. 16 ' The Bahamian Government's means of generating revenues to
sustain governmental services is through indirect taxation on goods and
152. Martin Vaughn and Keith Koffler, Senate Tax Cuts Could Grow in Conference Report,
CONGRESS DAILY NEWSWIRE, May 9, 2003, available at 2003 WL 18098126.
153. Id.
154. Proposal to Add Taxes for U.S. Citizens Abroad Draws Fire, Agence France-Presse, May 15,
2003, available at 2003 WL 2802787.
155. Letter from Robert A. Zarzar, Chair, Tax Executive Committee, American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, to The Honorable Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Senate Finance Committee (May 14,
2003), available at http://www.cpabiz.comlResourceCenterslTaxllnternational/secion9 1.htm.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 108 CONG. REC. S 1054 (daily ed. May 14, 2003) (statement of Sen. Grassley), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited on June 21, 2003).
159. Marguerite H. Vanlandingham, Code Section 911 Tax Relief and the Cost of Living Abroad, 24
INTL TAX J. 48, 50 (1998).
160. Id.
161. Id.
services."' Thus, an American citizen working in the Bahamas pays "approxi-
mately one-and-one-half times" more to purchase products than in the United
States.'63 Based on these circumstances, an American citizen working in the
Bahamas, and qualified to elect the exclusion, would earn income of "approxi-
mately one-and-one-half times" the income in the United States. 164 Simulta-
neously that same American citizen would pay to purchase products in the
Bahamas one-and-one-half-times the cost of products in the United States. 165
The net result is no gain."6
The policy and purpose of the provision excluding foreign earned income
continues to have a significant impact not only on the economy of the United
States but also on its citizens working abroad.
162. Id.
163. Vanlandingham, supra note 159, at 52.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 52-53.
166. Id. at 53.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Within the last decade, this country has made tremendous strides in the
way of immigration legislation.' The current Violence Against Women Act
(V.A.W.A.) legislation allows a battered spouse or child with conditional status
to self-petition for permanent legal residency, as well as request a cancellation
of removal or suspension of deportation without the assistance of their abusive
citizen sponsor.2
However, barriers to legal and social service agencies have impeded
battered immigrants' access to the legal remedies now available under the
* J.D. candidate December 2004, Shepard Broad Law Center at Nova Southeastern University.
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1. See Michelle J. Anderson, A License to Abuse: The Impact of Conditional Status on Female
Immigration, 102 YALE L.J. 1401 (1993).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (a)(l)(A)(iii)(1) (2003).
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applicable immigration laws.3 As a result, battered immigrants are generally at
variance with facing the legal, social, and economic consequence attendant to
ending their abusive relationship.4
Moreover, battered immigrants face numerous barriers when they attempt
to access the civil legal system which often results in them avoiding the legal
system altogether.5 Among these barriers is their lack of access to information
concerning the civil and administrative remedies available to them that could
potentially dispel their belief that reporting the abuse adversely affects their
ability to obtain sufficient legal status in this country.6 There is also a wide-
spread belief, amongst the immigrant population, that the domestic relation laws
in the United States are comparable to similar laws in their home country.7
However, unlike the United States, many countries do not offer legal remedies
to domestic violence victims.'
Battered immigrants also mistakenly believe that legal and social services
are only available to citizens and very providently to documented immigrants. 9
Although accessibility to free legal services for certain categories of battered
immigrants is limited, these services nonetheless exist and are administered by
the Legal Services Corporation (L.S.C.)."°
L.S.C. is a private non-profit corporation that allocates federal funds to
legal service programs to be used for representing indigent persons in certain
civil matters." Legal Services programs now exist in virtually every county in
every state.' 2 However, L.S.C. has imposed numerous restrictions upon legal
services programs on the types of cases and classes of clients that these
programs are allowed to represent. 3 Also, over time, L.S.C. lost the support of
Congress, which has often resulted in a reduction in funding and an increase in
program restrictions, including the ability of federally funded programs to
3. See Anderson, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Linda Kelly, Stories From the Front: Seeking Refuge for Battered Immigrants in the Violence
Against Women Act, 92 Nw. U.L. REv. 665 (1998).
9. Id. at 681.
10. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRAINING FOR V.A.W.O.
GRANTEES: THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANT VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 276
(2000).
11. Robert L. Bach, Building Community Among Diversity: Legal Services for Impoverished
Immigrants, 27 U. MICH. J.L REFORM 639, 642 (1994).
12. Id.
13. Ingrid V. Eagly, Community Education: Creating A New Vision of Legal Services Practice, 4
CLINICAL L. REV. 433, 438 (1998).
provide representation to various classes of immigrants. 4 However, for the
most part, legal services programs provide the only source of free civil legal
representation to indigent battered immigrants. 5 Moreover, it is often the case
that legal services attorneys are the only attorneys within the community who
have the expertise and training necessary to address both the domestic violence
and poverty law issues that generally accompany the abuse. 6
Notwithstanding their need for free legal services, it has been found that
legal services programs routinely deny services to battered immigrants.'" How-
ever, it has been suggested that their denial of services is largely due to the
programs' misconception that funding restrictions prohibit its legal representa-
tion of most immigrants.'"
Through, V.A.W.A., federal funds are allocated to assist programs in
addressing the social, economic, and legal needs of battered immigrants. 9
Therefore, it would be safe to presume that legal services programs have
expanded its client base to include battered immigrants.2"
This paper will first discuss the prevailing theories concerning domestic
violence and the resulting effects of the abuse, including the fears and
challenges that are unique to battered immigrants. A comprehensive discussion
of both the prohibited and permissible L.S.C. activities will follow. Next, the
effect of L.S.C. restrictions on federally funded programs' delivery of legal
services, as well as an analysis of the traditional lawyering practices of most
legal services programs will be addressed. This paper will also examine the
impact that alternative sources of funding have on battered immigrants' access
to legal services programs. Finally, this paper will discuss the need for a
cooperative effort by legal services programs, immigration advocacy groups,
and victim services programs as a means to ensure that the battered immigrant's
efforts to flee from the abusive relationship are successful.
14. Id.
15. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN OFFICE, supra note 10.
16. Id. at 277.
17. Virginia Coto, Lucha, The Struggle for Life: Legal Services for Battered Immigrant Women,
53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 749, 752 (1999).
18. Id.
19. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN OFFICE, supra note 10.
20. Id.
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I. PREVAILING THEORIES ABOUT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE FEARS AND
CHALLENGES OF BATTERED IMMIGRANTS
National statistics report that more than six million women are abused each
year.2 Statistics further reveal that battered immigrant women are unlikely to
report domestic violence occurring in the home or leave their abusive relation-
ship.22 Moreover, it has been suggested that battered immigrant women face
triple jeopardy because of the domestic violence they experience, cultural
implications, and problems that may arise from the immigration processes.23
Those who do not understand the psychological, social, and legal effect
that domestic violence has upon its victims, often question why the victim
remains in the abusive relationship.24 Therefore, in order to appreciate the
problems faced by victims of domestic violence and to fully address their legal
needs, it is imperative that the legal practitioner fully understands the dynamics
of domestic violence.
Domestic violence is quite often ill defined and generally does not encom-
pass the psychological, social, and familial constructs which forms the environ-
ment in which the abuse occurs.26 Typically, domestic violence is thought of as
consisting of the physical act of abuse.27 However, there is actually no one
physical act or distinctive trait or attribute that exemplifies a victim of abuse and
which could accurately define the scope of domestic violence.28 Consequently,
domestic violence is best defined as a multitude of factors and behaviors by
which an abuser exercises dominion and control over the victim.
29
Moreover, through intimidation, manipulation, and aggression, the abuser
forces the victim to live in continuous threat of danger and anticipation of
violence.30 Batterers further succeed in controlling their victims by limiting
their contact and associations with family and friends who might otherwise
provide them with a source of support. 3' This effectively results in the victim's
21. Coto, supra note 17, at 750.
22. Kelly, supra note 8.
23. Coto, supra note 17, at 750.
24. See Roberta L. Valente, Addressing Domestic Violence: The Role of the Family Law
Practitioner, 29 FAM. L.Q. 187, 188 (1995).
25. Id. at 187.
26. Id. at 188.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Valente, supra note 24.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 189.
physical and emotional isolation.32 Consequently, abused women do not have
the network of familial and social support needed to effectively deal with the
debilitating effects of domestic violence.33
Batterers also exert financial control over their victims by not permitting
them to work which serves to ensure that the victim is also economically in-
secure.' Therefore, battered immigrants' financial dependence on their abuser
makes it extremely difficult for many of them to end their abusive relationship.35
Generally speaking, battered immigrant women are also unemployed and have
very little, if any, individual financial resources. 36 They also usually lack the
requisite education or skills needed to secure an income sufficient enough to
enable them to live independent of their abuser.37 For those battered immigrants
who are undocumented or whose legal status is pending, immigration laws limit
their ability to obtain suitable employment which forces many battered immi-
grants to resort to jobs that pay minimal wages with no benefits.38
Language barriers also significantly limit battered immigrants access to
employment opportunities. 39  Given these harsh economic realities, many
battered immigrants are forced to choose between a life of poverty or to
succumb to the evils of domestic violence.40
Language barriers also prevent battered immigrants from effectively arti-
culating the conditions in which they live to victim services programs and legal
advocates, as well as impede their understanding of the legal remedies available
to them both in the civil arena and through the administrative processes of the
immigration system. 4' Moreover, because of their language and communication
barriers, battered immigrants are usually unaware that domestic violence acts
have been criminalized or that legal and social services are available.42
Language and communication barriers also cause battered victims to refuse
to seek the assistance of law enforcement officers, attorneys, shelters, or other
32. Id.
33. Tien-Li Loke, Note, Trapped In Domestic Violence: The Impact of United States Immigration
Laws on Battered Immigrant Women, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 589, 592 (1997).
34. Id.
35. Nimish R. Ganatra, Comment, The Cultural Dynamic in Domestic Violence: Understanding
the Additional Burdens Battered Immigrant Women of Color Face in the United States, 2 J.L. SoC'Y 109, 128
(2001).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 129.
38. Id. at 128.
39. Id. at 129.
40. Ganatra, supra note 35, at 129.
41. Coto, supra note 17, at 752.
42. Ganatra, supra note 35, at 113.
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domestic violence and inmmigration advocates.43 Furthermore, in view of the
fact that domestic violence services are generally targeted to English speaking
victims, the inability of immigrant victims to communicate effectively in
English has the potential of significantly hindering their ability to escape from
their abusers."
In an effort to assist battered immigrants to flee from their abuser, lawyers
and domestic violence counselors fervently promote civil injunctions for
protections.45 However, many battered immigrants fear that their physical safety
would be significantly compromised if they confront their abuser in the legal
system.46 Consequently, when faced with a system that is usually uninviting,
battered immigrants will concede to the deeply rooted bureaucratic machinery
of the immigration processes and remain undocumented or simply surrender to
the abuse.47 One study reported that battered immigrants are extremely fearful
of the immigration and naturalization agencies. 48 As a result, battered immi-
grants are hesitant to seek the assistance of law enforcement out of fear that they
or their abuser will be deported.49 In fact, instead of involving the police or the
immigration authorities in their matters, many battered immigrants opt to remain
in their abusive relationship.50
Divorce also offers a solution to battered immigrants.5' However, in some
immigrant communities, it comes at the high cost of extreme stigmatization.52
Some of these communities pressure battered women to remain in the marriage
and rebuff those who choose to dissolve their marriage.53 In fact, in some
immigrant communities, divorce is so heavily stigmatized that women who end
their marriage because of domestic violence are forbidden to remarry within that
community.54 She additionally faces the possibility of rejection by her family
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Anderson, supra note 1, at 1421.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1422.
50. Anderson, supra note 1, at 1422.
51. Sudha Shetty & Janice Kaguyutan, Immigrant Victims of Domestic Violence: Cultural Challen-
ges and Available Legal Protections (Feb. 2002), http://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/vawnet/arimmigrant
(last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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of origin because the divorce brings extreme disgrace and dishonor to the entire
family.
55
Although the foregoing fears and challenges effectively immobilize
battered immigrants from taking positive action to free themselves from their
abusers' control, their most paralyzing fear is the threat of deportation.5 6 This
is primarily due to false information given to battered immigrants by their
abuser which is used as a means to exert continuous control over the victim.57
Consequently, rather than face deportation, many battered immigrants choose
to remain in their abusive relationship.5
Therefore, when addressing family law issues for battered immigrants, the
legal practitioner must consider the foregoing challenges confronted by battered
immigrants and advocate accordingly.
E[[. L.S.C. PROHIBITIONS AND PERMISSIBLE AcTIvrnES AS APPLIED TO
IMMIGRANTS
As stated earlier, most legal services programs receive federal funding
under the auspices of L.S.C.5' However, since the Regan administration,
federally funded programs have operated under the constant threat of defund-
ing.6° Moreover, L.S.C. imposed strict funding guidelines on the types of cases
and classification of persons qualified for program representation, including
immigrants.6
Therefore, in order to receive services from federally funded legal services
programs, pursuant to Title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 1626.5,
it is required that immigrants meet one of the following categories: (a) An alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence; (b) An alien who is either married
to a United States citizen or is a parent or an unmarried child who has filed an
application for adjustment of status to permanent resident on behalf of the alien;
(c) An alien who has been permitted refugee admission or who has been granted
asylum; and, (d) An alien who has been granted conditional entry because of
persecution or fear of persecution from the alien's country of origin.62
However, the Legal Services Corporation Appropriations Act of 1997,
commonly referred to as the Kennedy Amendment, made a significant change
55. Id.
56. Coto, supra note 17, at 751.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Bach, supra note 11, at 641-42.
60. Eagly, supra note 13, at 439.
61. Id. at 439-40.
62. Regulations Relating to Public Welfare, Legal Services Corporation, 45 C.F.R. § 1626.5 (2003).
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to its general prohibition against representation of unqualified immigrants.63
Prior to the Amendment, legal services programs were also prohibited from
using its non-federal funds to provide legal representation to L.S.C. ineligible
immigrants. 4 This restriction effectively barred legal services programs from
using its non-L.S.C. funds to the same extent as its L.S.C. funds.65 Conse-
quently, many battered immigrants could not access legal assistance and were
therefore left with little or no assistance in obtaining civil and administrative
legal redress for the effects resulting from the abuse.'
However, Congress subsequently amended the L.S.C. restriction by
providing an exception for indigent battered immigrants who did not otherwise
meet the L.S.C. alien eligibility guidelines.67 The exception authorized legal
services programs to assist unqualified battered immigrants with issues that
were "directly related to the prevention of the abuse or obtaining relief from the
battery or cruelty. 68 Therefore, legal services programs were permitted to assist
undocumented immigrant spouses and children who had been abused or
subjected. to extreme cruelty by a spouse or a parent, as long as it could be
demonstrated that the legal assistance was tied to the domestic violence.69
The Kennedy Amendment defined the term "legal assistance directly
related to the prevention of, or obtaining relief from the battery or cruelty"
rather broadly, and thus permitted L.S.C. funded programs to assist undocu-
mented battered immigrants with a wide range of legal issues.70 The intent of
the legislation was to help battered immigrants to escape from their abusive
situation, ameliorate the effects of the abuse, and to warn against future abuse.7'
However, the definition precludes L.S.C. funded programs from using non-
L.S.C. funds to serve ineligible immigrants with any and all legal assistance that
would ordinarily fall within the programs' established priorities.72 Therefore,
this restriction effectively limits legal services programs' representation of
undocumented battered immigrants to only those matters that have some nexus
with the domestic violence.73 Consequently, many legal services programs are
banned from assisting ineligible battered immigrants with services that
63. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.1 (2003).
64. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.3 (2003).
65. Id.
66. See Eagly, supra note 13.
67. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.5 (2003).
68. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1612.2(f)(g), 1626.4 (2003).
69. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.4 (2003).
70. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.2(g) (2003).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
otherwise are provided to non-immigrant applicants.74 However, legal services
programs are able to offer brief consultation to ineligible immigrants, as well as
referrals to social services agencies and the private bar associations."
Although L.S.C. does not offer an exhaustive list of allowable issues that
a program's non-L.S.C. funds can be used to address, it does permit representa-
tion for a broad range of family law, housing, consumer, and public benefits
issues.76 Therefore, in an effort to assist undocumented battered immigrants to
physically escape the abusive relationship, non-L.S.C. funds can be used for
representation of civil injunction for protections, dissolution of marriage,
custody, dependency actions, and spousal and child support cases.77
Non-L.S.C. funds can also be used to assist battered immigrants with
securing and maintaining public housing and various public benefits, in order
that the abused immigrant spouse and children are no longer forced to rely
exclusively on the financial resources of their abuser.78  However, absent
evidence that supports a claim that the immigrant's circumstances were the
direct result of the abuse, legal services programs are prohibited from providing
legal representation to the immigrant.79
Even though the Kennedy Amendment authorizes recipients of L.S.C.
funded programs to use other funding to assist illegal immigrants, many pro-
grams do not allocate non-L.S.C. funds for this purpose' ° The reality for many
legal services programs was that funding limitations simply did not permit the
reallocation or diversion of funding to permit access to representation to L.S.C.
ineligible immigrants.8'
Also, because most legal services programs are not experienced in handling
immigration issues, primarily due to the prior L.S.C. restrictions, many pro-
grams simply did not address battered immigrant issues.82 Therefore, since a
great number of these programs rely substantially on L.S.C. funding, non-L.S.C.
funds do not provide a practicable source of funding to address legal issues for
battered immigrants who are L.S.C. ineligible.83
74. Id.
75. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.2(g) (2003).
76. Id.
77. 45 C.F.R § 1626.4 (2003).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Bach, supra note 11, at 643.
81. Id.
82. See Coto, supra note 17.
83. See Bach, supra note 11, at 643.
2003] Varner
188 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 10:179
IV. THE EFFECT OF L.S.C. RESTRICTIONS ON THE DELIVERY OF
LEGAL SERVICES
As stated earlier, some categories of battered immigrants qualify for
representation by federally funded programs.' Therefore, access to free legal
service varies according to the battered immigrant's legal status. 85 Undocu-
mented battered immigrants experience the most difficulty in accessing free
legal assistance.86 Consequently, they are forced to rely on the most ineffective
form of help; primarily, non-legal community based immigration agencies.87
In contrast, battered immigrants who meet the L.S.C. requirements are able to
obtain legal assistance from federally funded legal services programs.88
However, funding restrictions have induced legal services programs to
maintain the status quo and represent only those issues that have been tradition-
ally accepted by L.S.C.
It is typically the practice of legal services programs to provide high
volume legal representation for poverty law issues to poor people residing
within the program's service area.89 However, due to the growth in poverty
combined with an insufficiency of resources, legal services programs have
become overwhelmed by demands for services and have, thus, found it
necessary to limit the types of cases it will handle.90 As a result, legal services
programs have established priorities for the types of cases that qualify for
representation by taking into account several factors, which include the degree
of need, severity of poverty, and the likelihood of success. 9'
Traditionally, the focus of legal services programs has been on impact
litigation.92 Although impact litigation had the potential to reform laws and
effect policy changes that benefited indigent people, it also diminished the
ability of the lawyer and client to establish a personal connection with each
other, which is fundamental to the legal relationship.93 Instead, the client was
reduced to a legal issue.94 However, due to the increase in domestic violence,
84. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.2(g) (2003).
85. Bach, supra note 11, at 653.
86. Id. at 654.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Coto, supra note 17.
90. Eagly, supra note 13, at 440.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Peter Margulies, Political Lawyering, One Person at a Time: The Challenge of Legal Work
Against Domestic Violence for the Impact Litigation/Client Service Debate, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L 493,502
(1996).
94. Id. at 510.
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it became necessary for legal services programs to shift the focus of poverty law
from impact work to intensive client service work.95
The client service model focuses on the one attorney to one client paradigm
that is designed to impact the individual client.96 However, because legal
services programs usually have extremely heavy caseloads and limited financial
resources, little time is spent in fully assessing its clients' concerns.9 7 For that
reason, representation is generally limited to the client's most pressing legal
issues.98 Consequently, the legal, economic, and social consequences that could
potentially result from the underlying legal problem are generally not taken into
account.99 Therefore, it is arguable that this approach to service delivery is only
effective in providing a temporary solution to the client's problems.' °
Moreover, even though the client service approach may successfully
remedy the battered immigrant's immediate concern, it often fails miserably in
resolving their non-legal issues, such as the immigrant's overall economic
situation.' For the most part, the services provided to battered immigrants are
strictly limited to legal representation of the family law issues that accompany
the domestic violence and typically do not involve investigation into other legal
or non-legal matters. 1
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However, some programs have strayed away form its traditional role and
offer a holistic approach to legal representation, in an effort to address the
economic, cultural, educational, and social implications generally faced by poor
people.'0 3 Unfortunately, this approach is not the norm of most legal services
programs."
Moreover, the current strategies employed by legal services programs often
fail to consider that if provided sufficient information and the appropriate
referrals, battered immigrants could become empowered to address their non-
legal issues.0 5 Furthermore, without the appropriate direction, many battered
95. Id. at 511.
96. Stacy Brustin, Expanding Our Vision of Legal Services Representation, The Hermanas Unidas
Project, 1 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 39, 44 (1993).
97. Coto, supra note 17.
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99. Id. at 753.
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immigrants will simply fall through the cracks and abandon or refuse all efforts
to resolve the issues surrounding the domestic violence.° 6
Also, in spite of the fact that battered immigrants have been successful in
accessing legal assistance from legal services programs, statistics reveal that
private attorneys provide the largest source of legal representation to the
indigent immigrant population.'0 7 It has also been reported that grass-root
community based immigration agencies provide a slightly higher percentage of
legal assistance to indigent immigrants than do legal services programs.0 8
Although these organizations offer invaluable assistance to immigrants, the
unfortunate reality is that most of these programs lack the legal training,
knowledge, and skills necessary to sufficiently address the legal concerns of the
immigrants they serve."0 9
V. THE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE FUNDING OPPORTUNITIES ON BATTERED
IMMIGRANTS' ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES
Although L.S.C. authorized legal services programs to use its non-L.S.C.
funds to assist battered immigrants, most programs choose not to utilize these
funds for that purpose."0 Therefore, in order to avoid the restrictions of L.S.C.,
legal service providers seek private funding from its local community, the
private bar, and non- profit foundations."' However, due to a host of reasons,
funding from these sources is inconsistent.1 2 Consequently, the availability of
legal services to battered indigent immigrants has also been unstable.' 1'
However, as a direct result of the V.A.W.A. legislation, alternative funding
streams were created which effectively increased the availability of services to
battered immigrants. "' Among other purposes, the intent of the V.A.W.A.
legislation was to ensure that battered immigrants were provided equal access
to domestic violence services." 5
The Violence Against Women Office of the Department of Justice
(V.A.W.O.) administers several grant programs that are designed to address the
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107. Bach, supra note 11, at 652.
108. Id.
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legal needs of victims of abuse, which include funding for civil legal projects." 6
V.A.W.O. also offers funds to programs that address the legal needs of battered
immigrants." 7 Because V.A.W.O. grants do not impose alienage restrictions on
its grant recipients, L.S.C. funded programs that have been awarded V.A.W.O.
grants, have broadened its accessibility of legal assistance to otherwise
ineligible battered immigrants."' However, these programs can only use
V.A.W.O. funding for undocumented battered immigrants, in situations where
it can be shown that the issue being represented is somehow tied to the abuse." 9
Also, marriage or parentage must relate the undocumented battered immigrant's
abuser. '20
Moreover, it is generally the policy of V.A.W.O. to provide funding to
legal services programs that have a demonstrated history of providing direct
legal representation and advocacy to domestic violence victims. 12' Therefore,
funding is available to legal service programs to implement and establish
independent, as well as collaborative efforts with domestic violence and sexual
assault victim services organizations.1
22
One of the most significant sources of V.A.W.O. funds for domestic
violence victims, including battered immigrants, is the Legal Assistance for
Victims (L.A.V.) grant. 23 The L.A.V. grant is intended to increase the avail-
ability of legal assistance in order to provide effective aid to victims who are
seeking relief in legal matters arising as a consequence of the abuse or
violence. 124 These funds enable legal services programs to represent battered
immigrants in civil injunction for protection and family law cases, juvenile
proceedings, evictions, and public benefits cases as it could be argued that the
legal issues that arise within each of these areas are associated with domestic
violence.2 5
V.A.W.O. also offers special interest funding to legal service agencies to
establish projects that respond to the unmet legal needs of individuals who are
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members of a diverse and traditionally under served populations. 26 Battered
immigrants are included in the list of the under served. 27
Another funding source offered by V.A.W.O. is the Services, Training,
Officers, and Prosecutors (S.T.O.P.) grant, which is allocated to the states for
disbursement to projects that address issues on behalf of domestic violence
victims. 2  Numerous legal service providers, within the various states, have
been awarded S.T.O.P. funding and are able to use these funds to assist battered
immigrants with any legal action that could help the victim to end the abuse.
129
In view of the fact that V.A.W.O. grants offer legal service programs an
alternative to L.S.C. funding, many programs are now able to provide needed
representation to battered immigrants.130  Moreover, given the fact that
V.A.W.O. grants do not impose funding restrictions on immigration status, legal
service programs have been less apprehensive in opening their doors to both
documented and undocumented immigrants.' 3 ' Consequently, through the use
of alternative funding, L.S.C. programs are able to offer a wide array of legal
services to battered immigrants.
32
VI. THE NEED FOR COMMUNITY COLLABORATIONS
It has been recognized that legal services programs are unable to address
every issue faced by battered immigrants. 3 3 However, combining its efforts
with other community resources, such as victim service programs, grass-root
immigration initiatives, and legal immigration advocacy organizations, would
increase the effectiveness of legal services programs. 131 Considering that many
of these programs offer overlapping services, the benefits to battered immigrants
of such collaboration would be immeasurable and could result in a creative
project that utilizes the expertise of each program to address the unmet needs of
battered immigrant. 35 Furthermore, legal services programs likely view colla-
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borations with victim services programs and immigration advocacy groups as
interdependent. 136
A study conducted by the American Bar Association reported that the
resources of the community are paramount in diminishing the effects of
abuse. 137 Therefore, the criminal court system, family court judges, immigration
advocacy groups, law enforcement personnel, shelter workers, victim services
professionals, psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers are equally
instrumental in fighting the debilitating effects of domestic violence. 131 In light
of this, legal services attorneys who represent battered immigrant issues must
work toward providing victims with solutions that not only ensure their physical
safety, but which also offer remedies that focus on the emotional, mental, and
economic hurdles presented to battered immigrants. 139
VII. CONCLUSION
In view of the fact that V.A.W.A. funding sources are now available for
legal services programs, it is incumbent upon federally funded providers to
reorganize its resources and priorities to additionally meet the needs of battered
immigrants."4
Although numerous legislators oppose providing federally funded legal
services to undocumented immigrants, extending legal services to them would
ensure that all battered immigrants are offered the same legal safeguards and
protection as are their United States born counterparts.'41 It would additionally
heighten the likelihood that all categories of battered immigrants could escape
from their abuser because funding restrictions would not confine legal services
programs. 4
However, the only real chance that battered immigrants have to success-
fully overcome the effects of the abuse is by receiving a combination of both
legal and social services. 4 3 As it now stands, most community legal service
programs and social service agencies require that the battered immigrant apply
directly to each individual agency for individual services. Consequently, it
generally rests upon battered immigrants to determine specifically which social
136. Margulies, supra note 93, at 512.
137. Valente, supra note 24, at 193.
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services resource will appropriately address their economic, educational, mental
health, social, and legal needs.
A part of the problem results from funding competition. Typically, the
agencies that provide services to battered immigrants are all competing for the
same funds. Unfortunately, this often results in a lack of commitment by the
various community programs to join together to form a shared enterprise."
However, the effects of the domestic violence on the battered immigrant can
only be diminished when legal services programs, immigrant advocacy groups,
and victim services agencies combine, and use the unique strengths of each
program, to combat the challenges faced by battered immigrants. 145
144. Id.
145. Valente, supra note 24, at 194.
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With unexpected speed, the International Criminal Court has become a
reality. Now that the ICC prosecutor and judges are sitting in The Hague, a
careful analysis of the Court's implications for the future of legal accountability
for international crimes has become all the more important. At the entry into
force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on July 1, 2002,
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan gave his evaluation--claiming that the court
would be "a great victory for justice, and for world order-a turn away from the
rule of brute force, and towards the rule of law."'
He was both right and wrong-right that we have witnessed a significant
turn toward the rule of law, but wrong that the court itself will be a powerful
and direct means for justice and world order. I do not mean to say that the ICC
is not important. In fact, it is extremely important. Rather, I hope to sketch for
you today the outlines of a court that, created in compromise, is highly
constrained, but has great potential to transform international criminal justice
as we understand it today.
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I will begin by suggesting four reasons why the ICC as it has been created
is an extremely limited mechanism and will not itself be the victory for justice
the Secretary-General predicted. Then, I will offer three observations about how
the ICC will nonetheless transform and greatly strengthen accountability for
international crimes. I will conclude with a brief look toward the future.
I. THE WEAKNESSES OF THE ICC
There is probably no weaker court in the world-including the local traffic
court down the street-than the International Criminal Court. The ICC was
designed to be weak. Its architects feared the effects of a powerful court and
throughout the process of drafting the Rome Statute they reached a number of
compromises that effectively undercut the Court at every turn. Most of these
compromises were pushed by the U.S. delegation at Rome. U.S. Ambassador
David Scheffer knew the only hope for U.S. ratification was a court so con-
strained it would appear impotent to its domestic critics. The Europeans gave
way-in part to placate the U.S. and in part because they too could come to fear
a strong court. I will hope to explore the limitations of the court by examining
four of these compromises-the limitations on jurisdiction, the narrow
admissibility of cases, the lack of authority to apprehend, and the Court's
limited capacity.
A. Limited Jurisdiction
One of the major compromises reached at Rome was to restrict the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Largely based on pressure from
the U.S., the Rome Statute requires that either the state where the crimes
occurred or the state of which the accused is a national be a party to the Statute.
This compromise, embodied in Article 12 of the Statute, has profound
implications. In short it means that only crimes committed on the territory of a
state party to the Statute or those committed by a national of a state party to the
Statute can be prosecuted by the Court. Yet, this also effectively defines the two
types of states least likely to accept the jurisdiction of the court. States where
international crimes occur are often experiencing massive governmental break-
down or are run by tyrants who commit international crimes. These are the very
people who wish to avoid prosecution and are unlikely to join the Court. Com-
pounding this limitation, in cases where a dictator commits crimes against his
own people, the national and territorial states are likely to be the same. Govern-
ments that are likely to commit crimes themselves are unlikely to join the Court
and subject their own nationals to prosecution. Thus, the Court is unlikely to
have jurisdiction over the very countries where crimes are most likely to be
committed and where national courts are most likely to be ineffective. From the
perspective of accountability, this is far from an ideal outcome.
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Notably lacking in the Court's jurisdiction are the victim state and the
custodial state. Including the victim state - the state whose nationals were the
victim of the crime-in the Court's jurisdiction would have promoted account-
ability by focusing on those who were most effected by the crimes. Similarly,
giving the Court jurisdiction when the custodial state-the state in which the
accused is found-was a party would also have expanded the ICC's reach,
allowing it to prosecute when a suspect is apprehended by some third state.
Without these jurisdictional provisions, the ICC will have a hard time finding
cases in which it is empowered to prosecute.
Admittedly, the picture is not entirely bleak. Already more than 80 states
have ratified the Statute. This includes a number of surprising candidates-
states in which it is entirely possible that international crimes could be
committed. Moreover, it seems that many transitional governments have
decided to accept the Court's jurisdiction, in part to lock in future governments,
subjecting them to the ICC and thereby hopefully preventing them from
committing crimes in the future. Over time more states are sure to join, thus
further expanding the Court's reach. However, at least in the short term, the ICC
will find these limitations on jurisdiction a significant bar to ending impunity.
B. Complementarity and the limits of admissibility
A second major restriction on the ICC, which renders it a weak institution,
is the limit on admissibility of cases before the Court. In another compromise
at Rome, Article 17 of the Statute dictates that the cases are only admissible
where national courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute. This is the principle
of complementarity, which gives national courts a first opportunity to prosecute
before the ICC can act. Understanding complementarity is essential to under-
standing the ICC. In effect, the ICC is designed to be a backstop to national
courts, rather than itself on the front lines of prosecution. In fact, all a national
court has to do to block the ICC from prosecuting is to conduct a good faith
investigation and determine that no crime was committed. Where a national
court investigates or prosecutes in good faith, the ICC is rendered powerless.
Note that this is very different from the Yugoslav (ICTY) or Rwandan
(ICTR) Tribunals, which have primacy over national courts. The ICTY can take
a case away from a national court if it wants to, but that the ICC must defer to
national courts. Again, the constraining implications of complementarity are
profound. Even if an individual is within the ICCs jurisdiction and the
prosecutor wants to pursue the case, if a national court-any national court-
investigates or prosecutes, the ICC is effectively stopped in its tracks. Thus,
despite the Court's best efforts to act, any national court can prevent it from
doing so.
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It is yet unclear what will constitute sufficient investigation by a national
court to render the case inadmissible before the ICC. An important aspect of the
Rome Statute is that it gives the ICC self-judging power in this respect through
pre-trail motions. The ICC will itself determine when national court efforts are
insufficient and therefore cases are admissible to the ICC. On one end of the
spectrum, it could determine that only serious, legitimate prosecutions by
national courts are sufficient to deny the ICC the power to prosecute. Conceiv-
ably, however, investigation could be defined more broadly to even include
investigations by a truth and reconciliation commission that-notwithstanding
its impact on reconciliation-does little to combat impunity. One of the most
interesting questions the ICC will address in its early cases, then, is what
constitutes sufficient investigation by a national court and when such prosecu-
tion is legitimate. To some degree, this will be a political question, with the
Assembly of States Parties exerting pressure on the Court to either expand or
restrict admissibility. However the ICC rules on these issues in its early cases,
the Rome Statute makes clear that limits on admissibility will deprive the ICC
of any number of cases.
C. The Difficulty of Apprehension
The third limit facing the ICC is the difficulty of apprehending suspects.
Indicted war criminals don't generally hand themselves over to courts. They are
often in hiding or in places beyond the reach of law enforcement authorities.
Despite requirements for national cooperation in the apprehension of suspects,
the ICC has no police or military force at its disposal to secure the arrest of
indictees. The Yugoslav Tribunal has also suffered from this problem. It was
only able to secure its first suspect - Dusko Tadic - by exercising its powers
of primacy, a power the ICC notably lacks, and having the German authorities
hand over Dusko Tadic who was sitting in a German prison. The ICTY has
another significant advantage over the ICC in apprehension. Most ICTY
indictees are in Bosnia or Kosovo, areas patrolled by KFOR and SFOR,
multinational forces that have the power to arrest. Nonetheless, two of the
ICTY's most wanted suspects, Radavan Karadic and Ratko Mladic, remain at
large. Most of the ICC's indictees, in contrast, will be in territories without such
multinational forces. Moreover, many of the likely target states for investiga-
tions have very limited national police forces to arrest suspects themselves or
may be undergoing political transition and unwilling to apprehend suspects
because of the potential for political destabalization.
The ICC's power of apprehension is ever further limited by the U.S.
hostility to the Court. Take, for example, the ICC's first likely case - the crimes
in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The UN Mission in
Congo (MONUC) currently lacks the authority and probably also the military
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capacity to arrest potential indictees. If a Chapter VII Resolution were put
forward in the Security Council to give MONUC such authority, it seems likely
the U.S. would oppose the move and exercise its veto. In other regions such as
Iraq, peacekeeping forces are largely led by the U.S. Again given U.S.
opposition to the Court, it seems highly unlikely that the U.S. military would
arrest an indictee and hand him over to the ICC.
Even after the ICC finds a case over which it has jurisdiction and which is
admissible, the challenge of apprehension will remain. Just as the first ICTY
prosecutor, South African Justice Richard Goldstone, carefully chose his first
cases to focus on low-level perpetrators who could be apprehended, so too will
Louis Moreno-Ocampo, the new ICC prosecutor, have to chose suspects who
can be apprehended. Likely scenarios for early arrests include cases where the
government of the territorial state is able and willing to hand over indictees or
where such indictees travel to other states that will arrest them. This is, in fact,
how Tihomir Blaskic, a Serb general, was arrested when he when to a
conference in Vienna. Again, these limits on the power of the ICC to apprehend
suspects will undoubtedly shape and restrict the Court's effectiveness.
D. Limited Capacity
The fourth constraint on the ICC is its limited capacity. The ICC is
designed to be a small court. At most, it may handle a few trials a year.
International justice is, after all, slow and expensive. In its nearly 10 years of
existence, the ICTY has issued just over 20 decisions and sentenced only about
30 individuals. The trial of Slobadon Milosevic is already well into its second
year. It seems highly unlikely that the ICC could operate more quickly or handle
many more cases than has the ICTY. By guaranteeing extensive procedural
protections, the Rome Statute has ensured the ICC will hear only a few cases.
Yet, each year hundreds, if not thousands, of international crimes are committed
around the globe. In its first year of operation the ICC received 499 communica-
tions from individuals in 66 countries suggesting possible crimes to investigate
and prosecute. The ICC simply lacks the capacity to deal with all, or even a
significant proportion, of these alleged crimes. It will have to choose its cases
carefully. Consequently, many crimes will go unprosecuted.
II. THE ICC AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ACCOUNTABILITY
I have just sketched a picture of a weak and circumscribed court. The ICC
can only exercise jurisdiction in very few cases. Cases are only admissible
before the ICC when all national courts are unable or unwilling to act. The ICC
will have a very hard time apprehending suspects even when it has jurisdiction.
And it will only be able to hear a few cases. This is not a court that the U.S.
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should fear or need actively thwart. In fact, it is a court that is likely to have
little direct impact in its early years.
While the ICC is, by intent and compromise, a weak court, it is also a court
with extraordinary potential to transform international criminal law and advance
accountability everywhere. Let me share with you three ways in which I
anticipate the ICC will reshape the landscape of international criminal law in at
least the following three ways.
A. An Expansion of Crimes
First, let us consider the case of Ituri in Eastern Congo, where two of the
most heinous international crimes are occurring with systematic regularity. In
Ituri mass rape is being used as a political tool. There are no accurate reports as
to the number of victims. But thousands, if not tens of thousands of women and
men have been the victims of mass sexual violence. Similarly, in this region of
Congo tens of thousands of children under the age of 15 are being conscripted
-kidnapped might be a better word-and forced to serve regional warlords.
Even if the children are able to escape, they are rarely welcomed back into their
communities for fear that they have become spies and will betray the village.
Often they are malnourished, drug addicted and toting AK 47s. The look in their
eyes is both heartbreaking and frightening. Before the Rome Statute the
perpetrators of sexual violence and crimes against children in internal armed
conflicts would probably have gone unpunished.
In fact, before the Rome Statute it is unclear whether their acts would have
been subject to individual criminal responsibility at all. Generally, international
humanitarian law has two separate regimes-one for international conflicts and
for internal conflicts. War crimes committed in international armed conflicts-
where two states go to war with one another-are regulated by the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949. The ICC definition of war crimes in international armed
conflicts moves beyond the Geneva Conventions by including sexual crimes and
the conscription of child soldiers. For example, Article 8(2)(b) of the Statute
includes the commission of rape, sexual slavery and the conscription of children
under the age of 15 as war crimes.
Traditionally, war crimes committed in internal conflicts--civil wars and
the likes-have been subject to less regulation and civilian victims have had
even less protection. The Rome Statute, however, includes a long list of crimes
in internal armed conflicts that are subject to the Court's jurisdiction. For
example, the Statute, in its definition of war crimes in internal armed conflicts,
includes intentional attacks on civilians, rape, and the conscription of minors.
In many ways this is a radical and very important expansion of international
criminal law and has been described by some commentators as the greatest
achievement of the Rome Conference. Today, the crimes against women and
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children in Eastern Congo are for the first time unquestionably subject to
individual responsibility. Moreover, as states enact the requisite domestic
legislation to implement the Rome Statute, they are modifying their own penal
codes to include wider definitions of war crimes, including those committed in
internal armed conflicts.
A little-noted paragraph in the preamble of the Rome Statute may also have
a significant effect in expanding the substance of international criminal law. The
paragraph provides, in a relatively understated tone "that it is the duty of every
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes." Prior to the Rome Statute, states were authorized to prosecute inter-
national crimes. However, with the exception of Grave Breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, they were under no obligation to do so. Yet, the preamble to the
Rome Statute speaks of a duty for states parties to affirmatively exercise juris-
diction. That paragraph should expand the willingness and ability of national
courts to prosecute international crimes. Taken to its logical conclusion, the
failure of states to enact the necessary domestic legislation and actually pro-
secute such crimes could generate some level of state responsibility. If said
paragraph were operationalized, it would imply an affirmative duty for states to
actively prosecute international crimes. Time will tell whether states parties take
that duty seriously.
B. Empowering National Courts
While it is true that according to the pinciple of complementarity discussed
earlier, the ICC is constrained to act only when national courts fail to do so, at
the same time the principle of complementarity is probably the most important
and transformative aspect of the Statute. Rather than thinking of comple-
mentarity as a limit on the ICC, we can also view it as a way of empowering
national courts. Complementarity fundamentally changes the incentives for
national courts and should make them more likely to address international
crimes directly. Before the ICC, national courts had the choice of either pro-
secuting international crimes or allowing impunity. For a variety of political
reasons, such courts often chose--or were forced to choose-impunity. With
the creation of the ICC, however, the choice is very different. National courts
can either prosecute the crimes themselves--ensuring some level of control over
the proceedings and possibly greater acceptance by the local population -- or the
ICC may step in and prosecute. Many national courts would rather maintain
control over the prosecution themselves. With these choices, national courts
should be far more likely to act themselves and motivated, to clean up their own
messes at home in order to avoid ICC action.
National courts are extremely powerful tools. To the degree that the ICC
can spur them into action that is a great advancement for accountability. First,
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national courts are ubiquitous. Collectively, their jurisdiction covers just about
every territory where a crime could occur. Second, they are proximate to crimes
and victims. This facilitates the collection of evidence and the involvement of
victims. Finally, national courts have police power at their disposal and they can
use that power to apprehend and arrest suspects.
The new prosecutor of the ICC, Louis-Moreno Ocampo, understands this
fundamental power of the Court to encourage national courts to act. As he
observed at his swearing in this past July: "the absence of trials before this
Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions,
would be a major success."2
The ICC is having its desired effect in empowering national courts. Let me
give you an example. The ICC Prosecutor has recently indicated that his first
investigation is likely to involve the crimes in the Ituri region of Congo. The
war in the Congo over the past decade has caused somewhere on the order of
five million deaths, with at least tens of thousands dead since the entry into
force of the Rome Statute last year. Yet, there is a new transitional government
in Congo and, for the first time in years, there are real prospects for peace.
While the ICC should and will have some role to play in ensuring accountability
in Congo, after the Prosecutor's announcement that Congo will be the Court's
first investigation, the government of Congo has shown new interest in
strengthening its failed national judiciary. I will be working closely with the
U.S. Department of State to investigate possibilities for developing national
judicial capabilities in Congo to deal with these crimes and will present a report
to the State Department and the ICC on how the domestic Congolese judiciary
and the ICC could work together to provide accountability in Congo as
envisioned by the concept of complemetnarity.
Many crimes committed in Congo are outside the jurisdiction of the ICC
as they were committed before July 2002 when the Rome Statute entered into
force. Even if the ICC does prosecute some of the crimes committed in Eastern
Congo, given the vast scale of crimes, there is no way it could prosecute all
those responsible. If, however, the threat of ICC prosecution spurs the Congo-
lese government to create domestic prosecutorial mechanisms, it can foster the
development of national capacity and promote accountability on a larger scale.
Another way in which the complementarity provisions of the Rome Statute
strengthen accountability is by encouraging the exercise of universal jurisdiction
by national courts. The principle of universality allows national courts to
prosecute international crimes wherever they are committed. A number of states
have passed the necessary domestic legislation to do so. For example, Belgium
2. Louis Moreno-Ocampo, Ceremony for the solemn undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court, June 16, 2003, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/030616_moreno_ocampo
- english final.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2003).
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and the Netherlands have prosecuted international criminals from Rwanda,
Congo, and Surinam. Complementarity gives national courts-even those out-
side the state where the crimes occurred-the opportunity to prosecute before
the ICC. Complementiary may make national courts more willing to exercise
universal jurisdiction.
Taken collectively, complementarity should greatly enhance accountability
for international crimes. It allows and encourages series of different courts to
prosecute international crimes. In so doing, it tends to keep prosecutions close
to home, promoting legitimacy and enhancing the reconciliatory effects of
criminal prosecution.
C. Backstopping National Courts
The third way in which the ICC may transform the future of accountability
is by acting as a backstop for national courts. I have already described the
potential power and benefit of national courts. Yet, sometimes national courts
will fail. There are countless reasons for such failures---domestic political pres-
sure, lack of capacity, and corruption, just to name a few. A judge in Congo,
after noting that judges had not been paid in over five years, told me how to
differentiate between a good judge and a corrupt one. He explained the good
judge hears the case, decides who has the best argument and shakes down that
side for money, effectively his salary. The bad judge demands payments from
both parties and sides with the one who pays most. I'm not sure we want even
a good unpaid judge enforcing international criminal law.
Even where national courts are not corrupt, they may not be effective.
Take, for example, the courts of Chile that could not prosecute Augusto
Pinochet due do national amnesty and domestic political pressure. Or, the courts
of Rwanda which, for many years after the genocide, simply lacked the
resources to engage in meaningful prosecution. One judge in Rwanda com-
plained to me in 1999 that his office lacked pencils and paper to record cases.
National courts should and will be on the front lines of international criminal
law, but there will be times when they are unable or unwilling to act.
In these cases the ICC will be able to play a direct and meaningful role in
prosecution. Admittedly, the ICC could not act in the two cases I have just
mentioned-the crimes of Pinochet or the Rwandan genocide-because they
occurred before the Rome Statute entered into force. But, looking toward the
future, as the jurisdiction of the ICC expands and when national courts fail to
prosecute, the ICC will find itself with a meaningful case load. In some of these
casers it will step in as a backstop and ensure accountability. Admittedly, some
cases will still slip through the cracks. Given the limits on jurisdiction, admissi-
bility, and apprehension, there will be crimes that can not be prosecuted any-
where. But, over time, the ICC will continue to narrow the realm of impunity.
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The ICC will have at least one other important function as a backstop to
national courts. It will ensure some level of commonality and uniformity of
jurisprudence. In the international criminal system there is no general form of
appellate review. While individual cases can be reviewed within their own court
system, no overarching supreme court exists to ensure commonality of juris-
prudence. With the growing number of national and supranational courts enforc-
ing international law this could pose a threat to the system as different standards
evolve in different courts. Even though the ICC may handle only a few cases,
it seems likely that national courts will defer to its decisions on key points of
international criminal law. Just as the ICTY has played this role to date-with
national courts frequently referencing ICTY decisions-the ICC will come to
be the standard bearer of international criminal jurisprudence. Its comparatively
greater resources, its international status, and the expected quality of its staff
make it seem likely that the ICC-even acting only as a backstop-will come to
be the definitive voice on the rules of international criminal law.
IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
In conclusion, let me speculate for a moment on the future of accountabil-
ity and, particularly, how we can move toward a real system of international
criminal justice. As I have argued, the ICC is weak. It will try only a relatively
small number of individuals. Where national courts are strong, they have juris-
diction over crimes committed on their territory and by their nationals. Relying
on the principle of universal jurisdiction, many states have enacted the neces-
sary legislation to prosecute international crimes committed anywhere. Cruci-
ally, national courts have the police power to actually apprehend and arrest
suspects. And now, with the complementarity provisions of the Rome Statute,
national courts have a new incentive to act. By developing domestic capacity
and prosecuting, national courts address crimes close to home and avoid investi-
gation by the ICC. Yet, where national courts are unable or unwilling to act-
the ICC will be able to step in. Acting as a backstop, the ICC will help ensure
accountability where other courts fail.
For this system to work, the ICC and national courts will have to coope-
rate. There will be many cases when the ICC will have to rely on national
courts. And. there will be times-such as when new law is being developed or
where globally known despots are being prosecuted-that national courts may
want or need to defer to the ICC. For this relationship to work national courts
and the ICC will have to build trust, such that the ICC can count on national
courts and national courts will not fear ICC prosecution. Congolese judges, for
example, will have to cooperate with their international counterparts and
international judges will have to help train and assist domestic judges. Both
sides will need to further develop and refine the "unable or unwilling to prose-
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cute" language of the Rome Statute so that these two layers of judicial institu-
tions can cooperate.
Most importantly, the ICC and national courts will need to understand that
they are part of a common mission-accountability for international crimes-
and that both bring different tools and capabilities to that effort. If they succeed,
the Rome Statute and the ICC can have a truly transformative impact on the
future of international legal accountability. And the perpetrators of the crimes
will face justice.
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I. EFFORTS AND TRIALS PRIOR TO WWI.
The history of attempts to create international criminal tribunals for prose-
cution of international crimes includes attention to the responsibility of heads
of state, other public officials, and private persons for violations of treaties and
customary international law and, thus, nonimmunity of heads of state and other
governmental actors. One of the early prosecutions of a public official for an
international crime occurred in a domestic tribunal in Naples in 1268 when
Conradin von Hohenstafen, Duke of Suabia, was tried for initiating an unjust
war or what we term an offense against peace or war of aggression. Von
Hohenstafen was later executed for his misdeeds on October 29, 1268.'
In 1474, the Burgundian Peter von Hagenbach, who served as Governor
of territory under Duke Charles of Burgundy, was tried before what can be
termed an international tribunal for the oppression of persons under his charge
and for actions against the "laws of God and man," including responsibility for
murder, rape and pillage. 2 The trial of von Hagenbach for the improper admini-
stration of pledged territories on the Upper Rhine had occurred at Breisach at
the order of the Archduke of Austria and was presided over by twenty-eight
judges from allied towns. It should also be noted that von Hagenbach was tried
before actual war in 1476, so it would not be proper to label the case a normal
"war crimes" trial. He raised a defense of obedience to superior orders and
asked for adjournment to obtain confirmation of such orders, but the defense
was denied as being contrary to the law of God.
1. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 621
(2d ed. 2000).
2. Id. at 622.
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More generally during the Middle Ages, the Holy Roman Emperor failed
to obtain sufficient authority to enforce the law of arms. Such application occur-
red in the councils and courts of the major sovereigns in Europe. Further, the
Papacy had attempted to establish a right to hear claims concerning violations
of the law of arms, but to no avail.3
During the U.S. Revolutionary War, there were suggestions that the King
of England and others be prosecuted for their "War against the natural rights of
all Mankind,"4 but there had been no capture of the King of England by the
Americans and no such trials took place. Although the British war against
human rights and crimes of political oppression led to no criminal sanctions, in
view of the trial of von Hagenbach an international trial would not have been
completely unprecedented.
One of the early recognitions of criminal responsibility of a head of state
occurred at the Congress at Aix-La-Chapelle in 1818 when the Congress, with-
out formal trial, found Napoleon guilty of waging wars against peace.5 After his
capture in 1815, he had been banished to the Island of St. Helena where he died
some six years later.
During the 1915 massacres of Armenians by Turks, the governments of
Great Britain, France, and Russia had condemned the massacres as "crimes
against humanity,"' 6 but none of the alleged perpetrators were captured abroad
and subject to trial in domestic or international fora.
II. THE 1919 PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE AND REPORT
After Word War I, there was an important Report of the Commission on
the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties
that was presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference in Paris on March 29,
1919.' Members of the 1919 Commission were: the United States, the British
Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Romania, and Serbia.
The Report identified then current opiniojuris concerning "responsibility of the
authors of the war"; responsibility for breaches of neutrality (another form of
offenses against peace); responsibility for war crimes, including a list of cus-
tomary crimes under the laws of war'; responsibility for offenses against "the
laws of humanity" (what we term crimes against humanity, which were
3. Id. at 622.
4. Id. at 621-22.
5. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, JOAN M. FITZPATRICK & JON M. VAN DYKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 874 (2000).
6. See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, Er AL., supra note 1, at 857.
7. See, e.g., PAUST, FrIT.ZPATRICK & VAN DYKE, supra note 5, at 874. Here, I quote and borrow
extensively from the 1919 Report, as reproduced in our casebook.
8. See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 1, at 32-33.
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recognizable crimes under international law prior to creation of the Charters of
the IMTs at Nuremberg and for the Far East); and nonimmunity for heads of
state and other public officials (which every 20th Century Charter and Statute
with respect to international criminal tribunals has adopted, e.g., those for the
IMTN, IMTFE, ICTY, ICTR, and ICC).
Importantly, the Report stated a "desire to state expressly that in the
hierarchy of persons in authority, there is no reason why rank, however exalted,
should in any circumstances protect the holder of it from responsibility when
that responsibility has been established before a properly constituted tribunal.
This extends even to the case of heads of states. An argument has been raised
to the contrary based upon the alleged immunity, and in particular the alleged
inviolability, of a sovereign of a state. But this privilege, where it is recognized,
is one of practical expedience in municipal law, and is not fundamental. How-
ever, even if, in some countries, a sovereign is exempt from being prosecuted
in a national court of his own country the position from an international point
of view is quite different.
"We have later on in our Report proposed the establishment of a high
tribunal composed of judges drawn from many nations, and included the pos-
sibility of the trial before that tribunal of a former head of state with the consent
of that state itself secured by articles in the Treaty of Peace. If the immunity of
a sovereign is claimed to extend beyond the limits above stated, it would
involve laying down the principle that the greatest outrages against the laws and
customs of war and the laws of humanity, if proved against him, could in no
circumstances be punished. Such a conclusion would shock the conscience of
civilized mankind.
"In view of the grave charges which may be preferred against-to take one
case-the ex-Kaiser-the vindication of the principles of the laws and customs
of war and the laws of humanity which have been violated would be incomplete
if he were not brought to trial and if other offenders less highly placed were
punished. Moreover, the trial of the offenders might be seriously prejudiced if
they attempted and were able to plead the superior orders of a sovereign against
whom no steps had been or were being taken.
"There is little doubt that the ex-Kaiser and others in high authority were
cognizant of and could at least have mitigated the barbarities committed during
the course of the war. A word from them would have brought about a different
method in the action of their subordinates on land, at sea and in the air.
"We desire to say that civil and military authorities cannot be relieved from
responsibility by the mere fact that a higher authority might have been convicted
of the same offence. It will be for the court to decide whether a plea of superior
orders is sufficient to acquit the person charged from responsibility.
Paust
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"All persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their position
may have been, without distinction of rank, including Chiefs of States, who have
been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of
humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution...."9
However, with respect to an international criminal tribunal, the Report
opined:
"Any tribunal appropriate to deal with the other offences to
which reference is made [e.g., war crimes and crimes against human-
ity] might hardly be a good court to discuss and deal decisively with
such a subject as the authorship of the war. The proceedings and dis-
cussions, charges and counter-charges, if adequately and dispassion-
ately examined, might consume much time, and the result might con-
ceivably confuse the simpler issues into which the tribunal will be
charged to inquire. While this prolonged investigation was proceed-
ing some witnesses might disappear, the recollection of others would
become fainter and less trustworthy, offenders might escape, and the
moral effect of tardily imposed punishment would be much less salut-
ary than if punishment were inflicted while the memory of the wrongs
done was still fresh and the demand for punishment was insistent.
"We therefore do not advise that the acts which provoked the
war should be charged against their authors and made the subject of
proceedings before a tribunal."'"
The Report added that "acts which brought about the war should not be
charged against their authors or made the subject of proceedings before a tri-
bunal," but that the Conference should condemn them and "it would be right...
even to create a special organ in order to deal as they deserve with the authors
of such acts."" Kaiser William H had fled to the Netherlands and was not
surrendered for prosecution. No international criminal tribunals were estab-
lished; but there were several, yet insufficient, domestic prosecutions of persons
for war crimes in Germany during the Leipzig Trials of 1921 (involving prose-
cution of twelve and the conviction of six persons-including a civilian; a pri-
vate; a sergeant; various lieutenants, captains and majors; and three generals). 12
There were also prosecutions of various persons in the United States and in
other countries. 3
9. Reproduced in PAUST, FITZPATRICK & VAN DYKE, supra note 5, at 878-79.
10. Id. at 879.
11. Id. at 880.
12. See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 1, at 623-24.
13. See, e.g., id. at 278-87.
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It should not be forgotten, however, that later that year, on June 28, 1919,
the Treaty of Versailles (or Treaty of Peace) with Germany was created and as
Article 227 declared:
The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of
Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.
A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby
assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will
be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the following
were: namely the United States of America, Great Britain, France,
Italy and Japan ...
The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the
Government of the Netherlands for the surrender to them of the ex-
Emperor in order that he may be put on trial. 4
The treaty also proclaimed in Article 228 that "[t]he German Government
recognizes the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before
military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the
laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to
punishments laid down by law. This provision will apply notwithstanding any
proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or in the territory of
her allies," adding: "The German Government shall hand over to the Allied and
Associated Powers, or to such one of them as shall so request, all persons
accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war,
who are specified either by name or by the rank, office or employment which
they held under the German authorities."' 5
German accused were not surrendered, but both the 1919 Report of the
Commission on Responsibility and the 1919 Treaty of Versailles demonstrate
significant pre-Nuremberg expectations of the international community concern-
ing individual responsibility and nonimmunity for crimes against peace, war
crimes, and offenses against the laws of humanity. These patterns of expecta-
tion had historical support with respect to trials and condemnations of von
Hohenstafen (1268), von Hagenbach (1474), and Napoleon (1818), among
others, and in the claims of our Founders concerning offenses against the law
of nations allegedly committed by the King of England and his entourage.
14. Reproduced in PAUST, FITZPATRICK & VAN DYKE, supra note 5, at 880-81.
15. See id.
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Prior to Nuremberg, there had also been many domestic prosecutions for
war crimes and breaches of neutrality, especially within the United States.
Within the U.S., there had even been recognitions in the Supreme Court when
war ships were not immune with respect to breaches of the law of nations that
if a Prince "comes personally within our limits, although he generally enjoy a
personal immunity, he may become liable to judicial process in the same way,
and under the same circumstances, as the public ships of the nation."' 6 Similar
expectations of nonimmunity for heads of state were demonstrated in an 1859
Opinion of the Attorney General: "A sovereign who tramples upon the public
law of the world cannot excuse himself by pointing to a provision of his own
municipal code."' 7 Even earlier, Vattel had written in his widely read book in
1758, that "[t]he Prince...who would in his transports of fury take away the life
of an innocent person, divests himself of his character, and is no longer to be
considered in any other light than that of an unjust and outrageous enemy. 18
In 1625, Grotius had also recognized that sovereignty is limited by and all kings
are bound to observe the law of nations 9 and that a war against an oppressive
ruler was a permissible sanction who violated "the right of all human society"
to freedom from oppression.2° Other early U.S. cases had also recognized that
commissions from foreign governments do not create any immunity with
respect violations of international law.21 Further, universal jurisdiction over
violations of international law was recognized early in U.S. cases, 22 as well as
the duty of all states to prosecute customary international crimes.23
Was there precedent for the prosecutions at the IMT at Nuremberg, the
IMT for the Far East, and the tens of thousands of convictions in military
commissions under Control Council Law No. 10 in occupied territory after
World War HI? I believe there was significant, if somewhat sparse, precedent
16. See, e.g., The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 350-55 (1822); see also Berg v.
British and African Steam Navigation Co., 243 U.S. 124, 153-56 (1917) (nonimmunity of German
Government concerning civil claims).
17. 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 356, 357 (1859).
18. E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations, book II, sec. 213 (1758), quoted in United States v. Wilder,
28 F. Cas. 601, 604 (C.C.D. Mass. 1838) (No. 16,694) (Story, J.).
19. HuGo GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, bk. I, chpt. 3, § 16 (1625).
20. Id. bk. I1, chpt. 25, §8.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Furlong (The Pirates), 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 201-02 (1820); The
Estrella, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 298, 299-301, 304, 307-09 (1819); L'Invincible, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 238, 257-58
(1816).
22. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAw OFTHE UNITED STATEs 421-22(2 ed.
2003), and the many cases cited. A prominent example was Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 159-61 (1795)
("all ... trespasses committed against the general law of nations, are enquirable, and may be proceeded against,
in any nation....") (emphasis added).
23. See, e.g., id. at 421-22, 443-46, and numerous references cited.
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for individual responsibility for crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity and for nonimmunity for international crimes.24
24. Of particular interest with respect to violations of customary international law is the express
recognition of nonimmunity by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: "The principle of
international law, which under certain circumstances protects the representatives of a state, cannot be applied
to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law. The authors of these acts cannot shelter
themselves behind their official position... [and one] cannot claim immunity while acting in pursuance of the
authority of the State if the State in authorizing action moves outside its competence under international law."
Opinion and Judgment, I.M.T. at Nuremberg (1946).
TEAM507 A
2003 PHILIP C. JESSUP
INTERNATIONAL LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
THE PEACE PALACE
THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS
CASE CONCERNING THE WOMEN AND
CHILDREN OF THE CIVIL WAR
REPUBLIC OF ANNOLAY
Applicant
V.
REPUBLIC OF RESTON
Respondent
SPRING TERM 2003
MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT
Universidad Catolica Andres Bello
Team Members:
Moirah Sanchez, Carlos Hurtado,
Anneliese Fleckenstein and Jose Gregorio Rojas
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 10:215
CASE CONCERNING THE WOMEN AND
CHILDREN OF THE CIVIL WAR
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................... 217
II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ............................. 219
Ill. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS ................................. 219
IV. QUESTIONS PRESENTED .................................. 220
V . PLEADINGS ............................................ 220
Reston has breached its obligations and must pay damages to
Annolay to be distributed as reparations to those victims of
systematic rape during the Dysfunctian Civil War who
are now resident in Annolay ........................... 220
A. Annolay Has Standing To Bring This Claim Before the
C ourt ............................................. 221
B. The Rapes Of The Cascadian Women Breached
Erga Omnes Obligations .............................. 221
C. Reston is Responsible for Breaching Obligations in
Connection with the Rapes ............................ 225
D. Reston Must Pay Damages ............................ 226
Reston is in breach of its international obligations with repsect
to the bribes exacted by its border officials from Annolaysian
citizens, and is obligated to pay restitution in the amount of
the bribes to Annolay on behalf of the Annolaysian adoptive
parents ........................................... 226
A. Annolay's Claim Is Not Barred By The Clean-Hands
D octrine .......................................... 227
B. Furthermore, Annolaysian Parents Need Not Exhaust
Local Remedies .................................... 227
C. Reston's Conduct Entails A Breach Of Its International
O bligations ........................................ 228
D. Reston Is Bound To Pay Restitution ..................... 231
Reston is not entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction over
Mr. Fred Schmandefare .............................. 232
A. Evidence Does Not Support a Prima Facie Case Of
Schmandefare's Guilt ................................ 232
B. Alternatively, No Crime Against Humanity Has Been
Com m itted ........................................ 233
C. In The Further Alternative, Reston Is Banned From
Exercising Universal Jurisdiction ....................... 235
216
Distinguished Brief
D. The Court Should Award Declaratory Relief .............. 238
Annolay has not breached any international legal obligations
deriving from the alleged treatment of Cascadian women
working in brothels in Annolay, and in any event, Reston
has no standing to enforce any such obligations ........... 238
A. Reston Lacks Standing To Bring This Claim Before The
C ourt ............................................. 239
B. Alternatively, Annolay Has Not Breached Obligations
Regarding The Treatment of Cascadian Women ........... 240
C. The Court Should Provide Declaratory Relief ............. 242
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF ....................................... 242
VII. INDEX OF AUTHORmEs .................................. 242
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
This dispute arises from the Dysfuntian civil war between Restonian and
Cascadian militias, resulting in the creation of Reston (Respondent)-a
developing State-and Cascadia (not party to the case). Annolay (Applicant)-
a neighboring State-remained neutral during the war and offered its services
for a peace conference.
In April 1997, WRI reported that Restonian militiamen were systematically
raping Cascadian women. This was confirmed by a UNCHR mission, which
found that Raskolnikov, the Restonian militia leader, and his deputies took no
steps to stop the rapes. In 1998, Raskolnikov admitted his knowledge of the
rapes and that he was powerless to stop them.
In 1999, the militias agreed to a cease-fire. On 14 September, Dysfunctia
partitioned, and on November 1st, Reston held its first elections. Raskolnikov,
President elect, granted a comprehensive amnesty to everyone in Reston
accused of wartime crimes as part of his "National Healing Campaign".
The WRI Executive Director campaigned for the adoption by Annolaysian
parents of children left orphaned by the war. ARAS arranged for parents to
attend interviews in Reston to qualify for and receive foreign adoption certifi-
cates, and nearly 2000 children were adopted.
In January 2001, the ITP revealed that Restonian border officials were
exacting bribes from adoptive parents. The officials kept these amounts. On
February 2, Annolaysian President Contrary urged Raskolnikov to address the
corruption. Raskolnikov replied that it was a small issue, and that Annolay was
complicit in the children's illegal removal. Upon further pressure, Reston reas-
signed 10 border officials accused of corruption-10% of those implicated.
None were prosecuted or disciplined.
On March 21, 2001, Contrary expressed concern about the wartime rapes
of Cascadian women, and urged Cascadia and Reston to punish the perpetrators
and pay reparations to victims. On March 31, 2001, Raskolnikov reminded
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Annolay of the amnesty, denying that his government owed any reparations. On
April 20, 2001, given its neighbors' failure to pursue the matter, Contrary stated
that Annolay would take up the cause and seek reparations for the women.
On December 1999, the UNCHR estimated that thousands of raped women
lived without families or means of support. Reports indicate that in September
of that year agents of the Schmandefare Co.-an Annolaysian private company
founded by Fred Schmandefare (Annolaysian, and company CEO)-traveled
to Cascadia to recruit hundreds of these women to find new lives in Annolay.
They were promised jobs and education, and were assisted in filing work and
travel documentation. Once in Annolay, nearly all began working in the Com-
pany's brothels. By December 2000, over 2,500 Cascadian women had been
relocated to Annolay, which granted them resident status. According to the ITP,
Schmandefare organized their recruitment and transportation to Annolay.
On 1 May 2001, ILSA published a report focusing on Cascadian women
working in Schmandefare's brothels, alleging that many were abused and
deprived of their liberty, and that Annolaysian agencies had dismissed women's
complaints. The Report provided a detailed account of a Cascadian rape victim
living in the brothels, who was subject to harsh living and working conditions.
On May 17, 2001, Contrary expressed shock and horror at this, and announced
the creation of a blue-ribbon panel to examine the problem. She denied
Annolay's responsibility for the brothels' operation, and her government's
independent knowledge of the facts in the report. She expressed her concern for
the Cascadian women, yet affirmed that the Report was insufficient basis for
criminal charges. She recognized that although complaints had been filed, the
government was not involved in the abuse of Cascadian women.
On 19 May, 2001, Raskolnikov ordered his Justice Minister to perform an
investigation on human rights violations in Annolay. Later that day, the Justice
Ministry announced that it would prosecute Schmandefare for trafficking in
women for sexual slavery based on the universal jurisdiction principle applic-
able to crimes against humanity. It is the first time that Reston invokes univer-
sal jurisdiction. Reston announced that it would try him in absentia if jurisdic-
tion was not obtained, and requested Schmandefare through diplomatic
channels. There is no extradition treaty between Annolay and Reston.
The following day Contrary accused Raskolnikov of trying to distract
attention from his country's problems, denying the commission of a crime
against humanity and Reston's right to exercise universal jurisdiction. She
requested that Reston respect Annolay's sovereignty.
On 21 May 2001, Raskolnikov released copies of the ILSA Report's
unpublished background research, which indicated that the Schmandefare Co.
operated dozens of brothels. Raskolnikov reiterated Reston's intention to try
Schmandefare under the universality principle.
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Following unsuccessful mediation by the UNSG, the parties agreed to
submit their differences to the ICJ. Contrary has ordered Schmandefare not to
leave the country, pending the judgment of the Court.
IE. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Annolay and Reston have submitted by Special Agreement their differ-
ences concerning the women and children of the Dysfunctian civil war and
related matters, and transmitted a copy thereof to the Registrar of the Court
pursuant to article 40(1) of the Statute. Therefore, both parties have accepted
the jurisdiction of the ICJ pursuant to Article 36(1) of the Statute.
ImI. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
The Court should declare that Reston has breached its international obliga-
tions and must pay damages to Annolay to be distributed to victims of systema-
tic rape during the Dysfunctian civil war now resident in Annolay. Annolay has
standing since it can exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the victims
based on the effective link doctrine. In any case, since the rapes constitute war
crimes in violation of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions or,
at least acts of torture, Annolay has standing because Reston breached these
erga omnes obligations. Reston's responsibility arises from the attribution of
the acts of the Restonian militia to the new State of Reston because of the
continuity of the organization of the militia and that of the new State, as well as
from Reston's subsequent ultimate default to prosecute and punish the
perpetrators of such criminal acts through the granting of a comprehensive
amnesty. Indeed, the granting of amnesty for gross violations of human rights
is rejected under customary law.
Reston is in breach of its international obligations with respect to the bribes
exacted by its border officials from Annolaysian citizens, and is obligated to pay
restitution in the amount of the bribes. Annolay's claim is not barred by the
clean-hands doctrine, since the damage was not due to the sole fault of the
parents, nor were the parents required to exhaust local remedies as such
remedies would be futile. Reston is responsible for the bribes due to its failure
to enact anti-bribery legislation-which defeats the object and purpose of the
RACC-and as a result of not prosecuting and punishing the corrupt border
officials. Furthermore, by not preventing the improper financial gain of those
officials involved, Reston breached customary obligations set out in the CRC
regarding adoption, which directly relate to the Best Interest of the Child
Principle.
Reston is not entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction over Schmandefare,
as it intends, since the only available evidence of a crime against humanity
subject to universal jurisdiction are press articles and NGO reports, which are
insufficient to establish a primafacie case of Schmandefare's guilt. Moreover,
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the contextual elements required of crimes against humanity are not met because
Schmandefare was acting in his private capacity without instigation from any
State or organization, and the attack was not directed against a specific civilian
population. Reston is also barred from exercising universal jurisdiction, as the
universality principle has not gained customary status. Additionally, trials in
absentia are forbidden under international law, as evidenced by State practice.
Moreover, trying Schmandefare in absentia without proper notice clearly
breaches his right to due process, specifically to be present at trial. Finally,
since Reston's assertion of universal jurisdiction over Schmandefare is retalia-
tory to Annolay' s purpose of seeking reparation for the war victims, it is in bad
faith.
Annolay has not breached any international legal obligations deriving from
the alleged treatment of Cascadian women working in brothels in Annolay, and
in any event, Reston has no standing to enforce such obligations. Indeed, the
obligations relating to trafficking have not acquired erga omnes status, hence
Reston, as it is not an injured State, cannot invoke Annolay's responsibility.
Alternatively, Annolay is not responsible for the treatment of the Cascadian
women since customary law does not provide Reston any grounds for enforcing
the obligation to prevent and punish trafficking upon Annolay, due to the lack
of consistent State practice. Also, the creation of the investigatory panel
evidences Annolay's diligence in the matter.
IV. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether Reston has breached its international obligations and must pay
damages to be distributed as reparations to those victims of systematic rape
during the Dysfunctian civil war now resident in Annolay;
2. Whether Reston is in breach of its international obligations with respect to
the bribes exacted by its border officials from Annolaysian citizens and is
obligated to pay restitution in the amount of the bribes to Annolay on
behalf of the Annolaysian adoptive parents;
3. Whether Reston in entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction over Mr. Fred
Schmandefare; and
4. Whether Annolay has breached any international legal obligations deriving
from the alleged treatment of Cascadian women working in brothels in
Annolay, and whether Reston has standing to enforce such obligations.
V. PLEADINGS
Reston has breached its obligations and must pay damages to Annolay to be
distributed as reparations to those victims of systematic rape during the
Dysfunctian Civil War who are now resident in Annolay.
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A. Annolay Has Standing To Bring This Claim Before the Court.
Although in principle States can exercise diplomatic protection only on
behalf of nationals,' a progressive reading of Nottebohm can extend such pro-
tection to residents. In resolving which State could exercise diplomatic protec-
tion on Nottebohm's behalf, residence was used as a link between Nottebohm
and the State to determine his nationality. 2  Although the women are not
Annolaysians, they came into Annolay as Dysfunctians, a State that ceased to
exist; Cascadia declined its right to exercise this claim; and they were victims
of gross human rights violations deserving reparation. Hence, their State of
residence, the only one with which they have an effective link, should be
allowed to step forward. Thus, Annolay requests this Court to innovate towards
a more reasonable approach and allow Annolay to bring this claim on behalf of
its Cascadian residents. Alternatively, States other than the injured State may
invoke the responsibility of another for breaches of obligations erga omnes.3
As proven below, Reston's conduct breaches two erga omnes rules: the pro-
hibition against war crimes4 and the prohibition against torture,5 hence Annolay
has standing to bring this claim.
B. The Rapes Of The Cascadian Women Breached Erga Omnes Obligations.
Although the widespread and presumably systematic nature of the rapes
may qualify them as crimes against humanity, Reston's responsibility arises
more clearly from the commission of war crimes and/or torture. Thus, Annolay
will base this claim on said arguments.
1. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Second Phase) (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 5); Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Est. v. Lith.), 1939 P.C.I.J. 1, (ser. A/B), at 357 (Feb. 28); Draft
Articles on Diplomatic Protection, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., 2562nd mtg., U.N. Doc. A/53/10 (2001), art. 4;
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 406 (5th ed. Clarendo Press Oxford 1998).
2. See Nottebohm (Second Phase) (Liech.v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).
3. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 48(1)(b),
INT'L L. COMM'N, 56th Sess., G.A. Supp No. 10, U.N. Doc A/56/83 (2001); OSCAR SCHACHTER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 208 (Martinus Nijhoff Pub.1995); ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 202 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001); THERON MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 191 (Oxford Univ. Press 1991).
4. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes, in 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 68 (1996); LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 245
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2002); MERON, supra note 3, at 227.
5. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Nov. 16, 1998, No. IT-96-21-T, Trial, 454; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Feb.
22, 2001, No. IT - 96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, 466, at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/triac2/judgement/kun-
tj010222e.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2003); Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d. 699, (9th Cir. 1992);
Mary Griffin, Ending the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Atrocities: A Major Challenge for
International Law in the 21st Century, 838 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, 369-389 (2000); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW ON THE UNITED STATES § 70 (1987).
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1. The Rapes of the Cascadian Women were War Crimes.
An act is a war crime when: (i) it breaches a customary rule of internation-
al humanitarian law that protects important values, involving grave consequen-
ces for the victims; and (ii) said rule entails individual criminal responsibility
under customary law.6 The rapes of Cascadian women constitute war crimes.
a. The rapes breached a customary rule of humanitarian law protecting
important values.
Common Article 3, which applies to all armed conflicts7 (including internal
wars between groups without government involvement or where the State
ceases to exist)8 is custom,9 as evidenced from State practice deriving from the
creation of international criminal tribunals, whose case-law has applied this rule
as custom.'0 Opiniojuris follows from the widespread acceptance of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, regarded as customary law,"' and UN Resolutions calling
for respect of human rights and humanitarian law, including Common Article
3, in all armed conflicts. 2 Additionally, a breach of Common Article 3 requires
6. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Nov. 2, 2001, No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, 123; Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Oct. 2, 1995, No. IT-94-1-T, Defense Motion on Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 94; Prosecutor v.
Aleksovski, Mar. 24, 2000, No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement, 1 20, at www.un.org/icty/lalekovski/appeal/
judgmentale-asj000324e.pdf. (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
7. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U. S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 218 (June 27).
8. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.JV/1 1.95, doe. 7 rev. 271 (1997),
[ 152; DIETER FLECK, THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS, 48 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1999); Daniel ThUrer, The "Failed State" and International Law, 836 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS,
731-61 (2001).
9. MERON, supra note 3, 227-28; Kelly D. Askdn, Women and International Humanitarian Law,
in 1 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 55 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds. Trans-
national Pub. Inc. 1998); Kathleen M. Pratt & Laurel E. Fletcher, Time for Justice: The Case for International
Prosecutions of Rape and Gender-Based Violence in the Former Yugoslavia, BERKELEY WOMEN' S L.J., Note
85 (1994).
10. Prosecutor v. Bla[ki], Mar. 3, 2000, No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, 1 166; Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Sept. 2, 1998, No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, 1608; Prosecutor v. Tadic, May 7 1997, No. 1T-94- 1-T, Opinion
and Judgement, 557; Prosecutor v. Tadic, July 15, 1999, No. IT-94-1-T, Appeals Chamber, Judgement,
613.
11. Legality Of The Threat Or Use Of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 8, (July 8) (Advisory Opinion)
[hereinafter Nuclear Weapons], at http://www.dfat.gov.au/intorgs/icj nuc/unan5a a.html (last visited Sept. 29,
2003); STEvEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATTROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 82 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
12. S.C. Res. 788, U.N. SCOR, 3138th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/778 (1992); S.C. Res. 794, U.N.
SCOR, 3145th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doe. S/RES/794 (1992); S.C. Res 814, U.N. SCOR, 318th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doe.
S/RES/814 (1993); S.C. Res. 972, U.N. SCOR, 3489th mtg. at, U.N. Doe. S/RES/972 (1995); S.C. Res. 1001,
U.N. SCOR, 3549th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1001 (1995); Declaration on Respect for Human Rights in
Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII), 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 18, at 164, U.N. Doc. A17433 (1968);
Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian Populations in Armed Conflicts, U.N.G.A., 25th Sess., 1922nd
mtg., G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV) (1970).
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(i) that the victims be "protected persons" (i. e,. not taking part in the hostili-
ties); and (ii) that a nexus exist between the offence and the armed conflict.' 3
In this case, (i) no evidence points to the victims' taking part in the hostilities,
thus they were protected persons; and (ii) according to UNCHR and WRI
reports, which are admissible evidence, 4 the rapes were systematic and intended
to coerce the Cascadian population, which proves their nexus to the war. Thus,
the rapes breached Common Article 3.
Second, Common Article 3 implicitly prohibits rape, 5 as rape constitutes
cruel treatment under general principles of law, 16 and can also take the form of
torture, 7 as did the rapes of the Cascadian women (as proven infra). Accord-
ingly, Common article 3 protects important values, since it reflects elementary
considerations of humanity, 8 and protects rights recognized in major human
rights instruments. Moreover, the rapes entailed grave consequences for
victims, as rape inflicts severe physical and psychological suffering, 9 and the
Cascadian women endured ostracism, unemployment, and loss of family and
friends.
b. The breach of Common Article 3 entails individual criminal
responsibility.
International criminal courts prosecute breaches of Common Article 3
under the idea that they entail individual criminal responsibility,2" a notion
13. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, June 7, 2001, No. ICTR-95-1 A-T, Judgement, 103; Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Oct. 2 1995, Opinion and Judgment, No. IT-94-1 -T, 614-15; Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Nov. 2, 2001, No.
IT-98-30/1-T, (H 123-24; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Feb. 22, 2001, No. IT - 96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, 407.
14. Corfu Channel, 1948 I.C.J. 4, Prelim. Obj. 15 18 (Mar. 25); Velazquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-
Am. C.H.R., Final Draft Text of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/l/Add. 1,
Rule 63 (2000).
15. Askin, supra note 9, at 56; Arturo Carrillo-Suarez, Hors de Logique: Contemporary Issues in
International Humanitarian Law as Applied to Internal Armed Conflict, 15 AM. U. INT'L L REV. 1, 115-16
(1999).
16. M. CHERtIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANiKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 574-75 (Transnational Pub. 1996).
17. Christin B. Coan, Comment, Rethinking the Spoils of War: Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime
in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 26 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 183, 205-
10 (2000); Rhonda Copelon, Symposium, Women's Rights as International Human Rights: Women and War
Crimes, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 61 (1995); Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig, International Criminal Law
and the ICC Statute, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 15 (Transnational Pub. 2000).
18. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14 at 218.
19. Evelyn Mary Aswald, Torture by Means of Rape, GEO. L.J. 1932 (1996); Christine Chinkin,
Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International Law, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 3 (1994); Tadic, No. IT-94-I-T,
91612.
20. Prosecutor v. Delalic (AElebici Case), Feb. 20, 2001, No. IT-96-21 -A, Appeal, 153; Prosecutor
v. Kunarac, Feb. 22, 2001, No. IT - 96-23-T & IT-96-23/1 -T, 1408; Prosecutor v. Kordic, Feb. 26, 2001, No.
95-14/2-T, 1 168.
2003]
224 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 10:215
supported by States.2' Moreover, international law has developed towards the
criminalization of breaches of Common Article 3, as acts perpetrated in internal
conflicts cannot be treated more leniently than those committed in international
conflicts.2 Thus, since both elements required for acts to constitute war crimes
are met, the rapes constitute war crimes.
2. Alternatively, The Rapes Constitute Acts of Torture.
International criminal tribunals have relied on human rights instruments to
define torture,2 3 which can be committed by non-state actors in some circum-
stances.24 The elements of torture are: (i) the intentional infliction of severe
pain; (ii) for the purpose of, inter alia, intimidating or coercing the victim or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination; (iii) with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or someone acting in official capacity. As
stated supra, rape is a form of torture, specially when committed systematically
and for political purposes.25 In armed conflict, rape inherently entails coercive
or discriminatory purposes. 6 This case was no exception: UNCHR and WRI
reports characterized the rapes as systematic and deliberately used to spread
terror among the Cascadian population. Moreover, rape victims endure a high
degree of suffering, as stated supra. Therefore, the first two elements of torture
are met. The third element is also present, since officials of non-state organizat-
ions or groups seeking political control over a territory, and non-state parties to
an internal conflict, such as Restonian militia, act in official capacity.27 Thus,
the rapes constituted torture.
21. Statement by French Representative, Sec. Council, 3217th mtg., at 11, UN Doe. S/PV.3217
(1993); U.S. Gov't Submission Concerning Certain Arguments by the Council for the Accused in Prosecutor
v. Tadic, Oct. 2, 1995, No. rT-94-1-T, 35-36; EU Joint Statement No. 11, at 102 (1992); Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, UN Doec. A/Conf. 183/9, art 8.2(c) (2002) [hereinafter ICC], at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/stattue/romefra.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
22. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Nov. 16, 1998, No. IT-96-21-A at 300; R. Degni-Sequi, Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, C.H.R Res. S-3/l., 51 st Sess., U.N. Doec. E/CN.4/1995/7 (1994) 154;
Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 561 (1995).
23. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Dec. 10, 1998, No. IT-95-17/1-T, 1 160; Delalic, No. IT-96-21-A
1459; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Sept. 2, 1998, No. ICTR-96-4-T, 459; MOIR, supra note 4, at 201.
24. H.L.R. v. France, 11/1996/630/813, Eur. Ct. H.R. at40 (1997); Kunarac, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-
23/1-T 911 408, 496.
25. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Reports of the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, OEA/Ser.IJV/IL88, doec. 10
rev. 134 (1995); Andrew Byrnes, The Convention Against Torture, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 198 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds. 2000).
26. Delalic, No. IT-96-2 I -T 1 495-96.
27. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 11, at 119; Barbara Coechrane Alexander, Convention Against
Torture: A Viable Alternative Legal Remedy for Domestic Violence Victims, 15 AM. U. INT'L L REV. 895,
920 (2000); Delalic, No. IT-96-21 -T 1 473.
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The prohibition against torture in Common Article 3 constitutes an
elementary consideration of humanity which must be respected in all armed
conflicts,28 due to the need to ensure respect for certain human rights and
humanitarian norms, minimum humanitarian standards, in all circumstances.
Elementary considerations of humanity bind all States as principles of law. a°
Thus, the prohibition against torture should have been respected during the Dys-
fuctian war.
C. Reston is Responsible for Breaching Obligations in Connection with the
Rapes.
Internationally wrongful acts of States, which occur when conduct is
attributable to the State and constitutes a breach of its international obligations 3
entail their responsibility. 32 A State's international responsibility can arise from
an ultimate default to prosecute and punish internationally injurious acts of its
nationals.3 Such default results from the pardon of an offence, for this causes
a State to deprive itself of the possibility to punish a crime under international
law.34 Particularly, granting amnesties for war crimes breaches international
human rights law and undermines principles enshrined in UN Resolutions. 5
28. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14 at 218; Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity,
and Dictates of Public Conscience, AM. J. INT'L. L. 82 (2000); The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 8 (Jul. 8 1996) (Shahabuddeen, dissenting Op.).
29. Minimum Humanitarian Standards, C.H.R. Res. 1997/21, U.N. ESCOR, 56th mtg., Supp. No.
3, at 88, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1997/21 (1997); Report of the Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to C.H.R.
Decision 2001/112, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Fundamental Standards of Humanity,
C.H.R. Res. 2000/69, 58th Sess., E/CN.4/2002/103 (2001) para. 3.
30. Corfu Channel, 1948 I.C.J. 15 158; Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 8 79.
31. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 3,
at art. 2; Case Concerning Phosphates in Morocco, (Italy v. Fr.) 1938 P.C.I.J. 4, (ser. A/B), No. 74, at 10 (June
14); Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3
(May 24) 56; Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymoros Project, (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 78 (Sept.
25) 1 66.
32. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 3,
art. 1; SS Wimbledon, 1923 P.C.I.J. 1, (ser. A) No. 5, at 178 (Aug. 17); Chorzow Factory, 1927 P.C.I.J. 21
(ser. A) No. 9, at 21 (Judgment); Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.LJ. (ser. A) No. 9, at 29 (Sept.
1928).
33. Short v. Iran, 16 Iran-U. S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 83, 83-85 (1987); Case of the Montijo, (U.S. v. Col.),
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, 2 HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE U.S.
HAS BEEN A PARTY, 1439 (1874), Janes Claim, (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 82 (1926) [hereinafter Janes Claim];
Parker Massey, US-Mex Gral. Cl. Comm., No. C166, (1927).
34. West, US-Mex. Gral. Cl. Comm., No. (1927).
35. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Dec. 10, 1998, IT-95-17/l-T, 155; Declaration of Basic Principles
of Justice for victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, U.N. G.A. Res. 40/34, 96th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/
40/34 (1985); Principles of International Cooperation in the Detention, Arrest Extradition, and Punishment
of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, U.N. G.A. Res. 3047 (XXVIII), Dec. 3, 1973,
(1973).
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Indeed, States have an obligation to prosecute and punish gross violations of
human rights, which include acts of torture.36 Moreover, despite UN reluctance
to reject general amnesties, as in the case concerning Haiti,37 the state of the law
evolves towards the contrary. Indeed, in the more recent case of Sierra Leone,
the UN affirmed that it did not recognize amnesty for war crimes and other
serious violations of international law.38 Thus, Reston's granting of amnesty
breaches its obligation to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of the crime,
giving rise to its responsibility.
D. Reston Must Pay Damages.
States entitled to invoke another State's responsibility for breaches of erga
omnes obligations may claim reparation in the interest of the beneficiaries of
said obligation.39 Hence, Annolay can claim reparations for the Cascadian
women, specifically compensation due when a wronged situation cannot be
reestablished to the conditions that existed before the wrongful act was
committed.4" Here, the situation cannot be reestablished, since the women's
physical and psychological suffering cannot be undone. Thus, considering that
compensation has been awarded before, both for physical and moral damage,4'
Annolay requests that the Court order Reston payment to be distributed among
the rape victims now resident in Annolay.
Reston is in breach of its international obligations with repsect to the bribes
exacted by its border officials from Annolaysian citizens, and is obligated to pay
36. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, annexed to GA Res. 39/46, 39 GAOR, Supp. No. 51, 197 U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1987), art. 12,
13; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXII), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.
16, U.N. Doc A/6316 (1976), art. 7 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Inter-Am. Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 67 (1987), art. 1; Case 10.150, O.A.S. Ann. Rep. on Suriname, O.A.S/ser.L./V/H.77; William
W. Burke-White, Reframing Impunity: Applying Liberal International Law Theory to an Analysis ofAmnesty
Legislation, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 467, 479 (2001).
37. Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There A Duty To Prosecute International
Crimes in Haiti, 31 TEx. INT'L L.J. 1 (1996).
38. U.N. DAILY PRESS BRIEFING OF OFFICE OF SPOKESMAN FOR SEC. GEN., July 5-7, 1999, available
at http://www.un.org/News/briefing/docs/1999/19990707.DB070799.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2003); 13
AFRICA RECOVERY 2-3, Sept. 8, 1999.
39. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 3,
at art. 48(2)(b).
40. CHRISTINE D. GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INT'L LAW 14 (Clarendon Press Oxford 1987);
DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 44 (Oxford Univ. Press1999); Ian Brownlie,
Remedies in the ICJ, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 565 (Vaughan Lowe &
Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
41. I'm Alone, (Can. v. U.S.), 3 R.I.A.A. 44, 1618 (1949) (1933); Spanish Zone of Morocco (Spain
v. U.K.), 2 R.I.A.A., ii, 615 (1925); The Rainbow Warrior Incident, 19 R.I.A.A. 202 (1986); Norwegian
Shipowners' Claim, 1 R.I.A.A. 309 (1922); Maal Case, 10 R.I.A.A. 731 (1903).
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restitution in the amount of the bribes to Annolay on behalf of the Annolaysian
adoptive parents.
A. Annolay's Claim Is Not Barred By The Clean-Hands Doctrine.
A claimant's involvement in illegal activities may bar his claim, thus the
clean-hands doctrine can be invoked as basis for rejecting a claim of diplomatic
protection.42 Accordingly, Reston may argue that Annolaysian parents were, by
paying the bribes- involved themselves in corruption and have "dirty hands."
However, said argument must be dismissed. Indeed, the value of "clean-hands"
is highly questionable, since it has been rarely applied. 3 The doctrine succeeds
only where the breach by the victim was the sole cause of her damage, that is,
where the cause-and-effect relationship between the damage and the victim's
conduct involved no wrongful act by the respondent State. 4 However, the
corruption of the Restonian officials was a quid pro quo, involving no sole fault
since, as with any case of corruption, someone paid and someone was paid.45
Consequently, the clean-hands doctrine does not apply.
B. Furthermore, Annolaysian Parents Need Not Exhaust Local Remedies.
Reston may also argue that Annolaysian parents should have sought
redress in Reston before Annolay could bring the case to the ICJ. Nevertheless,
in this case exceptions to the exhaustion of local remedies rule apply: first, the
requirement is exonerated where local remedies do not exist;46 second, local
remedies need not be exhausted whenever they are futile.47 In this case, (i)
42. Eastern Greenland Case, April 5, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 95 (Dissenting Op.);
Diversion of Water from the Meuse, (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 172 (June 28); JOHN
BASSETT MOORE, 3 HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE U. S. HAS
BEEN A PARTY, 2738-39 (1898) [hereinafter Clarke Claim]; BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCtPLES OF LAW AS
APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 156 (Cambridge Grotius Pub. Ltd. 1987).
43. Report ofthe International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 at 173, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (2001); Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 10.
at 191, U.N. Doc. A/54/10 (1999); Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14 at 218 at 14 392-94.
44. Report of the International Law Commission, Second Report on State Responsibility, U.N. G.A,
at 49, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/498/Add.2 (1999); Salmon, (Des 'mains propres' comme Condition de
Recevabilit), A.F.D.I. 249 (1964); GARCIA ARIAS, LA DOCTRINE DES "CLEAN HANDS" EN DROrr INTER-
NACIONAL PUBLIC, ANNUAIRE A.A.D.I. 18 (1960).
45. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
REFORM 93 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999).
46. Altesor v. Uruguay, 70 LLR. 248 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., No. R.2/10 1982); Exception to the
Exhaustion of Local Remedies, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OC-1 1 (1990); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PEACE INTRODUCTION AND PART 1 525, (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds. 9th ed., Longman 1996).
47. Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, supra note 1, at art. 14(a); Finnish Shipowners' Arbi-
tration, (Fin. v. U.K.), 3 R.LA.A. 1479 (1934); Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (U.S. v. Italy), 1989
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evidently there are no remedies available in Reston, since the non-existence of
specific anti-bribery laws in that State makes it impossible for Annolaysians to
charge the officials for bribery under Restonian criminal law; and (ii) remedies
are obviously futile in a State that showed the most flagrant tolerance towards
corruption, not only by its lack of anti-bribery laws, but by considering that the
mere reassignment of officials, while none have been disciplined or prosecuted,
was enough to solve the problem, and furthermore by its President's declaration
regarding the corruption problem as a small issue undeserving his immediate
attention; a stand that contradicts most States' view of corruption as an inter-
national crime that threatens democracy and human rights.48 Thus, arguments
claiming non-exhaustion of local remedies should be disregarded.
C. Reston 's Conduct Entails A Breach Of Its International Obligations.
1. Reston Breached the Obligation to Enact Anti-Bribery Laws.
The customary character of the rule binding States to enact anti-bribery
laws derives from its inclusion in international instruments,49 suggesting a
pattern of State practice. Opinio juris follows from the criminalization of
bribery in most States' domestic law. ° In this case, Reston has clearly failed to
enact legislation against corruption. Furthermore, such failure entails a breach
I.C.J. 15 (July 20) [hereinafter ELSI]; C. F. AMERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INT'L LAW (2nd ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003).
48. Explanatory Report CLCC, GMC (98)40 § 11 (1998); THE PENAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 27 (1983); Henkin & Hargrove,
Enforcing Human rights Through International Criminal Law and Through an International Criminal Court
in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 347 (1994).
49. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Regional Anti-Corruption Convention), 38 I.L.M. 505,
at art. 3 [hereinafter RACC]; id. at art. 3; Inter-Am. Cony. against Corruption, March 29, 1996, art, H (1), art
VIII, available at http://www.oas.orgljuridico/english/Treaties/b-58.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2003); Southern
African Development Community, Protocol Against Corruption, art. 2(a), art. 3(1)(a); Action against
Corruption, U.N.G.A., 82nd mtg, U.N. Doc A/RES/51/59 (1996); Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,
Report of the Third Committee, U.N GA, 51 st Sess., Agenda item 101, U.N. Doc. A/51/610 (1996).
50. Bah: Criminal Code, § 118-23; Department of Justice Canada, Corruption of Foreign Public
Officials Act, c. 34 (1998); Report of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Corrupt Practices and
Illegal Transfer of Funds, U.N. GA, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 93(b) at 8, U.N. Doc. A/55/405 (2000); The
Prevention of Corruption Act, Central Act No. 49/1988, ch. 111 (1988), available at http://www.kar.nic.id/
lokayukta/preact.htm (last visited Sept 23, 2003); Indon: Criminal Code of Law Regarding Bribery, 1980;
Kaz: Criminal Code, art. 147, Decree on Responsibility for Corruption, 22 Dec. 1995; Libya: Economic
Crimes Law No. 2, 1979, art. 226; Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, Criminal Code Act, Ch. 77 (1990); Peru:
Supreme Res. No. 160, May 27, 2001; PRC: Supplementary Regulations on Suppression of Corruption and
Bribery (1988); U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions (1977), available at
http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/fcpl.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
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of the object and purpose of the RACC, which Reston is bound not to defeat,51
as a signatory of the RACC, and a party to the VCLT. According to legal
experts, the object and purpose of the RACC (identical to that of the CLCC)
derives from its Preamble," which states the need to pursue, as a matter of
priority, a common criminal policy to protect society against corruption, includ-
ing the adoption of appropriate legislation.3 Accordingly, the duty of States
to enact anti-corruption legislation (and forbid bribery) is part of the object and
purpose of the RACC. Thus, Reston' s failure to enact anti-bribery laws defeats
the object and purpose of a signed treaty.
2. Reston Breached its Obligation to Establish Jurisdiction over the Bribers.
States have a general duty to exercise due diligence in the prosecution and
punishment of nationals when these have harmed nationals of other States.' As re-
gards corruption, there is a duty to assert jurisdiction over offenses committed
within their territories or by their nationals, which is a customary obligation, as
derives from its inclusion in international instruments and UN Resolutions on
corruption urging States to adopt legislation permitting prosecution of corruption,"
and its continuous application by national tribunals.56 Reston's breach of this
obligation is evidenced by three facts: first, the Restonian officials committed
passive bribery, defined as the request or receipt by any public official of an
undue advantage in order to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his
51. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 18(a), 1155 U.N.T.S 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
52. Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of International Corruption
Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 793 (2001); Fritz Heimann, SHOULD
FOREIGN BRIBERY BE A CRIME? 7 TRANSPARENCY INT'L 1994; David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee,
Symposium: Fighting International Corruption & Bribery in the 21st Century, Fighting Corruption: A
Principled Approach; The C2 Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 595 (2000); Claire
Moore Dickerson, Political Corruption: Free-Flowing Opportunism, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 393 (1999).
53. RACC, supra note 49, at Preamble; Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 49,
at Preamble.
54. Janes Claim, supra note, at 33; Norwegian Shipowners' Claim, I R.I.A.A. 309 (1922); (Neer
v. Mex), 4 R.I.A.A. 60, (1926) [hereinafter Neer]; Noyes Claim, 6 R.I.A.A. 308 (1933); M. SHAw,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 513 (4th ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997).
55. RACC, supra note 49, at art. 17; Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 49, at art.
17; OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, U.N. GAR 5 1/59, (1996), at art.
4; Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 49, at art. VI; Measures against Corrupt
Practices of Transnational and Other Corporations, their Intermediaries and Others Involved, U.N. GAR,
2441st mtg, 3514 (XXX) 1976; Business and Development, U.N. G.A., 96th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/106
(1995); United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, U.N. GA, 55th Sess., Agenda
Item 105, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (2000).
56. Berlusconi, Ital. Ct. Cass. (2001); Montesinos, Special Crim. Law Chamber (2002); Att'y
General v. Hui Kin-Hong, 1HK C.L.R 227 (CA) 299 (1995); Att'y General. v. Reid, 1 AC 324 (1994); A. G.
Ogun State v. A.G. of the Federation., 3 NCLR 166 (1982).
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functions; 7 second, the State's only reaction to the rampant corruption at its
borders was to reassign a mere 10% of the individuals implicated; and third,
although no border officials were ever prosecuted or disciplined, Reston con-
sidered that the problem had been "taken care of'. Moreover, even if Reston
has no criminal anti-bribery laws, at least civil and/or administrative liability
remained possible. Therefore, Reston is responsible for the breach of the obli-
gation to establish jurisdiction over acts of corruption.
3. Reston Breached its Obligation to Prevent Improper Financial
Gain in Adoption.
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) binds all States
under customary international law.58 Said status derives from its ratification by
all States, excepting Somalia and the United States (which have nevertheless
signed the CRC),59 and Reston, the only State in the world which has not even
signed the CRC. The CRC requires States to take all appropriate measures to
ensure that adoption does not result in improper financial gain for those
involved,6' a customary rule, as evidenced from the practice of States in accept-
ing its inclusion in international instruments,6 and from the opinio juris
revealed by its adoption in domestic legislation.62 Also, State practice in
57. RACC, supra note 49, at art. 3, 5; Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 49, at
art. 3, 5; Inter-American Convention against Corruption, supra note 49, at art. VI(l)(a); Revised Draft U.N.
Convention against Corruption, U.N. Doc. A/AC.261/3 rev. 1, 24-25 (2002).
58. Cynthia Price Cohen, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Feminist
Landmark, 3 WM. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 29 (1997); Nicole Barner Graff, Note, Intercountry Adoption and
the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Can the Free Market in Children Be Controlled?, 27 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & COM. 405,412 (2000); LAwRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
45 (Univ. of Nebreska Press 1995).
59. U.N. Hum. Rts. Treaties Database, Status of Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, Somalia (2002), at http://www.unhchr.org (last visited Oct. 11, 2003); U.N. Hum. Rts. Treaties
Database, Status of Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.S. (1995), at
http://www.unhchr.org (last visited Oct. 11, 2003); UNICEF, Office of the High Commissioner for Hum. Rts.,
Status of Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, available at http://www.unicef.orglcrcl
crc.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
60. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, November 20, 1989, U.N. Doc.
A44/736 (1990), an. 21(d).
61. Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children,
with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally, U.N. GAR, 95th
mtg., G.A. Res. 41/85, December 3, 1986, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/85, an. 20; Hague Convention on the
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercounty Adoption, art. 32(1); US: Uniform
Adoption Act (1994).
62. Alb: Family Law (1992); BeIr: Family & Marriage Law (2002); Bol: C6digo del Menor
(1992); Braz: Estatuto del Menor y del Adloescente (1990); Can: Adoption Act (1993); Chile: Ley de
Adopci6n; Peru: Civil Code; Phil: Republic Act No. 8043; PRC: Order of the President of the PRC No. 10,
Adoption Law of 1999; Rom: Strategy Concerning the Protection of Children in Difficulty.
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fighting corruption in adoption is shown by cases such as Romania's, where
States have halted their international adoptions to stop related acts of corrup-
tion."
Moreover, this provision relates directly to the observance of the Best
Interest of the Child Principle,64 as the rule seeks to contribute in the fight
against baby selling and child trafficking. One case where the world has most
clearly regarded the best interest of children is where a State has suffered
internal or international conflicts, resulting in the adoption of approximately
65 o20,000 children per year, most of which come from countries with serious
difficulties (e.g., Paraguay, Colombia, Honduras, Sri Lanka, Romania, and the
Former Yugoslavia).66 In Romania, thousands came forward to adopt over
165,000 children living in inhumane conditions. 67 The case at hand is impres-
sively similar to Romania's. However, Reston allowed its officials to obtain
improper financial gain from the adoptions, even after knowing of the situation
through the publication of the "Corruption in the Nursery" articles; which
results in a breach of its international obligations.
D. Reston Is Bound To Pay Restitution.
In this case, the most adequate form of reparation is restitution of the
amounts paid to the officials. Indeed, international tribunals have awarded
restitution in a number of cases.6" Consequently, the most adequate form of
63. Update on Romanian Moratorium on InternationalAdoption, (June 2003). U. S. Dep't. of State,
Bureau of Consular Affairs Overseas Citizens Services Office of Children Issues, available at
Http://travel.state.gov/adoption-mmania.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2003); Romania Bans International
Adoption, available at http://www.cnn.com/2001I/WORLD/europe/06/22/romania.adoption. (last visited Oct.
4, 2003).
64. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 60, at art. 21, 21(d); Banner, supra note 58,
at 416.
65. Ahilemah Jonet, Legal Measures to Eliminate Transnational Trading of Infants for Adoption:
An Analysis ofAnti-Infant Trading Statutes in the United States, 13 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 305 (1990);
Margaret Liu, Comment. International Adoptions: An Overview, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 187 (1994);
Jonathan G. Stein, A Call to End Baby Selling: Why the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption Should
Be Modified to Include the Consent Provisions of the Uniform Adoption Act, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 39
(2001); Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Propriety, Prospects and Pragmatics, 13 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. LAW 181(1996).
66. Jorge L. Carro, Regulation of Intercountry Adoption: Can the Abuses Come to an End?, 18
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 121 (1994).
67. Pollitt, Intercountry Adoption, 49-53 (1992); DAVID ROMANIA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
(1991); M. Farrow, Romanian Orphans Suffer by New Rules, Supporters Say, VANCOUVER SUN. Dec. 4, 1991,
at B5.
68. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, 2 HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO
WHICH THE U.S. HAS BEEN A PARTY 1449, 1466 (1898); Orinoco Company, 9 R.I.A.A. 297 (1903); Case
Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Camb. v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15); Rights of Britons in
Spanish Morocco, 2 R.I.A.A. 615, 722 (1923).
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reparation for the Annolaysians' monetary losses is restitution in kind. How-
ever, since the parents paid the bribes, a question arises on the matter of com-
parative fault, recognized as grounds for the determination of damages.69
Indeed, international tribunals have reduced the claimant's award in proportion
to her culpability. 70 In this case, Annolay is prepared to accept that the parents
"culpability" has an effect on the determination of damages, conceding to the
following: (i) that parents who complied with all adoption requirements bear
absolutely no fault in the corruption, hence the Court should award them
restitution in the full amount; and (ii) that parents who paid bribes after failing
or without attending fitness interviews bear comparative fault, and thus Annolay
accepts any reduction in recovery deemed appropriate.
Reston is not entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction over Mr. Fred
Schmandefare.
Under "universal jurisdiction", any State can prosecute perpetrators of
crimes that are considered heinous and harmful to mankind under the idea that
every State has a legal interest to prosecute crimes that have been universally
condemned.71 In this case, Reston has argued that it is entitled to exercise uni-
versal jurisdiction over Schmandefare based on the assumption that he com-
mitted a crime against humanity. However, the argument must be dismissed.
A. Evidence Does Not Support a Prima Facie Case Of Schmandefare's
Guilt.
For this Court to assert that Reston can exercise universal jurisdiction over
Schmandefare, a prima facie case of his guilt for the crime against humanity of
sexual slavery (as affirmed by Reston) must be established. A prima facie case
is a credible case which would, if not contradicted, be sufficient legal basis to
convict the accused.72 However, in this case, the evidence does not support the
69. GARCIA AMADOR, RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES
TO ALIENS 35 (1974); DE BEUS, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GENERAL CLAIMS COMMISSION, U.S. AND
MEXICO 312 (1938); David J. Bederman, Contributory Fault and State Responsibility, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 335
(1990).
70. Garcia & Garcia, 4 R.I.A.A. 119, 123 (1926); Kling v. Mex., 4 R.I.A.A. 575, 585 (1930); JOHN
BASSETT MOORE, 2 HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE U.S. HAS
BEEN A PARTY 1865, 1895-96 (1898).
71. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 11, at 411; CASSESE, supra note 3, at 261; Kenneth C. Randall,
Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 788 (1988); BENAVIDES, UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION, A.M.D.I. 26 (2001).
72. Kai Ambos, Establishing an International Criminal Court and an International Criminal Code
- Observations from an International Criminal Law Viewpoint, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L (2001), available at
http://www.ejil.org/joumallVoll7No4/art4-Ol .html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).
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construction of a prima facie case against Schmandefare, since close analysis
of the treatment of the Cascadian women is required, and the Compromis
contains few facts on the matter, other than ILSAs findings and ITP articles.
This information does not suffice, as NGO findings and press information have
little evidentiary value in the field of criminal law,73 in light of the requirement
of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.74 Moreover, press reports alone are
not regarded as evidence capable of proving facts.75 Thus, the ILSA report and
ITP articles do not constitute sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
of crimes against humanity.
B. Alternatively, No Crime Against Humanity Has Been Committed.
Qualification of conduct as a crime against humanity requires a stringent
test," since these are considered the gravest crimes of international concern.
Since Reston accused Schmandefare of "trafficking for the purpose of sexual
slavery" there must be proof beyond reasonable doubt of all the elements of the
crime against humanity of sexual slavery, which are:
(i) the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership over
persons;
(ii) the causing of persons to engage in sexual acts;
(iii) a context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population; and
the perpetrator's knowledge that his conduct is part of such an attack.77
1. Schmandefare's Conduct does not Meet the Objective
Elements of Sexual Slavery.
Reston has specifically alleged that Schmandefare's actions amount to
trafficking in women, which is one of the property rights included in this
73. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 11, at 256.
74. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 7, Rule 87(a) (1996); International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Statute,
SC Res. 827 (1923), art. 19(1); ICTR Statute, SC Res. 955 (1994), art. 18(1); Prosecutor v. Delalic, Nov. 16,
1998, IT-96-21-T, 601.
75. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14 62.
76. Darryl Robinson, Defining Crimes Against Humanity at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 43 (1999); John L. Washburn, Convener of the American NGO Coalition on the ICC, The International
Criminal Court Arrives: Establishing an Ethic of Peace and Justice 4 (2002), 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 873,
876 (2002).
77. Report of the Preparatory Commission for the Int'l Crim. Ct., Addendum, Part U Finalized Draft
Text of the Elements of Crimes, Nov. 2, 2000, U.N. PCNICC/2000/I/Add.2, art. 7(1)(g)- 2 [hereinafter
Elements of Crimes]; ICC, supra note 21, at art. 9.
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element.78 Trafficking involves, inter alia, the use of coercion or deception.79
As indicated in the Compromis, representatives of the Schmandefare Company
recruited women to work primarily as nannies or domestic servants, and they
voluntarily accepted to come into Annolay to work for the Schmandefare
Company, hence the women appear to have had a choice as to their work, since
not all of them ended up working in brothels, and they were all granted perm-
anent resident status, meaning that they had no legal restraints as to their
freedom of work in the country. Thus, since no coercion or deception is
evident, Schmandefare's conduct does not amount to trafficking, as one of the
objective elements required by sexual slavery is not met.
2. Schmandefare's Conduct does not Meet the Contextual Elements of
Sexual Slavery.
The contextual elements of a crime against humanity exclude isolated
random acts from this category, since conduct must be part of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population,0 pursuant to a State or
organizational policy to commit such an attack.8' Absent State policy, the crime
must be linked to the policy of an organization with State-like characteristics
(e.g., control over territory or defacto authority).82 The instigation or direction
by such an organization is what makes the act a crime against humanity,8" and
excludes acts of individuals acting on their own initiative pursuant to their own
criminal plan.84 Schmandefare, as CEO and founder of the Schmandefare
Company, which has no ties to any government or public agency, was acting
78. Elements of Crimes, supra note 77, at art. 7(l)(g)-2, at note 18.
79. 1 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, U.N. GAOR 55/25, Annex H, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A 45/49 (2001), art. 3(a); Council
Framework Decision on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, July 19, 2002 O.J. (629/JHA), art. 1(a)(b).
80. ICC, supra note 21, at art. 7(2)(a); Elements of Crimes, supra note 77, at art. 7, Introduction,
3; Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, ILC Commentary, U.N. Doc.
A/51/I0/Corr.l (1996), art. 18, 93.
81. K.H.W. v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R., Loycaides Concurring Op. (2001); Regina v. Finta, 28 CR
4th 265 (1994); Touvier, Cass. Crim. (1992); Prosecutor v. Menten, Jan. 13, 1981, 75 I.L.R. 362, 362-63
(1982).
82. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Jan. 14, 2000, No. IT-95-16-T, 552; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Oct. 2,
1995, No. IT-94-1-T 654, CASSESSE, supra note 3, at 250-51; M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 275 (1999).
83. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Oct. 2 1995, Appeal, No. IT-94-1-T n 654-55; Prosecutor v. Kayishema,
May 21, 1999, No. ICTR-95-1-T, U1 125-26; Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, supra note 80; Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Apr. 8, 2003, IT-94-2, 26.
84. Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, supra note 80, at art. 18; Slye,
Apartheid as a Crime against Humanity: A Submission to the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, MICH. J. INT'L L. 284 (1999); Simon Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order: Defining the
Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 10 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 307, (2000).
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pursuant to his own initiative. Indeed, it has not been disputed that he was
responsible for organizing the recruitment and transportation of women from
Cascadia to Annolay for employment in brothels. Moreover, the Schmandefare
Company does not posses any State-like characteristics, and thus he could not
be acting pursuant to the required organizational or State policy. Consequently,
Schmandefare clearly was not under the control or instigation of a State or
organization, which leaves out the possibility that he was acting pursuant to the
required policy.
Additionally, the attack must be directed against a civilian population
(individuals are victimized because of their membership to a targeted
population). The Schmandefare Company owned a large number of brothels
prior to the Cascadian women's arrival, which means that the women working
there were not only Cascadian. It follows that the women were not "victimized"
specifically because they were Cascadian, hence this requirement is not met.
Finally, the mens rea requirement is not met because, if as stated supra,
Schmandefare's acts were not part of a widespread or systematic attack, it
follows that he did not intend his acts to be of said nature. In sum, the elements
of a prima facie case of the crime against humanity of sexual slavery are miss-
ing, thus, prima facie no crime subject to universal jurisdiction has been
committed.
C. In The Further Alternative, Reston Is Banned From Exercising Universal
Jurisdiction.
Universal jurisdiction is the most exceptional basis for jurisdiction, 6 used
as an auxiliary form of jurisdiction in conjunction with other bases of
jurisdiction, 7 and only when the forum State has custody over the offender.88
As evidenced by State practice, States must rely on treaties when asserting juris-
diction based on universality,89 applying conventional rules regarding crimes of
85. Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Nov. 29, 2002, No. 1T-98-32-T, 33; Prossecutor v. Kunarac, Feb. 22,
2001, No. IT - 96-23-T & IT-96-23/l-T 421; Prosecutor v. Kordic, Feb. 26, 2001, No. IT-95-14/2-T, 178;
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Oct. 2 1995, No. IT-94-1-T 644.
86. BENAVIDES, supra note 71, at 58; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdictionfor International
Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81 (2001); Scottish
Parliament Information Center, The International Criminal Court and the Concept of Universal Jurisdiction,
RNOI/83, at 5 (2001).
87. Att'y Gen. of the Gov't. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.LR. 26 11 (The Individual in Int'l Law
1968); Case 19/47, Spain Nat'l App. Ct. (1998); Case 1/98, Spain Nat'l App. Ct. (1998).
88. Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A Weapon for all Nations Against
International Crime, 9 MSUJ-DCL J. INT'L L. 4 (2000); Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case
for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni & Madeline H. Morris eds. 1996).
89. Prosecutor v. Djajic (Bravarian High Ct. 1997), May 23, 1997; Prosecutor v. Jorgic (Dusselforf
High Ct. 1997) Sept. 26, 1997; Pinochet, Tribunal de Premihre Instance de Bruxelles, No. X96-32.491 PF,
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terrorism, drug trafficking, torture, etc. 9° Hence, since Reston is not a party to
any convention which allows universal jurisdiction, it must rely on custom.
However, the state of the law does not evidence any consensus supporting
the notion that crimes against international law should be justiciable in national
courts on grounds of universality. 9' On the contrary, according to Amnesty
International, a passionate advocate of universal jurisdiction, merely a dozen
States have asserted universal jurisdiction.92 Such scant practice cannot amount
to customary law, as evidenced today more than ever by the stand of several ICJ
justices, who very recently expressly denied said customary status in the Arrest
Warrant Case. Thus, Reston is banned from exercising universal jurisdiction.
In any case, Reston's assertion of universal jurisdiction over Schmandefare
breaches international law.
1. A Trial In Absentia would Breach International Law.
Trials in absentia are normally forbidden. 93 Indeed, although most States
have prescribed laws against war crimes or crimes against humanity,94 until
2002 only five allowed trials in absentia.95 Moreover, the rejection of trials in
absentia is clearly evidenced by States' accord not to include this possibility
under the ICC Statute. Also, even perpetrators of the most serious international
crimes have been afforded the right to be present at trial,96 further evidencing
a general rejection of trials in absentia.
Judgment of the Ct. of Cass. (Chambre Criminelle 1998).
90. Int'l Conv. against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 18, 1979, U.N. G.A. Res. 34/145 (XXXIV),
34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 46, at art, 5, 8, U.N. Doc. A/34/146; International Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorist Bombing, Jan. 9. 1998, at art. 6, U.N. Doc. A152/653 (1998); Convention Against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988), art. 4, available at
http://www.ukcia.orgpolawllawlibrary/conventionagainstillicittraffic 1988.html. (last visited Sept. 23, 2003);
Convention against Torture, supra note 36, at art. 5.
91. Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate et. al., 2000 1 A.C. 61, 79; SHAW,
supra note 54, at 411; CASSESE, supra note 3, at 262; Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000,
(Demo. Rep. of the Congo v. Belg.), 2000 I.C.J. 182 6-7 (December 8) (Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures).
92. Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction [hereinafter Al Universal Juris.], available at
http://web.amnesty.orglweb/web.nsflprintlint-jus-uj. (last visited Oct. 4, 2003).
93. Lawyers' Committee for Hum. Rts, Universal Juris. 9 (2002); Al, Universal Juris., I.O.R.
53/003/2001 (2001); Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and
Functioning of the LC.T.Y. and the LC.T.R., U.N. Doc. A154/634 I 10-11 (1999).
94. Demo. Rep. of the Congo, I.C.J. 182 1 8; Al Universal Juris. supra note 92, at ch. 2.
95. Bol: Penal Code, art. 1(7); Burundi: Dbcret-Loi No. 1/6, 4 April 1981, art. 4; El Sal: Penal
Code 1998, art. 10; Peru: Penal Code 1998, art. 2(5); Switz: Code Pnal Militaire Suisse.
96. Prosecutor v. Djajic (Bravarian High Ct. 1997) May 23, 1997; Pros. v. Akayesu, Sept. 2, 1998,
No. ICTR-96-4-T 608 ; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Dec. 10, 1998, No. IT-95-17/1-T 160; Prosecutor v.
Bla[ki], Mar. 3, 2000, No. IT-95-14-T 166.
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Reston may argue that the Lotus Case supports the exercise of universal
jurisdiction in absentia, based on the dicta that, unless conduct is expressly
prohibited by international law, it is permitted.97 However, since in Lotus the
acts occurred at high seas, assertion of jurisdiction over the defendants did not
conflict with the territorial jurisdiction of any State. In contrast, Reston's
assertion of jurisdiction over Schmandefare would conflict with Annolay's
territorial jurisdiction. Hence, based on such distinguishing features, and on the
fact that a cloud of doubt continues to hang over Lotus,98 its invocation is
dubious at best. Accordingly, Reston's intention to prosecute Schmandefare in
absentia contradicts international law.
2. A Trial In Absentia would Breach Schmandefare's Right to Due Process.
A State's power to exercise universal jurisdiction requires that the accused
be present at trial and the observance of international due process norms.99 The
right to due process has acquired customary status, as derives from its
recognition in human rights instruments,"° suggesting a pattern of State
practice. Opinio juris follows from its inclusion in most States' national
legislation,'0 ' and application by international and national tribunals.' °
Moreover, even if trials in absentia may be performed under exceptionally
justified reasons, °3 the accused must be sufficiently informed of proceedings,
and he must voluntarily have waived his right to be present,' °4 none of which
97. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser A) No. 10 at 4 (Sept. 1927) (Judgment No. 9),
available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/cases/lotuslaw.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
98. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 77
(Clarendon Press - Oxford 1994).
99. SCHACTER, supra note 3, at 270; PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION,
Principles 1(2), 1(4) (Macedo ed. 2001).
100. Universal Declaration of Hum. Rt., G.A. Res. 217 A (LII), Dec. 10, 1948, U.N. Doc. A/810, at
art. 10 (1948); ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 14; The Eur. Cony. for the Protection of Hum. Rts. and
Fundamental Freedoms, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols Nos 3, 5, 8 entered into
force Sept. 21, 1970, Dec. 20, 197 1, Jan. 1, 1990, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, art. 6; American Convention of Human
Rights, November 22, 1969, entered into force July 18, 1970, O.A.S.T.S. 4 No 36 at 1, O.A.C. off. Rec.
OEA/Ser. A16, 1144 U.N.T.S. [hereinafter AMCHR], art. 8; African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People's
Rights (1986), art. 7.
101. Const. Arg.., sect. 18; Can: Const., art. 4 §7; Chile: Const., art 19; PRC: Const., art 8(1);
Colom: Const., art. 28; Ecuador: Const., art. 24; Mex: Const., art. 18; Nor: Const., art. 9; S. Afr.: Const.,
art. 12(l)(a); Spain: Const., art. 17; Venez: Const., art. 47.
102. Reid v. Jamaica, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., No. 356/1989 (1993); Maxwell v. U.K., Eur.
Ct. H.R. (1994); U.S. (B.E. Chattin) v. Mex., US-Mex Cl. Comm. (1927); Lala v. Neth, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994).
103. U.N. H.C.R., Gral. Comm., 11 (1984), art. 13, 14; Justice in the Balance: Recommendations
for an Independent and Effective International Criminal Court, Comment to art. 63[56], HUM. RTS. WATCH
(1998).
104. Mbenge v. Zaire, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm. No. 16/1977, Supp. No. 40, Sept. 8, 1977,
U.N. Doc. A/38/40 at 134 (1983); Conteris v. Uruguay, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. No. 139/1983, Supp. No. 40,
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has happened here. Indeed, Reston has a priori voiced its intention to try
Schmandefare in absentia even before proper notice was issued. Therefore, he
was not given the opportunity to be present or to waive such right; hence a trial
in absentia would breach Schmandefare's due process rights.
3. Reston' s Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction Breaches the Principle of
Good Faith.
In exercising its right to assert universal jurisdiction, a State must act in
good faith, 05 a principle that controls the exercise of rights by States.' 6 Facts
show that Reston's assertion of jurisdiction over Schmandefare is retaliatory to
Annolay's purpose of seeking reparation for the war victims, since a decision
to exercise universal jurisdiction must be based on legal considerations, not
political interference.l"7 The Restonian Min. of Justice expressed his intention
to try Schmandefare the same day that he received a memorandum from
President Raskolnikov stating: "Annolay's President challenges the conduct of
Restonian militiamen (...), but at the same time, (...) fails to protect the human
rights of women in her own country(...). Please have your Department
investigate this." Clearly, this statement was not based on legal considerations,
and the Court should dismiss Reston's bad faith claim for universal jurisdiction.
D. The Court Should Award Declaratory Relief
This Court has awarded declaratory judgments establishing obligations on
States to act in certain ways, and providing detailed guidance on their future
conduct.0 8 Accordingly, Annolay requests the Court to declare that Reston is
not entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction over Schmandefare.
Annolay has not breached any international legal obligations deriving from the
alleged treatment of Cascadian women working in brothels in Annolay, and in
any event, Reston has no standing to enforce any such obligations.
U.N. Doc. A/40/40 at 196 (1985); Colozza v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. 28 (1985); Wolf v. Panama, ImIRL 17,
Mar. 26, 1992, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., No. 289/1988 (1992).
105. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 425 (5th ed. 1999).
106. U.N. CHARTER, art (2)(1) (1945); CHENG, supra note 42, at 121; Bassiouni, supra note 86, at
87.
107. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 14 PRINCIPLES ON THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION, I.O.R. 53/01/99, Prin. 8; PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, Commentary
43 (2001).
108. Haya de la Tone, (Colom. v. Peru), 1951 I.C.J. 71, 82; Temple of Preah Vihear, (Camb. v.
Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6.
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A. Reston Lacks Standing To Bring This Claim Before The Court.
Annolay will first deal with the issue of locus standi, since States must
raise their objections to admissibility in a timely manner (i.e., at the earliest
stages of the case) lest it be presumed that they have tacitly waived such an
objection.'" As established supra, a State other than the injured State can
invoke another State's responsibility for breaches of obligations erga omnes."°
In this case, obligations regarding trafficking in women have not acquired erga
omnes status. Indeed, erga omnes obligations are defined as peremptory norms
recognized as such by the international community as a whole,"' which is not
the case of obligations on trafficking, due to lack of international consensus as
to a definition of trafficking and the varying practice and opinio juris of
States. " 2 Hence, Reston has no standing to bring this claim.
Reston may then try to prove that trafficking breaches the erga omnes
prohibition against slavery. However, that idea is not widely accepted, since
States consider trafficking to be a prohibited, yet distinct practice from
slavery," 3 as derives from the treatment of trafficking as a distinct crime in
specialized conventions.1 4 At most, trafficking may be a contemporary form
of slavery, not "slavery" as originally understood (i.e., the status of persons over
whom powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised)," 5 and there is
no evidence that the erga omnes status of slavery extends to its contemporary
forms, since their substantive content has not been identified.' 16 Thus, Reston's
attempt to base it locus standi on a supposed erga omnes breach through
trafficking in women is, at the very least, highly questionable.
109. Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, 1992 I.C.J. 240 IN 31-36; Velazquez
Rodriguez, Inter-Am. C.H.R., U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 88; Loizidou v. Turk., Eur. Ct. H.R. t42-
45 (1995).
110. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 3,
at art. 48(l)(b); Barcelona Traction, (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3; South West Africa, 1962 I.C.J Jessup
separate opinion.; Case Concerning East Timor, (Port. v. Aus.) 1995 I.C.J. 90, 209-16 (June 30).
111. VCLT, supra note 51, at art. 53.
112. U.N. Secretary General Report on Trafficking in Women and Girls, U.N. Doc. 9/50/369, at para.
23 [hereinafter Trafficking in Women and Girls]; Trafficking in Women and Girls, 57th Sess., Item 104, U.N.
Doc. A/57/170, at para. 2; Stephanie Farrior, The International Law on Trafficking in Women and Children
for Prostitution: Making it Live up to its Potential, 10 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 213, 219 (1997); Nora v.
Demleitner, Forced Prostitution: Naming an International Offense, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 163 (1994).
113. A. Yasmine Rassam, Contemporary Forms of Slavery and the Evolution of the Prohibition of
Slavery and the Slave Trade Under Customary International Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 303, 308-09 (1999);
Michelle 0. P. Dunbar, Comment, The Past, Present, and Future of International Trafficking in Women for
Prostitution, 8 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 116 (1999-2000).
114. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res.
34/180, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981), at art. 6;
Trafficking Convention (1951), at art. 1.
115. Slavery Convention , 60 L.N.T.S. 253, entered into force March 9, 1927, at art. 1.
116. Dunbar, supra note 113, at 116; Rassam, supra note 113, at 308.
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B. Alternatively, Annolay Has Not Breached Obligations Regarding The
Treatment of Cascadian Women.
1. Reston Cannot Enforce Any Obligation Upon Annolay.
Reston will argue that the conventional "obligation to prevent, prosecute
and punish trafficking in women""' 7 is customary. However, this is not so, as
derives from these facts: (i) the most recent treaty on trafficking has been
ratified by only 8 States; 18 (ii) the Trafficking Convention has been ratified
only by one third of States in over 50 years;" 9 and (iii) until very recently, there
was no consensus on the definition of trafficking, 2 ' which has today not been
adopted by the majority of States.12' Moreover, differences in State practice and
opinio juris on this subject 22 remove any possibility of customary status. On
the contrary, State practice shows that: (i) persistent patterns of trafficking in
women are common around the world, both into developed countries (e.g., in
the US 50,000 trafficked women), 123 and underdeveloped countries (e.g., India
117. Convention against Trafficking, supra note 114, at art. 1, 2, 16; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress,
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, supra note 79, at art. 2(a); Women's Convention, supra note 114, at art.
6.
118. Trafficking in Women and Girls, U.N. Doc. A/57/170, supra note 112, at 2.
119. Demleitner, supra note 112, at 172; Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons
and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, March 21, 1950, U.N. GA Res. 317 (IV), 96 U.N. T.S.
271 (entered into force on July 25, 1951, in acc. with art. 24), available at http://www.unhchr/htmllmenu3/b/
treatylla.htm. (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
120. Trafficking in Women and Girls, U.N. Doc. 9/50/369, supra note, 112 at para. 23; OWED
Justice, V. International Legal Standards on Trafficking in Women: Thai Women Trafficked into Debt
Bondage in Japan, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/j apan/5-int-
stand.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2003); Robyn Emerton, Tracking of Women into Hong Kong for the Purpose
of Prostitution, U.H.K. 2 (2000).
121. Trafficking in Women and Girls, U.N. Doc. A/51/170, supra note 112, at 2; U.N. G.A., Special
Session on Children, Statement by Vincent McClean, Representative, U.N. Office for Drug Control and
Crime Prevention, to the Committee of the Whole (2002).
122. Farrior, supra note 112, at 219; Lois Chiang, Trafficking in Women in I WOMEN AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 357 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., Transnational Pub.
1999); See generally U.N. ESCOR, Report on Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and
Human Trafficking, Substantive Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. E/2002/68/Add. 1 (2002); Trafficking in Women and
Girls, U.N. Div. for the Advancement of Women, Dep't of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, U.N. Doc.
EGM/TRAF/2002/Rep. 1 at 6 (2002).
123. Kathryn E. Nelson, Comment, Sex Trafficking and Forced Prostitution: Comprehensive New
Legal Approaches, 24 HouS. J. INT'L L. 551, 554 (2002); Kelly E. Hyland, Protecting Human Victims of
Trafficking: An American Frame Work, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L J. 29, 30 (2001); Sabrina FRve &
Christina Finzel, Recent Development, Trafficking of People, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 279, 280 (2001); Amy
O'Neill Richard, International Trafficking of Women into the U.S.: A Contemporary Manifestation of Slavery
and Organized Crime, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/traffic/report
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and Thailand); 24 and (ii) the culprits of this practice are rarely punished.
Indeed, trafficking and prostitution of women are today a sad but extremely
common reality. Hence, customary law does not provide Reston any grounds
for enforcing the obligation to prevent and punish trafficking upon Annolay.
2. Alternatively, Annolay Complied with its Due Diligence Obligation.
Reston cannot argue that Annolay was insufficiently diligent in dealing
with the matter of the Cascadian women since, as established supra, State
obligations are not clear regarding trafficking in women, hence it is unrealistic
to hold States legally responsible for lack of due diligence. 21 In any case,
Annolay created a blue-ribbon panel to look into the matter merely two weeks
after the ILSA report was published, which evidences the State's diligence on
the matter. These panels have been created all over the world to resolve human
rights violations, 26 such as in Argentina. 27  A blue-ribbon panel expedites
results since proceedings need not follow rigid procedures, and their ability to
gather evidence is enhanced.' Moreover, although the panel has taken over a
year to produce results, this is a reasonable period of time, since trafficking is
an extremely complex problem.129 Thus, Annolay has been diligent in dealing
with this matter.
.pdf. (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
124. Shelley Case Inglis, Expanding International and National Protections against Trafficking
Forced Labor Using a Human Rights Framework, 7 BuFF. HUM. RTs. L REV. 55 (2001); A Modern Form of
Slavery: Trafficking of Burmese Women and Girls into Brothels in Thailand, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (1993),
available at http:lwww.hrw.org/reportsll993/thailandL. (last visited Oct. 3, 2003).
125. Chiang, supra note 122, at 356.
126. Gregory Jowdy, Note, Truth Commissions in El Salvador United States Institute of Peace. Truth
Commissions in El Salvador and Guatemala: A Proposal for Truth in Guatemala, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
285,307 (1997); See generally Commissions Around the World, Truth Commissions Digital Collection, avail-
able at http://www.usip.org/library/truth.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2003); See generally A Culture of Recon-
ciliation in Africa: The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission - Transformative Justice, the
Restoration of Dignity and Reconciliation, available at http://www.jiia.or.jp/pdf/lax.pdf. (last visited Oct. 4,
2003).
127. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 11, at 234-35.
128. Angelika Schlunck, Contributor, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, 4 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 415, 416-17 (1998); Mark Vasallo, Comment, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: General
Considerations and a Critical Comparison of the Commissions of Chile and El Salvador, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 153, 160 (2002).
129. U.N. H.C.H.R., Statement to the Asia-Pacific Symposium on Trafficking in Persons, Tokyo
(2000); See generally, Memorandum of Concern: Trafficking of Migrant Women for Forced Prostitution in
Greece, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (July 2001), available at
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/greece/greece-memo-all.pdf. (last visited Oct. 10, 2003); Laurie
Hauber, The Trafficking of Women for Prostitution: A Growing Problem Within the European Union, 21 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 183, 185 (1998).
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C. The Court Should Provide Declaratory Relief.
Declaratory judgments provide satisfaction for breaches of international
law, 130 and have been willingly granted by this Court and its predecessor.'13
Accordingly, Annolay requests that this Court award a declaratory judgment
stating that it has not breached its international obligations deriving from the
alleged treatment of Cascadian women working in brothels in Annolay.
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Annolay respectfully requests that the Court: DECLARE that Reston has
breached its international obligations with respect to the rape victims now
resident in Annolay and ORDER payment of damages to be distributed to those
victims; DECLARE that Reston has breached its international obligations with
respect to the bribes exacted from Annolaysian citizens, and ORDER payment
of restitution in the amount of the bribes; DECLARE that Reston is not entitled
to exercise universal jurisdiction over Schmandefare; and DECLARE that Reston
has no standing to raise a claim regarding the treatment of Cascadian women
working in brothels in Annolay, and that, in any event, Annolay has not
breached any international legal obligations in that respect.
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Annolay and the Republic of Reston have submitted the
present dispute by Special Agreement to the International Court of Justice
pursuant to Articles 36(1) and 40(1) of the Statute of the Court for final
resolution. There is no dispute as to the court's jurisdiction in this matter.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Following three years of civil war, the Kingdom of Dysfunctia was
partitioned to create the Republics of Reston and Cascadia in September 1999.
The Republic of Annolay, which borders Reston and Cascadia, assisted in the
peace talks at the conclusion of the war. Annolay is a developed country in
contrast to Reston, whose developing economy was devastated by the civil war.
In April 1997, War-Time Relief International claimed that Restonian
militiamen were raping ethnic Cascadian women. However, Colonel Georg
Raskolnikov, the leader of the Restonian militia, stated that he was powerless
to stop the rapes.
Raskolnikov was announced as Reston' s first democratically elected Presi-
dent in November 1999. His first presidential task was to foster reconciliation
within the country by granting an amnesty to all persons in Reston who were
accused of crimes during the civil war. Further, he established crisis centers for
war victims. Annolay has reopened the wounds of the war by seeking repara-
tions for Cascadian women raped during the war.
Due to Cascadia's conservative culture, rape victims were ostracized by
their communities. The Schmandefare Company ('Company'), an operator of
numerous brothels, coerced thousands of these women to Annolay. The
Company's Chief Executive Officer, Fred Schmandefare, promised the women
positions as nannies or domestic servants but despite all promises, the women
were forced to work as prostitutes. The Company charged each woman an
administrative fee of US$10 000. To pay this amount the women took out
compounding loans from the Company, the effect of which was to double the
amount owed. Ongoing costs for shelter, clothing, food and medical attention
were added to the compounding debt. Although illegal, prostitution and
solicitation are rarely prosecuted in Annolay.
The Institute for Labor Studies and Advancement ('I.L.S.A.') published an
article about Cascadian women forced to work in the Company's brothels in
May 2001. I.L.S.A. found that the women were mentally and physically
abused. The report claimed that Annolaysian police and at least three
2003]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 10:247
government departments ignored written appeals for help. The case of 'Heidi
F' was reported as indicative of the treatment women experienced in the
Company's brothels. 'Heidi F' was subjected to wretched conditions and severe
restraints on her liberty. She fled from the brothel but Annolaysian police
promptly returned her.
President Contrary denied Annolay's responsibility for the Company's
abuse of the women. Following this, Reston expressed its intention to prosecute
Schmandefare, applying the principle of universal jurisdiction. Reston seeks to
prosecute Schmandefare for the crime against humanity of illegal trafficking for
the purpose of sexual slavery.
In December 1999, the Annolaysian Regional Adoption Society
('A.R.A.S.'), through advertisements, called for the adoption of children
orphaned in the civil war. A.R.A.S. charged a fee for its assistance to Annolay-
sian nationals seeking to adopt Restonian orphans. Reston's adoption laws
obligated all prospective adoptive parents to attend mandatory fitness inter-
views. Successful applicants received a 'Certificate of Authorization for
Foreign Adoption' ('certificate of fitness'), which was required for presentation
at the border.
In January 2001, the International Times-Picayune reported that Reston's
border officials were requesting fees from adopting parents, which was outside
their authority. Although many Annolaysian adopting parents did not hold
certificates of fitness for adoption, Annolaysian border officials seldom
questioned them and in all cases allowed them to re-enter Annolay with a child.
Upon the parents' return to Annolay, Annolaysian authorities swiftly concluded
the adoption process. Consequently, a number of adopting parents admitted that
they did not attend fitness interviews in light of Annolay's lax adoption
administration process. Reston addressed the issue by permanently reassigning
implicated border officials in March 2001.
Both Reston and Annolay are U.N. members and parties to Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and both voted in favor of U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 56/83 regarding the International Law Commission's
Articles on State Responsibility. Annolay is a party to, and Reston is a
signatory to, the Regional Anti-Corruption Convention.
After several failed attempts at mediation facilitated by the U.N. Secretary
General's office, Annolay and Reston agreed to bring this dispute before the
International Court of Justice for resolution.
IH. QUESTION PRESENTED
Reston asks the court:
1. Whether Annolay has standing to bring a claim on behalf of the
ethnic Cascadian women resident in Annolay;
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2. Whether Reston acted lawfully regarding the treatment of ethnic
Cascadian women during the civil war and must pay damages to
Annolay;
3. Whether Reston has standing to bring an action regarding the
treatment of ethnic Cascadian women;
4. Whether Annolay breached international law regarding the treatment
of ethnic Cascadian women working in Annolaysian brothels;
5. Whether Reston may exercise universal jurisdiction to prosecute Mr.
Schmandefare;
6. Whether Annolay's claim regarding border corruption is admissible;
7. Whether Reston acted lawfully regarding the conduct of its border
officials; and
8. Whether Reston is required to pay restitution to Annolay in the
amount of the bribes.
IV. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
A. Reston is not responsible for the wartime rape of ethnic Cascadian women,
nor is it liable to pay damages to Annolay on their behalf. Annolay does
not have standing to bring a claim on behalf of wartime rape victims.
Annolay cannot exercise diplomatic protection, as the Cascadian women
are not nationals of Annolay. Standing cannot be asserted on the basis of
obligations erga omnes because Annolay is not representing the
international community. Alternatively, Reston did not breach any such
obligations. The wartime rapes did not constitute genocide or torture so
as to give rise to any obligation on Reston's part. Even if they did, the
rapes are not attributable to Reston, and the Restonian militia leaders were
unable to stop them. Reston's amnesty also justifies any breach of an
obligation to prosecute Restonian militiamen. In any event, Reston is not
liable to pay damages to Annolay because it is inappropriate for a state to
request them on behalf of a limited group of victims for a breach of an
obligation erga omnes.
B. Annolay acted unlawfully regarding the treatment of Cascadian women in
its territory. Reston has standing to bring this claim on behalf of the
international community because slavery is an obligation erga omnes. The
ethnic Cascadian women who worked in brothels in Annolay were held in
slavery because the Schmandefare Company exercised rights of ownership
over them. Annolay breached its customary obligation to respect and
ensure freedom from slavery by failing to prevent and punish acts of
slavery. The Cascadian women are not under any obligation to exhaust
local remedies in Annolay.
C. Reston may exercise universal jurisdiction to prosecute Fred Schmandefare
for the crime against humanity of illegal trafficking for the purpose of
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sexual slavery. Universal jurisdiction may be exercised over crimes
against humanity, and trafficking for the purpose of sexual slavery is
characterized as such an offence. The trial of Schmandefare in absentia is
concordant with the content and purpose of the universality principle.
D. Reston is not responsible for corruption at its borders, nor liable to repay
bribes in the form of restitution. Annolay's failure to prevent the illegal
removal of Restonian children invokes the doctrine of 'unclean hands',
which renders a claim for restitution inadmissible. In any event, Reston
did not breach international law with respect to the bribes. The bribery is
not attributable to Reston as the border officials were acting in their private
capacity and outside their authority. Reston upheld the object and purpose
of the Regional Anti-Corruption Convention and exercised due diligence
to protect Annolaysian nationals by permanently reassigning implicated
border officials. Furthermore, there is no customary obligation to prevent
bribery of public officials exists, nor did Reston breach such an obligation.
Reston also acted in the best interests of Restonian children, and thus did
not violate any obligations concerning the children's rights. Even if
Reston did breach international law, it does not owe Annolay reparations.
Restitution would impose a disproportionate burden on Reston and
Annolay cannot claim compensation because this remedy was not
requested.
V. PLEADINGS
A. Reston is not internationally liable for the treatment of Cascadian women
during the civil war
This dispute arises from a civil war that existed in the former sovereign
territory of Dysfunctia [Compromis 1]. Annolay had no involvement in the
war [Compromis 6] and no right to intervene in Dysfunctia's internal affairs.'
Now, as then, international legal norms prevent Annolay from involving itself
in matters existing between Restonians and Cascadians.
1. Annolay has no standing to bring this action
The action regarding rapes during the civil war is inadmissible, as Annolay
cannot adequately invoke a basis for standing. Diplomatic protection allows a
state to protect its injured nationals and requires the victim to have continuously
held the nationality of the asserting state from the time of the injury until the
1. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
106-07 (June 27).
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presentation of the claim.2 The ethnic Cascadian complainants only recently
acquired permanent residency in Annolay [Compromis 25], which is not a
genuine and effective link of nationality for the purposes of diplomatic
protection. Even if permanent residency is a sufficient link of nationality, the
link was established after the injury occurred [Compare Compromis 13 & 25],
and therefore was not continuous. Consequently, Annolay has no standing on
the basis of diplomatic protection.
Also, Annolay may not derive standing from obligations erga omnes
('towards all') because it does not act on behalf of the international community.
Obligations erga omnes are owed to the entire international community,4 so
their breach injures that community.' The international community is unable to
bring a claim of its own, as it has no legal personality.6 Therefore, standing
must be conferred on those member states prepared to act on its behalf.7
Annolay's claim of reparations for the narrow class of victims now resident
within its territory is an inappropriate claim as it is represents Annolay's own
interests rather than those of the international community. 8
2. See Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Est. v. Lith.), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 76 (Feb. 28);
Petrolane v. Iran, 27 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 64 (1991); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
403 (1998); LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 150 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed., Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 1998) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM]; Declaration of the Government
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Repubfic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981,
http://www.iusct.org/claims-settlement.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
3. See Nottebohm (Second Phase) (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6); Flegenheimer Claim
(Ital. v. U.S.), 25 I.L.R. 91 (Concil. Comm'n 1958); United States ex rel. Merg6 v. Italian Republic (Ital. v.
U.S.), 14 R.I.A.A. 236, 246 (Concil. Comm'n 1955).
4. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Second Phase) (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 5) [hereinafter Barcelona Traction].
5. Bruno Simma, Does the U.N. Charter Provide an Adequate Legal Basis for Individual or
Collective Responses to Violations of Obligations Erga Omnes, in FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT 136 (Jost DelbrUck ed., Duncker & Humblot 1993); Hugh Thirlway, The Law and Procedure
of the International Court of Justice 1960-1989, 60 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 93 (1989).
6. CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 286 (Ian Brownie ed., Clarendon
Press 1993); Claudia Annacker, The Legal Regime of Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law, 46
AusTL. J. PUB. INT'L L. 131, 139 (1994); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law,
77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 432 (1983).
7. RENE PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 292 (Cambridge
University Press 2002); CHINKIN, supra note 6, at 286; Annacker, supra note 6, at 156; ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (Oxford University Press 2001); see Simma, supra note 5, at 136; Oscar Schachter,
International Law in Theory and Practice, in 13 DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 345 (Martinus
Nijhoff Pub. 1991).
8. See CASSESE, supra note 7, at 201; K. Sachariew, State Responsibility for Multilateral Treaty
Violations: Identifying the 'Injured State' and its Legal Status, 35 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 273, 284 (1988); see
Jonathan I. Charney, Third State Remedies in International Law, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 57, 98 (1989).
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In any event, standing is limited to the established obligations erga omnes:
the outlawing of acts of aggression and genocide, protection from slavery and
racial discrimination,9 and the right to self-determination. 0 Annolay has -no
standing to assert a breach of any other obligation.
2. Alternatively, Reston acted consistently with international law regarding
the treatment of cascadian women
A state only breaches international law if conduct that is attributable to it
breaches an international obligation." The occurrence of the rapes prior to the
establishment of Reston precludes Reston from being internationally responsible
for the wartime rapes, and other rules of international law demonstrate that
Reston did not breach any of the limited obligations erga omnes.
a. No obligations erga omnes may be invoked on the facts
i. The wartime rapes did not constitute genocide
The rapes perpetrated by the Restonian militiamen did not constitute
genocide. Genocide requires an intention to destroy an ethnic group in whole
or in part." Such an intention must be formed prior to the commission of the
offence.' 3 Rape is primarily a sexually or privately motivated offence. 4 There
is no evidence that the wartime rapes were intended to destroy the Cascadian
group or that acts of rape were pre-meditated. Without clear evidence of such
9. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 3.
10. East Timor (Port. v. AustL), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30).
11. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (May
24) (hereinafter HOSTAGES]; G.A. Res. 83, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/56/83 (2002) [hereinafter ILC STATE RESPONSIBIITY].
12. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. 2,
78 U.N.T.S. 277; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, art. 4(2), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993)
[hereinafter ICTY STATUTE]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed
in the Territory of Neighboring States Between 1 January and 31 December 1994, art. 2(2), S.C. Res. 955,
U.N. SCOR, 3453rd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR STATUTE]; Statute for the
International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court (ICC), art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter ROME STATUTE];
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES § 702 (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
13. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Judgment and Sentence, May 21, 1999, ICTR-95-1-T [hereinafter
Kayeshima].
14. Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987); see Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d
1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1987).
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intent rape should not be characterized as genocide. 5 Additionally, genocide
generally requires the involvement of the state. 6 The absence of incitement or
condonation by the Restonian leadership therefore precludes the
characterization of the rapes as genocide. 17  In any event, rape must be
accompanied by aggravating acts, such as murder, to constitute genocide.'
8
There is no evidence that Cascadian women suffered any other attacks or
restraints on their liberty and consequently genocide has not occurred.
ii. No other obligation erga omnes applies
No other obligation erga omnes recognized by this court [see §I:A] is
applicable to the wartime rapes. Even if this court should expand on the limited
number of obligations erga omnes, it is likely that it would only do so to include
obligations regarding torture.
Torture only covers the intentional infliction of severe physical or psy-
chological pain or suffering for an interrogative purpose with the acquiescence
of a public official.' 9 The requisite pain and suffering must amount to more than
a mere assault on personal integrity2° and cause prolonged suffering of extreme
intensity.2 ' Rape cannot constitute torture without such aggravating factors.
22
There is no evidence that the rapes were prolonged nor is there evidence that the
individual acts of rape were accompanied by additional injury. The rapes of
15. Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Prospective: Violence Against
Women, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, U.N.
ESCOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 12(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68 Add. 3 (1999); Reportofthe International
Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to the Secretary General, U.N. High Comm'r for H.R., 54th Sess.,
Agenda Item 96, U.N. Doc. S/2000/59 (2000); JUDITH GARDAM & MICHELLE JARVIS, WOMEN, ARMED
CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (Kluwer Law Int'l 2001); SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR
WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 31-113 (Bantam Books 1975); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, East Timor:
Justice Past, Present and Future (July 27, 2001), available at http://web.amnesty.orgllibrary/index
ENGASA570012001 (last visited Oct. 9, 2003); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WOMEN IN THE FRONTLINE:
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST WOMEN 44 (Amnesty Int'l 1991).
16. Kayishema, ICTR-95-I-T at 94.
17. Kayishema, ICTR-95-1-T;Prosecutorv. Jelisic, Dec. 14,1999, IT-95-10; Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Sept. 2, 1998, ICTR-96-4-T.
18. Kayishema, ICTR-95-1-T; Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T; Johan Vander Vyver, Prosecution and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 286, 311 (1999).
19. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66 (1978); Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR.
CONY. ON H.R. (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) 186; M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 351 (Martinus Nijhoff Pub. 1999).
20. OSCAR M. UHLER Er AL., COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 598 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross
1958).
21. Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 66.
22. Cyprus v. Turkey, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 482 (1982); Campos-Guardado, 809 F.2d at 285; Ireland, 25
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 67.
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Cascadian women were also not inflicted for an interrogative purpose.2 ' Rape
is primarily sexually or privately motivated 24 and there is no evidence that
Restonian militiamen raped Cascadian women to gain information. In any case,
there is neither condonation of the rapes nor clear acquiescence [Compromis 3]
by public officials and as such, torture has not occurred.
b. In any event, Reston did not breach any obligation erga omnes
i. Reston did not breach any obligation prohibiting the wartime rapes
At customary international law, there is a general presumption of non-
responsibility for the conduct of an insurrectional movement.26 However, such
conduct may be attributable to the state in the event that the movement is
successful.27 Although the conduct of the Restonian militia is attributable to
Reston pursuant to this rule, the rapes perpetrated by individual militiamen are
not. The conduct of individuals acting in their private capacity is not
attributable to Reston.28 Individual militiamen who act in the absence of
command do so in their private capacity.29 Doubt surrounds the extent to which
the rapes were condoned by militia commanders [Compromis 3] and the
existence of a command structure is questionable [Compromis 4]. The rapes
were therefore committed by individual militiamen in the absence of either
control3" or command3 and are not attributable to Reston.
ii. Reston did not breach any obligation requiring it to prevent
the wartime rapes
Should this court find Reston subject to customary obligations requiring
it to prevent wartime rapes, Reston discharged these obligations. Any obliga-
23. Greek Case, 1969EUR.CONV. ON H.R. at 186; Prosecutor v. Delalic, Nov. 16, 1998, IT-96-21-T
(Sep. Dis. Ops. JJ. Hunt, D. & Bennouna, M., dissenting); BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 351.
24. See Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1434; Campos-Guardado, 809 F.2d at 285.
25. See Prosecutor v. Musema, Jan. 27, 2000, ICTR-96-13-1; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Dec. 10,
1998, IT-95-17/1-T; BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 351.
26. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, 3 HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO
WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 2873 (1898); id. at 2881; id. at 2886; id. at 2900; id. at 2902;
iolo (U.K. v. U.S.), 6 R.I.A.A. 158 (1925); Solis (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 358 (1928); Home Missionary
Society (U.K. v. U.S.), 6 R.I.A.A. 42 (1920).
27. ILC STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 11, at art. 10(2).
28. Solis, supra note 26, at 362; JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 117 (Cambridge University
Press 2002).
29. MOORE, supra note 26, at 2995-96.
30. Dix (U.S. v. Venez.), 9 R.I.A.A. 119, 120 (1902).
31. MOORE, supra note 26, at 2995-96.
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tion to prevent rape is only breached if a state fails to take measures that are
reasonably expected in the circumstances.32 The rapes were committed in the
context of ethnic rivalry in existence for approximately 300 years [Compromis
2]. When Colonel Raskolnikov was informed of the rapes, he declared that he
was powerless to stop them [Compromis 4]. Thus, in the context of the
Dysfunctian civil war, measures to prevent the rapes could not reasonably be
expected from the Restonian militia leaders.
iii. Reston did not breach any obligation requiring it to prosecute the
wartime rapes
Reston did not breach any obligation to prosecute those who committed
rape because of the general amnesty declared by President Raskolnikov. Post-
conflict states may avoid customary obligations to prosecute individuals by
granting amnesties in the interests of reconciliation, stability and democracy,
and to prevent the re-emergence of conflict.33 National legislation,34 the U.N.
Security Council, 35 an international agreement, 36 judicial decisions 37 and the
32. Platform 'Arzte Fur das Leben' v. Austria, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 210 (1988); Robert
Weiner & Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Beyond the Laws of War, 27 COLUM. HUM. RGTS. L. REV. 293, 345 (1995);
see also HLR v. France, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29, 40 (1997); Velasquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 4 (1988),
http://www l.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_l 1_12d.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
33. See Regina v. Bartle, 37 IL.M. 1302, 1317, 1322 (H.L. 1998); Azanian Peoples Org. v. Presi-
dent, 1996, (4) SALR 671, 690 (CC), http://www.concourt.gov.zalfiles/azapo/azapo.pdf (last visited Oct. 14,
2003); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871); Murphy v. Ford, 390 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. Mich. 1975);
SYLVIE-STOYANKA JUNOD, COMMENTARY ON THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL I1) 4618 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987); W. Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to
Genocide and Other Massive Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 79 (1996); THE
FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton); U.S. Delegation Draft, State Practice Regarding Amnesties and
Pardons, to the International Criminal Court (Aug. 1997) (on file with ILSA Journal of International and Com-
parative Law).
34. Indemnity Law for Security Personnel, No. 20 (1982) (Sri Lanka); Law No. 23.492, Dec. 24,
1986, (Arg.), http://www.derechos.org/ddhh/arglley/final.txt (last visited Sept. 20, 2003); Decreto Ley, No.
2.191 (1978) (Chile); Proclamations, No. 347-48 (1994) (Phil.); The Situation in the Middle East, Agreement
on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, U.N. GAOR & SCOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 38, U.N. Doc.
A/49/180, S/1994/727 (1994); Immunity Decree 2000, No. 18 (2000) (Fiji); Promotion of National Unity and
National Reconciliation Act, No. 34 (1995) (S. Afr.).
35. Statement of the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg. at 120,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993); S.C. Res. 880, U.N. SCOR, 3303rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/880 (1993); see
Rainer Grote, The United Nations and the Establishment of a New Model of Governancefor Central America:
The Case of Guatemala, 2 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. L. (1998); Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement, U.N. SCOR,
U.N. Doc. S/1999/815 (1999).
36. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11), June 8, 1977, art. 6(5), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
37. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and Another v. Phillip, 1 A.E.R. 93, 396 (1995);
Border Guards Prosecution, 100 I.L.R. 366 (BGH 1992).
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opinions of publicists38 evidence the customary status of this power. President
Raskolnikov's amnesty to promote national healing [Compromis 22] is
consistent with these established justifications.
3. In any event, Reston is not required to make reparations to Annolay
The consequence of an internationally wrongful act is that the delinquent
state must make reparations to any other state that suffers injury39 for which the
wrongful act is the proximate cause.4° Where Reston is not responsible for the
rapes, it does not owe reparations.
In any event, the remedies available to an injured state are limited if
standing is conferred on the basis of obligations erga omnes.41 Actions concern-
ing obligations erga omnes are brought on behalf of the international
community. 42 It is inappropriate for a state to seek individual reparations for
itself or a limited class of individuals when it is bringing an action on behalf of
the international community. 4' Therefore, Annolay may not seek individual
reparations for the Cascadian women within its territory. Satisfaction, which
may consist of an expression of regret or a formal apology,44 is the only
appropriate remedy because it may be directed to the international community. 5
B. Annolay breached international law with respect to the treatment of
Cascadian women in Annolay
Reston brings this claim in relation to the abhorrent treatment of Cascadian
women in Annolay. Although Annolay seeks to protect these women in one
respect by requesting that this court award them damages for wartime injury,
Annolay has not afforded the women the protection they deserve within its
territory.
38. Payam Akhvan, The Yugoslav Tribunal at Crossroads: The Dayton Peace Accords and Beyond,
18 HUM. RGTS. Q. 259, 271 (1996); Carla Edelenbos, Human Rights Violations, 7 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 5, 13
(1994); Michael Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'LL.J. 507,
521-23 (1999).
39. Factory at Chorz6w (Germ. v. Pol), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 20 [hereinafter Chorz6w];
ILC STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 11, at art. 31; CHRISTINE D. GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 79 (Ian Brownlie ed., Oxford University Press 1987); BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 460.
40. DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw 10 (Oxford University
Press 1999); J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECIVE 735 (Martinus Nijhoff 1973);
LOUIS HENKIN ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 758 (West Wadsworth 1993).
41. Carney, supra note 8, at 98.
42. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 33.
43. Sachariew, supra note 8, at 283.
44. L.,C STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 11, at art. 37; see Mark S. Ellies & Elizabeth Hutton,
Policy Implications of World War II Reparations and Restitution as Applied to the Former Yugoslavia, 20
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 342 (2002).
45. Crawford, supra note 28, at 232; BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 463.
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1. Reston has standing to bring this action
A member state of the international community has standing to assert a
breach of an obligation erga omnes46 regardless of the nationality of the
victim.47 The sole condition is that the state acts on behalf of the international
community [see §I:A]. Protection from slavery is an obligation erga omnes [see
§I:A], and Reston is seeking a declaration from this court rather than any other
form of reparation. Reston therefore has standing to assert a breach of the
obligation to respect and ensure freedom from slavery.
2. Annolay breached its obligation to respect and ensure freedom
from slavery
The Schmandefare Company's ['Company'] treatment of ethnic Cascadian
women constituted slavery. Slavery is the situation in which entities exercise
rights of ownership over individuals," characterized by the victims' lack of true
consent and lack of control over their own labor.49 The Company deceived the
Cascadian women by promising them employment as nannies or domestic
servants, yet forced them to work in its brothels [Compromis 24]. Upon arrival
in Annolay, the Company controlled the Cascadian women's work schedule,
labour conditions, standard of living and financial position [Compromis 24
& 29]. The women also suffered mental and physical abuse and restraints on
their liberty. The Cascadian women were also unable to escape the Company's
control due to the compounding debt on their loans [Compromis 24]. There-
fore, the Cascadian women were enslaved due to their lack of consent to work
in brothels and the control the Company exercised over them.
46. East Timor (Port. v. AustL), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30) 172, 221 (Weeramantry, dissenting), 266
(Szubiszewski, dissenting); ILC STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 11, at art. 48; PROVOST, supra note 7, at
125; Giogio Gaj a, Obligations Erga Omnes, International Crimes and Jus Cogens, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
OF STATE 154 (Maria Spinedi et. al., 1989); Thirlway, supra note 5, at 93; RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, §
702; Louis Henkin, Human Rights & State 'Sovereignty,' 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L 31, 42 (1995).
47. CASSESE, supra note 7, at 185, 201; THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAw 191, 194-95 (Clarendon Press 1989); ANDRE DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA
OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: A THEORETICAL INQUIRY INTO THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
ENFORCEMENT OFTHE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES 68-69 (Martinus Nijhoff 1996); Schachter,
supra note 7, at 208; RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 702, comment (b).
48. Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery (1926), Sept. 25, 1926, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2183,
60 L.N.T.S. 253 [hereinafter SLAVERY CONVENTION]; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery,
the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (1956), Sept. 7, 1956, art. 7(a), 18 U.S.T.
3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY SLAVERY CONVENTION]; DAVID J. HARRIS ET AL., LAW
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 91 (1995).
49. Sandbya Drew, Human Trafficking: A Modern Form of Slavery, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 481,
487 (2002).
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As ethnic Cascadian women were enslaved in Annolay, Annolay breached
customary international law. Customary international law is formed by general
and consistent practice and opinio juris ° International5 and regional instru-
ments," national constitutions" and the work of publicists, 54 demonstrate that
every state must respect and ensure freedom from slavery under customary
international law. Freedom from slavery is also a jus cogens norm. 5  The
customary obligation to respect and ensure freedom from slavery is not negated
by occasional non-observance of the slavery prohibition.
5 6
Annolay breached its customary obligation to respect and ensure freedom
from slavery. This obligation requires a state to prevent, 57 investigate 58 and
50. N. Sea Continental Shelf (Germ. v. Den., Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20); Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 98.
51. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 8, 999 U.N.T.S. 717
[hereinafter ICCPR]; SLAVERY CONVENTION, supra note 48, at art. 2; SUPPLEMENTARY SLAVERY
CONVENTION, supra note 48, at art. 1.
52. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; see Arab Charter on Human Rights, Sept. 15, 1994, reprinted in 18 HUM. RTS. LJ.
151, 152 (1997); American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, 9 I.L.M. 673; African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, July 20, 1979, ar. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58.
53. ETH. CONST. art. 18; LA CONSTITUCION ARG. DE 1853 [Constitution] art. 15; BOSN. AND HERZ.
CONST. art. 2; CONGO CONST. art. 31; CYPRUS CONST. art. 10; Fuli CONST. ch. 24; NIHONKOKU KENPO
[Constitution] preamble (Japan); KENYA CONST. art. 73; NAMIB. CONST. art. 9; NEPAL CONST. art. 20; PAK.
CONST. art. 11; CONSTITUCION DE LAW REPUBLICA DE PARA. [Constitution] art. 10 (Para.); SIERRA LEONE
CONST. art. 19; S. AFR. CONST. art. 13; ZAMBIA CONST. art. 14; SUDAN CONST. art. 20; RWANDA CONST. art.
17; SING. CONST. art. 15; U.S. CONST., amend. XIII §§ 1, 2.
54. OPPENHEIM, supra note 2; LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS, VALUES AND
FUNCTIONS 189 (Martinus Nijhoff 1995); RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 702; MERON, supra note 47, at 10;
Hurst Hannum, Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 151 (Christopher Joyner
ed., 1997).
55. HENKIN, supra note 54, at 39; LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (Jus COGENS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW), 446 (Coronet Books 1989); Schachter, supra note 7, at 343; M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
Enslavement as an International Crime, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 445 (1991); Drew, supra note 49, at
481.
56. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.) 1951 I.C.J. 116, 138 (Dec. 18); Schachter, supra
note 7, at 338; Bruno Simma & Phillip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L.
82, 97 (1988-1989).
57. Zafiro (U.K. v. U.S.), 6 R.I.A.A. 160 (1925); Rodriguez, supra note 32; Keir Starmer, Positive
Obligations Under the Convention, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES 146 (Jeffrey Jowell &
Jonathan Cooper eds., 2002).
58. Rodriguez, supra note 32; Janes Claim (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 82 (1926); Godinez Cruz,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 5 (1989), http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/8-ing.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2003);
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Nontreaty Sources of the Obligation to Investigate and Prosecute, in IMPUNITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 39 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., Oxford University Press
1995).
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prosecute59 acts of slavery. A state must intervene in non-government affairs
in its territory when slavery is reasonably predictable or suspected,' when an
individual has sought protection from a government agency," or where the
victim is vulnerable to breaches of personal integrity.62 The Cascadian women
sought the protection of the Annolaysian government, yet were ignored
[Compromis 28]. They were also vulnerable to breaches of personal integrity
because of their ignorance of the Annolaysian language and culture and their
impoverished status [Compromis 22].
Annolay breached its duty to prevent slavery by failing to enforce its anti-
prostitution laws or to monitor the actions of the Company [Compromis 23].
Annolay also breached its duty to investigate acts of slavery. Investigation must
be exhaustive, swift and impartial.63 Annolay' s failure to investigate swiftly and
exhaustively, despite the written appeals of the brothel workers [Compromis
28] and the police officer's knowledge of the situation of 'Heidi F.' [Com-
promis 29], evidence a breach of its duty. The blue ribbon panel established
by President Contrary [Compromis 30] has failed to discharge the obligation
to investigate because it has not fulfilled its purpose to identify those
responsible [Clarification 9]. Finally, Annolay breached its obligation to
prosecute acts of slavery. Annolay has not prosecuted anyone responsible for
the enslavement of women. Annolay cannot escape responsibility for its
conduct based on any attribution principle because its omissions, including
those of its government agencies and police, 6' are attributable to it.
65
3. The Cascadian women were under no obligation to exhaust local remedies
Individuals are not required to exhaust local remedies before a state may
bring an action on their behalf if local remedies are available or effective.'
There is no evidence that effective remedies were available to the enslaved
59. Rodriguez, supra note 32; Janes, supra note 58; Cruz, supra note 58; Roht-Arriaza, supra note
58, at 29.
60. Rebecca Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women's Human Rights, 7 HARV. HUM.
RTs. J. 125, 145 (1994).
61. Id.
62. A. v. United Kingdom, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 611 (1999).
63. Rodriguez, supra note 32.
64. Pugh (U.K. v. Pan.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1441, 1448 (1933); Roper (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 145 (1927);
Langdon (U.S. v. Pan.), 6 R.I.A.A. 325 (1933); Cibich (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 57 (1926); ILC STATE
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 11, at art. 4(2); CRAWFORD, supra note 28, at 94.
65. Advisory Opinion on Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29); ILC STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra
note 11, at art. 4; OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, § 165; CHiTrHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 38 (Clarendon Press 1967).
66. Altestor v. Uruguay, 70 I.L.R. 248, 253 (U.N. H.R Comm. 1982); ILC STATE RESPONSIBILITY,
supra note 11, at art. 44(b); CRAWFORD, supra note 28; Schachter, supra note 7, at 213-14.
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Cascadian women and the burden lies with Annolay to prove otherwise.67 There
is no evidence that the Annolaysian legal system provided the ethnic Cascadian
women with individual rights to obtain redress for the injury they suffered. The
purpose of the 'blue ribbon panel' was to identify possible offenders involved
in the slavery and did not grant any rights to the victims. Even if domestic
remedies did exist, they were not available to the Cascadian women. The
women were held in slavery and therefore could not access potential avenues
for any redress. Any complaints the women made to Annolaysian government
organs proved ineffective [Compromis 28] and there is no evidence that
Annolay's investigations will result in the release of ethnic Cascadian women
from slavery.
C. Reston is entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction over Fred
Schmandefare ('Schmandefare')
International law is founded on the sovereign equality of all states.68
Reston's sovereignty permits it to exercise jurisdiction as it sees fit, unless it is
restricted from doing so by international law. Annolay bears the burden of
proving customary norms exist to limit Reston's sovereignty.69
1. Reston may exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity
States may use the principle of universality to obtain jurisdiction over an
alleged offender whose crime is of such gravity and magnitude that it offends
all humankind.7" Numerous offences, including crimes against humanity, have
been recognized to give rise to universal jurisdiction. 7' Crimes against human-
ity are of a peculiarly universal character vesting in every state the authority to
prosecute anyone who participated in their commission.72 Reston is legally
permitted to exercise universal jurisdiction over Schmandefare and to prosecute
him on behalf of the international community for any offence that constitutes
a crime against humanity.
67. Greece v. United Kingdom, 25 I.LR. 27, 29 (Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1958); A. A. CANCADO
TRINDADE, THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 134,
146 (Cambridge University Press 1983).
68. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(1).
69. N. Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 3.
70. Attorney Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 316 I.L.R. 227 (Sup. Ct. Isr. 1962) [hereinafter Eichmann];
CASSESE, supra note 7, at 262; STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 161 (2001); BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 229.
71. BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 240; Schachter, supra note 7, at 267; RATNER, supra note 70, at
162; John Murphy, International Crimes, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 362, 375
(Christopher Joyner ed., 1997).
72. Eichmann, 316 I.L.R. at 227.
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2. Trafficking for the purpose of sexual slavery is a crime against humanity
Trafficking is the movement of people across borders with the use of
threat, violence or coercion.73 It has recently been recognized as a crime against
humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.74 This
classification is confirmed by the nature of trafficking. Crimes against human-
ity are serious acts that are harmful to human beings because they strike down
what is most essential to them: their life, liberty, physical welfare, health or
dignity.75 Trafficking has the same effects, particularly when it is committed for
the purpose of sexual slavery.
Alternatively, trafficking is a form of slavery.76 Slavery is a recognized
crime against humanity77 that occurs where an entity exercises rights of owner-
ship over an individual.78 Traffickers inevitably exercise rights of ownership
over victims because they control the removal, transfer and destination of the
victims. Often the victims cannot escape the control of their traffickers because
of financial dependence, fear and physical restraint. Trafficking for the purpose
of sexual slavery is slavery, because the victims are ultimately forced into
situations where others exercise rights of ownership over them.
3. Reston may exercise universal jurisdiction over Schmandefare in absentia
States may utilize universal jurisdiction to prosecute an individual accused
of an international crime irrespective of whether the individual is in their
custody.79 The purpose of universal jurisdiction is to prosecute individuals who
73. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 2, 2000, 40 I.L.M.
335 (2001); Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitu-
tion of Others, Dec. 9, 1949, opened for signature Mar. 21, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S. 272, 282 (entered into force
July 25, 1951); Advancement of Women, Traffic in Women and Girls, Report of the Secretary General, U.N.
GAOR, 15th Sess., Agenda Item 109, U.N. Doc. A/50/150 (1995); Radhika Coomaraswamy & Lisa M. Kois,
Violence Against Women, in I WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAwS 202 (Kelly D. Askin &
Dorean Koenig eds., 1999).
74. ROME STATUTE, supra note 12, at art. 7(2)(c).
75. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, Nov. 29, 1996, 1T-96-22-T.
76. ROME STATUTE, supra note 12, at art. 7(2)(c); BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 454.
77. CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL art. 6(c); CHARTER OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST art. 5(c); ICTY STATUTE, supra note 12, at art. 5(c);
ICTR STATUTE, supra note 12, at art. 3(c); ROME STATUTE, supra note 12, at art. 7(2)(c); BASSIOUNI, supra
note 19, at 215.
78. SLAVERY CONVENTION, supra note 48; SUPPLEMENTARY SLAVERY CONVENTION, supra note
48; RATNER, supra note 70, at 112.
79. Organic Law of the Judicial Power art. 23 (B.O.E. 1985, 157) (Spain); Law of 16 June 1993
(Belg.); Law of 19 Feb. 1999, art. 7 (Belg.); Codice Penale [C.p.] art. 7.5 (Italy); CASSESE, supra note 7, at
26.
20031
266 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 10:247
have committed crimes that are universally condemned.8' Therefore, custody
of the offender does not impact upon the purpose of the universality principle.
This court recently confirmed that the exercise of universal jurisdiction in
absentia is not a violation of international law. 8' The alleged offence of
Schmandefare is one that is deeply offensive and harmful to the international
community. Reston is permitted to prosecute Schmandefare using universal
jurisdiction regardless of the fact that he is not in its custody.
D. Reston has acted consistently with international law with respect to the
bribery and need not make restitution
Annolaysians did not only instigate the transfer of Cascadian women into
Annolay, but also the transfer of Restonian children. Annolay is claiming
restitution for bribes paid to Restonian border officials by Annolaysian adoptive
parents, but it has no basis for such a claim in international law.
1. Annolay's unclean hands render this action inadmissible
A state's involvement in illegal acts in international law prevents the state
from claiming redress. This is known as the 'clean hands doctrine' and it is
supported by judicial decisions 82 and publicists.83 Annolay failed to prevent the
illegal removal and retention of Restonian children and thus acted unlawfully.
Its claim is therefore inadmissible under the clean hands doctrine.
80. MARTIN DIXON & ROBERT MCCORQUODALE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
304 (Oxford University Press 2000); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes:
Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L 81, 82, 88 (2001).
81. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of I I April 2000 (Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14)
(Oda, Van Den Wyngaert, dissenting) (Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal, dissenting).
82. Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984, I.C.J. I, 268 (Nov. 26) (Schwebel, dissenting); Tehran
Hostages (U.S. v. Iran), 1980, I.C.J. 1, 53, 62 (Morozov, Tarazi, dissenting); Diversion of Water from the
Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (set. A/B) No. 70, at 50, 77 (Anzilotti & Hudson, dissenting);
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 5, at 50; Legal Status of
Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 95; SIR EDMIND GRIMANI HORNBY,
REPORT OF THE MIXED COMMISSION ON PRIVATE CLAIMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CONVENTION BETWEEN
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OF THE 8TH FEBRUARY 1853 397-98 (Harrison & Sons
1856); see Chorz6w supra note 39, at 31; Medea and the Good Return (Gren. v. U.S.), 3 Int. Arb. 2730, 2731
(Cl. Comm. 1857); Pellettier, 2 Int. Arb. (Haiti v. U.S.), 1749, 1750 (Cl. Trib.); I'm Alone (Can. v. U.S.), 3
R.LA.A. 1609, 1618 (1935).
83. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 508; BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 155 (Cambridge University Press 1953); ELIZABETH ZOLLER,
PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES (Transnational Pub's 1984); Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule
of Law, in 92 RECUEIL DES COURS 119 (1957); Oscar Schacter, International Law in the Hostage Crisis, in
AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN: THE CONDUCT OF A CRISIS 344 (Paul H. Kreisberg ed., 1985).
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States have a customary obligation to prevent the illegal removal or reten-
tion of children.84 Removal of children is illegal where an entity's custodial
rights over a child are violated without the entity's consent. Reston had
custodial rights over the children removed from its territory because they were
orphans [Compromis 9] and thus wards of the state.85 Reston's custodial rights
were breached as children were removed without its consent [Compromis 13].
Annolay took no action whatsoever to determine whether Restonian children
entering its territory were illegally removed [Compromis 13] or to ensure that
illegally removed children were returned to Reston. Annolay therefore breached
its customary obligation to prevent the illegal removal or retention of children,
and consequently its claim regarding the bribery is inadmissible.
2. Reston acted consistently with international law with
respect to the bribery
a. The conduct of the Restonian border officials is not attributable to Reston
The conduct of minor officials is not attributable to the state merely
because they are agents of the state. 6 Where minor officials act in their private
capacity, their conduct is not attributable to the state. 87 The particular circum-
stances of each case must be considered when determining the capacity of any
individual official. 88 Officials motivated by personal profit act in their private
capacity." The Restonian border officials kept the proceeds of the bribes for
themselves [Clarifications 5], so their conduct is not attributable to Reston.
In any event, the conduct of minor officials is not attributable to the state
where the conduct falls outside their apparent authority.90 Restonian border
officials were not authorized to exact money unlawfully and acted without the
84. See CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD art. 11(1), 35 [hereinafter CRC]; HAGUE
CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION art. 3(a); G.A. Res. 41/85, U.N.
GAOR, 95th Plenary Mtg., at art. 19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/85 (1986).
85. George Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or Tyrant, 25
DEPAuL L. REV. 895, 896 (1976).
86. ILC STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 11, at art. 7.
87. Mallen (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 173, 174-75 (1927); MOORE, supra note 26, at 2999-3000,
3012-13, 3018-20; Caire (Fr. v. Mex.), 5 R.I.A.A. 516, 531 (1929); OPPENHEIM supra note 2, § 165;
AMERASINGHE, supra note 65, at 53.
88. CRAWFORD, supra note 28, at 99.
89. See Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran, AWD 324-10199-1, 17 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 92, 111 (1987).
90. REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT AND MATERIALS 177 (Sweet
& Maxwell Ltd. 1997); AMERASINGHE, supra note 65, at 53; LAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY PT. 1, at 145 (Clarendon Press 1983); Theodor Meron, International
Responsibility of States for Unauthorized Acts of Their Officials, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 85, 104 (Oxford
University Press 1957); Jimenez Arechega, International Responsibility, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 548 (Max. Sorensen ed., 1968).
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approval of the Restonian government [Compromis [13]. The bribery of
Annolaysian parents therefore fell outside the apparent authority of the border
officials and is not attributable to Reston.
b. Reston has upheld the object and purpose of the Regional
Anti-Corruption Convention [R.A. C. C.]
Signatories have an obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty before it enters into force." The object and purpose of a treaty is defeated
when a signatory's conduct is intended 92 to do so. The purpose of the R.A.C.C.
is to prevent and prohibit corruption.93 Reston never intended to defeat the
object and purpose of the R.A.C.C. but instead demonstrated good faith by per-
manently reassigning border officials implicated in the bribery [Compromis
17].
Furthermore, a failure to act immediately to requests for investigation does
not completely defeat the object and purpose of the R.A.C.C., especially when
Reston's delicate, post-conflict status is considered [Compromis 15]. Conse-
quently, the failure of Reston to respond immediately to information regarding
the exaction of bribes by a small number of Restonian officials does not evi-
dence the state's intention to defeat the object and purpose of the entire
R.A.C.C.94
c. Reston fulfilled its obligation to exercise due diligence to protect the
rights of aliens within its territory
States have a duty to protect the rights of other states and the rights of
aliens within their territories in customary international law.95 States only
breach this duty if they do not exercise due diligence to discharge it.96 This can
91. VIENNA CONV. art. 18.
92. SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 48 (Columbia University
Press 1904); ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 94 (Cambridge University Press 2000);
J. MERVYN JONES, FULL POWERS AND RATIFICATION: A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF TREATY- MAKING
PROCEDURE 70 (Cambridge University Press 1946).
93. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Regional Anti-Corruption Convention), 38 LL.M. 505
[hereinafter R.A.C.C.].
94. See AUST, supra note 92, at 94; JONES, supra note 92, at 71.
95. Island of Palms (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 831 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928); Elettronica Sicula
(U.S. v. Ital.), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20); BROWNLIE, supra note 90, at 162; Richard B. Lillich, The Current
Status of the Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSI-
BILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 7 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1983); AMERASINGHE, supra note 65, at 281-82;
Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of
States, in STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, 110 (Ren Provost ed., 2002).
96. MOORE, supra note 26, at 3033-34, 3039, 3041; Sevey (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 474 (1929);
Boyd (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 380 (1928); Mead (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 653 (1930); Kennedy (Mex. v.
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only be proven if every reasonable and impartial person would recognize
measures that a state takes as insufficient. 97 Reston took reasonable steps to
discharge its obligation by permanently reassigning border officials implicated
in the bribery and it therefore did not breach it [Compromis 17].
d. There is no customary law to prevent the bribery of public officials
For customary international law to be established, rigorous conformity of
state practice is required.98 State practice preventing bribery of public officials
is inconsistent99 in its criminalisation of active and passive bribery, l ' the size
and type of bribes prohibited' and the type of public officials liable.'12 The
inconsistency in state practice is further evidenced by the lack of legislation
prohibiting bribery in developing states.'0 3 This distinct lack of consistent state
practice negates the existence of a customary obligation to prevent bribery of
public officials. In any event, Reston did not breach any obligation requiring
it to prevent bribery for the same reasons as it did not breach its obligations to
prevent injury to aliens [see §IV:B:3].
U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 194 (1927); Smith (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 469 (1929); Ermerins (Mex. v. U.S.), 4
R.I.A.A. 476 (1929); Cibich, supra note 64, at 58; Mallen, supra note 87, at 173; Chapman (Mex. v. U.S.) 4
R.I.A.A. 632 (1930).
97. Neer (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 60 (1926).
98. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 186; N. Sea
Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 3; OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, § 27; CASSESE, supra note 7, at 119.
99. W. PAATI OFOSU-AMAAH, ET AL., COMBATING CORRUPTION: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF
SELECTED LEGAL ASPECTS OF STATE PRACTICE AND MAJOR INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES 7 (World Bank
1999); W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY CRUSADES AND REFORMS 63 (Free Press 1979);
MARSHALL B. CLINARD & DANIEL J. ABBOTT, CRIME IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 53 (John Wiley & Sons 1973); RONALD WRAITH & EDGAR SIMPKINS, CORRUPTION IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 51 (W. W. Norton & Co. 1963); Leon Sheleff, International White Collar Crime,
in WHITE COLLAR & ECONOMIC CRIME: MULTIDISCIPLINARY AND CROSS NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 51 (Peter
Wickman & Timothy Dailey eds., 1980).
100. Compare R.A.C.C. supra note 93, at art. 13, with Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, art. 1, 37 I.L.M. I [hereinafter OECD BRIBERY CONVENTION].
101. Compare Public Bodes Corrupt Practices Act, 1889, § 7 (Eng.), with The Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1993, § 2 (Tanz.), with The Corrupt Practices Act, 1995, § 3 (Malawi), with Council of
Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, art. 2, E.T.S. No. 173, 38 I.L.M. 505 (1999)
[hereinafter EUROPE CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTION].
102. Compare R.A.C.C., supra note 93, at art. 1 (a), and EUROPE CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTION, supra
note 101, at art l(a), with OECD BRIBERY CONVENTION, supra note 100, at art. 4(a).
103. Luke Allnutt, et al., Commonwealth of Independent States, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT
2001, at 116 (Luke Allnutt, et al. eds., 2001), http://gcr.netscript.kunde.sserv.de/download/gcr2OOl/rr-cis.pdf
(last visited Oct. 14, 2003); U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2000,
available at http:l/www.state.gov/gldrllrls/hrrpt/2000/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2003); Gitau Warigi, East and East-
Central Africa, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2001, at 70 (Luke Allnutt, et al. eds., 2001),
http://gcr.netscript.kunde.sserv.de/download/gcr2001/rr-eecafrica.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
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e. Reston satisfied any obligation to prevent violations of children's rights
If Reston was required to take action to prevent the illegal removal of
children or other similar conduct, it satisfied its obligation. Obligations con-
cerning children must be interpreted in light of the child's best interests.1' 4
Reston consistently acted in the best interests of the children and thus did not
breach any obligation regarding its treatment of the children. Reston provided
facilities to care for orphaned children as best it could after the civil war
[Compromis 9]. It also compelled prospective adoptive parents of Restonian
children to attend fitness interviews and to obtain certificates of fitness before
they were able to adopt a Restonian child [Compromis 11]. Finally, Reston
reassigned the border officials implicated in bribery [Compromis 17] in order
to prevent further illegal removal of Restonian children. These facts indicate
that Reston acted in the best interest of Restonian children and thus it could not
have breached any of its obligations regarding children.
3. Reston is not obligated to make reparations to Annolay
The consequence of an internationally wrongful act is that a state must
make reparations to any other state that suffers injury'05 for which the wrongful
act is the proximate cause. 0 6 Any willful or negligent contribution to the injury
suffered by either the victims or the state itself must be taken into account.'07
Such contribution negates or reduces any reparations owed.
0 8
Annolaysian adoptive parents with certificates of fitness negligently
contributed to their injury because they knew of their legal right to return to
Annolay with their child. Annolaysian nationals without certificates of fitness
willfully contributed to their injury because they knew they could not cross the
border without a certificate of fitness and therefore the only way of returning to
Annolay with their child was to pay bribes to border officials [Compromis 13].
Annolay seeks reparations for the bribes exacted from its nationals in the
form of restitution [Compromis 41]. Restitution may not be awarded, however,
if it would result in a burden disproportionate to the benefit derived. ' 9 This
burden includes threats to political independence or the economic stability of a
104. CRC, supra note 84, at art. 3(1).
105. Chorz6w, supra note 39, at 20; ILC STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 11, at art. 31; GRAY,
supra note 39, at 79; BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 460.
106. SHELTON, supra note 40, at 101; VERZUL, supra note 40, at 735; HENKIN, supra note 40, at 758.
107. ILC STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 11, at art. 39; CRAWFORD, supra note 28, at 232.
108. SHELTON, supra note 40, at 94; GRAY, supra note 39, at 23; BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 508;
CRAWFORD, supra note 28, at 240-41; HENKIN, supra note 40, at 757.
109. ILC STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 11, at art. 35.
Distinguished Brief
state." Reston is a developing state with a devastated economy [Compromis
8]. To provide restitution to the Annolaysian adoptive parents would require
Reston to locate every implicated border official and every Annolaysian
national. The administrative and economic burden this would place on Reston
is disproportionate to any benefit derived by the Annolaysian parents. Compen-
sation may not be awarded as an alternative because Annolay did not request
it.'"
VI. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the foregoing reasons, the Republic of Reston respectfully requests that
this Court:
1. DECLARE that Reston acted lawfully regarding the treatment of
ethnic Cascadian women during the civil war and is not liable to pay
Annolay damages;
2. DECLARE that Annolay violated international law regarding the
treatment of Cascadian women working in Annolaysian brothels;
3. DECLARE that Reston is entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction
over Mr. Fred Schmandefare; and
4. DECLARE that Reston acted lawfully regarding the bribes exacted
by its border officials and is not liable to repay them.
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